Idealists: What does 'physical' mean to you?

[rocketdodger]

What would you expect me to say? That we should all just believe the Bible (or whatever book you can pick) as good enough and call it a day where research is concerned?

Why would I do that?

You missed my sarcasm. My opinion is that your suggestion to funnel resources into NDE and medium research betrays your ulterior motives. As if the rest of your responses didn't already...

Quotes? All I recall I've ever said is that atheism is the belief that the universe (and all therin) is self-sustaining (i.e. uncreated).

There you go. You keep asserting that the only alternative to God-mind is "self-sustaining" or "uncreated." What, exactly, do those terms mean?

Because according to materialism, every result must have a cause. It doesn't make sense to a human to think otherwise. So I don't know wtf you are talking about with this "uncreated" nonsense.

 

[articulett]

I think if there was an iota of evidence to show that NDE's were more than wishful thinking, that funding from all over would come out of the woodwork. Who wouldn't want to understand and refine knowledge on such a thing if it signified something about consciousness after we die?... Who wouldn't jump upon the opportunity to really know about consciousness outside the brain if such a phenomena existed. We'd be developing the science faster than we have with DNA and brain research. But there is just nothing useful there. It seems a fascinating study of the way humans are so eager to fool themselves--especially regarding their own mortality.

 

[Malerin]

I think if there was an iota of evidence to show that NDE's were more than wishful thinking, that funding from all over would come out of the woodwork. Who wouldn't want to understand and refine knowledge on such a thing if it signified something about consciousness after we die?... Who wouldn't jump upon the opportunity to really know about consciousness outside the brain if such a phenomena existed. We'd be developing the science faster than we have with DNA and brain research. But there is just nothing useful there. It seems a fascinating study of the way humans are so eager to fool themselves--especially regarding their own mortality.

The largest (and longest study) ever done on NDE's rejected materialistic causes (hypercarbia, cerebral hypoxia, etc.) , and had this to say:

Finally, the theory and background of transcendence should be included as a part of an explanatory framework for these experiences.

http://profezie3m.altervista.org/archivio/TheLancet_NDE.htm

 

[AkuManiMani]

Earlier, I brought up examples of computation and cognition in the human brain that are not conscious.

Which isn't relevant.

If you understand what I'm trying to get at you would see that it's extremely relevant.

We know at this point that the brain is the medium for the phenomenon we call consciousness but there is not yet any understanding of what it is, exactly.

Reflection.

I recall you bringing up self-referencing programs earlier as an example of conscious awareness. I agree with you that it clearly has a critical role in intelligence but when I say 'consciousness' I am not referring merely to intelligence. Reflection is clearly not identical to awareness. Its essentially a class of internal feedback that take place not only in the brain but as a means of self-regulation in cells.

I think that we can agree that even tho our cells regulate their gene expression they are not conscious -- at least not what we experience as conscious. The crux of what I'm saying is that feedback response is not necessarily identical to awareness. The fact that such processes are continually at work in our bodies even when we are not lucid is proof of that. To assume that it is (even in the case of computational Reflection) would be a leap of faith.

The very phenomenon of experiencing these frequencies as color is a part of what we call consciousness.

Why do you say that?

Seems I'm having a hard time communicating what I'm actually getting at so I'll try to use an example you might find 'relevant'.

Lets say that you've constructed an automaton with its own onboard AI system whose main function is to vacuum floors without constant human supervision. Its equipped with adaptive reflective programing and has optic sensory systems, responds to sounds and vibrations, and for good measure, lets just say it even has some chemosense to detect spills and odors.

Now, assuming that it has all the computational functions that you identify with consciousness how do we know it experiences EM radiation the way we do? How about smells or sounds? Better yet, how would we know it experiences it chemosense as taste smell or something entirely different? A more important question would be: Even tho it can algorithmically respond to external and internal stimuli how would we know it subjectively experiences them as qualitative phenomenon at all?

I'll use another example to illustrate what I'm trying to convey.

Theres a condition in which a person's brain responds to visual information that comes thru the eyes. For all intents and purposes, the brain ''sees". The only problem is that people with this condition are not consciously aware of this sight -- they don't actually see. I believe the condition is called Blindsight. There are numerous examples one could point out of the brain unconsciously sensing and performing complex functions without full conscious awareness or without any conscious awareness at all.

