Can theists be rational?

[JoeTheJuggler]

Did you think I said is limited to sight instead of isn't?

No.

That's why I asked you what the other senses were (to observe falling) and why you didn't consider the vestibular system (and the otoliths in particular) to be able to sense gravity directly.

Why do you think I mistook "isn't" for "is"? If I did, my question would have made no sense. (Sort of like you saying, there's no more of something, and me asking what those somethings more are.)

 

[Malerin]

It is a hypothesis that would explain the receipt of electromagnetic radiation that contains information.

Except that there are no "receipts of electromagnetic radiation that contain information", are there? So the E.T. life hypothesis explains nothing. This is like me saying theism is explanatory because it would explain celestial messages from God.

Can you name a thing that it predicts in a manner that the absence of that thing would falsify the hypothesis?

It's an explanatory hypothesis. Not all hypotheses are predictive, especially when the evidence is already known. As an explanatory hypothesis, it explains phenomena such as veridical NDE's, spiritual experiences, etc.

Our knowledge about God is based on an idea.

Says you. Our knowledge about God is based on God. Your atheistic bias is showing. The most we can say is our knowledge of God may be based on an idea or come from God itself.

Right. An entirely circular explanation and therefore useless.

You say circular so many times, it's lost all meaning. It's not circular to claim that apparent spiritual experiences are actual spiritual experiences, anymore than it's circular to claim apparent spiritual experiences are not actual spiritual experiences. The God hypothesis claims these experiences are grounded in the reality of a supernatural being. The natrualistic hypothesis says they're not grounded in reality at all (other than just being manifestations of brain states). These are two very different claims, and neither one is circular.

Right. So they cannot provide any independent knowledge about God. And we have no knowledge about God without reference to these events.

Who's claiming this? Many theists will tell you that you can gain knowledge about God by introspection or prayer.

Because you've already given me a whole bunch of clues by telling me I'm in a forest (i.e. on the surface of the earth (which is roughly spherical and large), not near the poles) and that you are making reference to a system that divides direction into 4 quadrants on a 2-D surface, so you've already greatly constrained my choices as to direction.

Ok, so you're making a trivial point:
Take a guess.
About what?
I can't tell you anything about what you're guessing about because that would be a clue, wouldn't it?

I don't know what the point is here.

Try answering the question I posed to you earlier about guessing what was inside a large building without any windows, to get an idea of what I'm talking about.

Wait, you already broke the rules with "building". I'm guessing whatever's inside the building is NOT Jupiter. Hey, I'm right! So much for "rarely"!

When you said that God was supernatural.

So? I never claimed that the supernatural cannot interact with the natural world. A supernatural God can affect the natural world (NDE's, spiritual experiences, fine-tuning, etc.)

That's not what I meant. I asked you what methodology you would use to determine which of these accounts are not legitimate experiences of the supernatural.

If we had evidence the person was lying, on drugs at the time, schizophrenic, etc.

 

[Bri]

It's not what you've been talking about.

I've been talking mainly about compelling evidence.

Perhaps it is rarely objective. But I'm going to make a strong claim here. I'll concede that there may not be an objective means of ruling on evidence, but I most certainly do not concede that legitimate means of ruling on evidence is arbitrary.

OK, I don't think anyone said it was arbitrary.

In other words, given two non-specific means by which one can rule on the quality and quantity of evidence, it does not follow from "it is rarely objective", that these two means are equivalent, or equally valid, or equally sound--or, more to the point, equally rational. They may be. They may not even be comparable. But there are means of judging evidence that are comparable, and not all means of judging evidence are equal.

Now I'll simply ask the question--do you agree?

Sure, I can agree that not all means of evaluating evidence are equal.

That's a start. Can you tell me why you hold this opinion then? What's wrong with B? What feels wrong about it? What is it about this piece of evidence that makes it not count?

Note that evidence "1" in both scenarios is merely a proxy. We're really comparing A.2 with B.2. The only reason 1 is there is to keep you from backsliding into the red herring of compelling evidence, since it's solely the quality of evidence that is under discussion, and not the quantity, nor the overall judgment.

I've never said it was the quantity of the evidence that was important, but the quality of all the evidence. So yes I agree that the number of pieces of evidence isn't important (that's not what I meant by "amount" of evidence).

So...you're asking why A.2 is slightly better evidence that the sun will rise tomorrow than B.2? Because we understand the conditions by which the sun rises, and flipping a coin doesn't have anything to do with the sun rising.

Now here's the thing. A.1 is actually more relevant than B.1, even though they are the same. Why? Because A.1 in conjunction with A.2 is stronger evidence than just A.1 or A.2 by themselves (which are by themselves very weak evidence). You cannot look at a piece of evidence in isolation -- you have to examine the totality of the evidence both for and against a proposition in order to determine if there is compelling evidence for it.

So at the very least, you should contend that there's stuff that can be proposed as evidence that has zero evidential value--and stuff that has more than zero evidential value.

Well, stuff that has zero evidential value probably isn't evidence for the proposition at all, but yes. Some evidence certainly is stronger than other evidence.

