Can theists be rational?

[Bri]

Oops, my mistake. I should have included the idea of an organizing or organized force behind it. I thought that I had,but I obviously didn't. That is certainly the way that I meant it to be expressed.

Not a problem. I still think that defining a term so that it only applies in a certain circumstance is special pleading though.

There is always some organizing force behind such "things" even in the common conception of them.

I don't think so. I've never had a common conception that a magic penny would have some sort of intelligent agent living inside it.

Well, I did mean it to be controversial. Did it work?

Well, it certainly succeeded in distracting from the discussion for a while if that was your intent. However, it didn't succeed in furthering your argument.

Why not use the word 'unexplainable' -- because there is more to it, specifically that a discussion of dualism includes the idea that the unexplainable involves some sort of organization and that organization interacts with the world through unexplainable means.

Organization? Please define that. Or more likely, redefine it to make it very specific so that the definition only applies to dualism lest I attempt to use it to describe something else.

While that interaction is logically possible, it seems to violate the laws of physics (it certainly violates the law of conservation of energy).

It only violates the law of conservation of energy in the case of the mind/body problem and only then if you assume that the body is a closed system.

The only way out of that dilemma is to suggest that we do not live within a closed system, or that humans are not a closed system for the mind-body problem. But that still leaves a huge unexplainable gap.

Please elaborate. What huge unexplainable gap does it leave?

To repeat, if we can find a mechanism for how such a thing would work, then we are not discussing actual dualism, since mechanism is defined as a causal account for how things occur. If there is a causal accout, then it's materialism.

It could be property dualism, neutral monism, or something else. I've never seen a reference that says that knowledge of how the supernatural interacts with the natural is impossible. Can you cite one please?

I am not special pleading. I simply left out part of the description initially.

Leaving out that part of the description would not be special pleading. Putting it in is special pleading. You seem to be making an exception for one specific case without any justification other than you think that somehow calling something "magic" will make it seem irrational and you don't want things that you want to seem rational to also be called "magic." Why not just redefine the word "rational" to exclude belief in a god and be done with it?

The point is that we can describe a mechanism for differences that arise for material objects. When we invoke the word 'mechanism' that is what we mean -- that we can provide a causal account (based in observation and repeatable through scientific investigation). We may not have all the details, but at least a causal account is possible. Where is the causal account for dualism, whatever the flavor?

By definition we cannot know the cause/mechanism of uncaused causes -- that is one of my points.

OK, so here you've given one possible criteria for determining whether something is irrational: it lacks a causal account (by which I assume you to mean that the cause cannot be known).

Unfortunately, we've already established a lack of a causal account for other things such as quantum randomness, which I assume you feel are rational. At the same time, you haven't really given a valid reason why you feel that it is impossible for knowledge about the interaction between the supernatural and the natural to be known.

By definition we cannot know the cause/mechanism of uncaused causes -- that is one of my points.

The point is that for organized occurrences, it is irrational to believe them if a rational mechanism cannot be provided (note I said 'cannot' and not 'has not yet been').

So now you seem to be qualifying your statement about a causal account -- that it only applies to organized (presumably meaning non-random) occurrences. You haven't really given a valid reason why it only applies to organized occurrences other than to eliminate quantum randomness from the "irrational" bin, which would amount to special pleading.

But of course gravity can't be explained and isn't random, so is that irrational?

One of the many meanings of rational is "reasonable to believe" or "having reason". If we cannot reason to a cause, why is it rational to accept the offered 'explanation', which is no explanation of something like 'well, the mind controls the body but we can't explain it'? Reasonable to believe rests on justification. Good justification -- reasonable to believe.

That justification would apply to both organized and unorganized occurrences.

Justification depends on observable evidence and coherence of the concepts/logical analysis.

You already said that interaction between the supernatural and the natural is possible, which means that if it occurred, we could indeed observe it. Also, the coherence of the concept has already been established (that's what we mean by "it's possible."

