Can theists be rational?

[JoeTheJuggler]

Do you think the notion of God is logically contradictory?

Define God. A formal, logical definition is a list of all characteristics that will include the objects you intend in the class "God" and exclude those you don't intend.

I've yet to run into a well-formed definition of God that wasn't logically contradictory and/or abundantly, overwhelmingly contradictory with the empirical world.

Joe's main problem here is he's talking about modal logic without understanding the difference between actual worlds and possible worlds. In modal logic, there is a possible world where green unicorns live on Mars. That does not mean there are actually green unicorns on Mars. Just that it's a possibility. Under modal logic, anything that is not a logical contradication exists in a possible world. If the epistemic value of the proposition is between 0 and 1 (as in the case of the green unicorns), there's a possible world where that proposition is true (if the value is 1, then the proposition is true in all worlds).

Nope. Not at all. I understand fully the difference between possible and actual. The problem with Premise 1 is that it assume existence.

When the weatherman says there is a 50% chance of rain tomorrow, this assumes the existence of rain. If he said there was a 50% chance of a ping-pong ball shower, it would assume the existence of ping-pong ball showers.

If you claimed there was a 1 in 5000 chance of there being unicorns on Mars, you're absolutely 100% without a doubt assuming the existence of unicorns. If unicorns did not exist, then the probability of them being anywhere is zero. Placing a value on that probability makes an assumption about their existence. If you use that assumption to "prove" their existence, the reasoning is circular. If you start with that as a premise--or a postulate or a given or a stipulated fact--and arrived at the conclusion that unicorns probably exist, your reasoning is circular.

So when someone makes the claim that God possibly exists, under modal logic, that claim would read there is a possible world where God exists. Once the possibility is established, you can then move on to Bayesian probability to argue how likely it is that something in a possible world exists in an actual world.

Yes, fine. That's not the problem. The problem is that the conclusion in assumed in the premises (or postulates or givens or stipulated facts). If God is probable, then God is probable is a pointless, circular argument.

As a side note, the ontological argument has a new formulation incorporating modal logic (this is very slick). Under this argument, God is defined as a necessary being (that is to say God has the property that it's non-existence is a logical contradiction).

It's still circular. You can't predicate existence (that is, make "exists" part of the definition of something) and then use that to conclude that it exists without being circular. It's also an example of a validating argument. I can stipulate "necessary" into ANY concept and then "prove" it exists.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

The thing is most people accept there is a small chance - maybe P=0.000001 f'rinstance.

Most people believe a lot of strange things. It doesn't make them true.

Also, the argument you posted basically proves that 1 in a million is not a "small chance".

Same as with the SETI thing (1 in a million intelligent civilizations would be a very high probability given the number of stars in a galaxy and galaxies in the universe). Ditto the issue of apparently precognitive dreams. 6.7 billion people have a lot of dreams. If just by random selection, there's a 1 in a million chance of a dream reflecting future events (and not due to precognition or clairvoyance), you'd still expect them to happen a LOT.

Does the God argument show anything other than that if you start with the assumption that God is probable you will end with the conclusion that God is probable?

 

[Bri]

If you are presuming any percentage, you are presuming that conclusion. It's like saying there's a .000001% chance that sound can travel in a vacuum or that a perpetual motion machine exists or that there's real magic. You are making a presumption that is contrary to the laws of nature with no justification whatsoever.

If you assign the percentage in the premise to anything above 0% you are indeed assuming the possibility. If you disagree with the premise, you can assign your own value or even 0% if you think the existence of a god is impossible. I've never said otherwise.

I said that the argument cj presented is a rational argument. Whether or not you accept the premises is another matter.

Joe is suggesting that the argument is invalid because of circular reasoning. As Malerin pointed out, the argument has been around for a while, and is never attacked as begging the question. Either Joe is wrong or he's discovered something that nobody else has.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

If you claimed there was a 1 in 5000 chance of there being unicorns on Mars, you're absolutely 100% without a doubt assuming the existence of unicorns. If unicorns did not exist, then the probability of them being anywhere is zero. Placing a value on that probability makes an assumption about their existence.

That's simply wrong. If I say that there's a 0.0001% chance that a rain cloud will form in the desert in the next decade, am I assuming the existence of a rain cloud in the desert in the next decade? No, I'm just saying that there's a slim possibility of its existence in the next decade.

