Free Will

[cyborg]

What, pray tell, do X Y and Z represent in your equation?

And premise and actions.

And how do those quantities correspond to phenomena of autonomous choice?

Autonomous choice is basically just choice with actions.

What do they explain about why we humans think it is so important?

They don't, any more than they explain why some humans think it is important to get dressed up. Not really the same class of problem.

My, you're very much into non sequitors aren't you!

We all find certain mysteries of life fascinating. But they aren't the same for everybody.

"Free-will" is simply a much smaller part of a much larger puzzle and is only remains "interesting" if you don't ever progress away from mystical thinking on it.

 

[Beth]

What other way can things interact aside from determinism with possible true random influences? Name me a 3rd way.

With intent.

 

[cyborg]

With intent.

Which is?

 

[dv82matt]

Free will is the ability to choose to do or say whatever you want (so long as it is physically possible). That you can't choose something you don't want is beyond the scope of the concept.

 

[Gate2501]

Which is?

Spoooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooky

 

[linusrichard]

Which is?

Do you disbelieve in everything you observe that you can't explain, or just this one thing?

 

[minorwork]

What you are, whether your mind is some spiritual thing floating around and created by God, or a bunch of atoms and molecules and neurons, is a machine that processes inputs and creates actions and decisions based on that.

Two "is" statements separated by an "or" and another "is" statement. I'm confused is that two choices or three? I'll challenge the last in that you forgot feeling. You (as the experiencer) may feel like crying, puking, and peeing. You feel pain in the bodily vehicle and love. And you feel like you have a choice even though at times you may not want to have a choice. See Sophie's Choice.

Nothing more, nothing less. Such a thing is deterministic (or partially random, which doesn't help the case for free will) because that's the only kind of thing that exists.

Hard determinism then. I'll agree that there is a large part of that in my life. It takes real work to even realize when I am not doing my will. I don't even want to go to my own funeral. I don't see much choice in that. But if I have to go to work I can prepare for work. If I have to die, then I can also prepare to die. I might choose the day I die and the method. By the way, a real man uses a ball peen hammer. Or I can choose to go reluctantly, naturally. Remember I'm talking of the feeling of having a choice as the pragmatic definition of free will.

I won't (being male), but if I turned up pregnant after some ass took me with the date rape drug, I want the feeling of having a choice in my future decisions regarding the matter. But look out, there is the lure of saying there is no choice. That it's not my fault. Young adults. My own, even, when they screw up and think I believe that. Right. Best to realize the hard truth that you are in charge even if you want to give up your choice to another. And not to choose is to choose. Life is trying to pick your way thru the inevitable choices presented. How? By making wise choices. Good luck I was told getting in the plane to make a skydive from 20k feet. "NO! The idea is to never suppose luck. This is a planned jump." Too bad the pilot's name was Murphy, eh?

What other way can things interact aside from determinism with possible true random influences? Name me a 3rd way.

A true Fatalist? I don't believe it. The proof of determinism is metaphysical, abstract, or concluded from induction. If you are right you should be able to predict some things by this determinism. I'll grant you can within broad limits such as the ping pong ball gun. Spring operated get in a gym and fire 10 and draw a 1 foot circle where each will rest. No way without gimmicks. But you can say they will land in the gym and be more accurate. The smaller your target, the less likely will your predictions prove true. To prove determinism you'd need an infinite amount of time.

Which brings me to quantum theory. Could you accept it as a third if there was no woo-woo?

 

[cyborg]

Do you disbelieve in everything you observe that you can't explain, or just this one thing?

Eh?

 

[linusrichard]

Eh?

You apparently chose to press the "Quote" button, and apparently chose to type "Eh?" and apparently chose to click "Submit Reply." You had the experience of making these choices, but you don't believe you actually made the choices, because you don't understand how it is possible that you could have made these choices.

Have I got that right?

So you observe something (yourself making choices), but reject it because you can't conceive of a mechanism that would make such a thing possible. And I'm asking if you do that in any other area as well?

If I show you a rock that floats in the air, would you conclude that you are hallucinating, or that there is something about that rock you don't yet understand? And how much more complex is the brain than a rock?

 

[cyborg]

You apparently chose to press the "Quote" button, and apparently chose to type "Eh?" and apparently chose to click "Submit Reply." You had the experience of making these choices, but you don't believe you actually made the choices, because you don't understand how it is possible that you could have made these choices.

Have I got that right?

No.