Ah. Evolution. If pain was pleasurable we'd all be dead.

Its fully conceivable that evolution could have the brought about the pain response (i.e. avoiding or retreating from negative stimulus) without there necessarily being a conscious sensation of suffering.

Theres nothing in the currently known laws of physics that accounts for subjective experience.

Baloney. There is nothing in subjective experience that raises the slightest problem for a purely physical explanation.

My point is we don't have that explanation yet. Are color, taste, sadness, joy, etc. physical properties of matter? What force is the carrier of pain? Is subjective perception inherent in any physics equation? Why is there subjective experience at all and what physical principle makes it happen?

Why is it that a particular subset of chemical systems (i.e. organism) not only physically interact and respond to events but sometimes experience them as well?

What is it really? We honestly don't know yet.

Yes. Yes we do. We don't know every detail of how the brain functions, but we know perfectly well that part of its function results in subjective experience.

Pointing out that we have an idea of where it happens is not the same as demonstrating that we know what subjective experience is or how it happens.

While its not justified to fill in that gap [in our understanding] with unsubstantiated 'magic' solutions its also not productive to pretend that it's not there.

Perhaps you could point it out to me, because I sure can't see it.

PixyMisa, have you ever sleepwalked or known someone who has? The person walks around and can be responsive to external stimuli but without any conscious awareness of the experience or their actions. I've personally had to be told of things I've done while sleep walking after the fact because I had no conscious experience of it at all.

If autonomous behavior and response is not a guarantor of consciousness in a human being how is it at all founded to assume that it is in the case of an inanimate automaton? What would makes the smart-vac robot in my earlier example conscious while the sleepwalker is clearly not?

Better yet, what if one were to utilize AI technology similar to that of the hypothetical smart-vac in a much different way. Say we had a person in a coma and we had the technology to have a direct computer interface between the brain/nervous system to the point where we could have an AI system control the motor function of their body. Lets say that this system could also utilize sensory information coming into the brain. With this in place, hypothetically, it would be possible to have a comatose person behave in an autonomous manner and even program them to perform relatively complex tasks.

By your definition, would they be conscious? Hows about the AI put in place to control their behavior and motor functions? Would you consider the AI to be their consciousness? Why or why not?

Your computer = conscious is as unfounded as the 'Overmind' postulate.

Have you read Dennett on this? Or Hofstadter? Do you know why Dennett regards a device as simple as a thermostat as conscious and not qualitatively different from a human brain or a human mind?

If not, then go read. Hofstadter's Godel, Escher, Bach in particular.

If so, then why are you spouting rubbish?

I'm familiar with Dennett's definition of consciousness and why he states that a thermostat is not qualitatively different than the human brain/mind. Essentially his argument is that the difference between the two examples is a matter of degree rather than kind and that the only thing that truly distinguishes human 'consciousness' from thermostat 'consciousness' is that the process in question is more complex in humans.

I fully understand this position but, for reasons I've already mentioned, I find it extremely lacking.

 

[PixyMisa]

The largest (and longest study) ever done on NDE's rejected materialistic causes (hypercarbia, cerebral hypoxia, etc.) , and had this to say:

http://profezie3m.altervista.org/archivio/TheLancet_NDE.htm

That's it? That's the best you've got?

An entirely subjective survey of CPR patients, and a second-hand anecdote?

 

[PixyMisa]

I recall you bringing up self-referencing programs earlier as an example of conscious awareness. I agree with you that it clearly has a critical role in intelligence but when I say 'consciousness' I am not referring merely to intelligence.

Neither am I.

Reflection is clearly not identical to awareness.

No, it's self-awareness.

I think that we can agree that even tho our cells regulate their gene expression they are not conscious -- at least not what we experience as conscious.

Irrelevant.

The crux of what I'm saying is that feedback response is not necessarily identical to awareness.

I never said it was.

The fact that such processes are continually at work in our bodies even when we are not lucid is proof of that.

Doubly irrelevant.

To assume that it is (even in the case of computational Reflection) would be a leap of faith.

