Free Will

[linusrichard]

I just don't think that there is anything coherent, intelligible that you can actually mean by it.

Things don't exist or fail to exist based on my abilities with the written English language. What's frustrating about this discussion is that I know you know exactly what I'm talking about. And I think you know that every time you talk about "choice" and "free will" in the compatibilist sense, you're not talking about what I'm talking about.

What I meant here is that as far as I understand this stuff there is a contradiction in terms. Lib free will tries to connect the choice to that what makes up you on one hand by asserting responsibility, i.e. you and your choice. On the other hand though there is not only no good reason to pass off the event that is dubbed 'choice' as yours,

Why not? I made the choice. Just because you don't think it's true, that doesn't mean it's a "contradiction in terms." Santa Claus is not a contradiction in terms just because he isn't real.

but the assertion of multiple different outcomes severs the connection between you and the choice.

What does this mean? That because I don't control the chain all the way to the outcome makes it meaningless (or incoherent or unintelligible or wrong) for me to assert that I have absolute control over one step in the chain? Or do you mean something else?

You need to be aware of what "you" means. There is no "you" that exists independently of its constituents.

I don't think I agree with this.

"You" that is - depending on your exact definition of course - your genetic make-up, your memories, your perceptions, your brain, your will, desire and - if you want - even your soul, spirit and so on. It is not legitimate to try and disassociate "chemical makeup of your brain" from "you." This "chemical makeup"is (a part of) what you are.

Right. A part of. It is as legitimate to disassociate "chemical makeup of your brain" from "you" as it is legitimate to reprove the child who says "I didn't hit him, mommy, my arm hit him."

So, it is not that something compels something else to do some action as in "the chemical makeup of your brain, perhaps acted upon by random elements in some way, compels you to "choose" coffee." But rather it is that you compel the outcome 'coffee' to begin with. And because there actually is a connection - a causal connection - between you and the outcome, this outcome can be treated as yours, i.e. your choice.

I'm with you here. This sounds like lib free will to me.

And this is where lib free will breaks down, I think. It is actually stipulated that there are multiple different outcomes that could come to pass from the very same starting state. The starting state of course that what makes up you; your brain, your soul, memories, your perceptions etc (it doesn't really matter what you toss in there exactly). However, if there are multiple different outcomes to begin with, you can not say that any of the outcomes are compelled, brought about, or caused by you.

You lost me. If there are multiple outcomes possible from the same starting state, and I am the one who brought about the one outcome that actually came about, how can you not say that that outcome was "compelled, brought about, or caused" - or chosen by me? Doesn't determinism have to stipulate or claim the opposite: that from any given starting state, there is only one possible outcome - or if there is more than one possible outcome, the outcome is selected by some random event?

Sure, 'coffee' might be the outcome, but there is nothing about you that made this happen. It is not anything in your soul, not anything in your brain, nothing that could be called your memories that is responsible for coffee (and not tea).

Coffee is the outcome because I chose coffee. There was a choice between coffee and tea. Someone else is responsible for other steps in the chain, both before and after my choice (e.g. actually making the coffee), but there was a point when I was equally capable of choosing coffee or tea, and I could have chosen tea, but I chose coffee. If we could go back in time to the exact same time, I could have chosen tea.

If there is something about you that is responsible for the outcome, then we are back to determinism.

Unless that something about me that is responsible for the outcome is my libertarian free will, right?

Of course there is the additional problem that that what makes up a person is not fixed. You are in constant flux, and that what was called "you" five minutes ago, is not exaclty the same "you" as of now. And I think that is where the real crux lies. There is a plain and simple equivocation on the meaning of "you" (or "I" or "person") that is responsible for the perception that you could be reponsible for multiple different things. The you from five minutes ago causes 'coffee,' whereas the slightly different you as of now causes 'tea.'

No, I don't agree. I am the same me that I was before, and the same me that I will be. I have changed, and will continue to change, but I'm not a different me - I'm the same me, but different. The language makes it hard to express, but there is a difference between the same thing existing through time but changing, and what you're talking about, "constant flux." And I don't believe in what you're talking about; I believe there is a constant me, even as it goes through changes.

This is similar to the free will argument. Everyone experiences being the same person, albeit changing throughout time. But then because of what we think we know about biology and chemistry, we reject that experience in favor of this idea of constant flux which makes little sense. You say we're in constant flux, but you don't - you can't - actually live like that.

(The plinko disc is similar to the calculator. There are several important ingredients missing that would make it permissable to even talk about choice at all. Intention, desire, will and so on. It has nothing to do with determinism or not though.)

