The fine tuning argument

[Beth]

Before we had Newton's gravity and Galileo's and Copernicus' heliocentrism, there were elaborate and detailed explanations for the movement of the lights in the night sky. But other than their movement around the earth, the lights which we now know represent stars and galaxies were unconnected to those we now know represent planets. And falling apples never even entered the equation. So what we had were seemingly unconstrained descriptions of these movements without a way to explain why they followed the patterns they did. Then heliocentrism provided a constraining and unifying explanation.

I take it that the answer to my question is no, you are not aware of any any unexplained parameter settings in our current models for how lights move in the sky. Thank you.

But we could have an accurate description of how the lights moved and how apples fell to earth, and we could recognize that both were relevant to our existence, and that they would behave in an unrecognizable manner if the parameters were changed, without recognizing that there was a straightforward connection between the two.

You are basically arguing that there are likely to be unknown constraints that require the parameter values to be fixed they way they are. Quite possible. It's one of the competing hypotheses for the apparent fine-tuning. It's a very reasonable hypothesis. Based on past history, such as that you gave regarding lights in the sky, it's quite possible there is a more unifying comprehensive way to model these things that won't require so many parameter values to be set arbitrarily. I'm no argument with that hypothesis. I think it is the most likely myself. But you can't claim to have knowledge that that one is correct and the 'designer' and the 'multiverse' hypotheses are not. All three are viable hypothesis to explain the situation with our current models. [Not to mention that none of them are mutually exclusive with any of the others.]

Was it reasonable that all this was considered evidence for a designer?

Apparently so. My understanding is that Newton himself felt that way.

Oh come on. People don't want to call it a "designer" because it likes to go around making universes which contain anti-matter. We think this universe is of interest because it contains us, that the designer is interested in us.

I'm sorry. I though you were referring to me specifically with your previous comment. I see now you meant it in a more general way. At any rate, I don't agree with the sentiment that a designer, if one exists, must be interested in us. There's nothing to suggest that when hypothesizing a fine-tuner exists.

Because it isn't a consequence of hypothesizing about fine-tuning. It's a consequence of musing about how to find a sciency-sounding place for God. To bring up the idea of a designer when talking about fine-tuning gives the dishonest impression that it's a hypothesis that could form in the absence of any pre-conceived notions about God.

You keep using that word 'dishonest'. I do not think it is appropriate here.
The fine-tuning hypothesis does not lead to any further hypotheses about the nature or character of such a designer, but I do find a designer to be a reasonable consequence of hypothesizing about why such apparent fine-tuning is required in our best models. It is one of the three given in the wiki article reference earlier.

Also, you and others keep referring to it as an explanation. Yet it isn't an explanation. It doesn't constrain the supposedly fine-tuned constants unless you arbitrarily decide that it would choose to form universes that would be of interest to us. And that merely reflects our own narcissism, not something which can be drawn from our observations.

I think it does serve as an explanation as to why certain constants have the values they do. It doesn't constrain the designer to only choosing those parameter values, just

It does NOT require the assumption that such a designer would choose to form universes of interest to us. It only requires the assumption that a universe with the parameter values ours possess would be of interest to it. This doesn't seem an unreasonable assumption when you examine the universes that other parameter values lead to. Ours appears to be highly unusual.

 

[Beth]

The "X" that I referred to was unrelated to the "X" in the OP. I was just putting a variable there, to let you know that fine-tuning is tautological when applied to any observable object/event in the universe, not just human life.



Perhaps you do not understand the point that I, and others, have made. The idea that the constants of the universe are "fine-tuned" to allow for the existence of an object within that universe, is tautological in nature.

This is the tautology from which you are extrapolating. It is a plain and simple tautology, and no contingency may be extracted from it. Any attempt to use it as a tool of reasoning are entirely absurd, and will lead to equally absurd conclusions.

Sorry, but you'll have to explain to me what tautology you think exists in noticing that our best models require fine-tuning by the humans who create them. It doesn't seem tautological to me. I think most of the humans involved in creating those models would be very happy to do without the fine-tuning. Unfortunately, so far they haven't been able to do so despite some very very smart and motivated people trying very very hard to do so.

 

[Gate2501]

This doesn't seem an unreasonable assumption when you examine the universes that other parameter values lead to. Ours appears to be highly unusual.

Incorrect.