For a personal God we must also admit that some form of dualism comes into play (either substance or property dualism).

Or neutral monism, or maybe something else. I'm just not convinced that the differences between materialism, neutral monism, property dualism, or something else support your assertion that belief that a personal god could interact with the natural world is irrational.

And since dualisms involve an unexplainable interaction, they are more suspect -- we simply don't have good ways to investigate their truth.

Maybe. Or maybe we don't currently have good ways to investigate their truth. But the same can be said of other things that you consider rational.

Belief in God is not in the same category as belief in something more mundane, like the existence of intelligent life elsewhere in the universe (something that is both logically and physically possible), for which the burden of evidence is not as high (we are always more inclined to believe the logically and physically possible if we have decent enough evidence).

We've already agreed that both concepts are logically possible, so what do you mean by "physically possible" and why would that make the burden of evidence lower? Are you saying that there is a lower burden of evidence for the belief that teapots orbit Jupiter because it is physically possible?

And even if the burden of evidence was lower, there's no compelling evidence for either one. If there's no compelling evidence for something, there's no compelling evidence for it regardless of the burden of evidence.

The reason that we have been trying to make these distinctions, in part, is because different categories of existence require different types of evidence. For the physically possible, circumstantial evidence is often good enough to move us from non-belief to "that is probable" (where there are variations in degree of probability).

You do realize "that is probable" implies a probability greater than 50%, right? So what sort of "circumstantial evidence" is there to conclude that, say, aliens are probable?

When it comes to God, however, the burden of proof is much higher. If the same person told you that they had also talked to God yesterday, you'd most likely conclude not only that they most likely did not talk to God but they are probably lying or somehow mistaken about the Heidi Klum sighting. Few people take personal reports as definitive evidence, but that relatively weak evidence is more likely to move us if the event under discussion is physically possible than if it is just logically possible (but not physically impossible, which is where I think God fits, as opposed to faeries or Santa Claus where the burden of proof is even higher).

I see your point, but I don't accept that something being "physically possible" lowers the bar as far as evidence goes. If there were strong evidence for something that isn't currently considered "physically possible" we'd have to change the laws of physics just as we'd be inclined to believe anything for which there is strong evidence. If there is weak evidence, physically possible or otherwise, then we have no reason to assume that it's true, but we might still very well have an opinion about it.

My whole point in discussing the dualism issue was to highlight this difference -- the cateogry differences. This isn't just an evidence issue. There are more fudamental issues at play that influence the burden of proof.

I disagree. It appears to be an evidence issue that you're trying to special-plead out of by suggesting a higher burden of evidence for dualism but giving no concrete reasons why (nor even providing compelling evidence that dualism is required for the supernatural to interact with the natural).

-Bri

 

[PixyMisa]

Again, this will depend on the person. For me, God is credible and believable.

How can you possibly know that, if you don't even know what it is?

If someone thinks God is unbelievable, they should either have evidence or a good reason to support their view.

Okay, sure, no problem. Define this God thingy for us, and we'll tell you why we don't believe it exists.

And whether we're at probable or not will depend on the metaphysical views of whatever person you're asking.

No, your views are irrelevant.

You can't prove an idealist or materialist wrong, and one is likely to think God is very probable while the other will think God is very improbable.

Some forms of idealism are demonstrably wrong; the others are isomorphic with materialism. God is problematic in any case, even if we were by some strange chance to stumble upon a coherent definition.

Again, this goes back to the claim I made earlier: A supporter of a multiverse theory certainly doesn't have to provide a specific defintion of the universes they believe in.

They have to define what a universe is, though.

A supporter of E.T. life doesn't have to describe the aliens which they believe exist.

They have to define what life is, though.

I'm fine with God as supernatural being(s).

What, anything at all? The IPU? The FSM?

Some people would go further: God as very powerful supernatural being, just as a supporter of E.T. life may go further by claiming aliens are carbon-based life-forms (in fact, I bet many supporters of E.T. life would claim just this thing: if they think alien life may not be carbon-based, not only are they in the realm of pure speculation, they're going against all known biological evidence).