Well, what is the difference between me and a plinko disc, according to determinism? I have "intention," "desire," "will"? None of which really are what they say they are -- they appear to all be names for very fancy sets of chemical reactions that are either inevitable or random, but not actually me asserting my intention, desire, or will. We could name the spin on the plinko disc "intention," its downward velocity "will," and the set of pins it travels through "desire," if we wanted to. But changing the names we give to things doesn't imbue the plinko disc with free will, and calling compatibilist free will "free will" doesn't actually make it free will.

The quote in your posts says, in brackets, "providing that all parties agree on incompatibilism."

Yes. Yes, it does. If all parties agreed on compatibilism, then free will wouldn't be an illusion, but it wouldn't be anything particularly meaningful or interesting either, as far as I can see. The difference between compatibilist "free will" and the "free will" my calculator exercises in "choosing" what to display when I press = is a difference in degree, not kind.

 

[cyborg]

How do you know the machines say what you think they say? .. snip ...

The concept of error correction does not work for you does it?

Nope, either you trust your perceptions and it's all good or you don't and everything's wrong with the world. There is no inbetween.

 

[Lord Emsworth]

Things don't exist or fail to exist based on my abilities with the written English language. What's frustrating about this discussion is that I know you know exactly what I'm talking about.

Not only do I know exactly what you are talking about. I know exactly why it doesn't make sense at all, and yet why you think it does. *grins*

And I think you know that every time you talk about "choice" and "free will" in the compatibilist sense, you're not talking about what I'm talking about.


Why not? I made the choice. Just because you don't think it's true, that doesn't mean it's a "contradiction in terms." Santa Claus is not a contradiction in terms just because he isn't real.

"Square circle" is a contradiction in terms though. Square and cirlce are defined mutually exclusive, it asserts that something is and is not a circle at the same time and in the same respect.

And like so with lib free will. One on hand there is the assertion that there is a connection between you and the outcome of the choice, while denying this connection at the same time.

You stipulate that the outcome of some event could be several different things, regardless of the then prevailing state of affairs. Only to then turn around and state that the outcome came about because of the then prevailing state of affairs.

What does this mean? That because I don't control the chain all the way to the outcome makes it meaningless (or incoherent or unintelligible or wrong) for me to assert that I have absolute control over one step in the chain? Or do you mean something else?

That you can't have it both ways. You cannot be in control over one step in the chain on one hand AND have that step in the chain be uncontrolled at the same time. If there are multiple different outcomes given the exactly same conditions, then this means that there is by definition nothing in these exacltly same conditions that controls the outcome. Saying that you are in control though denies this and asserts that there indeed is something in the starting conditions that controls the outcome: YOU.

Either the outcome is controlled by something, or it is not. Multiple different outcomes says uncontrolled, and that includes you.

I don't think I agree with this.

Right. A part of. It is as legitimate to disassociate "chemical makeup of your brain" from "you" as it is legitimate to reprove the child who says "I didn't hit him, mommy, my arm hit him."

I'm with you here. This sounds like lib free will to me.

No, because the outcome of the "choice event" is not open. It is determined - maybe by you - but still determined.

You lost me. If there are multiple outcomes possible from the same starting state, and I am the one who brought about the one outcome that actually came about, how can you not say that that outcome was "compelled, brought about, or caused" - or chosen by me?

It denies that there were multiple different outcomes to begin with.

Doesn't determinism have to stipulate or claim the opposite: that from any given starting state, there is only one possible outcome - or if there is more than one possible outcome, the outcome is selected by some random event?

Yes. And what makes you is a part of that starting state.

Coffee is the outcome because I chose coffee. There was a choice between coffee and tea. Someone else is responsible for other steps in the chain, both before and after my choice (e.g. actually making the coffee), but there was a point when I was equally capable of choosing coffee or tea, and I could have chosen tea, but I chose coffee. If we could go back in time to the exact same time, I could have chosen tea.

Unless that something about me that is responsible for the outcome is my libertarian free will, right?

This sounds as if you were treating libertarian free will as a thing that is a part of a causal chain. Libertarian free will determines the outcome.

No, I don't agree. I am the same me that I was before, and the same me that I will be. I have changed, and will continue to change, but I'm not a different me - I'm the same me, but different. The language makes it hard to express, but there is a difference between the same thing existing through time but changing, and what you're talking about, "constant flux." And I don't believe in what you're talking about; I believe there is a constant me, even as it goes through changes.

As I said, you are equivocating. You are treating different things, or states, as if they were the same by using the same word for it. Me, I chose coffee. And then later, me, I chose tea. See, same starting state, and yet different outcomes. Well, not really. The starting conditions were slightly different even though a part of these conditons is referred to by the same word.