Irrelevant non-sequitur.

Seems I'm having a hard time communicating what I'm actually getting at so I'll try to use an example you might find 'relevant'.

Okay, shoot.

Lets say that you've constructed an automaton with its own onboard AI system whose main function is to vacuum floors without constant human supervision.

Okay.

Its equipped with adaptive reflective programing and has optic sensory systems, responds to sounds and vibrations, and for good measure, lets just say it even has some chemosense to detect spills and odors.

Fine. It's conscious.

Now, assuming that it has all the computational functions that you identify with consciousness how do we know it experiences EM radiation the way we do?

Irrelevant.

How about smells or sounds?

Irrelevant.

Better yet, how would we know it experiences it chemosense as taste smell or something entirely different?

Irrelevant.

Sensory input is necssary for conscious awareness. Human-identical sensory input isn't even universal among humans. Or do you not consider Helen Keller conscious? Synaesthetes?

A more important question would be: Even tho it can algorithmically respond to external and internal stimuli how would we know it subjectively experiences them as qualitative phenomenon at all?

Simple: Because that's what it means to subjectively epereince things as qualitative phenomena.

I'll use another example to illustrate what I'm trying to convey.

Okay.

Theres a condition in which a person's brain responds to visual information that comes thru the eyes. For all intents and purposes, the brain ''sees".

Yep.

The only problem is that people with this condition are not consciously aware of this sight -- they don't actually see. I believe the condition is called Blindsight.

Yes.

There are numerous examples one could point out of the brain unconsciously sensing and performing complex functions without full conscious awareness or without any conscious awareness at all.

Sure.

So what?

Its fully conceivable that evolution could have the brought about the pain response (i.e. avoiding or retreating from negative stimulus) without there necessarily being a conscious sensation of suffering.

It did.

My point is we don't have that explanation yet. Are color, taste, sadness, joy, etc. physical properties of matter?

They are material processes.

What force is the carrier of pain?

What definition of pain?

Is subjective perception inherent in any physics equation?

The equations describing a self-referential system with sensory input, yes.

Why is there subjective experience at all and what physical principle makes it happen?

Self-reference.

That's all. There's nothing special about subjective experience. There's no magic. In humans, it's complex. In toasters, it's simple. In both, it's the same thing.

Why is it that a particular subset of chemical systems (i.e. organism) not only physically interact and respond to events but sometimes experience them as well?

Self-reference.

Pointing out that we have an idea of where it happens is not the same as demonstrating that we know what subjective experience is or how it happens.

It explains everything about experience, based on what we already know about the brain. Where's the problem?

PixyMisa, have you ever sleepwalked or known someone who has? The person walks around and can be responsive to external stimuli but without any conscious awareness of the experience or their actions.

So?

I've personally had to be told of things I've done while sleep walking after the fact because I had no conscious experience of it at all.

So?

If autonomous behavior and response is not a guarantor of consciousness in a human being how is it at all founded to assume that it is in the case of an inanimate automaton?

It isn't.

The difference is, automata, unlike humans, can be taken apart and put back together, and we can point out the consciousness circuits, and stick a logic probe in there and watch it happen.

What would makes the smart-vac robot in my earlier example conscious while the sleepwalker is clearly not?

Is the sleepwalker so clearly not?

You're confusing consciousness as a fundamental process with consciousness as it is experience specifically by alert, healthy, psychosis-free, adult humans. That is just one specific example of consciousness, and you are attaching all sorts of baggage that simple doesn't apply to the general case.

What did Descartes tell us? I think, therefore I am. Consciousness is self-reference, all else is just factory-installed extras.

Better yet, what if one were to utilize AI technology similar to that of the hypothetical smart-vac in a much different way. Say we had a person in a coma and we had the technology to have a direct computer interface between the brain/nervous system to the point where we could have an AI system control the motor function of their body. Lets say that this system could also utilize sensory information coming into the brain. With this in place, hypothetically, it would be possible to have a comatose person behave in an autonomous manner and even program them to perform relatively complex tasks.

And?

By your definition, would they be conscious?

Who is the "they" here? You have stipulated that the human brain is not conscious. If the AI is conscious, and you consider the AI now part of the person, then the person is conscious, even though their meat brain is fried.

