"The universe is fine-tuned" is question begging. It implies, at the very least, teleological intent.
Not if you already establish the possibility of God in the first place.
Entirely incorrect. Establishing the possibility
precisely means establishing that god's existence cannot be ruled out. It says absolutely nothing of probability (at least not technically, but I'd rather not get into that minutia).
"The universe is fine-tuned" is a positive statement about the actual nature of the universe, not a probabilistic statement. That assumes not merely establishing that it can't be ruled out, and not even merely establishing that it's probable, but rather, actual full acceptance of the notion.
"Fine-tuned" necessarily implies "tuning", which necessarily implies that a subject has, with intent, adjusted parameters to accomplish a particular purpose; i.e., teleological intent.
The more precise formulation of the argument would be "The universe appears to be fine-tuned to support life. Therefore, it is probable to assume a fine-tuner exists".
And that more precise formulation is also fallacious. Consider: "The mountain appears to be shaped like an old man. Therefore, it is probable to assume that said old man existed at one time."
You need to establish more than appearance to get to probability. You need to establish, well, probability.
If you come across a watch in the desert, it's OK to posit the existence of a watch-maker to explain the existence of the watch. It's not question begging.
This is different because we already know watch-makers make watches. You don't already know that gods make universes. You don't already know that old men turn into mountains.
And that's how the argument is usually attacked: the universe is not really fine-tuned.
Actually, all three of these are categorically different scenarios, and they each look like this when properly analyzed:
- Watchmakers really do make watches
- Old men don't really turn into mountains
- Who knows if gods really make universes?
Note that we don't
assume watchmakers make watches--we
know they do. That doesn't change the fact that if we see a watch in the middle of nowhere, then positing there's a watchmaker is an inference--it certainly is one. But the justification for the inference is based on something we actually
know, actually
does, happen.
The justification for the inference of fine-tuning is based on something you
assume happens based on appearance.
And the justification for mountains that look like old men actually having been old men? Well, no sane person really believes it to be the case.
As for defining God, CJ was a little over-zealous in the argument's formulation. The fine-tuning argument first tries to establish the likelihood of a fine-tuner (some being(s) with the power to create a universe and "fix" it's physical constants). Once that is established, it takes further argumentation to prove there's a high probability that the fine-tuner is God.
You're a bit over-zealous in this formulation. It takes argumentation to demonstrate that there's an objective or at least mutually agreed, at least relatively crisp, concept of God before you can even speak of there being a probability that a particular fine tuner is or is not a god. Furthermore, you have to reach
this point to come to the conclusion that you just made--namely, that "it takes further argumentation to prove there's a high probability that the fine-tuner is God"--unless you can prove the weaker, which is that necessarily the term "God" would not apply to all fine-tuners--however, you still have to get agreement here before you can say that there's even a thing to prove.
So says this atheist, or pantheist, or polytheist. Honestly, without wavering, I'm any of these--it all depends on how you define "god". I call myself an atheist only to minimize misconceptions. (In fact, I'm really a polytheist--I know for a fact multiple gods exist. I've seen them--in museums, on display!)