-Bri

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

That's simply wrong. If I say that there's a 0.0001% chance that a rain cloud will form in the desert in the next decade, am I assuming the existence of a rain cloud in the desert in the next decade?

No. But you are absolutely 100% without a doubt assuming the existence of rainclouds.

If they don't exist, there is 0% chance that one will form in the desert or anywhere else.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

"God is possible" is not equivalent to "there is a 1 in 1 million chance that God exists".

By the way, before I even accept "God is possible", I want to know what you mean by "God". God as conventionally defined (omniscient, omnipotent, all-compassionate) is not possible in our world.

 

[cj.23]

Right, let's take on Joe's reply to my playing card analogy

Originally Posted by cj.23
No, because the opposite situation is included. So

1. The odds of playing card being red (excluding jokers, do they have colours? dunno!) is 0.5
The odds of playing card being black (excluding jokers) is 0.5

Now see how it works?

Yes.

And for you to state these odds, you are assuming the existence of red and black cards. If your argument is on the question of the existence of red and/or black cards, and you offer these odds, you are assuming the existence of both red and black cards. If you then proceed to construct an argument that concludes that red and black cards exist, it is a circular argument.

Right, my example here is flawed possibly - I'm not sure, but I think the problem in this case might be the Kebab dilemma

I want chilli sauce and salad with my kebab. I go in ti the shop, the kebab is made, and the assistant asks me "do you want chilli sauce or salad with that?" I appear to be faced with a dilemma - do I want chilli sauce, or do I want salad? They have been presented as mutually incompatible options. Or have they?

Actually "or" is employed here to offer either option or both. "And/or" is the sense actually being employed.

Now lets look at why my example is flawed.

Playing cards can be black "and/or" red.
God can not exist or exist, but can can not "and/or" exist.

So in the original example i cited, one of the other possibility in postulate 1 must be true, and the other false. So my example was flawed - but clearly as the initial postulate contains logically two contradictory states "or", as opposed to my examples logically contradictory outcomes "and/or", only one can be true. So both the existence and non-existence of God are postulated as possible, but neither as true, hence avoiding circular arguments.

Otherwise one could argue that the argument was circular in entirely the opposite direction - this one after all also postulates the non-existence of God, at a much higher probability - God's existence is defined as one million to one, the possibility of God not existing as 999,999 to one on. I think it's impossible to argue this is circular reasoning.

We can then ask "is the question of God's existence a meaningful question to ask?" sure. If we say no, then we must remain agnostic: for to say "we can not postulate a God so therefore no argument can be made for a God" truly is circular reasoning, by any definition.

Originally Posted by cj.23
Now imagine: if we were to turn over a single card, the result is either black or red. The probability that the card would be black or red still remains 0.5, even though now we know the truth 100%.

Yes, and the only way you knew the probability was 0.5 was by knowledge of the existence of red and black cards. If you don't know whether or not a black card, for example exists, you simply cannot give ANY value for its probability of being turned up. You just don't know. If you give a value for that probability, you're making an assumption about its existence, and that assumption shows up in your conclusion.

Yes, which is why as I keep saying this is an algorithm that you slot numbers in to to explore the possibilities, not a proof. The number assigned to the existence of God and no-God are arbitrary - slot in your own - it is merely used to show that the universe can be argued to be highly improbably without a designer (and i'm not convinced it does in anyway necessitate a designer, as I have noted many times anyway) - but if ypu look, the actual theorem is sound enough. The conclusions you draw from it may well be wonky however - but I have never denied that.

:
Still, as I said, not deductive - so not a proof, and not technically a premise, but a variable or postulate. You can change the numbers as you wish. Very different things, because in a deductive example the premise is necessary to the argument. Change one variable, the proof fails. Hence no fallacy.

It is circular. There are some who say that circular arguments are not fallacious, they're just pointless. You have to assume the existence of God in order to prove the existence of God. It is not fallacious to say "if p, then p". . .merely circular.

Not circular, because it postulates the existence and non-existence of God, using the hard "or". One or the other must be true. A circular argument can allow of no alternative.

I'm not quibbling about the value. I'm pointing out that just giving ANY value for the probability of God's existence makes an assumption about God's existence. Using that assumption to reach a conclusion about God's existence is circular reasoning.