I understand from the evidence that the choices were made before "I" was aware of them. That it seems like "I" made them is merely the "I" narrative but the electrochemical messages were already sent before "I" knew about them. And I say "I" because clearly it is still my brain making the decisions - it just isn't making them in the way "I" think it is.

So you observe something (yourself making choices), but reject it because you can't conceive of a mechanism that would make such a thing possible.

No, I reject it because over time as I have learnt more about the phenomena I have found that:

1) It isn't as it appears
2) Even if it was as it appears the pop-folk explanations are incoherent

If I show you a rock that floats in the air, would you conclude that you are hallucinating, or that there is something about that rock you don't yet understand? And how much more complex is the brain than a rock?

This is a complete non-sequitur but to entertain your question.

If I see a rock floating in the air then I'm seeing something that defies what I normally expect reality to do. Halucination is just one possibility.

The complexity of a system is not a panacea for magic. Mathematically the exhibition of complexity requires only very simple constructs.

 

[linusrichard]

No.

I understand from the evidence that the choices were made before "I" was aware of them. That it seems like "I" made them is merely the "I" narrative but the electrochemical messages were already sent before "I" knew about them. And I say "I" because clearly it is still my brain making the decisions - it just isn't making them in the way "I" think it is.

Why did you write "no" before that paragraph? That's exactly what I said. You dismiss the fact that it seems like "you" made the decisions as being "merely the 'I' narrative" because you don't consider it possible that "you" could have made the decisions. You reject the evidence that is your direct experience because it is in conflict with what you believe about yourself and your brain.

No, I reject it because over time as I have learnt more about the phenomena I have found that:

1) It isn't as it appears
2) Even if it was as it appears the pop-folk explanations are incoherent

I don't know about "pop-folk explanations." Have you found the mechanism that creates "the 'I' narrative"?

This is a complete non-sequitur but to entertain your question.

I'm sorry you consider it a non-sequitur, but thanks for answering anyway. This question is like what we're talking about because it's about your reaction to an observed phenomenon with no known explanation.

If I see a rock floating in the air then I'm seeing something that defies what I normally expect reality to do. Halucination is just one possibility.

That's kind of a dodge. Would you consider hallucination the best possibility?

The complexity of a system is not a panacea for magic. Mathematically the exhibition of complexity requires only very simple constructs.

I don't know what you mean by "a panacea for magic." Maybe "complexity" is the wrong word. My point is that there is probably a lot more, in terms of useful, interesting information, that is unknown about how brains work than about how rocks work. If I saw a floating rock, my first thought would be that there is something about that rock that I don't understand (I would consider hallucination to be an unlikely possibility). So when I experience myself making decisions, I don't consider that to be an illusion, even though I have no way of explaining how it happens. My guess is that there are things about the brain, or maybe about the mind or about the self, that we don't yet understand.

 

[cyborg]

Why did you write "no" before that paragraph?

You said:

"you don't understand how it is possible that you could have made these choices."

That is not right.

Have you found the mechanism that creates "the 'I' narrative"?

No. I tried looking in my garden but then I remembered I don't have one.

Would you consider hallucination the best possibility?

You've given me scant information to go on - like, was I eating magic mushrooms, the answer would be, "yup, I'm tripping like a mofo". There's a whole world full of possibilities - the rock defying its previous nature and deciding to behave completely differently not being at the top.

My point is that there is probably a lot more, in terms of useful, interesting information, that is unknown about how brains work than about how rocks work.

Not if you get enough of the right kind of rocks in the right place at the right time.

If I saw a floating rock, my first thought would be that there is something about that rock that I don't understand (I would consider hallucination to be an unlikely possibility).

Only people who labour under the presumption that we're mostly infalible when it comes to accurately perceiving the world rather than mostly we just about hobble together a passable likeness would consider the possibility of perceptual failure to be unlikely.

My guess is that there are things about the brain, or maybe about the mind or about the self, that we don't yet understand.

This isn't a guess: it's a simple factual statement.

I don't see the conclusions heading towards special biological consciousness material though.

 

[Lord Emsworth]

Maybe there is something about the physical brain that we don't understand that allows us to make decisions. Maybe there is something outside the physical brain that allows us to make decisions. This latter is actually my preferred hypothesis. I find it useful to name such a thing a "soul," although it does not necessarily share the characteristics that would normally be assigned to that word. I do not believe in an afterlife, or a God, or a universal morality, or any of the other baggage that might normally accompany belief in a soul, but I believe (though weakly) in something that I like to call a "soul." I don't believe that I am disobeying Ockham too egregiously by doing so.


