Can theists be rational?

[yy2bggggs]

JoeTheJuggler:

For the question of why people use faith with respect to some things and are rational with respect to others, I think the question almost answers itself--"with respect to some things". Of the things people invest faith in, they invest non-randomly. I don't think there's a unifying, global, slap you in the face reason for why this is so, except that there are varying reasons why people do it. It may not be satisfying, but I think it's actually the case. I can enumerate a few...

There's the fear of death component--whereby people have a specific, emotional motivation to try to alleviate their fear of death by preferring to believe that death isn't the end (people will so much as admit to that, using words such as "I have a hard time accepting that death is the end"). Related to this, there is a fear of nihilism/pointlessness among those who think that lack of belief will naturally lead to such. Also, there's a fear of immorality. It's not limited to fears either... there's a certain emotional reward people tend to get when they feel they have "privileged knowledge"--this is very easily seen when you examine the spread of urban legends. There are also philosophical reasons--where someone is ultimately convinced, based on experience in itself, that there's some "grander truth" and merely try to grasp at it.

All of these, or some of these, or others, set the stage, but where religions per se have tremendous advantages are: (1) they typically play in the home court; that is, where it's certainly not globally true, religions are for the most part "heritable", (2) people with emotive needs tend to feed the beast, (3) there's an intellectual comfort in group certitude, and (4) just as you personally observe, oddly enough, all of these people seem sane--which seems to add an air of credibility in itself. Note that common objections in this environment can naturally develop canned responses.

I'm not quite sure I can give you an answer that would satisfy you, and neither do I think there's a single grand reason why people choose faith over rationality, but given what I know of the human condition, I personally don't actually find it all that surprising.

 

[RandFan]

In other words it is "there is a very small chance God exists - here postulated as one in a million. There is a 999,999 to 1 chance there is no God.

Ok, I understand your point. Given that there is some chance of god. It should be noted that even Dawkins gives some chance for god. It's flawed though.

 

[fls]

Me too.

But I do think quite a few people (at least the vast majority of Catholics that I know) subscribe to something like it. In matters of medicine, biology, etc., they turn to rationality and science. In matters of the hereafter and the condition of their "souls", they use faith.

Yeah, I think it's a cop-out in order to placate the believers.

My first thought was that there are godless forms of Buddhism. However, I've run into plenty of people who say that because of that, it's not really a religion. (As I see you mention too.)

I guess my only problem is that this also seems to beg the question. If the question is, "Does the thing that forms the subject of your religion exist?" defining that thing for the purposes of answering that question as "that which is the subject of my religion" is circular.

That's not circular. If the definition included existence, then it would be circular. But there is no existence assumed within this definition.

What if the religion is based on nothing? Is it meaningful to say a God that is nothing exists?

A god that is nothing wouldn't fit the definition.

Yes, I understand that. I'm asking about "unlawful" as a characteristic to use in deciding whether or not something belongs in the class "God" for purposes of discussing whether God exists.

Since we don't know all the laws, we can't know whether a given phenomenon is unlawful or only seems to be.

The usefulness of this definition comes when we discover that something is lawful and it is removed from the purview of godness. That is why we can now say that God is flagrantly inconsistent with the empirical world.

Just to avoid talking about magnetism again--and because this is interesting--I'll mention something I just read in Charles Panati's Extraordinary Origins of Everyday Things. In 1603, an Italian cobbler who dabbled in alchemy came across a glow-in-the-dark coating. He of course thought it was a step on the path to discovering the philosopher's stone.

The story goes on to say that the stuff became especially popular in religious trinkets--crucifixes and so on. "The belief developed that prayers recited in the presence of glowing amulets were more readily answered." The artifacts "would only lose their mysterious aura centuries later, when physicists explained how molecules absorb and radiate light through the process of chemoluminescence."

So "makes my crucifix glow" was once a property of God. Now it is not.

How doe we know what other properties to attribute to God if we can't discern what is truly "unlawful".

