Can theists be rational?

Do you think the notion of God is logically contradictory?
If by god you mean Spinoza's god then no. If by god you mean a being who is omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient then yes. Of course.

Joe's main problem here is he's talking about modal logic without understanding the difference between actual worlds and possible worlds. In modal logic, there is a possible world where green unicorns live on Mars. That does not mean there are actually green unicorns on Mars. Just that it's a possibility. Under modal logic, anything that is not a logical contradication exists in a possible world. If the epistemic value of the proposition is between 0 and 1 (as in the case of the green unicorns), there's a possible world where that proposition is true (if the value is 1, then the proposition is true in all worlds).
It's been awhile but I am familiar with epistemology. Do a search for "randfan" and "anything not defined as impossible is possible" and you will find quite a number of posts. And I did acknowledge this in a post following the one you quoted.
 
I think consciousness outside a brain is as irrational a belief as sound inside a vacuum.

I think both claims are about equally impossible things. They are contradictory on the surface.
 
Spot on!

A series of excellent posts.
Agree absolutely. I am gradually working my way through and was thinking, now, when I get to the bottom of this page, I'll do a Quick Reply to JtheJ to say how I admire his posts.

In fact I have just e-mailed Simon (older son) to give him the link to this topic and mentioned particularly Jo the Juggler's posts to look out for, especially as he has decided to do an OU Philosophy course.

ETA And I really like articulett's following post.
 
Last edited:
:blush: you flatter me, twinkle toes!

(And I loved seeing your pix from Tim's party though I'm wildly jealous for being on the wrong continent... I hope you make it to TAM (my hometown) this year.)
 
It assumes that the religion has something as a subject. If God does not exist, then what does it mean as a definition? That's why I say it assumes existence.

Now that's just silly. We talk about all sorts of things that are made up without assuming that once the name is spoken someone is suggesting that the thing exists. If God does not exist, then it means that the subject of the religion does not exist.

Exactly--we're back to the ontological argument. By definition, a God that doesn't exist is not God, therefore God exists. (Substitute "subject of religion" for God and it's the same issue--you're assuming that what the religion considers its subject is something, and--for the purpose of tackling the question as to whether God exists, defining God as the subject of the religion.)

No. I am making no assumptions about the subject other than that the idea exists. We are quite capable of recognizing that an idea can exist without the subject of the idea existing.

For example, one of those deist definitions of God is that God is the First Cause. They (wrongly, I think) also say that there must be a First Cause. Thus the definition (the way they think of it) includes existence, so it's not a good definition for the question of the existence of God.

It's quite easy to recognize that there are two different questions there. "Is there a first cause?" and "Is that first cause God?" It may be initially framed in a way that begs the question, but it's easy to uncouple the two parts.

I agree with that. But isn't that back to the undue burden of debunking God?

Well, before we knew that anything was lawful, I'm not sure that I'd have had much of a rational case against lawlessness.

I am interested in what properties they attribute to God (as a definition) so that I can see if the concept is internally consistent. (And we can also put aside very silly arguments like the one cj posted where "God" is just a word.)

But finding examples of irrational gods doesn't necessarily tell you whether all gods are irrational. That is why I prefer a definition that is necessary and (hopefully) sufficient instead of one that simply lists a set of properties that are neither necessary nor sufficient. As we have seen, if you show one set of properties is internally inconsistent, the set is simply changed to something else, leaving the idea of God intact.

Linda
 
You've fallen into the exact same trap that Frank Drawke fell into with Fermi's Mistake.

Your formula is GIGO - you have no reliable numbers to input anywhere and all it does is prove the original point that christian belief is irrational. How the hell can it not be irrational when you try to support it with maths? Especially maths which is flawed immediately, because all of the input is WAG*.

*wild-arse guess.

I have already pointed out (in each post which includes the formula I think at least) that these numbers are arbitrary and subject to GIGO. The same is true of any Bayes Theorem - you can play with variables to investigate the possibility of a concept so long as you have one known figure. The "known" figure here is Davies number for probability of universe arising by chance. Forster & Marston's algorithm remains solid - you are trying to read it as something more than it is, or than I am asserting it is. Of course a mathematical argument will be rational - so yes - that was exactly why I chose to employ a mathematical argument as an example. Have alook at my later posts on this. :)

cj x
 
Last edited:
Because it has to be able to get around those constraints that would otherwise make its presence irrelevant.