There is absolute no difference to compatibilism. I could have done different had I only wanted to. Or, in other words, I could have done different had I only been slightly different.

This is similar to the free will argument. Everyone experiences being the same person, albeit changing throughout time. But then because of what we think we know about biology and chemistry, we reject that experience in favor of this idea of constant flux which makes little sense. You say we're in constant flux, but you don't - you can't - actually live like that.

We are fully aware that we are in constant flux even without any big science. Education, schooling, etc spell this out. If we were always the same, if we were unchangeable, if there could not be any slightly different versions of 'me' there would be little point in trying to teach or to learn anything.

ETA: And anyway, it is not as if I had intended "constant flux" to mean anything fundamentally different from what you call "changing throughout time."

Well, what is the difference between me and a plinko disc, according to determinism? I have "intention," "desire," "will"? None of which really are what they say they are -- they appear to all be names for very fancy sets of chemical reactions that are either inevitable or random, but not actually me asserting my intention, desire, or will.

Let me turn this around: What have you got? What do intention, desire, will really mean? What do they assert?

We could name the spin on the plinko disc "intention," its downward velocity "will," and the set of pins it travels through "desire," if we wanted to.

Sure. But it would be a metaphor. At best.

But changing the names we give to things doesn't imbue the plinko disc with free will, and calling compatibilist free will "free will" doesn't actually make it free will.

And just because you can say "square circle" doesn't mean that this is a meaningful proposition. Just because you can say "libertarian free will," it does not mean that there is a meaningful proposition either.

Moreover, tucking the same word onto different things or states doesn't make the different things or states magically the same.

Yes. Yes, it does. If all parties agreed on compatibilism, then free will wouldn't be an illusion, but it wouldn't be anything particularly meaningful or interesting either, as far as I can see. The difference between compatibilist "free will" and the "free will" my calculator exercises in "choosing" what to display when I press = is a difference in degree, not kind.

Could the calcultor have displayed something different, had it only wanted to? Is the spin on the plinko disc called "intention"?

 

[minorwork]

The concept of error correction does not work for you does it?

Nope, either you trust your perceptions and it's all good or you don't and everything's wrong with the world. There is no inbetween.

John Kennedy Jr. How does your statement speak of a pilot with no visible horizon like poor John John.?

 

[cyborg]

Eh?

 

[minorwork]

John Kennedy Jr. killed in a plane he was flying with his wife and another. No one knows for sure but the bets are he didn't trust his instruments and was relying on his senses. I fly. This can happen very easily when in fog, cloud, or when there is no horizon visible. Discipline is the only thing that might have saved him. Your senses say one thing and the instruments another. Tuff. That help?

 

[Beth]

No, because the outcome of the "choice event" is not open. It is determined - maybe by you - but still determined.

I'm confused by this statement. Isn't free will the concept that you are determining an outcome?

 

[cyborg]

John Kennedy Jr. killed in a plane he was flying with his wife and another. No one knows for sure but the bets are he didn't trust his instruments and was relying on his senses. I fly. This can happen very easily when in fog, cloud, or when there is no horizon visible. Discipline is the only thing that might have saved him. Your senses say one thing and the instruments another. Tuff. That help?

Yes. This sounds like a good example of what I was saying. Thanks.

 

[Lord Emsworth]

I'm confused by this statement. Isn't free will the concept that you are determining an outcome?

Depends. In compatibilsm this is true, I think. That is why it is compatible. The same you, in the same situation always leads to the same result. If a slighty different 'you', leads or may lead to a different outcome, then you could say that you are free to chose. If a slighty different 'you', cannot lead to a different outcome, then there is no choice at all.


However "real" free will asks for an open future, i.e. the outcome is undetermined. The same you, in the same situation ... well, who knows? May turn out to be this, may turn out to be that.

As an example a tidbit from the post I was responding to:

but there was a point when I was equally capable of choosing coffee or tea, and I could have chosen tea, but I chose coffee. If we could go back in time to the exact same time, I could have chosen tea.

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?p=4546019#post4546019

 

[linusrichard]

"Square circle" is a contradiction in terms though. Square and cirlce are defined mutually exclusive, it asserts that something is and is not a circle at the same time and in the same respect.

And like so with lib free will. One on hand there is the assertion that there is a connection between you and the outcome of the choice, while denying this connection at the same time.

If lib free will denies this connection, then I don't understand lib free will at all (totally possible, since I had never heard of it before yesterday). I understand what I'm talking about, and I thought what I was talking about was lib free will, but maybe I wasn't. I don't deny the connection between me and the outcome of my choice.