That's a good example of what I mean. It was chosen as a property of God because it was considered unlawful. Once the lawful nature was discovered it became "chemoluminescence", not "God". We are not interested in attributing properties to God, so it doesn't matter whether or not we know what is unlawful. Only those people who wish to attribute properties to God are interested in choosing that which isn't known to be lawful.

Linda

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

If it's a "postulate" or even an "opinion" to say the probability of God's existence is one in a million, it is a postulate or opinion that is being used as an integral part of the argument. (That figure is being used in the calculations!)

So yes, it is a premise.

From the fallacy files on Begging the Question :

Any form of argument in which the conclusion occurs as one of the premisses, or a chain of arguments in which the final conclusion is a premiss of one of the earlier arguments in the chain. More generally, an argument begs the question when it assumes any controversial point not conceded by the other side.

 

[cj.23]

If it's a "postulate" or even an "opinion" to say the probability of God's existence is one in a million, it is a postulate or opinion that is being used as an integral part of the argument. (That figure is being used in the calculations!)

So yes, it is a premise.

From the fallacy files on Begging the Question :

No, because the opposite situation is included. So

1. The odds of playing card being red (excluding jokers, do they have colours? dunno!) is 0.5
The odds of playing card being black (excluding jokers) is 0.5

Now see how it works?

Now imagine: if we were to turn over a single card, the result is either black or red. The probability that the card would be black or red still remains 0.5, even though now we know the truth 100%.

Now in the argument all I gave all is slotting in subjective arbitrary numbers, and multiplying them by bigger numbers, which are based on another probability estimate calculated by an astrophysicist based on contingent astrophysical variables potential ranges in the Standard Model.

Still, as I said, not deductive - so not a proof, and not technically a premise, but a variable or postulate. You can change the numbers as you wish. Very different things, because in a deductive example the premise is necessary to the argument. Change one variable, the proof fails. Hence no fallacy.

cj x

cj x

 

[cj.23]

I've still not realy had time to catch up with the whole thread, but I do strongly agree with Joe on one thing - most theists probably do not bother to make "rational" cases for God. So many theistic arguments are irrational, sure. To be fair very few people bother to make rational arguments for anything though?

cj x

 

[Bri]

So the conclusion is right there in the premise.

Let me try to explain it another way. Let's say that there is a 0.0001% probability that a rain cloud will form in the desert in the next decade. Am I making an assumption that a rain cloud exists in the desert? Or does it mean that there is only the potential for it to exist in the next decade (i.e. that its existence is possible although unlikely)?

Is there one square circle for every 1 million possible universes? There might be 1 million possible universes but is there even a possibility of god?

That's just a disagreement with the premise though. You're just saying that the probability of a god existing is 0%.

Joe's dispute is that he thinks if I say "there is a 0.0001% probability that a god exists" it makes an assumption that a god exists (not just that a god can possibly exist).

-Bri

 

[Bri]

I've still not realy had time to catch up with the whole thread, but I do strongly agree with Joe on one thing - most theists probably do not bother to make "rational" cases for God. So many theistic arguments are irrational, sure. To be fair very few people bother to make rational arguments for anything though?

I won't argue whether or not most theists make rational arguments for their belief in God. But there is a possible difference between belief in God and belief in, say, the Tooth Fairy or unicorns. One might reasonably expect there to be some evidence of the Tooth Fairy or of unicorns if they exist.

But think about it. If an omnipotent being wanted us to know for certain of its existence, we would know for certain of its existence. In other words, an omnipotent being would have no trouble hiding from us if it so chose (or making itself known to us if it so chose). Therefore, it's not clear that there would be any observable evidence of an omnipotent being if one exists.

We can also compare that to the belief in the existence of intelligent extra-terrestrials. We might reasonably assume that if they exist there would be some evidence of them (see Fermi Paradox). Given that there is little if any such evidence, is it irrational to believe that they exist?

-Bri

 

[cj.23]

HI Bri,

I'm not sure intelligent extraterrestrials would find it all that easy to let us know they exist, assuming the speed of light is a definite limit on information transfer. I remain cautiously agnostic on the issue.