You are attempting to divorce our universe from the fact that we do in fact exist within it. The probability that we would observe fundamental constants which allow us to exist, in a universe in which we do in fact exist, is 1. Probability = 1 is a far cry from unusual.

 

[Gate2501]

Sorry, but you'll have to explain to me what tautology you think exists in noticing that our best models require fine-tuning by the humans who create them. It doesn't seem tautological to me. I think most of the humans involved in creating those models would be very happy to do without the fine-tuning. Unfortunately, so far they haven't been able to do so despite some very very smart and motivated people trying very very hard to do so.

Did you outright ignore my last post? The one that you quoted?

The tautology is as follows:

I exist, I observe a universe with fundamental constants which allow me to exist. I would not observe a universe in which the fundamental constants did not allow me to exist, because I would not exist to make that observation.

 

[Beth]

Incorrect.

You are attempting to divorce our universe from the fact that we do in fact exist within it. The probability that we would observe fundamental constants which allow us to exist, in a universe in which we do in fact exist, is 1. Probability = 1 is a far cry from unusual.

That's not what I'm referring to. It's the fact that out of all possible parameter values, very very few lead to universes where such things as stars, planets and galaxies form. I forget how Stephen Hawking described the vast majority of results using different paramenter values, but that's what I meant by unusual, not that it possesses creatures such as us to observe that those parameter values are required.

 

[Gate2501]

That's not what I'm referring to. It's the fact that out of all possible parameter values, very very few lead to universes where such things as stars, planets and galaxies form.

And when you add in that the constants which allowed for the formation of these objects are "fine-tuned" to allow their existence, you are reasoning from a tautology from which contingency cannot be drawn.

You are still making the same mistake.

I forget how Stephen Hawking described the vast majority of results using different paramenter values, but that's what I meant by unusual, not that it possesses creatures such as us to observe that those parameter values are required.

The tautology upon which your argument is based, is not dependent upon observers existing at all.

 

[Beth]

Did you outright ignore my last post? The one that you quoted?

The tautology is as follows:

I exist, I observe a universe with fundamental constants which allow me to exist. I would not observe a universe in which the fundamental constants did not allow me to exist, because I would not exist to make that observation.

Oh, you're thinking of the anthropomorphic argument. That's not the argument I was discussing. I said that There is no tautology involved in noticing that our best models require fine-tuning by the humans who create them. There is nothing in there about observing fundamental constants in our universe. It's about setting them in the models. Why do our models require fine-tuning to match our observed universe? Some possible explanations are:

a) the universe is also fine-tuned (the designer hypothesis)
b) many universes exist, we exist in one of the few that will support creatures like us (the multiverse hypothesis)
c) our models are incomplete and when we know more, we will understand why those parameters have the values they do.

All are viable hypothesis. None are tautological IMO.

 

[Yoink]

Oh, you're thinking of the anthropomorphic argument. That's not the argument I was discussing. I said that There is no tautology involved in noticing that our best models require fine-tuning by the humans who create them. There is nothing in there about observing fundamental constants in our universe. It's about setting them in the models. Why do our models require fine-tuning to match our observed universe? Some possible explanations are:

a) the universe is also fine-tuned (the designer hypothesis)
b) many universes exist, we exist in one of the few that will support creatures like us (the multiverse hypothesis)
c) our models are incomplete and when we know more, we will understand why those parameters have the values they do.

All are viable hypothesis. None are tautological IMO.

I don't think I understand what you mean by "fine tuned" here. Why can't there be an option

D) there's no discoverable reason for these parameters having the values that they do, nor is there a multiverse: this just happens to be the way the universe came out; and that, in turn, allowed us to exist.

What objective proof of "fine-tuning" would you offer to disprove that possibility?

 

[Beth]

I don't think I understand what you mean by "fine tuned" here. Why can't there be an option

D) there's no discoverable reason for these parameters having the values that they do, nor is there a multiverse: this just happens to be the way the universe came out; and that, in turn, allowed us to exist.

What objective proof of "fine-tuning" would you offer to disprove that possibility?

D is possible (it would be the 'random chance' hypothesis). It can't be disproved [unless one of the other hypotheses are proved]. However, generally speaking, when the probability of a particular outcome arising by chance is extremely low, it's presumed to be due to something other than random chance.

The objective proof of "fine-tuning" is for our models, not the universe. It's an extrapolation to presume that the universe is also fine-tuned. But, given that the models are built to simulate the creation of the universe, it's a reasonable extrapolation.