Linda


That's interesting (traditional Christian theology at least, and Jewish and Islamic as far as I know stress an absolutely lawful deity - who can be no other way, as far as I can understand.) Whaty constraints would these be? Is this the sort of problem I occasionally talk about in my own theology where because by definition any supernatural act in nature will be natural, and hence appear to natural investigators as in accordance with natural law, we can't hope to detect God's action empirically? I'm sort of working on that at the moment in my spare time -- I have a few new ideas from my attempts to get up to speed on neurology again, which has led me to think about it in new ways. Anyway can you give an example?

cj x
 
Bri, you're still invoking the equivalent of a perpetual motion machine or sound in a vacuum or "magic" whenever you conclude that there can be consciousness without a material brain.

Always. If you are presuming any percentage, you are presuming that conclusion. It's like saying there's a .000001% chance that sound can travel in a vacuum or that a perpetual motion machine exists or that there's real magic. You are making a presumption that is contrary to the laws of nature with no justification whatsoever.

You don't even seem to see the difference in asserting god (a nonphysical form of consciousness) and aliens-- clearly physical beings of the type consciousness is known to reside in!


Yeah, but we run in to problems, because we are adding at least one new additional premise - materialism I think, but I could be wrong.

1. Consciousness in human life is associated with brains and matter
2. We have never observed consciousness distinct from matter
______________________________________________________________
3. Therefore consciousness does not exist without matter, and physical beings

The argument is as sound as nay inductive argument is - the problem is that we know induction is not logically sound, we just have to work as if it is to allow us to actually get anywhere. However inductive arguments are known since Hume to be not be actually logical in the strictest sense (see much earlier post.) It is entirely possible that consciousness can exist separate to physical beings - and we can't even assume it does not even if we allow Cosmological Uniformity, because it could simply be we have never noticed or discovered a consciousness that is separate to a physical being, or that it does not exist on our planet.

I recall once Professor Dawkins arguing intelligence is invariably a result of a long evolutionary process - again he makes an inductive reasoning - but clearly this is not logically necessary. We can invoke that amusing problem of Boltzmann's Brains - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boltzmann_brain

So the problem with the inductive logic is that it assumes that brains must be physical really, because we have never seen any other. Well I have nver seen a quasar, but they exist I'm told. However you are completely correct to say that aliens with bodies are far more reasonable, because we have evidence for the idea that conscioness can exist in bodies - but little evidence for minds not associated with bodies... :) (Though some psychic researchers would strongly disagree.) So really this only works if you assume materialism to begin with'? Dunno. I'd better reply to Joe then do some work...

cj x
 
...snip...

However you are completely correct to say that aliens with bodies are far more reasonable, because we have evidence for the idea that conscioness can exist in bodies - but little evidence for minds not associated with bodies... :) (

...snip...

I've highlighted where you've slipped up, it is not that we have little evidence we simply have no evidence. Your counter argument is simply a "god of the gaps" argument.
 
I think consciousness outside a brain is as irrational a belief as sound inside a vacuum.

I think both claims are about equally impossible things. They are contradictory on the surface.


Yes, that is quite sensible, if you are a materialist it follows rationally I guess.

Well, this comes down to how we regard reality. OK, I'll do this quickly, or I will bore everyone to tears as I'm sure many of you, especially Malerin and Athon and Randfan etc can point out all my mistakes!

We all experience what appear to be two types of thing - A) our consciousness, me, the thing looks out, and ideas in the mind and B) matter.

Those are the two basic types of "stuff" in the universe. Matter includes particles, waves, the strong and weak nuclear forces, electromagnetism, gravity, you know the whole energy thing. It's all MATTER stuff.

MIND stuff is well what it sounds like - the stuff of consciousness. We can only really know our MINDS exist - as we experience MATTER Through our minds. Hence Descartes famous phrase usually paraphrased "cogito ergo sum" - I think therefore i am. We can know we exist, we can't know the universe does...