Ahem. Evidence. Yes. Something you are distinctly lacking.

Then just go with God as powerful supernatural being. There is no evidence against that, just as there is no evidence against the claim carbon-based E.T. life exists (as opposed to E.T. life exists).

We have an example of carbon-based life forms. We know the requirements for life to arise - stars and planets, to start with. We see plenty of stars and planets.

There is absolutely zero evidence for any sort of supernatural anything. There's no evidence against it, no, because you haven't "supernatural" is not a definition. (Much less an operational definition, which I pointed out is what you require before you can talk about evidence.)

What does this powerful supernatural being do?

Evidence can't be post hoc. A hypothesis or theory about the evidence can be post hoc (which I think is what you're trying to say). My claim is that certain subjective experiences are evidence for God.

You can't make that claim. You haven't defined "God" yet.

Stumbled? Hypnosi and I must have used this dozens of times in another thread about why idealism is more parsimonious than materialism: God is an extrapolation from what we know exists (mind).

Nope. It's a post-hoc rationalisation, and a really bad one.

Matter can't even be called an extrapolation.

Right. It's not an extrapolation, it's a fact.

There is zero evidence that external objects made of some physical substance exist.

Then you won't mind at all if I hit you over the head with one, will you?

There is sense data, but that sense data is consistent with non-materialistic models of reality, and therefore, can't be considered to be evidence for the existence of physical objects.

Nope. Sense data is not consistent with any non-materialistic model of reality. We can trace sense data from subatomic interactions all the way to sociological implications, and it's all material, all the time.

Anyway, that is the gist of the argument Hypnosi and I were making.

Which was, and remains, purest tripe.

I started off agreeing with you, but now I'm not so sure. Suppose we think other universes actually exist (a rational belief).

How is it rational?

Do we know anything at all about these universes?

No. We can only speculate.

We don't even know what kinds of physical laws they have.

No, we don't.

Is it possible there's a force we can't even conceive that exists in these other universes?

No.

Is it possible that some don't have gravity at all?

Probably not - if you are talking cosmology and not just making stuff up.

But let's assume that God requires a greater degree of extrapolation.

You can't extrapolate an undefined entity.

"God exists", as a theory

It's not a theory. At this point, it's not even a coherent statement.

has an advantage over "E.T. life exists". "God exists" has greater explanatory power than "aliens exist".

"God exists" has no explanatory power whatsoever.

"Aliens exist" explains nothing because there is no evidence to be explained.

Yeah, how about that. We have no evidence for aliens, which is why we're looking for evidence.

"God exists" explains a number of interesting phenemena:

As I noted earlier, "God exists" cannot explain anything.

But show us your phenomena. Go on, surprise me.

Veridical NDE accounts

Don't exist.

Subjective spiritual experiences

There's no such thing. There are spiritual interpretations of subjective experiences, and they are post-hoc explanations themselves, and cannot serve as evidence for anything.

Anecdotal supernatural experiences

Oh, good grief. Stories about other people's post-hoc explanations of subjective experiences? This is what you call evidence?

Children's accounts of living past lives

Do not stand up to the most cursory examination.

I'm not claiming that "God exists" explains these completely, or is the only theory on the table, but it is a competing theory to the naturalistic accounts.

No. It's not a theory; it's not even a coherent statement; it explains nothing; and your supposed evidence doesn't exist either.

"Aliens exist" is pure spculation which explains nothing. Yet the belief in alien life is rational, but the belief in God is irrational?

If you could show me one god, I would be a lot more open to the possibility of the existence of other gods. Until then...

 

[PixyMisa]

Well, here we are folks. Page 50 (well, it's page 50 for me). I think the noes have it.

 

[Bri]

I noticed you quip that according to wikipedia the KCA has 'fatal flaws'. How quaint! How wrong!