You stipulate that the outcome of some event could be several different things, regardless of the then prevailing state of affairs. Only to then turn around and state that the outcome came about because of the then prevailing state of affairs.

I didn't say either of these things. Obviously the then prevailing state of affairs has some effect on the outcome. If I say "I'll have some coffee please" right now, nothing will happen, because I'm at home alone. If I say it at the coffee shop, coffee comes to me. So I would never say that the outcome will be what it is "regardless of the then prevailing state of affairs." But it's also not correct to say the outcome "came about because of the then prevailing state of affairs." If I'm at the coffee shop and ask for coffee, coffee comes. This is prevailing state of affairs + my action. But if I ask for tea, tea comes. If I don't ask, nothing comes. The determinist believes that what I'm going to ask for is either the inevitable result of the purely physical/chemical/electrical stuff going on in my head. Which is all part of the prevailing state of affairs - in other words, the result comes about entirely because of the prevailing state of affairs. But I say that I choose coffee (or tea, or whatever), injecting an element into the scenario that wasn't part of the prevailing state of affairs, that comes from me, that was a result of me exercising my will. If what I describe goes against lib free will, then I'm not talking about lib free will and I'm sorry I said I was.

That you can't have it both ways. You cannot be in control over one step in the chain on one hand AND have that step in the chain be uncontrolled at the same time.

I don't want it both ways. I have control over that step in the chain, and I might say that that step is otherwise uncontrolled, but I never meant to say that it was uncontrolled. It's controlled by me.

If there are multiple different outcomes given the exactly same conditions, then this means that there is by definition nothing in these exacltly same conditions that controls the outcome.

If the condition is I'm at the coffee shop, that fact controls that I can have the outcome of coffee or tea but not beer. So that's something in the starting conditions that has some effect on the outcome. "Controls"? Depends what you mean.

Saying that you are in control though denies this and asserts that there indeed is something in the starting conditions that controls the outcome: YOU.

Ah ha. Here's the problem. I think you may be equivocating a little - accidentally I'm sure. Okay, I'm in the starting conditions, and I control the outcome, so it looks problematic? But - what is it of me that controls the outcome? My choice - and I assert, contra determinism, that that choice was not present in the starting conditions - that I made that choice, in the most literal sense of that phrase. Starting conditions limit the outcome to a number of possible results. I create a choice which wasn't part of the starting conditions, I act based on the choice, and my action + starting conditions ==> outcome.

Either the outcome is controlled by something, or it is not. Multiple different outcomes says uncontrolled, and that includes you.

Multiple outcomes does not say uncontrolled.

No, because the outcome of the "choice event" is not open. It is determined - maybe by you - but still determined.

But if it's determined by me - that is, by my free will, then that's not "determined" in the sense the determinists want to use the word, is it?

This sounds as if you were treating libertarian free will as a thing that is a part of a causal chain. Libertarian free will determines the outcome.

Er, I can exercise my free will to try to fly all I want, but that's not going to determine the outcome - I'm not aerodynamic like that.

As I said, you are equivocating. You are treating different things, or states, as if they were the same by using the same word for it. Me, I chose coffee. And then later, me, I chose tea. See, same starting state, and yet different outcomes. Well, not really. The starting conditions were slightly different even though a part of these conditons is referred to by the same word.

We're getting to the crux of it. You consider the "me that is about to want coffee" as different from the "me that is about to want tea." I say there is only me, and I can want what I want.

There is absolute no difference to compatibilism. I could have done different had I only wanted to. Or, in other words, I could have done different had I only been slightly different.

I bolded this because I think this really is the crux of the disagreement. You consider what you want to be part of what you are, in a sense that I think is not true.

We are fully aware that we are in constant flux even without any big science. Education, schooling, etc spell this out. If we were always the same, if we were unchangeable, if there could not be any slightly different versions of 'me' there would be little point in trying to teach or to learn anything.

There's a difference between a constant you that changes, and newer versions of you. Education, schooling. Do I have to give back my degrees because a different person wrote every one of my papers, and a different person took all of my exams? No, it was all me.

ETA: And anyway, it is not as if I had intended "constant flux" to mean anything fundamentally different from what you call "changing throughout time."