So far, so good.

Now we have to look at the relationship between them

If you believe they are separate types of stuff, you are a DUALIST. The universe is comprised of mind and matter, and the two must interact in some way or removing your brain would not effect your mind! Penrose has been working on a quantum theory of consciousness which is dualist, and many leading parapsychologists are drawn to this idea because it seems to meet the evidence of some parapsychology.

If you believe that Matter & Mind are the same thing, you are probably a MONIST. We can divide that in to three separate categories

An IDEALIST believes that the basic reality is mind - the whole universe is comprised of mind-stuff, and "matter" is created by mind. This supermind is usually equated in Christian Theology with God obviously enough, but our own minds can impact reality, and do. Still there is only one kind of stuff, and it is MIND.

A MATERIALIST believes there is only one kind of stuff, and is matter. Mind is an emergent property of matter - so our consciousness is nothing more than an emergent property of our brains. The universe is made out of particles, waves and energy, and is physical - this is sometimes called physicalism in fact. Strong materialists like Daniel Dennet and Sue Blackmore say we are not really conscious at all - long story - but EPIPHENOMENALISM is the normal form. This has the advantage that it seems fairly obvious - most people don't think about MIND being a different type of stuff to MATTER, so it is the "common sense" of science - which by no means means all scientists agree on it, or it is scientifically proven. It's just a default working assumption used to speed things up --
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naturalism_(philosophy)#Methodological_and_Metaphysical_Naturalism
(if you have time interesting enough.)

The third option, favoured by relatively few philosophers (bertrand Russell is the one who springs to mind) is NEUTRAL MONISM. Basically this is the idea that neither matter or mind is the real stuff of which reality is comprised, there is a third type of reality which underlies both.

OK, let's just do the wiki links here
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_(philosophy_of_mind)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idealism
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neutral_monism

Now, can MIND effect MATTER? Well even in the materialist paradigm, yes - because our minds do all the time. I will the words to appear on the screen from my mind, my brain converts them to neural impulses which inform my muscles which type and lo! words appear! According to an epiphenomenalist materialist mind is just a product of highly organized brain matter, so MATTER can give rise to MIND. Many theologians have suggested the transfer can be the other way, and there is no theoretical reason for MIND not to give rise to MATTER, but that is a whole different ball game.

Most hypotheses on mind creating Matter work on the area where the usual rules of matter completely break down - so Mind would work by observing the State Vector at Quantum Event levels and hence creating changes in reality. I can have a go at explaining that if you really want, but I'm not particularly convinced.
icon_smile.gif
(the other are where all this gets really interesting is in Cosmology - the big Bang arising from a Quantum Vacuum fluctuation - but more on that another time.)

For a DUALIST the issue is how the interaction between the two states work. We simply don't know, but theoretically MIND not being constrained to brain but just as real can exist independently. Imagine your brain as a MATTER radio receiver - the signal is MIND. If you break the radio, the signal can continue - life after death for example. We know that if you drink a bottle of red wine or two your brain will be effected, and your mind will have trouble interfacing with reality - but that in no way disproves the hypothesis that mind and brain are different - just as if you put a radio in a cellar the reception may well falter.

Now all this has massive implications for psychical research, and indeed science generally. I could cheerfully talk about them,. but I generally assured I am incredibly boring. Sorry if all this is completely old hat to you, but I'm not sure if they teach it in school anymore, at least before A level Religion which I doubt many of you did, especially if you are American. :) (A levels are courses taught in British schools age 16-18, when we tend to specialize in on average three subjects, doing an A level in each.)

So again, if we assume the materialist epiphenomenalist theory of mind/brain sure, your assumptions are very reasonable - but we are still a long way off demonstrating it to be true, even if we ever can.

cj x
 
That's interesting (traditional Christian theology at least, and Jewish and Islamic as far as I know stress an absolutely lawful deity - who can be no other way, as far as I can understand.) Whaty constraints would these be?

<snip>

:confused:

What is lawful about parting the red sea to only allow the good guys to pass?
 
That's interesting (traditional Christian theology at least, and Jewish and Islamic as far as I know stress an absolutely lawful deity - who can be no other way, as far as I can understand.)