I'm sorry, but the fact that Wikipedia mentions of some of the objections to the KCA does not make those objections invalid. You can't simply ignore the several premises that are assumed without evidence. You also can't ignore what I find to be the most important problem with the KCA as an argument for the existence of a god, which is that even if you accept the premises, it doesn't in any way conclude the existence of God as the first cause.

It solves infinite regression neatly!

No, it assumes as a premise that an actual infinite cannot exist, but provides little evidence to back it up.

-Bri

 

[Belz...]

How can we possibly observe a god interacting with our world, when you say that by definition we cannot observe a god interacting with our world?

Don't you love that, though ? Irrevocable proof that such beings cannot exist.

 

[Belz...]

You take much artistic license with language.

What ? What part of "difficulty" was too hard for you to understand ? Please don't project your inability to read my posts on me.

I did not say you said you assumed I said you said, and please save your lectures for someone that wants to hear it.

I never say that anything is 100% certain

I never said you did. I simply said that I don't need to be 100% sure of something to claim it. Otherwise nothing could be claimed. Ever.

Sure you were.

Indeed I was. Why would I lie ? Or did you fail to understand the joke even after I told you it was a joke ?

Uh huh

What is that supposed to mean, now ? You seem to be the kind of person who reads posts diagonally, makes a knee-jerk reply, and when caught misreading, attempt to shift the blame to the other guy. Real classy.

I have a MA in comparative theology and can tell you with confidence that the bible is a manual that describes how to save your soul everything else is secondary.

Only there is no soul, so it's not really useful at all, is it ?

I love you I do not hate anyone.

You don't know me. Ergo you don't love me. Just because the bibble says you should doesn't mean you do.

I may not like your attitude nor your beliefs because I know they will harm you, so sorry if you do not understand that.

They will only harm me if your specific set of faiths are true.

 

[westprog]

Don't you love that, though? Irrevocable proof that such beings cannot exist.

Irrevocable proof? When I hear the words "irrevocable proof" on a philosophy forum I reach for my scepticism.

 

[Roma]

Well, here we are folks. Page 50 (well, it's page 50 for me). I think the noes have it.

With an unanswerable question like this the noes will always have it.

Well at least it's keeping the atheists off the streets and out of trouble for awhile trying to argue it.

 

[westprog]

With an unanswerable question like this the noes will always have it.

Well at least it's keeping the atheists off the streets and out of trouble for awhile trying to argue it.

If Pixy Misa had come up with any other answer after any number of pages, that might have been genuine evidence of God.

 

[fls]

Except that one theory has no explanatory power and the other theory does.

Neither of these ideas is a theory. The search for intelligent aliens is based on a hypothesis. God is based on an idea. This means that if we wish to compare the two, we need to compare the characteristics of hypotheses and those of ideas. One characteristic would be 'those which are eventually shown to be true'. The proportion of hypotheses shown eventually to be true is probably in the range of 25 to 50%. The proportion of ideas shown to be true is probably less than 1%.

The point here is that God is possible and logically coherent, there is evidence for God, and God explains certain phenemona that science has a hard time with.

A theory provides a useful explanation. This is why God isn't a theory, nor is it a hypothesis. It only serves as an explanation in a trivial or circular manner.

Unless you have a very good reason, or compelling evidence, there is no reason to assign Pr("God exists") an arbitrarily low value. That would just reveal an atheistic bias.

The reason is that guesses in the absence of clues are rarely, if ever, right. And you already told us that, by definition, no clues are available about the nature of God, since we cannot make reference to any natural events. RevDisturba and cj and you have brought up the idea that clues are provided by reference to prophesy, mysticism, veridical NDE accounts, subjective spiritual experiences, anecdotal supernatural experiences, and children's accounts of living past lives. If you wish for us to consider these valid ways of knowing, simply provide a methodology by which you would discover which experiences are not legitimate experiences of the supernatural.

Linda

 

[GStan]

If Pixy Misa had come up with any other answer after any number of pages, that might have been genuine evidence of God.