I'm pretty sure you did. You know the difference between saying something is the same thing, but it has changed, and saying something is a different thing. Come on - if you pulled up in front of my house, and I said, "Say, is that a new car?" would you say, "Of course, it's only one instant old."? Unless you want to be a total smart aleck, you would not say such a thing. I have owned the same car for about 4 years. Is every atom in the same car in the exact same state it was when I bought it? Obviously not. But we recognize - we have to recognize - that even though a thing changes, it is still the same thing. Now, maybe you think humans are different from cars in some fundamental way. Maybe when people ask how old you are, you say you are one instant old. Maybe people have stopped asking you how old you are. I am thirty-one years old. I am the same person that got born back then. Have I changed? Obviously, I've changed a whole lot, in pretty much every way. At an atomic level, I might be 99% different, I might be 100% different. Even in the past hour, you could point out significant ways that I've changed. But it's not useful to talk in terms of "new versions of me" and "old versions of me." There is a constant me.

Let me turn this around: What have you got? What do intention, desire, will really mean? What do they assert?

I don't feel like this is a completely honest question; I think you know what they assert. Again, just because I can't explain these things doesn't mean they don't exist or don't mean anything. I think they're just what they appear to be.

Sure. But it would be a metaphor. At best.

No metaphor - simply deciding we want to call something by a certain name. Like when compatibilists call something "free will" - I don't think it's fair to say that compatibilists use "free will" as a metaphor at best. I think they are literally talking about what they're talking about (although I don't think it's really free will).

And just because you can say "square circle" doesn't mean that this is a meaningful proposition. Just because you can say "libertarian free will," it does not mean that there is a meaningful proposition either.

Basically, when I say free will, I'm not saying much more than this: You know how you go through life appearing to make decisions? That's actually happening. You're actually doing what it appears you are doing. If that's "libertarian free will," then I don't see how that's not a meaningful proposition. I think you say it's not meaningful because you don't believe it's true.

Moreover, tucking the same word onto different things or states doesn't make the different things or states magically the same.

I think that was my point.

Could the calcultor have displayed something different, had it only wanted to? Is the spin on the plinko disc called "intention"?

Define "wanted to" - maybe what a calculator "wants" is what it's been programmed to display. If we define the spin on a plinko disc as "intention," then yes, the spin on a plinko disc is called "intention." We don't do that because we know that's not what intention is. Which is why I reject the determinist view of intention, because that's also not what intention is.

 

[linusrichard]

However "real" free will asks for an open future, i.e. the outcome is undetermined. The same you, in the same situation ... well, who knows? May turn out to be this, may turn out to be that.

Yes. This. How is that a meaningless proposition?

 

[linusrichard]

The concept of error correction does not work for you does it?

Nope, either you trust your perceptions and it's all good or you don't and everything's wrong with the world. There is no inbetween.

That's interesting. What I actually said, if you're interested, is that you should presume that your perceptions are trustworthy unless and until you have a good reason to believe otherwise. In other words, "inbetween." You think we have a good reason to toss out our consistent, confirmed, perceptions of a universally observed phenomenon. I disagree. Okay. But I'm interested in why you don't apply your extreme skepticism (bordering on solipsism) to anything else in this world. That's what I'm talking about.

 

[cyborg]

You think we have a good reason to toss out our consistent, confirmed, perceptions of a universally observed phenomenon.

Free Will is not a phenomenon - it's an explanation of phenomena.

 

[linusrichard]

Free Will is not a phenomenon - it's an explanation of phenomena.

Right, and what phenomena does it explain? The phenomena of you making choices. Which I'm saying really happens, and you're saying is an illusion, yclept "the 'I' narrative."

(I don't mean to sound contemptuous about "the 'I' narrative." I like the idea. I just happen to believe the other way.)

 

[cyborg]

Right, and what phenomena does it explain? The phenomena of you making choices. Which I'm saying really happens, and you're saying is an illusion, yclept "the 'I' narrative."

I'm saying two things really.

1) When pressed to reallty define its operation what most people think of as "Free Will" is "Libertarian" and "Libertarian" is, as far as I can tell, incoherent
2) The way in which it appears from "our" perspective that we make decisions isn't how we really make decisions. It's just an observed fact that when "I" think, "I shall move my fingers to type now," that the signal to do so had already arrived at my fingers. Given that it takes a finite and known amount of time greater than zero for a signal to travel through my nervous system either one would think that there's some sort of backwards-causation going on or the rest of the brain had already decided on that action before "you" had a chance to "decide" on it if one was going to insist that the feeling of "I make a choice NOW" was consistent.

 

[Gate2501]

Sorry to bring up this earlier post, but I just noticed that you had replied to me.

I don't know. I also don't know what exactly causes every object in the universe to exert an attractive force on every other object in the universe (I have a name for it: "gravity" - but that doesn't mean I know what it is), and yet I do believe that every object in the universe exerts an attractive force on every other object in the universe.