I mean lawful in the scientific sense, not in the sense of conforming to the needs of a religion.

Whaty constraints would these be?

Stuff like symmetry/conservation.

Is this the sort of problem I occasionally talk about in my own theology where because by definition any supernatural act in nature will be natural, and hence appear to natural investigators as in accordance with natural law, we can't hope to detect God's action empirically?

I am trying to get around the flaw in that definition by pointing out that supernatural acts in nature are not natural - i.e. they are meant to be a violation of the usual constraints. Part of the reason I am floating this particular definition is that theologists have been allowed to define gods in a way that contradicts how gods are really used.

I'm sort of working on that at the moment in my spare time -- I have a few new ideas from my attempts to get up to speed on neurology again, which has led me to think about it in new ways. Anyway can you give an example?

cj x

For example, an immaterial soul influences thoughts - i.e. it changes a physical quantity (brain processes). This means that there would need to be a change in physical properties that are not accounted for by the known fundamental forces (a violation of empiricism and symmetry) or a violation of conservation laws.

Linda
 
I've highlighted where you've slipped up, it is not that we have little evidence we simply have no evidence. Your counter argument is simply a "god of the gaps" argument.


Not so. The God of the Gaps argument is actually a theological argument, developed as a response to certain types of 18th century theology arising from Natural Theology, so I understand it fairly well, but basically it draws from Hume's induction problem again.

We have actually considerable evidence for non-corporeal minds according to many. It forms an excellent explanation for many of the claims of mediums, spiritualists, ghost stories (which are more often interactive than most people seem to realize) and psychical researchers. The reason we doubt that evidence is at least partly to do with our "common sense" materialism. Let's ignore all that evidence as weak, and just logically look at the case though


1.Swans are invariably white in my experience of pictures thereof
2. I have never seen a black swan
__________________________________________________ ____________
3. Therefore black swans do not exist

Of course it's a nonsense. We are arguing from personal incredulity, as we are when we say there is no consciousness without matter. We have never experienced such, so we simply draw from our personal experience via inductive reasoning a potentially false conclusion. All inductive claims, meaning almost every argument made in science outside of pure mathematics suffers from this - see earlier discussion on Hume. It only takes one black swan to falsify it, just as it would only take one non-corporeal intelligence to falsify the other claim.

Now why is it now "God of the Gaps"? I can see why you think so, perfectly sensibly. A God of the Gaps hides in those gaps where our science fails to provide answers yet -- he is a theoretically unknowable entity, but he keeps diminishing as we learn more. The counter argument applies to all human knowledge through induction, and is a major issue in Philosophy of Science, but here is in it's simplest form - without greater knowledge we are simply making at the very best a Inferred Best Explanation when we assume consciousness is dependent upon physical bodies. Using IBE is certainly not a proof of correctness. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inference_to_the_Best_Explanation

Still fun to think through! I'm quite sceptical about what we can really know about much, but I still try to learn as much as possible. A paradox maybe? :)

cj x
 
Last edited:
:confused:

What is lawful about parting the red sea to only allow the good guys to pass?


Imagine, and let's take one of the claims you sometimes see - I won't bother critiquing it -- the Exodus happened exactly as claimed in the Hebrew Bible - and date it sometime around 1500BCE (again problematic - this is an example - not to be confused with a claim any of it is true.). The Hebrews reach the Red Sea (again problematic) but following the Mediterranean island of Thera exploding in a huge volcanic event, the waters rush away from them, leaving time for the Hebrews to cross. The Egyptians follow, buts just as naturalistically the water floods abck and drowns them.

It's entirely in accordance with Natural Law. Lots of logical issues arise, concerning the interaction of the Supernatural God and the Natural universe, but sadly I have to work today. :) Still I hope this single example helps a bit.

cj x
 
...snip...

We have actually considerable evidence for non-corporeal minds according to many.

...snip...

No we don't - what we have is many claims for such things which granted is evidence of something however it is not evidence for "non-corporeal minds".


...snip...

Now why is it now "God of the Gaps"? I can see why you think so, perfectly sensibly. A God of the Gaps hides in those gaps where our science fails to provide answers yet -- he is a theoretically unknowable entity, but he keeps diminishing as we learn more.