And there's a definite difference--after enough sunrises, after all, "the sun rose yesterday" definitely does contribute to your belief that it will rise tomorrow, but "the coin landed heads" never does.

Yes, in conjunction with other evidence "the sun rose yesterday" would count as evidence whereas the coin would probably not (or would be extremely weak evidence).

So if these pieces of evidence ipso facto have this quality of potential value, do they not hold this quality, even when they stand on their own?

Not necessarily, but in this case "the sun rose today" is weak evidence that it will rise tomorrow, but very strong evidence in conjunction with the evidence that it rose thousands of times prior.

Can't we say that the coin flip simply doesn't count, before we even consider that there may or may not be enough other evidence to push us over the edge? And that the fact that the sun rose yesterday does count?

Sure, OK. I don't think I've said otherwise.

Sure, they're all the same in that they aren't compelling evidence of respective claims, but you're slipping back into the irrelevant.

That's what I said. They are all weak evidence.

They are all different in quality.

Well, not really. Weak evidence is weak evidence. There is not enough evidence by which you can provide a probability for aliens or gods, certainly not a probability greater than 50% (by which you could say that one is likely).

Without further argumentation, you can't judge on even the improbability of extra terrestrial intelligent life--that we know for damned sure we exist at all lends a high degree of plausibility that it could exist elsewhere.

Why? We don't know the conditions and events by which we exist, so how is there a high degree of plausibility that intelligence could exist elsewhere as opposed to a low degree of plausibility?

Of course, you would note, rightly so, that we also can't judge in itself the probability that there's intelligent life elsewhere, because that's extrapolating from a single data point--but you lack standing to argue specifically that it is improbable; extrapolation is extrapolation is extrapolation.

I never argued that it was improbable, so that's a straw man. I also don't think there is sufficient evidence to argue that the existence of a god is improbable.

And as for the argument for God, we're not even out of the ontology box... we've yet to establish that there's even an existing entity of the class in the first place. The fine tuning argument doesn't even establish this--it requires you to interject a prior, which is entirely up to the opinion of the theist going through the exercise or the atheist debating her. We know damned well intelligent life exists. Hell, we even know damned well teapots exist. Gods? Well, you sort of "need" faith, right?

The fact that there's no compelling evidence of a god doesn't mean you can conclude that it's unlikely that one exists. There's no compelling evidence by which you can conclude either way. The same with aliens, by the way.

But they are vastly different in quality. See above--evidence can be judged in terms of its quality in support of a claim aside from judgments of whether or not the totality of the evidence supports the claim.

I don't see a difference in quality of evidence between aliens and gods. Both have very weak evidence -- certainly not compelling enough to place a probability one way or the other.

-Bri

 

[Malerin]

Boy are you confused. To precisely describe what you mean is to precisely describe what you mean. If you overspecify, that's just as bad as when you underspecify.

Yet atheists get away with underspecifing all the time. What kind of universes exist, what kind of alien life exists?

Well, let's see. If it had 10 legs, and was alive, I would count it. If it had no legs, and was alive, I would count it. If it had no eyes, I would count it.

If it's Shiva,I would count it. If it's Jehovah, I would count it.If it's Zeus, I would count it.

If God had no hairs on his beard, would that be the god you're describing? If he had a few thousand? Billions? Does it matter how many hairs he has on his beard?

No, and that's my point. If SETI picked up a binary message from space that said, "Hey, how are you?", that would be evidence for E.T. life, period. If all the stars in the sky suddenly rearranged themselves to spell out, "Hey, it's God, just thought I'd let you know I exist" while at the same time the message was telepatheically broadcast into every mind on Earth, that would be evidence for God, period. People would argue about what kind of God, but atheism would be about as relevant as the Flat-Earth society.

And if that's what you mean by God, then simply say that God is some kind of supernatural being. For example, should I have a fairy in a jar, that's God.

And the E.T. life proponent runs into the same problem if they think alien life is invisible pink unicorns, or the multiverse proponent thinks other universes are made of cotton candy. For the purposes of argumentation, a broad meaning of God can be used without getting into specifics. Does the Drake equation fall apart because we're using the vague term "extra-terrestial life"? No. Is the multiverse theory incoherent unless we spell out exactly what kind of universes exist, down to the values of their physical constants? No. Such specifcity seems to be reserved strictly for theists.

Here's the test. Think of it as a game. You define it. I come up with something that fits your definition. If that thing I come up with is something you would not consider God, your definition is bad.

If the E.T. proponent doesn't have to play a similar game, then the theist proponent doesn't. And they don't- the Drake equation can be evaluated without resorting to such games. If the stars spelled out the message I talked about, there'd be no need to define God, would there? It would be obvious that God exists, but not obvious what kind of God exists, just as a message SETI picks up would make it obvious that alien life exists, but not obvious what kind of alien life exists.

For the purposes of the FT argument, it is enough to claim that a powerful universe creator sympathetic to life exists. If you want that to be God, OK. I really don't care because I'm not trying to prove a specific God, just as the Drake equation doesn't deal with specific aliens and the multiverse doesn't deal with specific universes.