Its more rational to come up with the answer, whatever that may be, by using genuine evidence, rather than the other way around.

 

[Malerin]

Neither of these ideas is a theory. The search for intelligent aliens is based on a hypothesis.

Ok, the existence of E.T. life is a hypothesis that explains nothing. The existence of God is a hypothesis that explains a lot of things.

God is based on an idea.

God is based on nothing. God either does or does not exist, regardless of our ideas (unless God's existence is somehow contingent on our idea of God. That would be very strange!)

This means that if we wish to compare the two, we need to compare the characteristics of hypotheses and those of ideas. One characteristic would be 'those which are eventually shown to be true'. The proportion of hypotheses shown eventually to be true is probably in the range of 25 to 50%. The proportion of ideas shown to be true is probably less than 1%.

What? When did you have time to survey all ideas and hypotheses ever thought of AND determine whether they were true or not? Considering the infinite number of mathematical ideas that are true (2+2=4) and false (2+2=5), I think you're going to be spending a long time trying to prove this.

A theory provides a useful explanation. This is why God isn't a theory, nor is it a hypothesis. It only serves as an explanation in a trivial or circular manner.

The existence of God provides an explanation for veridical NDE accounts: they're supernatural events (e.g., a person's soul leaving the body at near-death). If God does not exist, then these are not supernatural events. And how does "God exists" NOT explain spiritual experiences? If God exists, then these spiritual experiences are almost certainly genuine. If God does not exist, then these experiences are just byproducts of the brain or wishful thinking. And, of course, in the fine-tuning case, "God exists" explains the precise values of the constants needed for a life-permitting universe better than chance alone.

The reason is that guesses in the absence of clues are rarely, if ever, right.

Not true at all. Suppose you got turned around in the forest and had to guess which way was North. Are you rarely going to get it right, even though you have a 25% of... getting it right? Suppose you have to guess which side a coin will land. You have a 50% chance of getting it right just by guessing. That hardly qualifies as "rarely".

And you already told us that, by definition, no clues are available about the nature of God, since we cannot make reference to any natural events.

Huh? When did I claim that?

RevDisturba and cj and you have brought up the idea that clues are provided by reference to prophesy, mysticism, veridical NDE accounts, subjective spiritual experiences, anecdotal supernatural experiences, and children's accounts of living past lives.

Right...

If you wish for us to consider these valid ways of knowing, simply provide a methodology by which you would discover which experiences are not legitimate experiences of the supernatural.

Methodology would be HOW the accounts are obtained (interviews with NDE survivors, children, etc.) "God exists" would explain WHY these accounts exist in the first place: people have mystical experiences because a mystical being exists.

 

[TriskettheKid]

I honestly don't get this.

Rationality exists independent of a theistic stance.

One can be an irrational atheist, just as one can also be a rational atheist. One can be a rational theist, just as one can be an irrational theist.

What is the problem?

 

[Lord Emsworth]

The existence of God provides an explanation for veridical NDE accounts: they're supernatural events (e.g., a person's soul leaving the body at near-death). If God does not exist, then these are not supernatural events. And how does "God exists" NOT explain spiritual experiences? If God exists, then these spiritual experiences are almost certainly genuine. If God does not exist, then these experiences are just byproducts of the brain or wishful thinking. And, of course, in the fine-tuning case, "God exists" explains the precise values of the constants needed for a life-permitting universe better than chance alone.

I hope you don't think that saying "It is a supernatural event" or some such is an explanation? How does God explain "veridical NDE accounts," "spiritual experiences," or "fine tuning?"

All that I see is the claim of an explanation, but the explanations themselves are of course absent. Which is hardly surprising, because useful explantions usually impose limits upon that which is explained, and most importantly make that which is explained, in principle, falsifiable. An explanation for why the designer used constant X and not constant Y in his/her/its (there doesn't even seem to be a proper pronoun for God) fine tuning, would for example include a statement that Y could not be used for some reason or other. And we can't have "can not"s or "could not"s, or falsifiability, or can we?