As a side note, I find it interesting that determinists can't help (ha!) but use the language of free will all the time. We can not live as determinists, even those of us who are.

I think that I could actually succeed in giving a sensible definition of 'choice' that is not only compatible with, but necessiates, determinism, or better yet some form of causality. So, if I'd use the word "choice" in saying that "I chose to type a reply" I'd be perfectly justified in doing so. I cannot, on the other hand, conceive of what it would even mean from a (libertarian) free will perspective to do so. Either there is a connection between what makes up you* and your choice, or there isn't (although it would strictly speaking not be permissible to speak of your choice any longer.)

*even if that comprises a "soul"

 

[linusrichard]

You said:

"you don't understand how it is possible that you could have made these choices."

That is not right.

Okay, then explain to me how it is possible that you (that's you you, not your brain you) could have made these choices.

No. I tried looking in my garden but then I remembered I don't have one.

So without a mechanism for free will, you reject free will, but without a mechanism for "the 'I' narrative," you embrace "the 'I' narrative."

You've given me scant information to go on - like, was I eating magic mushrooms, the answer would be, "yup, I'm tripping like a mofo". There's a whole world full of possibilities - the rock defying its previous nature and deciding to behave completely differently not being at the top.

Well, let's consider the hypothetical in relation to the point that's being made with it. I'm saying you observe yourself making choices all the time, every day. Are you tripping like a mofo all the time, every day? Probably not. So for the rock example, I'll say - assume you're not tripping like a mofo, or have any other special reason to believe you're hallucinating.

Not if you get enough of the right kind of rocks in the right place at the right time.

Forget the rocks, if it's so confusing.

Only people who labour under the presumption that we're mostly infalible when it comes to accurately perceiving the world rather than mostly we just about hobble together a passable likeness would consider the possibility of perceptual failure to be unlikely.

As I think I have said earlier in this thread, I don't consider us to be mostly infallible when it comes to accurately perceiving the world, but our perceptions are all we have to go on, and what I'm saying is that, in the absence of a reason to believe that we've had perceptual failure, we should accept our perceptions. Otherwise, why do we think we know anything at all? I could throw out all of gravity, thermodynamics, evolution, germ theory, atomic theory, everything we think we know about science, it's all based on observations, which are based on perceptions. Since you don't consider perceptual failure to be unlikely, you throw all that out? I don't think you do. But you throw out free will, which we observe constantly, written off as "perceptual failure."

This isn't a guess: it's a simple factual statement.

I don't see the conclusions heading towards special biological consciousness material though.

I don't know what "special biological consciousness material" is.

 

[linusrichard]

I think that I could actually succeed in giving a sensible definition of 'choice' that is not only compatible with, but necessiates, determinism, or better yet some form of causality. So, if I'd use the word "choice" in saying that "I chose to type a reply" I'd be perfectly justified in doing so. I cannot, on the other hand, conceive of what it would even mean from a (libertarian) free will perspective to do so. Either there is a connection between what makes up you* and your choice, or there isn't (although it would strictly speaking not be permissible to speak of your choice any longer.)

*even if that comprises a "soul"

I'm not exactly sure what you're saying here. I think the only useful definition of "choice," for this discussion, is one that includes free will. Does a calculator "choose" to display "6" when I type "2 x 3 ="? We could define "choose" to include this type of thing, but I think that just opens the door to more confusion than is necessary. If I understand the determinist point of view, we may be more complex than the calculator, less predictable, less consistent, and maybe subject to randomness, but at the end of the day, we're basically versions of that calculator, in terms of the "choices" we make not really being choices at all.

 

[Lord Emsworth]

I'm not exactly sure what you're saying here. I think the only useful definition of "choice," for this discussion, is one that includes free will.

Free will in the libertarian sense is somewhere between a contradiction in terms and devoid of meaning. What you can get by with to some extent is compatibilist free will (compatible with determinism), and I would assert that it is in this sense that people actually use "choice."

You have a choice in a certain matter, if you could have done differently had you only wanted to.

For example, if somebody locks you up in your room, you can want to take a walk as much as you like, it is not going to happen. You have no choice in the matter. Or, as a different example, imagine somebody offers you either tea, or coffee. Now, imagine further that whichever of the two you want you will get. I.e. you want coffee, you get coffee; you want tea, you get tea. The choice is yours.