 

[Tubbythin]

I'm not sure how the Big Bang (which refers to the universe in its early hot, dense phase) is a valid example of something that could set the universal constants.

-Bri

Well, a period of inflation a tiny tiny fraction of a second after the Big Bang could be responsible for the flatness of the Universe (and the associated Omega constant, the ratio of the density of the Universe to the critical density). It could also remove one of those fine-tuning arguments. But I'm not gonna pretend I know all that much about this.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

For the purposes of the FT argument, it is enough to claim that a powerful universe creator sympathetic to life exists. If you want that to be God, OK.

If you're not talking about God then what does it have to do with theists?

 

[Lord Emsworth]

Except that there are no "receipts of electromagnetic radiation that contain information", are there? So the E.T. life hypothesis explains nothing.

You need to understand that an E.T. life hypothesis is in principle quite explanatory, and only in practice lacks this explanatory power because the example of E.T. life as such is - shall we say - anemic and lacks any kind of context. If there was some sort of concrete context, say, if we had information contained in electromagnetic radiation, or if we had UFOs flying around, then alien life would serve quite nicely as an explanation. Or, if we visited another planet and made certain observations those observations could be explained by either alien life as such, or by certain characteristics that said alien life possesses.

It's an explanatory hypothesis. Not all hypotheses are predictive, especially when the evidence is already known. As an explanatory hypothesis, it explains phenomena such as veridical NDE's, spiritual experiences, etc.

No, God is not an explanation for these. Now that was easy. *shrug* (One of these days ... The ability to just make claims, and claims, and claims. Too tempting.)

Glarfz, and not God, explains all of these though.


ETA:

If we had evidence the person was lying, on drugs at the time, schizophrenic, etc.

Why the reliance on the 'natural world' here?

 

[articulett]

I want to know how Malerin's god is different than the Invisible Pink Unicorn. We can assume they both look the same-- they're invisible. So what is the difference? Why should I take a god claim more seriously than an IPU claim or a neighbor's claim that they truly have been visited and probed by Extra Terrestrial aliens.

I want to understand what makes Roma's god belief or Malerin's god belief MORE rational than those things. Is there anything? I understand they really believe, but I want to know if there is anything that makes those beliefs "rational". I know that theists can be rational, I just don't think that their belief in god is more rational than my above examples. I often wonder if they understand each other or if they understand how garbled they sound to someone trying to get information.

Malerin seems to think he's made a case, but to me his case was always in his head. It is no different than someone like maatorc who believes he astrally travels. I just presume these folks are fooling themselves the same way I once fooled myself and the way myriads of humans for eons have been doing. I can see why dreams, illusions, coincidences, seizures, the ideomotor effect, emotions, etc. can be confused for mystical magical experiences--especially if you desperately want to have such an experience or have a vested interest in confirming a belief as "truth".

It's almost like a believer just can't "hear" the question that threatens their belief. Instead they dance around and play with semantics and change the subject and fight straw men. They don't just want to believe-- they need to convince themselves that the belief is rational and that nonbelievers are biased or mean or cynical for not accepting their claims as readily as they do.

 

[TriskettheKid]

I want to know how Malerin's god is different than the Invisible Pink Unicorn. We can assume they both look the same-- they're invisible. So what is the difference? Why should I take a god claim more seriously than an IPU claim or a neighbor's claim that they truly have been visited and probed by Extra Terrestrial aliens.

I want to understand what makes Roma's god belief or Malerin's god belief MORE rational than those things. Is there anything? I understand they really believe, but I want to know if there is anything that makes those beliefs "rational". I know that theists can be rational, I just don't think that their belief in god is more rational than my above examples. I often wonder if they understand each other or if they understand how garbled they sound to someone trying to get information.

Malerin seems to think he's made a case, but to me his case was always in his head. It is no different than someone like maatorc who believes he astrally travels. I just presume these folks are fooling themselves the same way I once fooled myself and the way myriads of humans for eons have been doing. I can see why dreams, illusions, coincidences, seizures, the ideomotor effect, emotions, etc. can be confused for mystical magical experiences--especially if you desperately want to have such an experience or have a vested interest in confirming a belief as "truth".

It's almost like a believer just can't "hear" the question that threatens their belief. Instead they dance around and play with semantics and change the subject and fight straw men. They don't just want to believe-- they need to convince themselves that the belief is rational and that nonbelievers are biased or mean or cynical for not accepting their claims as readily as they do.

Honestly, I think you're asking the wrong question.

I mean, it would be like asking, who is more rational:

E.O. Wilson or Martin Gardner?

 

[fls]

Yeah, well I did look on the SETI site and couldn't find a reference to being able to identify specific planets or even stars that are likely to contain life, so can you post a citation please?

It says on this page that Ames targetted sun-like stars.

http://www.seti.org/Page.aspx?pid=581

And, of course, I never said that people who work for SETI are pseudo-scientists, only that what SETI is doing is pseudo-science.