This allows for the possibility of God existing or not existing (and favours the latter) in the first postulate. How can one ask a question about the existence of God without postulating the question in the first place? If you do not offer the alternatives, you can make no statement - and must remain logically agnostic on the question. So you offer both alternatives.

1. The chance of the USA existing Prior Possibility: Pr = 0.99999
The chance of the USA not existing Pr=0.00001

Just as valid. If you say "no question about God" can be asked, because God doe snot exist, you simply make a completely circular question (or maybe attempt to revived Logical Positivism, but thta is dead as a dodo and a whole different issue.)


Hope clarifies
cj x

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Joe is suggesting that the argument is invalid because of circular reasoning. As Malerin pointed out, the argument has been around for a while, and is never attacked as begging the question. Either Joe is wrong or he's discovered something that nobody else has.

And this is a false dichotomy.

It could be that Malerin is wrong and that other people have pointed out this flaw before.

It could also be that many people look at the argument as pointless and absurd and not worthy of rebuttal.

Here is someone's comment on it that points out that it is a validating argument (that you could put ANYTHING in place of "God" and get the same result by making those assumptions):

OK, lets say instead of this remote chance that God exists, I believe that there is a remote chance that a Goblin has poisoned all my food and all the food I will eat in future. So I don't eat. Those around me try to reason with me. Now they cannot prove that a Goblin has not poisoned my food. How could they? My heath deteriorates. I have based my life on a remote possibility, for which I have no evidence. I may even die because of this belief. Can anyone say that my belief is rational? Of course it isn't. It is irrational to base something so critical, as whether or not we eat, on a remote possibility.

(Again, I don't think 1 in a million is necessarily a "remote chance"--but the point that this is a validating argument stands.)

On a quick Google, I found no other commentary on this argument.

 

[cj.23]

Regarding the goblin - the argument against not eating the food is actually based on a cost/benefit analysis - so it's a rational argument for acting as if Goblins have not poisoned my food. It tells us nothing about the actual existence of the food poisoning Goblin however - merely that it is pragmatic to act as if the Goblin does not exist in this instance. It faces exactly the same problem as Pascals wager, where if we assume that there is only two possible options - believe in God, or do not believe in God, and that if God exists he rewards those who believe in him and punish those who do not, it is better to believe in God. Sure, on a logical cost/benefit analysis it is -- but that tells us only that it is better to believe (granting Pascal's assumptions, which I do not), and nothing about if God actually exists or not.

cj x

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Otherwise one could argue that the argument was circular in entirely the opposite direction

I agree with this part. Which is why I've said it would be equally circular to assume that the probability of God's existence is 0 and then conclude that God doesn't exist.

- this one after all also postulates the non-existence of God, at a much higher probability -

Here's the problem. If God does not exist, the probability is 0, not 1 in anything--no matter how big the number is.

The opposite assumption of some numerical probability of God's existence is not simply a lower probability of God's existence. It is zero.

So if you're saying either one or the other of the two postulates must be true, you've got the wrong postulates.

In English, they should rather be:
1)There is some probability that God exists
2)There is no probability that God exists

ETA: and, for the record, choosing either one as an assumption results in a circular argument.

God's existence is defined as one million to one, the possibility of God not existing as 999,999 to one on. I think it's impossible to argue this is circular reasoning.

The opposite or of a probability of existence is not simply a lower probability of existence. It is zero probability of existence.

As I've said repeatedly, assuming either case gives you a circular argument.

If you do not offer the alternatives, you can make no statement - and must remain logically agnostic on the question. So you offer both alternatives.

1. The chance of the USA existing Prior Possibility: Pr = 0.99999
The chance of the USA not existing Pr=0.00001

Again, you've got the wrong alternatives. It should be
1. The probability of the USA existing: some value greater than zero
2. The probability of the USA existing: zero
are the two exclusive options.

Just as valid. If you say "no question about God" can be asked, because God doe snot exist, you simply make a completely circular question (or maybe attempt to revived Logical Positivism, but thta is dead as a dodo and a whole different issue.)

Yes, and I've agreed with this point from the start. It would be just as circular for me to assume the probability is zero.

Again, does the argument do anything other than say that "if God is probable then God is probable"?

Casting it as the SETI question (does ET intelligence exist?), you could make the same argument. 1 in a million is a very high probability, and you're saying if it's highly probable, then it's highly probable that ET intelligence exists.