 

[fls]

Ok, the existence of E.T. life is a hypothesis that explains nothing.

It is a hypothesis that would explain the receipt of electromagnetic radiation that contains information.

The existence of God is a hypothesis that explains a lot of things.

Can you name a thing that it predicts in a manner that the absence of that thing would falsify the hypothesis?

God is based on nothing. God either does or does not exist, regardless of our ideas (unless God's existence is somehow contingent on our idea of God. That would be very strange!)

Our knowledge about God is based on an idea.

What? When did you have time to survey all ideas and hypotheses ever thought of AND determine whether they were true or not? Considering the infinite number of mathematical ideas that are true (2+2=4) and false (2+2=5), I think you're going to be spending a long time trying to prove this.

Actually, this is a topic well worth discussion, but I never seem to get any bites on it.

Here's a start, anyway.

http://medicine.plosjournals.org/perlserv/?request=get-document&doi=10.1371/journal.pmed.0020124

The existence of God provides an explanation for veridical NDE accounts: they're supernatural events (e.g., a person's soul leaving the body at near-death). If God does not exist, then these are not supernatural events.

Right. An entirely circular explanation and therefore useless.

And how does "God exists" NOT explain spiritual experiences?

It does - in a trivial and useless manner. I never denied that.

If God exists, then these spiritual experiences are almost certainly genuine. If God does not exist, then these experiences are just byproducts of the brain or wishful thinking.

Right. So they cannot provide any independent knowledge about God. And we have no knowledge about God without reference to these events.

And, of course, in the fine-tuning case, "God exists" explains the precise values of the constants needed for a life-permitting universe better than chance alone.

But again, I specified that we were speaking of useful explanations, not useless explanations.

Not true at all. Suppose you got turned around in the forest and had to guess which way was North. Are you rarely going to get it right, even though you have a 25% of... getting it right?

Because you've already given me a whole bunch of clues by telling me I'm in a forest (i.e. on the surface of the earth (which is roughly spherical and large), not near the poles) and that you are making reference to a system that divides direction into 4 quadrants on a 2-D surface, so you've already greatly constrained my choices as to direction.

Suppose you have to guess which side a coin will land. You have a 50% chance of getting it right just by guessing. That hardly qualifies as "rarely".

Again, you've already given me a whole bunch of clues by making reference to an object with two-surfaces landing onto another surface so that one side is exposed. This greatly constrains my choices.

Try answering the question I posed to you earlier about guessing what was inside a large building without any windows, to get an idea of what I'm talking about.

Huh? When did I claim that?

When you said that God was supernatural.

Methodology would be HOW the accounts are obtained (interviews with NDE survivors, children, etc.) "God exists" would explain WHY these accounts exist in the first place: people have mystical experiences because a mystical being exists.

That's not what I meant. I asked you what methodology you would use to determine which of these accounts are not legitimate experiences of the supernatural.

Linda

 

[fls]

I honestly don't get this.

Rationality exists independent of a theistic stance.

One can be an irrational atheist, just as one can also be a rational atheist. One can be a rational theist, just as one can be an irrational theist.

What is the problem?

Rational in reference to a theistic stance.

Linda

 

[TriskettheKid]

Rational in reference to a theistic stance.

Linda

If that is the case, then it doesn't change things all that much.

An atheist is irrational when he claims to "know" there is no god (or gods). Likewise, the theist is being irrational when the claims to "know" that there is a god (or gods).

In that instance, the only purely rational stance to take would be that of the agnostic, in more of a "I don't know" position.

But once you get to "belief", then it gets to a point where you are back to having rational and irrational theists and atheists.

If an atheist claims to "believe" that there is no god (or gods), then that is taking a rational approach, since no statement of fact is being made. Likewise, it is rational when a theist claims to "believe" that there is a god (or gods).

But now we start to get bogged down in semantics, when it all goes back to what I said earlier, and what I'm sure was said elsewhere in this 50-page thread:

One can be a rational atheist, just as one can be an irrational atheist. One can be a rational theist, just as one can be an irrational theist. Not all atheists are rational, and not all theists are irrational.

