Can theists be rational?

[Bri]

Nice attempt at distraction, but you're wrong about the "approximate" stuff. The probability is 1:6. The ratio only means that there is one possible successful outcome and 6 equally likely possible total outcomes. The probability of tails on a fair coin is 1:2--in fact, that is the definition of a "fair" coin.

The question you asked was "On a regular die, what is the probability of rolling a '3'?"

It's more than a little ironic that your argument assumes the existence of a "fair" die when no such thing actually exists.

I would be willing to bet that of the thousands of times you've rolled a die in your lifetime, there has never been a single time that the probability of your rolling a "3" was exactly 1:6 due if nothing else than to imperfections in the die.

Without that numerical probability, the argument boils down to, "God is possible, therefore God is possible."

The argument is just saying that if you accept the premise that the chances of a life-supporting universe are greater with a god than without one, it can be concluded that the chances of a god existing in our universe is more likely than if our universe didn't support life.

How great those chances are depend entirely on the probabilities you assign in the premise. It's similar to Drake's equation in that regard. If you feel that any probability assigned is speculation, as with an argument based on Drake's equation, you are simply objecting to the premise that assigns the probability.

-Bri

 

[Darat]

...snip...

The argument is just saying that if you accept the premise that the chances of a life-supporting universe are greater with a god than without one, it can be concluded that the chances of a god existing in our universe is more likely than if our universe didn't support life.

...snip...

Which as Joe summarised earlier is the same as saying:

"God is possible, therefore God is possible."

 

[articulett]

Yep.

The semantics of the silly.

The chief tool for justification of all woo.

 

[Malerin]

"God is possible, therefore God is possible."

You're sooo close. Just a few more baby steps:

"God is possible, the universe is fine-tuned, therefore God is possible probable."

 

[Darat]

You're sooo close. Just a few more baby steps:

The only baby steps that could get me to accept that "God is possible, the universe is fine-tuned, therefore God is possible probable" is a logical argument would be for someone to open my skull and let the baby step all over my naked brain until it was pounded into mush and therefore could no longer distinguish gibberish from logic!

 

[Bri]

Which as Joe summarised earlier is the same as saying:

"God is possible, therefore God is possible."

As much as an argument based on Drake's equation can be summarized as "aliens are possible, therefore aliens are possible."

Which is to say not exactly. And that's the problem.

More like if a god is n% probable without consideration of other factors, a god may be more than n% probable with consideration of those factors.

The key difference being that the argument is not an example of "Begging the Question" as Joe has insisted that it is.

-Bri

 

[fls]

"God is possible, therefore God is possible."

You're sooo close. Just a few more baby steps:

"God is possible, the universe is fine-tuned, therefore God is possible probable."

What's your threshold for 'probable'? As I demonstrated earlier, the effect of the presence of fine-tuning may be to change a one in a trillion possibility of God to one in a billion.

Linda

 

[paximperium]

You're sooo close. Just a few more baby steps:

Nope. Your argument is:
"God is possible. I claim the universe is fine tuned without one shred of evidence and based on my ignorance of science therefore I make the blanket claim that god is probable."

 

[Bri]

What's your threshold for 'probable'? As I demonstrated earlier, the effect of the presence of fine-tuning may be to change a one in a trillion possibility of God to one in a billion.

That's an objection to the percentages used in the premise, and nobody is arguing that the premise is necessarily accurate. The argument (like all logical arguments) assume that you accept the premise in order for the conclusion to be valid.

Nope. Your argument is:
"God is possible. I claim the universe is fine tuned without one shred of evidence and based on my ignorance of science therefore I make the blanket claim that god is probable."

Again, a rejection of the premise.

-Bri

 

[yy2bggggs]

You're sooo close. Just a few more baby steps:

"God is possible, the universe is fine-tuned, therefore God is possible probable.

"The universe is fine-tuned" is question begging. It implies, at the very least, teleological intent.

Furthermore, it sort of has to be established before you can up and use it.

 

[Darat]

That's an objection to the percentages used in the premise, and nobody is arguing that the premise is necessarily accurate. The argument (like all logical arguments) assume that you accept the premise in order for the conclusion to be valid.

-Bri

And what do you call an argument that starts with its conclusion as one of its premises?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

And what do you call an argument that starts with its conclusion as one of its premises?

Right, but doesn't this sort of argument admit up front -- OK, we are going to assume that god is possible (so the question of the probability god's existence is non-zero from the start) -- that it carries that issue with it?

As long as we admit up front what we are doing and don't forget the form of the argument -- like with the Drake equation -- I don't see a particular problem with. Now with assigning probabilities, that's a doozy.

If you assume "god is not possible" there's not much to discuss at the water cooler.

 

[Bri]

And what do you call an argument that starts with its conclusion as one of its premises?

It doesn't start with the conclusion as one of its premises. There are two premises: a fine-tuned universe, and that the existence of a god is n% probable without consideration of a fine-tuned universe.

The conclusion is that the probability of a god's existence is greater if you assume a fine-tuned universe than if you don't.

The conclusion isn't assumed in the premise.

-Bri

 

[Darat]

Right, but doesn't this sort of argument admit up front -- OK, we are going to assume that god is possible (so the question of the probability god's existence is non-zero from the start) -- that it carries that issue with it?

As long as we admit up front what we are doing and don't forget the form of the argument -- like with the Drake equation -- I don't see a particular problem with. Now with assigning probabilities, that's a doozy.