On God, heck, I'm too tired to explain my thinking tonight - but sure if an omnipotent entity wanted to communicate infallibly with us it could I guess, even f I do you limit omnipotence to "omnipotence in regard to its creation". Theologians would generally invoke a Free Will Defence here - not the one you find in theodicy - but close - saying that absolute proof would demand obedience hence removing all Free Will. I'm not personally convinced by that.

Anyway it's late and i need sleep, but I'll cheerfully discuss the issue in another thread sometime.

cj x

 

[Bri]

Theologians would generally invoke a Free Will Defence here - not the one you find in theodicy - but close - saying that absolute proof would demand obedience hence removing all Free Will. I'm not personally convinced by that.

I can see the argument that if our purpose is to freely choose between right and wrong, it would be a bit like holding a gun to our heads if we knew for certain that God exists.

-Bri

 

[The Atheist]

This was pages ago, but....

There are a number of theists who are skeptical of omnipotence, traditional Abrahamic morality, Hell, etc. etc.

Which is exactly why I asked for which version of insanity christianity you wanted me to ridicule instead of asking for "general theistic beliefs" then immediately narrowing it down afterwards.

Waste of time, really.

Again we have a false dichotomy, you assume that either an individual is an atheist who accepts science or a theist who rejects science.

No, I didn't make any assumptions, and I have specifically said at least twice that atheists share no common ground. You're making this up as you go, so I'll leave it there.

Secondly, note postulate 1 is not "There is a God". Postulate 1 is there is
1.Prior probability: Pr [God exists]: = 0.000001
Prior probability: Pr [No God]: = 0.999999
In other words it is "there is a very small chance God exists - here postulated as one in a million.

You've fallen into the exact same trap that Frank Drawke fell into with Fermi's Mistake.

Your formula is GIGO - you have no reliable numbers to input anywhere and all it does is prove the original point that christian belief is irrational. How the hell can it not be irrational when you try to support it with maths? Especially maths which is flawed immediately, because all of the input is WAG*.

*wild-arse guess.

The fatal flaw, IMHO, is to assume that god is a possibility.

I'm tending to think that way myself. Religion has so much in common with homeopathy.

Is a square circle possible in any universe?

Hey, I did the circle thing, but my ones were blue rather than square!

And a million to one is ridiculous odds. The odds of winning a lottery or getting struck by lightning are way more than 1,000,000 : 1, yet people get struck by lightning all the time.

I usually quote a googolplex to one as the right odds.

 

[articulett]

Bri, you're still invoking the equivalent of a perpetual motion machine or sound in a vacuum or "magic" whenever you conclude that there can be consciousness without a material brain.

Always. If you are presuming any percentage, you are presuming that conclusion. It's like saying there's a .000001% chance that sound can travel in a vacuum or that a perpetual motion machine exists or that there's real magic. You are making a presumption that is contrary to the laws of nature with no justification whatsoever.

You don't even seem to see the difference in asserting god (a nonphysical form of consciousness) and aliens-- clearly physical beings of the type consciousness is known to reside in!

I just think you are way out your league in this thread.

Surely the explanation for a missing child is not "god magicked the child into space"... nor is it likely to be alien abduction. But the latter is much more probable than the former because the former is contrary to all known physical laws, but the latter is not.

Don't you see the difference. I don't think you can. I recall spending some time trying to get you to understand the difference at some point. I know you desperately want to believe that a certain immaterial entity is more likely than all the others and as likely as aliens, but this just is not so!

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

That's not circular. If the definition included existence, then it would be circular. But there is no existence assumed within this definition.

It assumes that the religion has something as a subject. If God does not exist, then what does it mean as a definition? That's why I say it assumes existence.

A god that is nothing wouldn't fit the definition.

Exactly--we're back to the ontological argument. By definition, a God that doesn't exist is not God, therefore God exists. (Substitute "subject of religion" for God and it's the same issue--you're assuming that what the religion considers its subject is something, and--for the purpose of tackling the question as to whether God exists, defining God as the subject of the religion.)