Spoilsport.

A logical argument is seldom considered compelling scientific evidence unless it is a sound argument (there is compelling evidence supporting all of the premises).

Some believers who present such arguments are scientists, but I don't think many would agree that the argument would be considered compelling scientific evidence without compelling evidence for the premises.

So SETI scientists are interested in whether compelling evidence can be found for their premises, but fine-tuning scientists are not?

Assuming the conclusion in one or more of the premises is begging the question.

Assuming that the conclusion is necessarily true by assuming that the premises are necessarily true would be a fallacy, but is not an example of begging the question.

In the case in question, I stated that in my opinion, looking for something for which there is no evidence for the purposes of proving an unfalsifiable hypothesis that doesn't explain any observation isn't a scientific endeavor. That's not a fallacy at all -- it's just my opinion. You may disagree if you like, but understand the implications of accepting that sort of endeavor as valid science.

That's the clue right there. I would agree with your conclusion. Who wouldn't, after all?

So you explicitly assumed the search for aliens had the characteristics of 'not science' in order to assume that the search for aliens was 'not science'.

Assumed, no. But yes, I stated characteristics of the search for aliens that I feel together distinguishes it from legitimate scientific inquiry.

Note the two words in bold mean the same thing.

You are making this about whether "looking for something for which there is no evidence for the purposes of proving an unfalsifiable hypothesis that doesn't explain any observation is or isn't a scientific endeavor". Since SETI has those characteristics and I agree that SETI is a scientific endeavor, then I must agree that it is scientific to do all those horrible things, at which point you expose me for saying something ridiculous. The problem is, however, that the question isn't whether it is or isn't scientific to do those things. The 'real' question, which you are begging to be asked by presenting the above argument, is whether SETI has those characteristics.

Since you have not prevailed on any of those points, your parrot-like repetition of that particular sequence is silly. Quit pretending that anyone is supporting the idea that that set of characteristics is science.

How do you propose to do a careful search of the galaxy? The galaxy is a very large place. So, no, we could not practically falsify the hypothesis by searching the galaxy.

So it's not unfalsifiable, it's simply more difficult to falsify than other ideas.

Would the hypothesis not explain the observation of an information containing electromagnetic transmission?

If one had ever been observed, sure. But there has never been an information containing electromagnetic transmission from outer space observed, so the hypothesis does not explain any observation.

Right, but many hypotheses don't explain any observations. The point of making an hypothesis is to direct what particular observations you are going to gather that only this hypothesis would explain.

Does that matter? Science hardly confines itself to studying only what we already know.

Rarely does science guess at something for which there is no other evidence unless it would provide a compelling explanation of known observations.

Is that really the only reason? No spirit of exploration imbues the field? No "let's see what it looks like if I put a drop of pond water under this new observing device"? No "let's see what it looks like when I point this telescope to the sky"? No "I wonder if there are any more of these weird bones where you found this one"?

But how is that relevant? If I perform a research study in order to test a new drug, no one suggests that I can't proceed until I already know what the results of my testing will be.

Nor did I. Testing new drugs involves falsifiable hypothesis that explain known observations.

Right, but I don't know if my hypothesis explains those observations until after I actually test my hypothesis by gathering those observations.

Aren't you putting the cart before the horse? The point of hypothesis testing is to suggest that we search for an observation that could only be explained (or could be best explained) by our idea.

The point of hypothesis testing is generally to be able to gather evidence both for or against the hypothesis. You can't gather evidence against an unfalsifiable hypothesis.

But we're not talking about that. We're talking about gathering evidence for or against a hypothesis that would happen to need a lot of against evidence to be falsified.

Why would you search for something that you already have compelling evidence of? Wouldn't that be redundant?

No. Scientists search for dinosaur bones all the time, even though they already know that dinosaur bones exist. They do so in order to find evidence to provide evidence for or against falsifiable hypotheses that explain known observations.

But you weren't talking about searching for undiscovered dinosaur bones. You were talking about compelling evidence. And you specifically excluded 'searching in likely locations for something that we already know exists in other locations' as an example of searching on the basis of compelling evidence.

I have spent 47 pages saying that that is exactly what we shouldn't be doing.

And yet you seem to be saying that it's perfectly valid science to look for something for which there is no evidence for the purposes of proving an unfalsifiable hypothesis that doesn't explain any observation.

There you go again, begging the question.

I have to ask. Do you have any experience whatsoever with Science or the Scientific Method?

Many years of it. How about you?

Then you must have some experience with writing up a research proposal. Do you not include a section titled "Background Research" that is intended to provide a base for your hypothesis - one that persuades others that your research proposal is likely to yield useful results, but also demonstrates an information gap it is necessary to fill for further progress in the field?

There is no compelling evidence that aliens would be closer to home. The reason to search closer to home is strictly for convenience.

I suspect it's much more than that. A bit pie-in-the-sky, I agree, but don't you think there's also the idea of some sort of exchange of information or contact? If we find something, wouldn't it be that much better to do so under conditions where that was remotely feasible?