 

[Bri]

No. But you are absolutely 100% without a doubt assuming the existence of rainclouds.

The question isn't about rainclouds -- it's about rainclouds in that particular desert. Let's call them "desertclouds." Am I assuming the existence of desertclouds?

If they don't exist, there is 0% chance that one will form in the desert or anywhere else.

Desertclouds don't exist. There have never been rainclouds in that particular desert before -- in other words desertclouds have never existed. If I propose a 0.0001% chance that a desertcloud will form for the first time ever, does that assume the existence of desertclouds?

-Bri

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Do you think maybe you're thinking of existence as the same as an event? In other words, rolling a 3 rather than the 3 itself?

If so, what is the event? (I'm back to 1 in a million whats?)


Back to the postulates:
If there is no three on the die, the probability of getting a three is zero.
Put another way, the probability of not getting a three is 1. It is not 0.99.

So making two exclusive choices you'd have to make the non-existence one a probability of 1. Then you could say either one or the other must be true. (Either there is a non-zero probability of God's existence or there is a zero probability.)

If we don't know whether there is a 3 on the die, you can't claim there is either a 1:6 chance of getting a three or a .9 probability of not getting a 3.

You can claim (assuming you know the number of other possible outcomes, and that there can't be more than one three on the die) that there is either a 1:6 probability of getting a three or a zero probability of getting a three (that is a pr=1.0 of not getting a 3). Those are the two probabilities that correspond with the postulates "there exists a 3 on the die" and "there does NOT exist a 3 on the die".

 

[yy2bggggs]

Of course it's a nonsense. We are arguing from personal incredulity, as we are when we say there is no consciousness without matter.

Au contraire! It's all sophistry.

There are two major issues here. The first major issue is that your first set of premises--the one you propose people use to infer that there are no minds apart from matter--is a straw man. The second major issue is that you are falsely assuming that possibility adds worth to an idea.

With regard to the first major issue, your consciousness set of propositions is nowhere near analogous to your swan set, and I think you at least have partial awareness as to why--the evidence suggests not merely an association between consciousness and matter, but a strong relationship. Your phrasing of the radio wave analogy departs a bit from what it is that we really observe (I don't drink, so pardon me for not relating to the red wine analogy) when due to certain material conditions (such as being sick; I predict it works just as well to describe experiences when you've had too much red wine). It's not just a lack of control over our facilities that we psychically experience--it is, instead, corresponding mental impairment. That suggests that something more fundamental is going on--it's not that the radio is out of tune, it's more like the radio waves themselves become muddled (thus breaking the analogy). (Note: I could enumerate stronger examples of this relationship very easily, but I'm not quite sure it's necessary, as you seem honest and capable enough to do this yourself).

Nothing remotely like this exists in your swan analogy; though we do in fact observe white swans, we don't have any observations that suggest that whiteness is so essential to swans.

Regarding the second major error, we do indeed know that there's a problem of induction, raised by Hume. At best, this demonstrates that premises that diverge from induced conclusions are possible--and, in fact, that agrees with how you're phrasing it. But it also opens the floodgates. In a sense, it gives your notion of incorporeal conscious minds a worth of 2 cents by introducing extreme hyperinflation--you should perhaps seriously consider just how many ideas are brought into play with such a move. In particular, with respect to this thread, you should consider how many irrational ideas are brought into play.

In the immortal words of the mortal Feynman: "...[The] problem is not what is possible. ... The problem is what is probable, what is happening. It does no good to demonstrate again and again that you can't disprove that this could be a flying saucer. ... We have to make a judgment about whether it is a flying saucer--whether it's reasonable, whether it's likely. ... [The] number of things that are possible is not fully appreciated by the average individual. And it is also not clear, then, to them, how many things that are possible must not be happening. That it's impossible that everything that is possible is happening. And there is too much variety, so most likely anything that you think of that is possible isn't true." (Taken from "The Meaning of It All: Thoughts of a Citizen-Scientist").

In regards to this, it does no good for you to prove that it's possible, and it's a bit futile for you to demonstrate that we can't disprove the notion that incorporeal minds exist, because the problem isn't what's possible--it's what is probable.