In other words, we treat something as a choice if a person's will makes a difference towards the eventual 'outcome.' In the first example it doesn't really matter at all what you want; in the second example though, as specified, it makes all the difference. Your will is treated a little bit like a variable in an equation, and if that variable determines the end result then there is a choice.



A calculator on the other hand ... Nobody really talks about desire, intent, will etc when referring to such a device, and that is why choice isn't used in this context:

Does a calculator "choose" to display "6" when I type "2 x 3 ="? We could define "choose" to include this type of thing, but I think that just opens the door to more confusion than is necessary. If I understand the determinist point of view, we may be more complex than the calculator, less predictable, less consistent, and maybe subject to randomness, but at the end of the day, we're basically versions of that calculator, in terms of the "choices" we make not really being choices at all.

 

[linusrichard]

Free will in the libertarian sense is somewhere between a contradiction in terms and devoid of meaning. What you can get by with to some extent is compatibilist free will (compatible with determinism), and I would assert that it is in this sense that people actually use "choice."

You have a choice in a certain matter, if you could have done differently had you only wanted to.

Okay, I'm not all up on my terminology, but I did a little wikiing, so I think I understand what you're saying. And what I would respond is that free will in the compatibilist sense is not really free will, or - better - free will in the compatibilist sense is not the free will that I'm talking about. And when I say "choice," I do not mean compatibilist free will.

I don't understand what you mean when you say that "Free will in the libertarian sense is somewhere between a contradiction in terms and devoid of meaning."

For example, if somebody locks you up in your room, you can want to take a walk as much as you like, it is not going to happen. You have no choice in the matter. Or, as a different example, imagine somebody offers you either tea, or coffee. Now, imagine further that whichever of the two you want you will get. I.e. you want coffee, you get coffee; you want tea, you get tea. The choice is yours.

In other words, we treat something as a choice if a person's will makes a difference towards the eventual 'outcome.' In the first example it doesn't really matter at all what you want; in the second example though, as specified, it makes all the difference. Your will is treated a little bit like a variable in an equation, and if that variable determines the end result then there is a choice.

Right, but isn't the determinist position that "you" - the real "you" - don't actually choose coffee or tea - that the chemical makeup of your brain, perhaps acted upon by random elements in some way, compels you to "choose" coffee, but there's no real choice, any more than the Plinko disc chooses to go into the "500" slot?

And what I'm saying is that I don't agree with that.

Thank you for using some of this terminology. It got me to look some things up. I learned that I am a libertarian in the metaphysical sense, which is not the same as a libertarian in the political sense. Neat.

It's also neat (but no surprise) to find the things I'm saying in this thread are nothing new:

If determinism could be proved conclusively (scientifically perhaps), it would have to be accepted that free will is an illusion (providing that all parties agree on incompatibilism). But if one were to adopt the practice of dismissing things as illusions without good reason, one would probably end in a widely deprecated position such as solipsism.

That's what I'm hollering.

 

[cyborg]

Okay, then explain to me how it is possible that you (that's you you, not your brain you) could have made these choices.

Exactly as it appears - I want to move my arm so my arm moves.

So without a mechanism for free will, you reject free will, but without a mechanism for "the 'I' narrative," you embrace "the 'I' narrative."

Hardly - there are several hypothetical and coherent possibilities for how it could work but you asked me if I found 'it'.

Free Will generally isn't even coherently defined - it vacuously lacks a mechanism.

Are you tripping like a mofo all the time, every day? Probably not. So for the rock example, I'll say - assume you're not tripping like a mofo, or have any other special reason to believe you're hallucinating.

Then beyond that are any number of perceptial mistakes, illusions or physical setups that would allow such a scenario.

As I think I have said earlier in this thread, I don't consider us to be mostly infallible when it comes to accurately perceiving the world, but our perceptions are all we have to go on, and what I'm saying is that, in the absence of a reason to believe that we've had perceptual failure, we should accept our perceptions.

Yes, as one mills about on one's day-to-day activities this is fine. This is to be expected. Anything else would be lunacy.

When it comes to serious investigation they absolutely should not be trusted.

Otherwise, why do we think we know anything at all? I could throw out all of gravity, thermodynamics, evolution, germ theory, atomic theory, everything we think we know about science, it's all based on observations, which are based on perceptions.

To be precise: observations made by machines, recorded by humans. You'll find that we've made all kinds of devices for the express purpose of reducing the error of measurement by humans.

Since you don't consider perceptual failure to be unlikely, you throw all that out? I don't think you do.

But you throw out free will, which we observe constantly, written off as "perceptual failure."