Examples:
Solid surface
Energy source
Solvent
Organic materials
Transmissible characteristics
Variation
Selection

You said:

We know the conditions under which intelligent life was formed here.​

Are you claiming that the list above represents the conditions under which intelligent life formed here?

You think it doesn't? Intelligence wasn't a product of evolution? Abiogenesis didn't require an energy source?

So, no, your list does not provide the conditions and events by which intelligent life emerged on Earth, much less provide the probability of those conditions and events having occurred elsewhere.

You didn't ask me for the latter. But are you serious? None of those things has anything to do with our presence here?

If we're talking about the fine-tuning argument, it doesn't deny the possibility of other natural explanations nor really say anything about complexity. It simply argues a higher likelihood of fine-tuning if a god exists than without a god.

It simply inserts a supernatural explanation which provides no explanatory power.

I don't understand your point here. It seems to me that proposing aliens as an explanation for buildings on Jupiter would be a rational process.

That's EXACTLY my point -- it would be a rational argument to propose aliens as an explanation for buildings on Jupiter. Does that argument deny the possibility of other natural explanations for the building? No, it simply argues that the most likely explanation is that an intelligent being capable of making a building is responsible for the building on Jupiter. That is very close in formulation to the fine-tuning argument.

That's not even remotely close. Aliens would have explanatory power.

But why wouldn't you include whatever it was that constrained the constants to particular values as part of the universe? We consider Gravity part of the universe, or the Big Bang part of the universe.

The gravitational constant (G) is one of the universal constants. Anything that could set the value of G would likely not be governed by gravity.

But gravity governs the movement of bodies with mass. Why not define the universe as everything that has mass so that everything else, like forces, would be not part of the universe and therefore supernatural?

I'm not sure how the Big Bang (which refers to the universe in its early hot, dense phase) is a valid example of something that could set the universal constants.

-Bri

The way in which symmetry broke at the time of and following the Big Bang set the four fundamental forces.

Linda

 

[Herzblut]

We certainly can directly sense gravity and acceleration.

No. You're orientation senses only function when you are on Earth's solid ground. The crew of the ISS, like everybody else who is in free fall, is weightlessly floating and has no sense of gravity. But please keep ignoring this disproof, for the sake of your intact self-righteousness.

If you think sensing the orientation of my head wrt to the center of mass of the Earth isn't directly sensing gravity, then is it also true that we can't directly see objects but only light reflecting off of them?

This is of course true. We don't even "see" anything, our brain construes an internal illusion of reality. Study Kant, try to understand what he refers to as the "thing as such", or however it translates, and why we don't have any access to it. Not intending to overburden you, of course.

 

[fls]

What part of my definition of god states that we cannot observe the interaction of a god with our world?

-Bri

We can observe the interaction. We cannot observe the God. The part where you said God was supernatural.

Linda

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

No. You're [sic] orientation senses only function when you are on Earth's solid ground.

First, that's not even literally true. (I'm in a house right now, sitting in a chair that's on a wooden floor supported by some wooden joists that spans a big hole in the ground and is supported on the two ends by a concrete foundation.)
Even going on what you meant to say (that I can only sense the orientation of a my head in relation to a large mass like the Earth when I'm relatively close to the surface of that large mass). . .
So? That's where humans evolved. I can also only see within a certain range of wavelengths and I can't hear at all in the vacuum of space. Does it follow that we can only detect sound by "observing" tiny changes in air pressure but are unable to directly perceive sound?

There is nothing analogous about the existence of gravity and the existence of God.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Not a problem. I still think that defining a term so that it only applies in a certain circumstance is special pleading though.



I don't think so. I've never had a common conception that a magic penny would have some sort of intelligent agent living inside it.



Well, it certainly succeeded in distracting from the discussion for a while if that was your intent. However, it didn't succeed in furthering your argument.



Organization? Please define that. Or more likely, redefine it to make it very specific so that the definition only applies to dualism lest I attempt to use it to describe something else.



It only violates the law of conservation of energy in the case of the mind/body problem and only then if you assume that the body is a closed system.



Please elaborate. What huge unexplainable gap does it leave?



It could be property dualism, neutral monism, or something else. I've never seen a reference that says that knowledge of how the supernatural interacts with the natural is impossible. Can you cite one please?



Leaving out that part of the description would not be special pleading. Putting it in is special pleading. You seem to be making an exception for one specific case without any justification other than you think that somehow calling something "magic" will make it seem irrational and you don't want things that you want to seem rational to also be called "magic." Why not just redefine the word "rational" to exclude belief in a god and be done with it?



OK, so here you've given one possible criteria for determining whether something is irrational: it lacks a causal account (by which I assume you to mean that the cause cannot be known).

Unfortunately, we've already established a lack of a causal account for other things such as quantum randomness, which I assume you feel are rational. At the same time, you haven't really given a valid reason why you feel that it is impossible for knowledge about the interaction between the supernatural and the natural to be known.