 

[cj.23]

With regard to the first major issue, your consciousness set of propositions is nowhere near analogous to your swan set, and I think you at least have partial awareness as to why--the evidence suggests not merely an association between consciousness and matter, but a strong relationship. Your phrasing of the radio wave analogy departs a bit from what it is that we really observe (I don't drink, so pardon me for not relating to the red wine analogy) when due to certain material conditions (such as being sick; I predict it works just as well to describe experiences when you've had too much red wine). It's not just a lack of control over our facilities that we psychically experience--it is, instead, corresponding mental impairment. That suggests that something more fundamental is going on--it's not that the radio is out of tune, it's more like the radio waves themselves become muddled (thus breaking the analogy). (Note: I could enumerate stronger examples of this relationship very easily, but I'm not quite sure it's necessary, as you seem honest and capable enough to do this yourself).

Ah, I'm not going to try and defend the "radio analogy" - at least not now. As to the evidence of neurology, that is far more complex than I have time to discuss today -- I certainly agree there is an extremely strong relationship between mental events and brains - but that is not enoug to demonstrate causality. I think we will need another thread to discuss this properly, and the full implications. Sadly I have a book to finish writing (on nothing remotely connected) by tomorrow night deadline, so I'm going to have to wait till Wednesday to get in to this, but having read your other posts i think it will be an excellent discussion - you have made many very astute comments in your short time on the forum.

Nothing remotely like this exists in your swan analogy; though we do in fact observe white swans, we don't have any observations that suggest that whiteness is so essential to swans.

We don't have any observations which logically entail that consciousness is limited to brains - merely as you quite correctly state, there there is a strong relationship between them.

Regarding the second major error, we do indeed know that there's a problem of induction, raised by Hume. At best, this demonstrates that premises that diverge from induced conclusions are possible--and, in fact, that agrees with how you're phrasing it. But it also opens the floodgates. In a sense, it gives your notion of incorporeal conscious minds a worth of 2 cents by introducing extreme hyperinflation--you should perhaps seriously consider just how many ideas are brought into play with such a move. In particular, with respect to this thread, you should consider how many irrational ideas are brought into play.

I don't think the fact the induction problem as I hope I have stressed sabotages all our understandings in science is remotely an error. I rather thought that was th epoint of it. Logically I am correct - and that is why I can not refute fairies, bigfoot, or many other things that many people seem very sure about. I am extremely sceptical about what we actually can know - after hume in this respect. I think the error is in most people not realising just problematic our knowledge claims actually are, and mistaking utility for absolute truth. It will therefore come as no surprise to you to learn that I am like Popper i believe an Objective Instrumentalist - and for any readers following this who are not aware of the concept, good link here -- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instrumentalism

In the immortal words of the mortal Feynman: "...[The] problem is not what is possible. ... The problem is what is probable, what is happening. It does no good to demonstrate again and again that you can't disprove that this could be a flying saucer. ... We have to make a judgment about whether it is a flying saucer--whether it's reasonable, whether it's likely. ... [The] number of things that are possible is not fully appreciated by the average individual. And it is also not clear, then, to them, how many things that are possible must not be happening. That it's impossible that everything that is possible is happening. And there is too much variety, so most likely anything that you think of that is possible isn't true." (Taken from "The Meaning of It All: Thoughts of a Citizen-Scientist").

Yes, and I have no disagreement with that - but that is all a great deal of knowledge is based upon - Best Inferred Explanation, and flawed induction. Pragmatically I may be willing to accept such claims, but they are not absolutely true - so we can only accept our knowledge is probabilistic (outside of pure maths) and ultimately subjective. Therefore i use utility as a method of assessing models: but do not confuse that with a depiction of absolute reality.

However to return to the concrete

In regards to this, it does no good for you to prove that it's possible, and it's a bit futile for you to demonstrate that we can't disprove the notion that incorporeal minds exist, because the problem isn't what's possible--it's what is probable.

And we know what is probable by induction... see the problem?

I'm pointing out Hume threw a huge spanner in to our understandings. It's also mildly amusing me, a Christian, arguing Hume on this forum, It's normally the other way round. We can not know that incorporeal minds are improbable. We can only know that we do not routinely experience such - and in that sense, it just becomes an argument from incredulity.

cj x

 

[Bri]

Do you think maybe you're thinking of existence as the same as an event? In other words, rolling a 3 rather than the 3 itself?

If so, what is the event? (I'm back to 1 in a million whats?)