 

[fls]

If that is the case, then it doesn't change things all that much.

Sure it does.

As far as 'rational' goes, we are referring to those things that are logically coherent and empirically grounded.

An atheist is irrational when he claims to "know" there is no god (or gods). Likewise, the theist is being irrational when the claims to "know" that there is a god (or gods).

I think the atheist claims that methodological naturalism is overwhelmingly useful. The 'no god' part is simply a consequence of recognizing that usefulness, not a claim of knowledge. The theist claims to find supernaturalism useful. I suspect it mostly reflects a difference in how 'useful' is considered. It's probably not fair when the discussion takes place on the internet (a consequence of methodologic naturalism), since that reveals a particular bias right off the bat.

In that instance, the only purely rational stance to take would be that of the agnostic, in more of a "I don't know" position.

The agnostic claims that they don't know how to figure out if something is useful.

Linda

 

[Bri]

I dunno. That's what they say at the SETI site, but can you really trust a bunch of know-nothing pseudo-scientists?

Yeah, well I did look on the SETI site and couldn't find a reference to being able to identify specific planets or even stars that are likely to contain life, so can you post a citation please?

And, of course, I never said that people who work for SETI are pseudo-scientists, only that what SETI is doing is pseudo-science.

And by the way, even if they are able to target planets that they feel are more likely to contain alien intelligence, that doesn't mean those planets are likely to contain alien intelligence. Nor does it have any bearing on the differences that I've already outlined between what SETI does and science. SETI concerns itself with searching for something for which there is no compelling evidence, to prove a hypothesis which is unfalsifiable and which doesn't explain any observation.

Then I have to ask just what you think a logical argument is?

A logical argument is a set of one or more propositions known as the premises along with another proposition known as the conclusion. A deductive argument (such as the fine-tuning argument) asserts that the truth of the conclusion is a logical consequence of the premises. An argument is valid if the truth of the conclusion is a logical consequence of the premises. An argument is sound if it is a valid argument with true premises.

A logical argument is seldom considered compelling scientific evidence unless it is a sound argument (there is compelling evidence supporting all of the premises).

I meant the argument that fine-tuning supports the presence of a fine-tuner. That seems to be an argument presented by scientist believers.

Some believers who present such arguments are scientists, but I don't think many would agree that the argument would be considered compelling scientific evidence without compelling evidence for the premises.

Then I have to ask just what you think 'begging the question' is?

Assuming the conclusion in one or more of the premises is begging the question.

Assuming that the conclusion is necessarily true by assuming that the premises are necessarily true would be a fallacy, but is not an example of begging the question.

In the case in question, I stated that in my opinion, looking for something for which there is no evidence for the purposes of proving an unfalsifiable hypothesis that doesn't explain any observation isn't a scientific endeavor. That's not a fallacy at all -- it's just my opinion. You may disagree if you like, but understand the implications of accepting that sort of endeavor as valid science.

So you explicitly assumed the search for aliens had the characteristics of 'not science' in order to assume that the search for aliens was 'not science'.

Assumed, no. But yes, I stated characteristics of the search for aliens that I feel together distinguishes it from legitimate scientific inquiry.

If a careful and thorough search of the galaxy revealed no patterned electromagnetic radiation, would we not alter our conclusions about the possibility of intelligent aliens in our galaxy?

How do you propose to do a careful search of the galaxy? The galaxy is a very large place. So, no, we could not practically falsify the hypothesis by searching the galaxy.

Would the hypothesis not explain the observation of an information containing electromagnetic transmission?

If one had ever been observed, sure. But there has never been an information containing electromagnetic transmission from outer space observed, so the hypothesis does not explain any observation.

Does that matter? Science hardly confines itself to studying only what we already know.