Do you mean to say, that you take free will to be an axiom? A self-evident truth? I believe that "gravity" is an entirely more coherent and scientifically observable phenomenon than "free will".

My take on it is this: The only thing we can directly observe is inside our mind. Everything else, we use tools. Some of our tools are biological: eyes, ears. Some are mechanical: microscopes, telescopes. But what's in our head, we observe directly.

I would argue that your brain is a tool as well.

I directly observe the experience of making decisions. Determinists will tell me that this is an illusion. They may be right. But any observation we make might be an illusion. We might be brains in jars, we might be batteries for robots a la The Matrix, we might be the dream of a demented God. Is any of this at all useful?

Your "experience" is limited by the processing power of that organ in your skull. What you directly observe, is an incomplete picture of what is really going on.

To equate the incompatibilist position on free will with the plot of the movie "The Matrix"(or solipsism), is an absurdity. It is especially absurd because we are both arguing for a currently unfalsifiable hypothesis.

We agree on one thing. As I said before, I do agree that this is pretty useless either way from a pragmatic standpoint. I just enjoy the debate, and feel that I have a strong position.

I submit that the first thing we have to do if we're going to get anywhere at all is pretend that we know that our observations are correct unless we have a very good reason to believe that they are not correct. Because without prima facie trusting our observations we have nothing.

I think that I have already explained my reasoning behind the idea that we might not be correct in thinking that free will is axiomatic. It would require your mind violate causality. Even if the whole "QM affects your mind!" bit were true, it does nothing but change "determinisic behavior" to "probabilistic/random behavior", and that ain't free will either.

I simply see no mechanism for free will.

So what is the very good reason determinists have for telling me my observations (along with the observations of every other human being, including the determinists) are incorrect?

See above.

It's that they can't conceive of a mechanism that would make them correct. To me, this is on a par with theism. Primitives say "we can't figure out why there's thunder, so it must be God." Then we figure out how that works, and later on, people say "we can't figure out how the variety of species came about, so it must have been God." And then we get Darwin, and figure that out. And then it'll be something else. To me, the determinists do something similar - they say "we can't figure out by what mechanism the individual makes a decision, so people must not really be making decisions." I'm sorry, but your failure to have a complete understanding of the workings of the human brain is not sufficient justification for me to throw out the shared observations of every member of the human race, including (most importantly from my point of view), me.

I can turn this entire argument back around on you. It is like your Matrix bit. This is not a sufficient criticism of the incompatibilist position, because the bulk of it could easily apply to your stance as well.

Maybe there is something about the physical brain that we don't understand that allows us to make decisions. Maybe there is something outside the physical brain that allows us to make decisions. This latter is actually my preferred hypothesis. I find it useful to name such a thing a "soul," although it does not necessarily share the characteristics that would normally be assigned to that word. I do not believe in an afterlife, or a God, or a universal morality, or any of the other baggage that might normally accompany belief in a soul, but I believe (though weakly) in something that I like to call a "soul." I don't believe that I am disobeying Ockham too egregiously by doing so.

Maybe there is. I don't buy it, but we can agree to disagree here.

As a side note, I find it interesting that determinists can't help (ha!) but use the language of free will all the time. We can not live as determinists, even those of us who are.

Does that mean that if I say "JESUS CHRIST" when I stub my toe, it is somehow interesting because I am an atheist? I don't really think so, but if you find it amusing that I don't insert "but I do not believe that I did this as an act of free will" into every other sentence, that's cool.

This seems reasonable, but my response is that since I observe free will directly (as do you), the onus is not on me to prove how it works, but on you to prove why these observations are false, since the only reasonable starting point is to assume that that which is observed is true.

Once again, you see free will as axiomatic, and shift the onus onto me.

/sigh

... and of course if this is all wrong, it isn't my fault, since I couldn't help but type all of it. Right?

Yessir.

ETA: My apologies in advance if I've misrepresented the determinist position - if I have done so I have done so in good faith and hope to escape the accusation of "Strawman," which to me is when someone intentionally or recklessly creates a weak position and assigns it to his opponent for the purpose of discrediting him dishonestly. I am trying to address what I honestly believe to be the determinist/anti-free-will position, so I hope if I am wrong it will be pointed out to me in patience.

Nah, I think you understand the determinist position pretty well. The big difference that you and I have (from what I can tell), is that you take free will to be a self-evident truth that does not require proof.

It's all good though, cause like you said before, none of this really matters. We will continue to behave as if we have free will, even if it is proven to be an illusion.