 

[Gate2501]

Oh, you're thinking of the anthropomorphic argument. That's not the argument I was discussing. I said that There is no tautology involved in noticing that our best models require fine-tuning by the humans who create them. There is nothing in there about observing fundamental constants in our universe. It's about setting them in the models. Why do our models require fine-tuning to match our observed universe? Some possible explanations are:

a) the universe is also fine-tuned (the designer hypothesis)
b) many universes exist, we exist in one of the few that will support creatures like us (the multiverse hypothesis)
c) our models are incomplete and when we know more, we will understand why those parameters have the values they do.

All are viable hypothesis. None are tautological IMO.

Wait what?

The parameters within our own models must be fine-tuned by us to fit reality, so that they are accurate descriptions of what we observe.

What does this have to do with a, b or c??? They totally DO NOT FOLLOW from your reasoning with respect to modeling by humans.

Examples a, b and c, are absolutely classic examples of reasoning drawn from the Anthropic Principle, which is tautological, and cannot be used as a reasoning tool. These are arguments made from fine-tuning. These are arguments made from an entirely circular premise.

 

[Yoink]

D is possible (it would be the 'random chance' hypothesis). It can't be disproved [unless one of the other hypotheses are proved]. However, generally speaking, when the probability of a particular outcome arising by chance is extremely low, it's presumed to be due to something other than random chance.

The objective proof of "fine-tuning" is for our models, not the universe. It's an extrapolation to presume that the universe is also fine-tuned. But, given that the models are built to simulate the creation of the universe, it's a reasonable extrapolation.

But isn't that just a misunderstanding of probability? I mean, take a lottery in which ten million tickets are sold and after they are all sold, one ticket is randomly selected as the winner. Now, the odds of any one person winning is 1-in-ten million, right? That's astronomical. But you'd be a fool to go find the winner--let's call him Fred Bloggs--and assume that there's something remarkable about him or that it "couldn't have just been chance" that lead to him winning, wouldn't you?

Even if the universe is the way it is simply by sheer luck, I can't see what inference we can draw from that. Had it turned out any other way, we wouldn't be here to ask "why was it this way." Had someone else won the lottery, Fred Bloggs wouldn't be in the position of asking "I wonder why I won?" either.

 

[Gate2501]

The objective proof of "fine-tuning" is for our models, not the universe. It's an extrapolation to presume that the universe is also fine-tuned. But, given that the models are built to simulate the creation of the universe, it's a reasonable extrapolation.

The fact that we must "fine-tune" the parameters within our models to fit reality is nothing more than a reflection OF reality.

What you are doing now is either deliberately dishonest, or you just wikipedia'd all of this a few hours ago and don't really know what you are going on about. All that you are doing is adding another layer on top of what is a bunk premise, and trying to dodge out of the fact that the premise itself is illogical by claiming to reason from this additional layer.

You are still making an argument based on a tautological observation.

 

[Beth]

But isn't that just a misunderstanding of probability? I mean, take a lottery in which ten million tickets are sold and after they are all sold, one ticket is randomly selected as the winner. Now, the odds of any one person winning is 1-in-ten million, right? That's astronomical. But you'd be a fool to go find the winner--let's call him Fred Bloggs--and assume that there's something remarkable about him or that it "couldn't have just been chance" that lead to him winning, wouldn't you?

In that situation, you have millions of tickets sold. That's analogous to the multiverse argument. Are there billions upon billions of universes, with only a few possessing the necessary parameter values to form stars and galaxies?

Even if the universe is the way it is simply by sheer luck, I can't see what inference we can draw from that. Had it turned out any other way, we wouldn't be here to ask "why was it this way." Had someone else won the lottery, Fred Bloggs wouldn't be in the position of asking "I wonder why I won?" either.

That's the anthromorphic argument, which usually accompanies the multiverse hypothesis. Yes, you're correct, Fred Bloggs wouldn't be in that position, but someone else were. The problem we are faced with is more like holding the only lottery ticket known to be in existance and wondering why we happen to have the winning combination. Maybe it's just chance. Sure, if we didn't have the ticket, we wouldn't be wondering about why we have it. But we do and it seems very odd and not very plausible without assuming that millions of other tickets also exist.