Rarely does science guess at something for which there is no other evidence unless it would provide a compelling explanation of known observations. So in combination with the other characteristics I listed, yes it matters that there is no evidence of aliens. Looking for something for which there is no evidence for the purposes of proving an unfalsifiable hypothesis that doesn't explain any observation isn't a scientific endeavor, in my opinion.

But how is that relevant? If I perform a research study in order to test a new drug, no one suggests that I can't proceed until I already know what the results of my testing will be.

Nor did I. Testing new drugs involves falsifiable hypothesis that explain known observations.

Aren't you putting the cart before the horse? The point of hypothesis testing is to suggest that we search for an observation that could only be explained (or could be best explained) by our idea.

The point of hypothesis testing is generally to be able to gather evidence both for or against the hypothesis. You can't gather evidence against an unfalsifiable hypothesis.

Why would you search for something that you already have compelling evidence of? Wouldn't that be redundant?

No. Scientists search for dinosaur bones all the time, even though they already know that dinosaur bones exist. They do so in order to find evidence to provide evidence for or against falsifiable hypotheses that explain known observations.

I have spent 47 pages saying that that is exactly what we shouldn't be doing.

And yet you seem to be saying that it's perfectly valid science to look for something for which there is no evidence for the purposes of proving an unfalsifiable hypothesis that doesn't explain any observation.

I have to ask. Do you have any experience whatsoever with Science or the Scientific Method?

Many years of it. How about you?

But we're not really talking about searching an infinite universe, but rather this galaxy. And even then, we're starting closer to home and then moving outward.

There is no compelling evidence that aliens would be closer to home. The reason to search closer to home is strictly for convenience. The galaxy, while perhaps not theoretically impossible to search, is (at least currently) practically impossible to search. And we have very little if any evidence that would help narrow the search that would make the hypothesis practically falsifiable.

Examples:
Solid surface
Energy source
Solvent
Organic materials
Transmissible characteristics
Variation
Selection

You said:

We know the conditions under which intelligent life was formed here.​

Are you claiming that the list above represents the conditions under which intelligent life formed here?

I'm curious as to why you have this idea that if we are uncertain about something, we are uncertain about everything?

I don't know where you got that from, but it wasn't from me. What I did say was that for an equation such as the Drake equation, we cannot be certain about the result unless we are certain about all of the terms. In this particular case, we are not certain about any of the terms, and only have a reasonable amount of compelling evidence to support numbers for one of them (the number of stars). Others have much less evidence to support them, and many have little if any compelling evidence to support them.

So, no, your list does not provide the conditions and events by which intelligent life emerged on Earth, much less provide the probability of those conditions and events having occurred elsewhere.

Well, we started by inserting supernatural causes wherever we saw complexity. This was gradually supplanted by removing complexity through recourse to natural causes. If you wish to go back to inserting supernatural causes, you are back to maintaining, rather than removing complexity.

If we're talking about the fine-tuning argument, it doesn't deny the possibility of other natural explanations nor really say anything about complexity. It simply argues a higher likelihood of fine-tuning if a god exists than without a god.

I don't understand your point here. It seems to me that proposing aliens as an explanation for buildings on Jupiter would be a rational process.

That's EXACTLY my point -- it would be a rational argument to propose aliens as an explanation for buildings on Jupiter. Does that argument deny the possibility of other natural explanations for the building? No, it simply argues that the most likely explanation is that an intelligent being capable of making a building is responsible for the building on Jupiter. That is very close in formulation to the fine-tuning argument.

But why wouldn't you include whatever it was that constrained the constants to particular values as part of the universe? We consider Gravity part of the universe, or the Big Bang part of the universe.

The gravitational constant (G) is one of the universal constants. Anything that could set the value of G would likely not be governed by gravity.

I'm not sure how the Big Bang (which refers to the universe in its early hot, dense phase) is a valid example of something that could set the universal constants.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

How can we possibly observe a god interacting with our world, when you say that by definition we cannot observe a god interacting with our world?

What part of my definition of god states that we cannot observe the interaction of a god with our world?

-Bri