So now you seem to be qualifying your statement about a causal account -- that it only applies to organized (presumably meaning non-random) occurrences. You haven't really given a valid reason why it only applies to organized occurrences other than to eliminate quantum randomness from the "irrational" bin, which would amount to special pleading.

But of course gravity can't be explained and isn't random, so is that irrational?



That justification would apply to both organized and unorganized occurrences.



You already said that interaction between the supernatural and the natural is possible, which means that if it occurred, we could indeed observe it. Also, the coherence of the concept has already been established (that's what we mean by "it's possible."



Or neutral monism, or maybe something else. I'm just not convinced that the differences between materialism, neutral monism, property dualism, or something else support your assertion that belief that a personal god could interact with the natural world is irrational.



Maybe. Or maybe we don't currently have good ways to investigate their truth. But the same can be said of other things that you consider rational.



We've already agreed that both concepts are logically possible, so what do you mean by "physically possible" and why would that make the burden of evidence lower? Are you saying that there is a lower burden of evidence for the belief that teapots orbit Jupiter because it is physically possible?

And even if the burden of evidence was lower, there's no compelling evidence for either one. If there's no compelling evidence for something, there's no compelling evidence for it regardless of the burden of evidence.



You do realize "that is probable" implies a probability greater than 50%, right? So what sort of "circumstantial evidence" is there to conclude that, say, aliens are probable?



I see your point, but I don't accept that something being "physically possible" lowers the bar as far as evidence goes. If there were strong evidence for something that isn't currently considered "physically possible" we'd have to change the laws of physics just as we'd be inclined to believe anything for which there is strong evidence. If there is weak evidence, physically possible or otherwise, then we have no reason to assume that it's true, but we might still very well have an opinion about it.



I disagree. It appears to be an evidence issue that you're trying to special-plead out of by suggesting a higher burden of evidence for dualism but giving no concrete reasons why (nor even providing compelling evidence that dualism is required for the supernatural to interact with the natural).

-Bri

I prepared a long answer and my computer just ate it, so here's a quick list instead.

1. The definition of 'magic' is not special pleading. It is a definition, so by definition it cannot take the form of that logical error.

2. "Magic" meaning that something organized occurs in this world without a possible explanation is just the way that most people do use the term, so I am not supplying anything special here. A magic penny works by doing something organized -- like granting a wish, etc. It fits precisely the same pattern. If magic pennies caused random subatomic particles to arise, we wouldn't call it magic. It could be that quantum weirdness is magic by this definition, that there is some organized force behind the world responsible for it. But there is no way that we could know that. We distinguish between the random, stochastic occurrences at this level and 'magic' because the latter includes the idea of either organization or intentionality or both.


3. Mind-body dualism consists of two entities -- mind and body. We cannot see mind. We can only see its effects on body. So, the only way to distinguish between a material monist and dualist account of "mind" is to provide a causal account of how it works. By definition, dualism cannot provide a causal account, only material monism can; that is how we distinguish them. If dualism could provide a causal account, then it would not be dualism. This is a fundamental definition issue, not an issue of what we currently know and don't know.

4. Dualism that involves the spiritual has the same feature. If it interacted through a describable mechanism, then it would not be dualist (which, by definition cannot work through causal, describable mechanisms since that is material monism), it would be monism.

5. I never once said that a god interacting with the world is impossible. In fact, I said the opposite. What I said was that we could not provide a mechanism (causal account) for how a personal God worked in the world because that is what dualism means (and I used the word 'magic' to denote this interaction problem). If God is made of the same material as us, then there is no issue, but that is not dualism, that is monism. If God acts in the world we could use that as evidence for the existence of God, but we could not, by definition, understand the mechanism by which He did it because God is not material, so does not work by means of causal/material action. His action in the world would be magic, a miracle.

6. A personal God is defined by theists as immaterial, hence dualism, if we accept that there is a material world. If you want to argue with their definition, then I suggest you take it up with them. But I would support the contention because divinity is considered something "other". 'Fundamentally other' means more than one substance. If God is made of the same stuff as us, then there is no problem by definition. That's just monism.

7. Property dualism (and neutral monism) suffers from the issue of an unexplainable way for differing fundamental (not mechanistic, like differences between iron and cobalt, which does have an explanation) properties to show in one thing and not another. Once again, if a mechanism were explainable, then it wouldn't be property dualism; it would be different attributes of a single fundamental substance (like iron and cobalt differing because of their atomic number, etc.) in a straight monism.

8. Please stop confusing the not yet explained with the fundamentally unexplainable. If something can be explained then it follows the laws of physics and is physically possible and is material. You are stuck on the level of attributes, not the fundamental. This is about fundamental properties/substances not the attributes of those substances in differing quantities/combinations/etc.