For example, one of those deist definitions of God is that God is the First Cause. They (wrongly, I think) also say that there must be a First Cause. Thus the definition (the way they think of it) includes existence, so it's not a good definition for the question of the existence of God.

The usefulness of this definition comes when we discover that something is lawful and it is removed from the purview of godness. That is why we can now say that God is flagrantly inconsistent with the empirical world.

I agree with that. But isn't that back to the undue burden of debunking God?

That's a good example of what I mean. It was chosen as a property of God because it was considered unlawful. Once the lawful nature was discovered it became "chemoluminescence", not "God". We are not interested in attributing properties to God, so it doesn't matter whether or not we know what is unlawful. Only those people who wish to attribute properties to God are interested in choosing that which isn't known to be lawful.

I am interested in what properties they attribute to God (as a definition) so that I can see if the concept is internally consistent. (And we can also put aside very silly arguments like the one cj posted where "God" is just a word.)

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

No, because the opposite situation is included. So

1. The odds of playing card being red (excluding jokers, do they have colours? dunno!) is 0.5
The odds of playing card being black (excluding jokers) is 0.5

Now see how it works?

Yes.

And for you to state these odds, you are assuming the existence of red and black cards. If your argument is on the question of the existence of red and/or black cards, and you offer these odds, you are assuming the existence of both red and black cards. If you then proceed to construct an argument that concludes that red and black cards exist, it is a circular argument.

Now imagine: if we were to turn over a single card, the result is either black or red. The probability that the card would be black or red still remains 0.5, even though now we know the truth 100%.

Yes, and the only way you knew the probability was 0.5 was by knowledge of the existence of red and black cards. If you don't know whether or not a black card, for example exists, you simply cannot give ANY value for its probability of being turned up. You just don't know. If you give a value for that probability, you're making an assumption about its existence, and that assumption shows up in your conclusion.

Still, as I said, not deductive - so not a proof, and not technically a premise, but a variable or postulate. You can change the numbers as you wish. Very different things, because in a deductive example the premise is necessary to the argument. Change one variable, the proof fails. Hence no fallacy.

It is circular. There are some who say that circular arguments are not fallacious, they're just pointless. You have to assume the existence of God in order to prove the existence of God. It is not fallacious to say "if p, then p". . .merely circular.

As I've said several times, if you change Premise 1 to say that the probability of God's existence is 0 (and therefore conclude that God does not exist) the argument is equally circular.

I'm not quibbling about the value. I'm pointing out that just giving ANY value for the probability of God's existence makes an assumption about God's existence. Using that assumption to reach a conclusion about God's existence is circular reasoning.

 

[articulett]

I think she defined god as an entity which defies natural laws...

Sure, that doesn't distinguish a god from a demon or IPU, but it is all inclusive of all gods except for pantheism (which Dawkins refers to as "sex upped atheist"-- "all nature is god")

A person would have to show that something supernatural could exist before being able to describe any attributes of that supernatural something or other.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

If you are presuming any percentage, you are presuming that conclusion.

Hooray!

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

I've still not realy had time to catch up with the whole thread, but I do strongly agree with Joe on one thing - most theists probably do not bother to make "rational" cases for God. So many theistic arguments are irrational, sure. To be fair very few people bother to make rational arguments for anything though?

Good point. As you get caught up, try to read the part of this thread about these issues. I'm very interested in what people think about this issue.

Even if people generally don't make rational arguments for most things in life, they exercise some degree of skepticism for most things. Or at least somehow shift mental gears to a different way of thinking. It boils down to the question, "Why this and not that?"

Why believe in transubstantiation purely on faith (the only way that particular feat is possible!), but reject the existence of elves, fairies, Big Foot, etc. without seeing some evidence? How do they draw the lines on what is a mystery they accept on faith, and what is cultish nonsense? Why believe a guy could bring dead people back to life, but then become very dubious when you get a spam e-mail offering you a million dollars for a lottery you never entered?

People do this, all the time. I'm not so sure how they pull it off.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

A person would have to show that something supernatural could exist before being able to describe any attributes of that supernatural something or other.