No, I write "Free Will" off as an incoherent mess.

 

[linusrichard]

To be precise: observations made by machines, recorded by humans. You'll find that we've made all kinds of devices for the express purpose of reducing the error of measurement by humans.

How do you know the machines say what you think they say? The only way to know what the machine tells you is to perceive its output. But according to you, for serious investigation, perception "absolutely should not be trusted."

Don't tell me you're one of those who "labour under the presumption that we're mostly infalible when it comes to accurately perceiving the world"?

Why is it when I perceive myself making a choice, it would be wrong to consider perceptual failure unlikely, but once you introduce a machine into the equation (which actually puts at least two intermediaries between you and the observed thing: the machine, and the eyes you use to read the machine), it's reasonable to assume that all is as it appears?

No, I'm going to stick with a presumption that, in the absence of a good reason to believe otherwise, our perceptions are to be trusted, and that just because something "isn't coherently defined" or "vacuously lacks a mechanism" isn't enough reason doesn't mean I can't trust my own perceptions.


ETA: I don't know how a "thumbs-up" got attached to this post...

 

[Lord Emsworth]

Okay, I'm not all up on my terminology, but I did a little wikiing, so I think I understand what you're saying. And what I would respond is that free will in the compatibilist sense is not really free will, or - better - free will in the compatibilist sense is not the free will that I'm talking about. And when I say "choice," I do not mean compatibilist free will.

I just don't think that there is anything coherent, intelligible that you can actually mean by it.

I don't understand what you mean when you say that "Free will in the libertarian sense is somewhere between a contradiction in terms and devoid of meaning."

What I meant here is that as far as I understand this stuff there is a contradiction in terms. Lib free will tries to connect the choice to that what makes up you on one hand by asserting responsibility, i.e. you and your choice. On the other hand though there is not only no good reason to pass off the event that is dubbed 'choice' as yours, but the assertion of multiple different outcomes severs the connection between you and the choice.

Right, but isn't the determinist position that "you" - the real "you" - don't actually choose coffee or tea - that the chemical makeup of your brain, perhaps acted upon by random elements in some way, compels you to "choose" coffee, but there's no real choice, any more than the Plinko disc chooses to go into the "500" slot?

You need to be aware of what "you" means. There is no "you" that exists independently of its constituents. "You" that is - depending on your exact definition of course - your genetic make-up, your memories, your perceptions, your brain, your will, desire and - if you want - even your soul, spirit and so on. It is not legitimate to try and disassociate "chemical makeup of your brain" from "you." This "chemical makeup"is (a part of) what you are.

So, it is not that something compels something else to do some action as in "the chemical makeup of your brain, perhaps acted upon by random elements in some way, compels you to "choose" coffee." But rather it is that you compel the outcome 'coffee' to begin with. And because there actually is a connection - a causal connection - between you and the outcome, this outcome can be treated as yours, i.e. your choice.


And this is where lib free will breaks down, I think. It is actually stipulated that there are multiple different outcomes that could come to pass from the very same starting state. The starting state of course that what makes up you; your brain, your soul, memories, your perceptions etc (it doesn't really matter what you toss in there exactly). However, if there are multiple different outcomes to begin with, you can not say that any of the outcomes are compelled, brought about, or caused by you.

Sure, 'coffee' might be the outcome, but there is nothing about you that made this happen. It is not anything in your soul, not anything in your brain, nothing that could be called your memories that is responsible for coffee (and not tea). If there is something about you that is responsible for the outcome, then we are back to determinism.


Of course there is the additional problem that that what makes up a person is not fixed. You are in constant flux, and that what was called "you" five minutes ago, is not exaclty the same "you" as of now. And I think that is where the real crux lies. There is a plain and simple equivocation on the meaning of "you" (or "I" or "person") that is responsible for the perception that you could be reponsible for multiple different things. The you from five minutes ago causes 'coffee,' whereas the slightly different you as of now causes 'tea.'



(The plinko disc is similar to the calculator. There are several important ingredients missing that would make it permissable to even talk about choice at all. Intention, desire, will and so on. It has nothing to do with determinism or not though.)

And what I'm saying is that I don't agree with that.

Thank you for using some of this terminology. It got me to look some things up. I learned that I am a libertarian in the metaphysical sense, which is not the same as a libertarian in the political sense. Neat.

It's also neat (but no surprise) to find the things I'm saying in this thread are nothing new:

That's what I'm hollering.

The quote in your posts says, in brackets, "providing that all parties agree on incompatibilism."