 

[Lord Emsworth]

If lib free will denies this connection, then I don't understand lib free will at all (totally possible, since I had never heard of it before yesterday). I understand what I'm talking about, and I thought what I was talking about was lib free will, but maybe I wasn't. I don't deny the connection between me and the outcome of my choice.

What kind of connection do you think there exists? I think there is a causal connection between me and the outcome of my choice, and it is completely irrelevant whether there are merely chemical/physical reactions or whether there is something more.

I didn't say either of these things. Obviously the then prevailing state of affairs has some effect on the outcome. If I say "I'll have some coffee please" right now, nothing will happen, because I'm at home alone. If I say it at the coffee shop, coffee comes to me. So I would never say that the outcome will be what it is "regardless of the then prevailing state of affairs." But it's also not correct to say the outcome "came about because of the then prevailing state of affairs." If I'm at the coffee shop and ask for coffee, coffee comes. This is prevailing state of affairs + my action. But if I ask for tea, tea comes. If I don't ask, nothing comes. The determinist believes that what I'm going to ask for is either the inevitable result of the purely physical/chemical/electrical stuff going on in my head.

In principle determinism is not at all restricted to purely physical/chemical/electrical stuff going on. The statement "The determinist believes that what I'm going to ask for is the inevitable result of the stuff going on" suffices completely.

Which is all part of the prevailing state of affairs - in other words, the result comes about entirely because of the prevailing state of affairs. But I say that I choose coffee (or tea, or whatever), injecting an element into the scenario that wasn't part of the prevailing state of affairs, that comes from me, that was a result of me exercising my will. If what I describe goes against lib free will, then I'm not talking about lib free will and I'm sorry I said I was.

But you are part of the starting state, regardless which way you toss it or turn it. And you state that the outcome is the result of something.

Now let the sum total of the starting state refer to the exact state that everything that exists has at that point in time, and you necessarily have that outcome 'come from' the starting state, if it can be said to be the result of something.

I don't want it both ways. I have control over that step in the chain, and I might say that that step is otherwise uncontrolled, but I never meant to say that it was uncontrolled. It's controlled by me.

And that "me" refers to something that existed in the moment at which the choice is said to take place, right?

If the condition is I'm at the coffee shop, that fact controls that I can have the outcome of coffee or tea but not beer. So that's something in the starting conditions that has some effect on the outcome. "Controls"? Depends what you mean.

Ah ha. Here's the problem. I think you may be equivocating a little - accidentally I'm sure. Okay, I'm in the starting conditions, and I control the outcome, so it looks problematic?

Not if you are a determinist.

But - what is it of me that controls the outcome? My choice - and I assert, contra determinism, that that choice was not present in the starting conditions - that I made that choice, in the most literal sense of that phrase.

Starting conditions limit the outcome to a number of possible results. I create a choice which wasn't part of the starting conditions, I act based on the choice, and my action + starting conditions ==> outcome.

Is making a choice like baking a cake? I mean, that you are creating something? That absolutely appears to be the case. You make, you create something which was not there before. I am not sure that can be legitimately called to be the most literal sense of that phrase.

I always took "making a choice" as synonymous to "chosing." And as referring to a process itself. And not as if "choice" was an object that is the result of a process. If I talk about outcome, I am talking about the outcome of that process which is referred to by the statement "making a choice."

Multiple outcomes does not say uncontrolled.

It does just that. You can only end up with one outcome, after all. And if there is something that makes outcome (a) come to pass, then and only then can that something be said to have control over the outcome. If you wish to assert multiple different outcomes, you can no longer meaningfully state are controlled by something specific.

You may talk about you controlling the outcome alright. And you may even have a definition of you in mind that leaves a few variables yet to be filled in (leaving the exact outcome yet to be filled in as well), but as soon as everything is filled in there is a very unique 'version' of you that can only meaningfully be said to control the one and only possible outcome. If you still think there are multiple different outcomes, there is nothing about you or connected to you, or even anything at all that controls the outcomes.

But if it's determined by me - that is, by my free will, then that's not "determined" in the sense the determinists want to use the word, is it?

You can say a lot of things. But not all of them make sense.

Er, I can exercise my free will to try to fly all I want, but that's not going to determine the outcome - I'm not aerodynamic like that.

We're getting to the crux of it. You consider the "me that is about to want coffee" as different from the "me that is about to want tea." I say there is only me, and I can want what I want.

This is just playing a semantics game. A cup of coffee is a different thing from a cup of tea, right? Or is it all just cups?

And likewise, "me, with a desire for coffee" refers to something different than "me, with a desire for tea." Not sure what is so hard to understand about it.