Well, you and I would think about it that way, but in fact, millions of believers ascribe a great many properties to God. I keep pressing for a defining list of characteristics because I would prefer these "does God exist" debates to be conducted with some idea of what their God is rather than what usually happens--you get "First Cause" or "universal force" or some such.

I just saw an ad from a local mega-church on TV. The hip young preacher made several claims about Jesus that I think would be quite easy to show are internally inconsistent and overwhelmingly inconsistent with the world we live in.

I guess I'm tired of discussing arguments like the one cj posted where "God" has no meaning whatsoever. You could put "Satan" into that argument and it would work just the same. You could put "Flying Spaghetti Monster" or anything else in there and it would work the same.

If you assume some probability that the FSM exists and you assume some probability of universes with life in them existing, and assume that universes with life are more likely if the FSM exists, you can show that it is highly probably that the FSM exists.

 

[articulett]

I feel the same way--it all sounds like smoke and mirrors and nonsense to me. I think it makes sense more in their head than anywhere else. All people once believed things they no longer believe... so I guess you can try and relate to it that way. It just involves "not thinking" about what is wrong with the argument and seeking and emphasizing "signs" that support it as true, I think.

People seek explanations and plug in bad ones when they have none... and then they use confirmation bias to make those bad explanations "more true" in their heads while, at the same time, keeping themselves completely unaware that they are doing so.

Faith is all about believing despite evidence, right? So if faith is "good", then evidence isn't necessary. I like a lot of believers, but my mind just fuzzes when they start spinning their reasons for belief. There are rational reasons for them to do so; --but the beliefs themselves are not rational.

 

[Malerin]

Well just answer the question. I'm only interested in probability and the fatal flaw of thinking that at some point the impossible becomes possible.

Is a square circle possible in any universe?

Do you think the notion of God is logically contradictory?

Joe's main problem here is he's talking about modal logic without understanding the difference between actual worlds and possible worlds. In modal logic, there is a possible world where green unicorns live on Mars. That does not mean there are actually green unicorns on Mars. Just that it's a possibility. Under modal logic, anything that is not a logical contradication exists in a possible world. If the epistemic value of the proposition is between 0 and 1 (as in the case of the green unicorns), there's a possible world where that proposition is true (if the value is 1, then the proposition is true in all worlds).

So when someone makes the claim that God possibly exists, under modal logic, that claim would read there is a possible world where God exists. Once the possibility is established, you can then move on to Bayesian probability to argue how likely it is that something in a possible world exists in an actual world.

So the argument from design is never attacked as begging the question or circular reasoning because it only assumes God exists in a possible world. The argument then tries to show that it's reasonable to conclude that God exists in the actual world.

As a side note, the ontological argument has a new formulation incorporating modal logic (this is very slick). Under this argument, God is defined as a necessary being (that is to say God has the property that it's non-existence is a logical contradiction). Under modal logic, if God (a necessary being) can be shown to exist in a possible world, it must exist in every world. Basically, if a necessary being is possible, then a necessary being exists, by virtue of its possessing the property of necessary existence.

ETA: Boy you guys are really getting hung up on epistemic values. They do NOT assume existence. Let's say you can't find your keys. The epistemic value of the proposition "Leprechauns stole my keys" is extremely low (a lot of .0's and 1). The epistemic value of the proposition "I lost my keys" is extremely high (.9 followed by a lot of 9's).

The low epistemic value for the leprechaun claim does NOT assume leprechauns actually exist. Joe, this is the point you keep getting hung up on. It only assumes it's possible, because nothing in the claim "Leprechauns stole my keys" is logically contradictory.

So when the argument from design begins with a low epistemic value for "God exists", it is NOT assuming God exists. All it is saying is that, as far as we can tell, there's a very low chance God exists (just like the Leprechaun claim). The argument then tries to show that the initial low epistemic value for "God exists" is wrong (because of fine-tuning of the universe), and the correct epistemic value is very high (which, again, is not saying God exists- just that it is very probable God exists). The argument goes from low probaility to high probability. It never assumes God actually exists, and if you read objections to the argument, they always attack the premises or the way the conclusion is derived from the premises.