For me, it all comes down to one thing.
Can your brain(a physical thing), violate causality.
I think this is an interesting question. If, as some speculate, our nervous system has processes that are dependent on QM, then our brain might well possess the ability to violate causality since QM can apparently violate causality.
If it cannot, then that means that given sufficient information on the variables(causes) that process in your mind to create a "choice"(effect), could be calculated beforehand, rendering free will an illusion. I look at it like the roll of a D6. There is really only one possible result to any roll once the initial conditions of the roll have been set in place. We only think that there are six, because we cannot calculate all of these variables with any degree of accuracy.
Actually, there are more than six possible outcomes, though the probability of anything outside of those six is extremely small. For example, one or both dice may land on edge displaying two sides as uppermost rather than one. When this happens in a board game because the die lands tilted against the edge of the board, we just reroll without giving the matter any further consideration, but it is an outcome outside of the usual six. I would also disagree with your contention that there is “only one possible result to any roll once the initial conditions of the roll have been set in place”. We simply don’t know that is true because we are not able to know all the conditions and therefore we cannot test the assertion that if all conditions were known, only one outcome is possible.
Well, even if the base "randomness" of quantum mechanics somehow does affect our minds, I don't see how that would translate into free will. The mind would still not be violating causation, it would just make some of the variables(causes) in the thought process "random". Those causes would still lead to a calculable effect(if we had the processing power and full knowledge of entry variables in a "choice").
But we don’t, nor can we ever have full knowledge of the entry variables in a “choice” because what choices are perceived by a human for any situation is a fundamentally subjective set and cannot be known by any other individual even if you are willing to grant that an individual can be said to have ‘full knowledge’ of all the possible choices they are considering. Since we don’t have that full knowledge, just as we don’t have full knowledge of the total conditions of a roll of dice, why should either be considered deterministic? It seems to me in both cases you are relying on the assumption that the world fundamentally works according to deterministic principles which we now know, via QM, is not the case at all.
Randomness wouldn't cause free will to emerge, it would just add another level of wackiness to the whole process. Even if it could somehow add possible outcomes to a choice, it wouldn't put "you" in control of the selection thereof.
I agree that a deterministic system would not allow for free will. While I agree that randomness may not cause free will to emerge, I think it does allow for it to occur since it changes the system from deterministic one to being non-deterministic . Why don’t you consider the brain to be the controlling agent of the choices an individual makes? Or perhaps, why don’t you consider that to be ‘free will’. How are you defining free will if that is the case?
I say either deterministic or random, you still don't end up with free will(unless you want to add an immaterial aspect to the mind).
I guess I’m not sure what you mean by free will then. I think of free will as the ability to make choices that a) cannot be predicted, even in principle and b) are a direct result of the individual making a conscious choice among various options that are considered. Since I don’t think we can, even in principle, ever determine the subjective array of possibilities that an individual is subconsciously considering before deciding which ones to consciously choose among, I don’t think that we can, in principle, predict the outcome although we may be able to predict general probabilities for some subset of likely outcomes. And why would it require an immaterial aspect to the mind?
Free will doesn't exist. Randomness isn't free will and determinism isn't, either. Unless someone can propose a mechanism by which one makes decisions not randomly AND not based on previous experiences, that horse is dead, dead, dead.
Why would that be required for ‘free will’. See my definition above. I think both randomness and previous experiences are part of the process of making choices and do not exclude the possibility of free will. What is your definition of ‘free will’ such that it cannot include such factors?