The die example assumes a probability of an event in the premise. The god or desertcloud examples assume the probability of the existence of something in the premise.

The problem is that you're mixing the two. You're thinking that the die experiment is about the probability of the existence of the 3 -- it's not. It's about the probability of an event (the die landing on the 3). The fact that the existence of the 3 is implied in one example does not mean that the existence of a god or desertcloud is implied in the other examples. In fact, just the opposite -- the premise of those explicitly states a 0.0001% probablilty of the existence of a god or a desertcloud which in turn implies a 99.9999% probability that they don't exist. In other words, they don't assume a god or desertcloud does exist, they assume that a god or desertcloud can exist.

Please answer this question about the desertcloud: If I say that there is a 0.0001% chance that a desertcloud will exist in the next decade, am I assuming the existence of a desertcloud?

-Bri

 

[yy2bggggs]

However to return to the concrete

In regards to this, it does no good for you to prove that it's possible, and it's a bit futile for you to demonstrate that we can't disprove the notion that incorporeal minds exist, because the problem isn't what's possible--it's what is probable.

And we know what is probable by induction... see the problem?

Yes, but a bigger question is, is it the same problem you see?

The problem of induction is a proper red herring. Even if I were to entertain it, the incorporeal mind remains an extremely hyperinflated 2 cents all the same. It gains you no ground to question induction.

you have made many very astute comments in your short time on the forum

Thanks, but frankly, don't be fooled by my low post count. That and my recent slew of posts only means that I've had a temporary spell of free time... I have, however, lurked here for quite some time.

 

[RandFan]

1.Swans are invariably white in my experience of pictures thereof
2. I have never seen a black swan
__________________________________________________ ____________
3. Therefore black swans do not exist

Of course it's a nonsense. We are arguing from personal incredulity, as we are when we say there is no consciousness without matter.

#3 is an empirical claim and it is only a model that best fits our observations and it is held provisionally, not as absolute truth only as a probability. The more swans we see that are not black the more reliable the argument.

No credulity. No magic shoved into any gaps. Just a workable model.

The supernatural? Not so much. There is no model for consciousness without matter.

Arguing for a negative claim "there are no black swans" in the face of the facts as we see them doesn't equate to arguing for a positive claim "there is consciousness without matter" without any evidence to support the proposition.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

The question isn't about rainclouds -- it's about rainclouds in that particular desert. Let's call them "desertclouds." Am I assuming the existence of desertclouds?

The existence of "desertclouds" assumes the existence of rainclouds. If your analogy is not about the existence of rainclouds, it's not a legitimate analogy. If you state a probability of rainclouds occuring in the desert, you are assuming the existence of rainclouds and any conclusion you make about the existence of rainclouds would be circular.

The thing about the problem of the existence of God is it's simply a matter of existence, not God occurring in some place or another.

Here's the issue with the argument.

The premise, as cj has elucidated it more thoroughly, is

Premise: One of the following two postulates must be right.
Postulate 1: the probability of God existing is 1 in 1 million
Postulate 2: the probability of God not existing is .999.

As I've shown above, this premise assumes (no matter which of the two postulates you try) a probability for the existence of god. The conclusion is a probability for the existence of god. It is circular. It begs the question.

It would not be a circular argument if you said

Premise: One of the following two postulates must be right.
Postulate 1: the probability of God existing is non-zero
Postulate 2: the probability of God existing is zero

Trouble is, you can't do much with that, can you?

If P or not P implies P is false.

 

[articulett]

You can't roll a zero unless there's a 0 on the die.

To say you have "some probability" to roll a zero presumes that there could be a die with a 0 on it.

For regular meanings of the word die, rolling 0 is impossible. To say that there's a probability that you CAN roll a 0 assumes the premise it's asserting. You are doing this with god, Bri.

 

[The Atheist]

Do you think the notion of God is logically contradictory?

Yes!

Of course a mathematical argument will be rational - so yes - that was exactly why I chose to employ a mathematical argument as an example. Have alook at my later posts on this.

cj x

Ah, no.

Mathematical arguments are only rational if it's right.

I can advance an argument that 2+2=5, and it's both irrational and mathematical.

You're losing the argument more badly every line.

You can't roll a zero unless there's a 0 on the die.

Man, I so badly want to get these guys on a craps table I can taste it.