 

[Gate2501]

But isn't that just a misunderstanding of probability? I mean, take a lottery in which ten million tickets are sold and after they are all sold, one ticket is randomly selected as the winner. Now, the odds of any one person winning is 1-in-ten million, right? That's astronomical. But you'd be a fool to go find the winner--let's call him Fred Bloggs--and assume that there's something remarkable about him or that it "couldn't have just been chance" that lead to him winning, wouldn't you?

Even if the universe is the way it is simply by sheer luck, I can't see what inference we can draw from that. Had it turned out any other way, we wouldn't be here to ask "why was it this way." Had someone else won the lottery, Fred Bloggs wouldn't be in the position of asking "I wonder why I won?" either.

Yes, most of this argument is based upon a rank misunderstanding of probability. People divorce the probability from conditionals like "X exists"(which make the probability = 1), and then ask "Oh my god, what are the chances of the universe being right for X to exist?!!!".

X can be a person, a galaxy, or a jelly doughnut.

 

[Yoink]

In that situation, you have millions of tickets sold. That's analogous to the multiverse argument. Are there billions upon billions of universes, with only a few possessing the necessary parameter values to form stars and galaxies?

Fred Bloggs bought only one ticket. And won. Does that prove that he's Destiny's Child?

The fact that there are millions of tickets doesn't alter the case at all. You don't win by holding a ticket, you win by having that ticket's number drawn. That number is drawn just once. So, is it a "miracle" that the number drawn on that sole occasion matches the number on Fred Blogg's ticket? That this single occurrence, out of all possible occurrences, was the one that made Fred Bloggs a multimillionaire?

That's the anthromorphic argument, which usually accompanies the multiverse hypothesis. Yes, you're correct, Fred Bloggs wouldn't be in that position, but someone else were. The problem we are faced with is more like holding the only lottery ticket known to be in existance and wondering why we happen to have the winning combination. Maybe it's just chance. Sure, if we didn't have the ticket, we wouldn't be wondering about why we have it. But we do and it seems very odd and not very plausible without assuming that millions of other tickets also exist.

I think this is just a rank misunderstanding of probability (and yes, I know that some esteemed philosophers have defended this position; I just take that to be further proof of the deleterious effect faith has on people's ability to reason).

There's simply a contradiction here: on the one hand you're saying "this universe could have had any parameters at all (--in other words, there were millions of lottery tickets). But on the other hand you're saying "and whatever form the universe takes we must regard it as miraculous 'fine tuning' that it took that form rather than some other form."

I mean, either it's random or it isn't. If it's random, then we have no right to be surprised by any particular outcome. If it's not random, then there's no basis for the "fine tuning" argument at all.

 

[Robin]

Right. If you run the naturalistic model (no multiverse), you get a prediction of 1 in a very large number that life will exist. That begs the question: Did we just get lucky?

Why does an Idealist care anyway?

 

[Robin]

1 and 5 seem reasonable statements to me. I don't think that the 2, 3, and 4 are necessary, but I don't spend enough time discussing it with proponents to determine if they are a typical part of the argument.

Mostly they do get left out, but they are nevertheless implicit.

If they were not true then no improbability could be demonstrated. I just believe in making implicit assumptions explicit.

 

[Robin]

If the Universe was "constructed" such that we could not and did not exist, then we would not be here to discuss it. QED.

The rest is window dressing.

But the usual answer to that is to consider the man who is anaesthetised, but first told that he will not be revived unless he wins every lottery in the USA over the coming month.

He wakes up and finds he is alive and people say "aren't you amazed that you won every lottery in the USA over a month?" and he answers "No, if I didn't win them I wouldn't be here to discuss it".

 

[Robin]

Actually, I think the original OP had X as the necessary precursor for our universe existing, not something in the universe. That doesn't strike me as a bunk premise; it seems reasonable to me to hypothesize that our universe was caused by something - you can call it X if you like.

Actually I said the Universe was contingent upon X, rather than "precursor" or "cause" since these things seem to imply time. If time began at the big bang then there could be no "precursor" unless the cause also had some kind of time.

Saying it is "contingent" does not have the same implication of there being a "before" the big bang.

 

[Beth]

Mostly they do get left out, but they are nevertheless implicit.

If they were not true then no improbability could be demonstrated. I just believe in making implicit assumptions explicit.

I'm not following you here. They don't seem necessary to me. If they were not true, why would that affect the improbability argument?