If you assume "god is not possible" there's not much to discuss at the water cooler.

But that's the very flaw in the argument we've been criticising, this type of argument will give a "positive" conclusion to whatever you plug into it, so as Joe said a long time ago it gives the same answer if you plug in "no God", that should be a clue that the argument is a tad flawed since it gives the same positive conclusion for "God" and "no God".

The Drake equation (as far as I recall) is not of this type of argument at all. (Not aimed at you.) I think the Drake equation being brought in is just adding noise to the discussion if it does suffer from the same flaws then it is also circular, but that has nothing to do with whether the "1 in million" god argument is flawed or not.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Right, but doesn't this sort of argument admit up front -- OK, we are going to assume that god is possible (so the question of the probability god's existence is non-zero from the start) -- that it carries that issue with it?

No. "Probable" does not mean that something has a nonzero probability--it means something is likely enough to be worth considering. Consider, for example, the difference in meaning between "impossible" and "improbable".

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

It doesn't start with the conclusion as one of its premises. There are two premises: a fine-tuned universe, and that the existence of a god is n% probable without consideration of a fine-tuned universe.

The conclusion is that the probability of a god's existence is greater if you assume a fine-tuned universe than if you don't.

The conclusion isn't assumed in the premise.

-Bri

What Darat is saying is that it assumes a non-zero probability for the existence of god(s) and it produces a non-zero probability for the existence of god(s). That is the premise that is assumed. You are correct that it does not assume the actual percentage, but it does assume a non-zero answer.

The problem I see could only arise if someone wants to use this argument to somehow "prove" the existence of god(s). It cannot be used that way. It is really only a way to think about the probabilities based on certain assumptions that are probably very suspect.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

No. "Probable" does not mean that something has a nonzero probability--it means something is likely enough to be worth considering. Consider, for example, the difference in meaning between "impossible" and "improbable".

I'm well aware of the ambiguity in the use of the word. I am certainly not arguing that God is probable.

 

[Darat]

Just as an example, here is the original argument:

...snip...

Let us assume the existence of a deity is one in a million.
Let us assume the chance of that deity creating the universe as is is also one in a million.

OK, so
1.Prior probability: Pr [God exists]: = 0.000001
Prior probability: Pr [No God]: = 0.999999

2.Prob [universe inhabitable if God exists] = 0.000001
Prob [universe inhabitable if no designer] = 0.00 (one billion, billion, billion zeros) 1]

THEN: Prob [God exists given that Universe is inhabitable]

Prob [universe is inhabitable if God exists] x Prob [God exists]
= -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
{ Prob [universe is inhabitable if God exists] x Prob [God exists] }
{+ Prob [universe is inhabitable if no God exists] x Prob [No God] }

0.000001 x 0.000001
= -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
{ 0.000001 x 0.000001 }
{ + (0.999999) x (0.00 (one billion, billion, billion zeros) 1) }

this gives us a figure so close to 100% as to seem to establish beyond doubt the reality of God (but see below!)

...snip...

Re-stated with the FSM:

Let us assume the existence of the FSM is one in a million.
Let us assume the chance of the FSM creating the universe as is is also one in a million.

OK, so
1.Prior probability: Pr [FSM exists]: = 0.000001
Prior probability: Pr [No FSM]: = 0.999999

2.Prob [universe inhabitable if FSM exists] = 0.000001
Prob [universe inhabitable if no designer] = 0.00 (one billion, billion, billion zeros) 1]

THEN: Prob [FSM exists given that Universe is inhabitable]

Prob [universe is inhabitable if the FSM exists] x Prob [FSM exists]
= -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
{ Prob [universe is inhabitable if the FSM exists] x Prob [the FSM exists] }
{+ Prob [universe is inhabitable if the FSM does not exist] x Prob [No FSM] }

0.000001 x 0.000001
= -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
{ 0.000001 x 0.000001 }
{ + (0.999999) x (0.00 (one billion, billion, billion zeros) 1) }

this gives us a figure so close to 100% as to seem to establish beyond doubt the reality of the FSM (but see below!)​

Now we know the FSM is recently made up fiction however the likes of Bri and Malern would hold that the above argument is a valid, logical and rational argument that shows it is "probable" that the FSM actually exists and created the universe!

It does not matter what you plug into this argument the answer will always be "...this gives us a figure so close to 100% as to seem to establish beyond doubt the reality of the XXXX..." and the reason being is that the argument is actually circular - it assumes the probability that XXX exists as one of its starting premises, that is why it always "establishes beyond doubt the reality of XXX..."

 

[Darat]

...snip...

The problem I see could only arise if someone wants to use this argument to somehow "prove" the existence of god(s). It cannot be used that way. It is really only a way to think about the probabilities based on certain assumptions that are probably very suspect.

Sorry for wanting to tie this back into the thread topic but it is also a problem if someone wishes to argue that this argument is a rational argument for god's existence...

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Sorry for wanting to tie this back into the thread topic but it is also a problem if someone wishes to argue that this argument is a rational argument for god's existence...

Oh, right, yes. It can only be used as a way of thinking about probabilities with all the underlying assumptions. The proper rational response to it should be that and not that it helps us to decide whether or not god(s) exist(s) in the first place.

I guess the problem can arise because it is a rational argument -- about probabilities with known assumptions. It is not, however, a rational argument for the existence of god(s), as you point out, since it leaves out the very real possibility of god(s) not existing.