I bolded this because I think this really is the crux of the disagreement. You consider what you want to be part of what you are, in a sense that I think is not true.

OK.

There's a difference between a constant you that changes, and newer versions of you.

Irrelevant. You may well take exception to the way that I tried to express something, however that which I tried to express remains utterly untouched. Moreover, I did not even use the word "new" or "newer" I think. You introduce the term here.

Likewise, I might just as well take exception to the way that you are expressing something here. After all, strictly speaking, constant can only refer to something that does not change. (Want to see a dictionary?) And therefore, strictly speaking, a constant something that changes is a contradiction in terms as much as a triangle that has four sides is.

But, this as well is irrelevant. I am fairly certain that, firstly, what you want to express by "a constant you that changes" is something that actually makes sense despite the non-sensical expression that you used to describe it with, and secondly that there is no significant difference to what I wanted to express by "constant flux" or "slightly different versions."



What I think does make a significant difference though, is whether there was a "me, with a desire for coffee" or a "me, with a desire for tea" in the starting conditions. Significant, because there is the very real possiblity that that what is different impacts your further actions.

I don't feel like this is a completely honest question; I think you know what they assert. Again, just because I can't explain these things doesn't mean they don't exist or don't mean anything. I think they're just what they appear to be.

I agree that these words mean something. And I know that they cannot be applied in their actual meanings to - what was it? - Plinko disks, or calculators. After all, I know what they assert. And they can refer to parts of a deterministic decision making process. Regardless of what you exactly have are very fancy sets of chemical reactions, or very fancy sets of spiritual stuff's reactions.

No metaphor - simply deciding we want to call something by a certain name. Like when compatibilists call something "free will" - I don't think it's fair to say that compatibilists use "free will" as a metaphor at best. I think they are literally talking about what they're talking about (although I don't think it's really free will).


Basically, when I say free will, I'm not saying much more than this: You know how you go through life appearing to make decisions? That's actually happening. You're actually doing what it appears you are doing. If that's "libertarian free will," then I don't see how that's not a meaningful proposition. I think you say it's not meaningful because you don't believe it's true.


I think that was my point.



Define "wanted to" - maybe what a calculator "wants" is what it's been programmed to display. If we define the spin on a plinko disc as "intention," then yes, the spin on a plinko disc is called "intention." We don't do that because we know that's not what intention is. Which is why I reject the determinist view of intention, because that's also not what intention is.

"Wanted to" means just what it appears to be. *grins smugly*

 

[linusrichard]

Oof.

These last few replies deserve better attention from me, but I have two papers, two other classes, two research projects, and a broken furnace (maybe) that also deserve better attention from me, so I'll be brief.

@ cyborg
- I don't see how (1) and (2) both make sense. If (1) is true, and lib free will is so incoherent, how can (2) refute it so well?
- (2) is pretty good stuff, I admit. But what are we measuring when we think we are determining the moment where you make the decision?

@ gate
- I don't consider free will as self-evident. I consider the mountain of evidence to be unrefuted by the lack of a mechanism. I agree with you when you say you see no mechanism. I see no mechanism either.
- I don't consider Free Will to be an axiom. My only "axiom" (if it is an axiom) is that our perceptions deserve our trust unless and until we have a very good reason to distrust them. You feel we have a very good reason to distrust the perception of making choices. I feel we don't, but I don't consider that to be axiomatic. I do consider it to be a pretty easy question when the main objection appears to be that we have no mechanism. Cyborg's point (2) above is a better objection, but still not good enough for me.
- And I agree with you on what I might call the metadiscussion: I don't mind admitting that I'm arguing for and against unfalsifiable hypotheses. And yet it is a very interesting debate, whichever side you're on.

@ emsworth:
You get the smallest response because I didn't get a chance to read your post until just now.
- I do think making a choice is literally creating something that wasn't there before. Not that it isn't also the outcome of a process of choosing, but unlike baking a cake, you can't infer or deduce or predict the outcome just from the previous state.
- I don't get how "wanted to" means what it appears to mean in a determinist (even compatibilist) viewpoint. Oh well.

@ gate, cyborg, and emsworth:
Sorry to bow out of this, but I need to be a better student. If you see me back here, it means I'm failing in that endeavor. We'll see. If I'm not back here, thanks for everything. I will return to the forums, of course, but likely well after this thread is dead.

 

[backstab]

I can't see how you can have free will and an all knowing god at the same time.

 

[Tsukasa Buddha]

I can't see how you can have free will and an all knowing god at the same time.

Well, knowing is not the same as causing. God exists outside of time, and can view it all from that rather unthinkable for us perspective.