9. This is not just an evidence issue. We are not discussing proofs here, but beliefs. We believe based on justifications. We use four major criteria for this -- logical possibility, physical possibility, coherence of ideas and how they fit together, and physical evidence. If something is logically possible but physically impossible we are inclined not to believe it even if there is evidence. Did you believe the photos that convinced Arthur Conan Doyle that faeries exist? But what if you saw an official NASA photo of a teapot orbiting Jupiter along with a story that someone thought it would be funny actually to put a teapot up there? I would consider that much better evidence to convince me to believe that a teapot was up there than a picture of a faerie whatever story went along with it. It will always take more evidence to convince me of faeries existence because they are, by definition, physically impossible (not an infinite amount of evidence, however, just more). Sure, it could be that we have the wrong definition of physically possible, but if that is the case, then faeries are physically possible, and we simply need to reorient our way of thinking. This doesn't change the fact that it is much more difficult for us to believe in the physically impossible than in the physically possible, given the same sort of evidence. If our picture of the world is wrong, then our picture of the world is wrong, and this predisposes us to errors.

10. By definition, God is not in the category of the physically possible or impossible, but he is logically possible. It is not rational to believe in something simply because it is logically possible. Certain definitions of God are coherent too, so that's on His side. So, we are stuck back with evidence. We need more evidence to think of God as existing than we do for something like life on extrasolar planets (just like we need more evidence to believe that faeries exist than to believe that there is a teapot circling Jupiter) because we can't discuss God as physically possible. I have logical arguments for a particular type of God, so there is plenty of evidence (or arguments) for some varieties of God. But we are discussing a personal God here, not a God that we can decide exists in monism. The Drake equation argument is a category error. God is not in the same category as intelligent life on other planets, so the analogy is not appropriate.

11. Why in the world would any theist object to the idea that belief in a personal God is irrational? I thought one of the pillars of religious belief was that it is based in faith and not on logical argument and evidence.

12. I have no clue what would lead you to believe that I think something random/stochastic is rational. The word does not apply to the random. Similarly, it is not special pleading to suggest that mechanism or causal account does not apply to things that are random. By definition, if something is random, there is no possible causal account. Let me remind you, we are not discussing the appearance of things here, but their fundamental nature; just because something appears random could simply mean that we don't have the knowledge to supply the causal account. I already mentioned previously that there is a distinction between the theory of quantum mechanics and the observation of (potentially, since we could arrive at a more fundamental account to explain quantum foam) quantum weirdness. There is no causal account for quantum weirdness within quantum mechanics. We have an uncertainty theorem, but that doesn't tell us why things are the way they are. Part of the reason that super smart people like Richard Feynman tell us that if we think we understand quantum mechanics then we don't is because of this issue.

13. Something unexplainable within materialism does not make materialism irrational. It means that there is something unexplainable. We don't know for sure that quantum weirdness is unexplainable, though. We know that we haven't got an explanation, but that differs from things that, by definition, we cannot provide an explanation.

 

[cj.23]

Honestly, I think you're asking the wrong question.

I mean, it would be like asking, who is more rational:

E.O. Wilson or Martin Gardner?

Both believers, Wilson a deist, Gardner a fideist. Was that your point?

cj x

 

[fls]

Except that there are no "receipts of electromagnetic radiation that contain information", are there? So the E.T. life hypothesis explains nothing.

It explains what we are looking for and why.

This is like me saying theism is explanatory because it would explain celestial messages from God.

Wouldn't it? We all have ideas about what we would consider evidence of God, don't we?

It's easier to start with stuff we already know exists, is all.

It's an explanatory hypothesis. Not all hypotheses are predictive, especially when the evidence is already known.

Give me an example of one that isn't.

As an explanatory hypothesis, it explains phenomena such as veridical NDE's, spiritual experiences, etc.

Only in a trivial way, though. It simply tacks a 'Goddidit' onto a hodge-podge of observations. It doesn't even provide a means of collecting those observations in a systematic manner. It's not like re-incarnation is a characteristic of the Judeo-Christian God.

Says you. Our knowledge about God is based on God. Your atheistic bias is showing. The most we can say is our knowledge of God may be based on an idea or come from God itself.

Yup, that's about it.

You say circular so many times, it's lost all meaning. It's not circular to claim that apparent spiritual experiences are actual spiritual experiences, anymore than it's circular to claim apparent spiritual experiences are not actual spiritual experiences. The God hypothesis claims these experiences are grounded in the reality of a supernatural being. The natrualistic hypothesis says they're not grounded in reality at all (other than just being manifestations of brain states). These are two very different claims, and neither one is circular.

There is no knowledge of God independent of the content of a collection of observations referred to as spiritual experiences.

There is knowledge of brain states independent of the contents of those brain states.

Who's claiming this? Many theists will tell you that you can gain knowledge about God by introspection or prayer.

These would be similar to the other things I referred to. If you can know about God by introspection or prayer, this still suggests a supernatural source for these thoughts (otherwise all you really know about is your own ideas).

Ok, so you're making a trivial point:
Take a guess.
About what?
I can't tell you anything about what you're guessing about because that would be a clue, wouldn't it?

I don't know what the point is here.

See below.

Wait, you already broke the rules with "building". I'm guessing whatever's inside the building is NOT Jupiter. Hey, I'm right! So much for "rarely"!