...snip...

"God of the gaps" is not about a theoretically unknowable entity, I think it is a fair summary to say it is opposite, it seeks to explain why so far we have failed to find evidence for god.

...snip...

here is in it's simplest form - without greater knowledge we are simply making at the very best a Inferred Best Explanation when we assume consciousness is dependent upon physical bodies.

...snip...

No, you are doing what you have been doing a lot in this thread - circular reasoning, assuming your conclusion in your starting premises. To propose in the first place that there is "consciousness" separate from our observations is not following the evidence, it's simply speculation.

Which of course may be useful and may help us discover new things we didn't know because no one had thought to "look" for it previously however until there is evidecne for it it is just speculation.
 
The fatal flaw, IMHO, is to assume that god is a possibility. Infinite monkey theorem won't make the impossible possible. Infinite dead monkeys will never type anything.

Absolutely. As i said, if for God P= 0 then no God. The thing is most people accept there is a small chance - maybe P=0.000001 f'rinstance. I'm hampered by mainly thinking in terms of my experience of Dawkins and his fans, who accept this.

cj x
 
No we don't - what we have is many claims for such things which granted is evidence of something however it is not evidence for "non-corporeal minds".

How do we know it's not? :) I agree, non-corporeal minds would be at best IBE. The evidence is not NOT evidence though for that possibility, as it is evidence which can be logically used to support it. The fact there may well be other explanations - absolutely. The hypothesis is underdetermined - again we hit another fundamental problem that underlies all scientific reasoning - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Underdetermination explains it well I think.


"God of the gaps" is not about a theoretically unknowable entity, I think it is a fair summary to say it is opposite, it seeks to explain why so far we have failed to find evidence for god.

It is in many modern formulations actually -

wiki said:
The God of the gaps refers to a view of God deriving from a theistic position in which anything that can be explained by human knowledge is not in the domain of God, so the role of God is therefore confined to the 'gaps' in scientific explanations of nature

I dislike the notion intensely - its just NOMA, from Stephen J Gould as far as i can make out, which I have little time for.

No, you are doing what you have been doing a lot in this thread - circular reasoning, assuming your conclusion in your starting premises. To propose in the first place that there is "consciousness" separate from our observations is not following the evidence, it's simply speculation.

That is completely true (the bit about speculation). Yet my point is we can't logically falsify it. The bit on circular reasoning I disagree with entirely, for reasons I have given, but should be logically clear once I get round to replying to Joe - which I will in a moment, I'm just trying to keep up with all the other posts!

Which of course may be useful and may help us discover new things we didn't know because no one had thought to "look" for it previously however until there is evidecne for it it is just speculation.

Yes, absolutely: but the opposite assumption is also not logically sound, as I keep saying - the Induction problem - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Induction_problem - it's a logical error.

cj x
 
Last edited:
Good point. As you get caught up, try to read the part of this thread about these issues. I'm very interested in what people think about this issue.

Even if people generally don't make rational arguments for most things in life, they exercise some degree of skepticism for most things. Or at least somehow shift mental gears to a different way of thinking. It boils down to the question, "Why this and not that?"

Why believe in transubstantiation purely on faith (the only way that particular feat is possible!), but reject the existence of elves, fairies, Big Foot, etc. without seeing some evidence? How do they draw the lines on what is a mystery they accept on faith, and what is cultish nonsense? Why believe a guy could bring dead people back to life, but then become very dubious when you get a spam e-mail offering you a million dollars for a lottery you never entered?

People do this, all the time. I'm not so sure how they pull it off.

HI Joe -- agreed. My working guess is it is something to do with how those little dendrites and axons link up in the old noggin - as we accept certain things as true we infer more and more about the absolute nature of reality, but pass far beyond logic. I certainly do not a priori reject the existence of elves, fairies, Big Foot, or beliefs contrary to my own, on principle. I'm still human though so I think that I must have millions of mistaken beliefs that I hold as true.

I sort of discuss these issues in thsi thread - first post anyway - you might find it useful in seeing where i am coming from --
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?t=130398

cj x
 

Back
Top Bottom