How many things are there that are "not Jupiter"? Have you now constrained the possibilities to two things so that your 'agnostic' p=0.5 will make sense?

So? I never claimed that the supernatural cannot interact with the natural world. A supernatural God can affect the natural world (NDE's, spiritual experiences, fine-tuning, etc.)

So we can know about NDE's, spiritual experiences, fine-tuning, etc., but not about God. So the question is, why make reference to this particular collection of natural events to serve as consequences of God?

If we had evidence the person was lying, on drugs at the time, schizophrenic, etc.

That sounds suspiciously like you are referring to a natural methodology. I was looking for your supernatural methodology.

Linda

 

[PixyMisa]

With an unanswerable question like this the noes will always have it.

What's the unanswerable question? Clearly not the one asked by the OP.

Well at least it's keeping the atheists off the streets and out of trouble for awhile trying to argue it.

Argue? More a question of sitting back and watching the cavalcade of logical fallacies.

 

[PixyMisa]

Ok, the existence of E.T. life is a hypothesis that explains nothing. The existence of God is a hypothesis that explains a lot of things.

The existence of God is not a hypothesis. You haven't even defined "God" yet.

God is based on nothing.

Correct!

God either does or does not exist, regardless of our ideas (unless God's existence is somehow contingent on our idea of God. That would be very strange!)

You haven't defined "God" yet. The question of God's existence is thus clearly contingent on our idea of God.

The existence of God provides an explanation for veridical NDE accounts

An undefined explanation for nonexistent events. Terrific.

they're supernatural events (e.g., a person's soul leaving the body at near-death).

Evidence for any of this?

If God does not exist, then these are not supernatural events.

Non-sequitur.

And how does "God exists" NOT explain spiritual experiences?

You tell me. Define "God". Define "exists" with relation to "God".

If God exists, then these spiritual experiences are almost certainly genuine.

Non-sequitur.

If God does not exist, then these experiences are just byproducts of the brain or wishful thinking.

Non-sequitur.

And, of course, in the fine-tuning case, "God exists" explains the precise values of the constants needed for a life-permitting universe better than chance alone.

Non-sequitur.

Fun, isn't it?

Methodology would be HOW the accounts are obtained (interviews with NDE survivors, children, etc.) "God exists" would explain WHY these accounts exist in the first place: people have mystical experiences because a mystical being exists.

Non-sequitur.

If you could show that these things happen (they don't), and you had an operational definition of God (you don't), then you could form a hypothesis connecting the two and test it.

Until then, several things can be said:

"God exists" is not a meaningful statement.
Therefore, there can be no evidence for the existence of God. You can't have evidence for an undefined entity.
The events you are claiming as evidence do not happen.
Therefore, even if you had a definition for "God", you would still have no evidence for the existence of God.

 

[Bri]

Well, a period of inflation a tiny tiny fraction of a second after the Big Bang could be responsible for the flatness of the Universe (and the associated Omega constant, the ratio of the density of the Universe to the critical density). It could also remove one of those fine-tuning arguments. But I'm not gonna pretend I know all that much about this.

My point was that I don't think it's unreasonable to assume that a being that is able to set all of the constants wouldn't be governed by those constants (i.e. wouldn't be constrained by the natural universe).

-Bri

 

[articulett]

Honestly, I think you're asking the wrong question.

I mean, it would be like asking, who is more rational:

E.O. Wilson or Martin Gardner?

I think it's exactly the right question... If a person cannot answer how a belief in god(s) is more rational than a belief in demon(s), then I shall presume that it is not more rational.

If there is nothing which distinguishes the statement "god exists" from "the ipu exists" as far as evidence is concerned, then I shall conclude they are equally unfalsifiable, somewhat incoherent, "irrational" claims. I shall treat belief in god the same way I treat belief in all other invisible forms of conscious that are purported to exist--I shall treat them as myths, legends, personifications, illusions, delusions, and/or confirmation of indoctrination biases. I don't see evidence that makes a god more likely than sprites. I'm sure believers can be rational in all sorts of areas of their life, but I don't consider belief in invisible forms of consciousness to be rational. Despite eons of belief, we have no such evidence for such entities, and lots of evidence that people invent such. They are told it's good to believe in one such entity labeled "God". But I don't think this god is any more likely than all the entities that go by different labels-- "the ghost of Aunt Mary", "angels", "goblins", etc.

I cannot see a good reason to treat god belief differently than these beliefs. I see no reason to be more "on the fence" about gods than about all the other purported invisible entities that people use as explanations to explain that which they don't understand. God might be a comforting belief or one that someone hangs on to out of fear-- but that doesn't mean that it's more rational to believe in god than any other "spirit being". I'm not sure people control what they "believe in" or not. At one time I guess I believed, but it's hard to say exactly what it was I believed in. I guess I believed someone was listening to my prayers or watching out for me--after all, I had been told that by the people I loved and trusted most in the world. But that is no longer good enough or a rational reason for me to believe. I don't care what people believe, but I don't find god belief "rational"--even when normally rational people profess belief.