Hows about the AI put in place to control their behavior and motor functions? Would you consider the AI to be their consciousness? Why or why not?

Is it self-referential? If yes, then yes. If no, then no.

I'm familiar with Dennett's definition of consciousness and why he states that a thermostat is not qualitatively different than the human brain/mind. Essentially his argument is that the difference between the two examples is a matter of degree rather than kind and that the only thing that truly distinguishes human 'consciousness' from thermostat 'consciousness' is that the process in question is more complex in humans.

Yes, that's precisely correct.

I fully understand this position but, for reasons I've already mentioned, I find it extremely lacking.

You're not talking about consciousness. You're essentially ignoring consciousness and talking about all sorts of other things that simply do not matter.

 

[Z]

HypnoPsi will never, ever, ever relinquish his belief in NDEs and OOBEs, regardless of what anyone shows him. It's his one unshakable point of faith, upon which he builds his entire worldview. Never mind that each and every experiment into these events either disproves their existence or was done so poorly as to be laughable; never mind that any properly done experiment demonstrates these events to be the direct result of a traumatized or chemically imbalanced brain. HP must and will believe that they prove consciousness is an independent entity from the brain.

Hence, discussion with him on the point is... pointless.

Luckily, cooler heads prevail worldwide, and we won't be wasting 'billions of dollars' on pointless, useless psi research.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I think that we can agree that even tho our cells regulate their gene expression they are not conscious -- at least not what we experience as conscious.

Irrelevant.

Irrelevant? Its absolutely central. If the processes involved in all biological functions are essentially the same as what you describe as consciousness [self-referential computation] and we, as living organisms, do not experience consciousness for as long as we are live there is a clear contradiction in the definition you've provided.

The definition you've provided is not useful because its too broad. Essentially, what you're saying is that a bacteria or plant is conscious. Even a comatose person would be 'conscious' by the definition you've provided. Yes, there is self-reference going on in conscious states but not all systems of self-reference are conscious. I'm not even just speaking of being 'self aware' simply being aware period is what is not clearly understood.

Lets say that you've constructed an automaton with its own onboard AI system whose main function is to vacuum floors without constant human supervision. Its equipped with adaptive reflective programing and has optic sensory systems, responds to sounds and vibrations, and for good measure, lets just say it even has some chemosense to detect spills and odors.

Fine. It's conscious.

Now, assuming that it has all the computational functions that you identify with consciousness how do we know it experiences EM radiation the way we do?

How about smells or sounds?

Better yet, how would we know it experiences it chemosense as taste smell or something entirely different?

Irrelevant.

Huh?

Judging from the context and usage it seems you're using the world 'irrelevant' in lieu of 'I don't know' or 'does not compute'.

You keep claiming that we sufficiently understand conscious yet you can't even explain to me how constructs based off of that alleged understanding would reproduce human sensory experience.

If consciousness is understood so rigorously explain to me how we would go about creating an entity that experiences 'redness'? Hows about 'bitterness'? Take your time and think about it -- don't just reflexively brush off the question because it confuzzles you. Humor me.

Better yet, how would we know it experiences it chemosense as taste smell or something entirely different?

Sensory input is necssary for conscious awareness. Human-identical sensory input isn't even universal among humans. Or do you not consider Helen Keller conscious? Synaesthetes?

Hellen Keller was indeed conscious, and so are synaesthetes but you're missing the point entirely. The questions of: What distinguishes one qualitative experience from another and what does it mean to be conscious of sensory input? A synaesthete experiences sensory input but that experience is qualitatively different from other people. Saying sensory input is essential for conscious awareness does not tell us WHAT consciousness IS.

Keller would still be conscious if her other senses later failed and she had no sensory feedback from her environment at all. She probably would have suffered a lot of psychological anguish to have been so profoundly cut off from the world and she would be left with nothing but her own thoughts emotions and, probably troubled, dreams.

A more important question would be: Even tho it can algorithmically respond to external and internal stimuli how would we know it subjectively experiences them as qualitative phenomenon at all?

Simple: Because that's what it means to subjectively experience things as qualitative phenomena.

Except for those 'irrelevant' exceptions that I brought up in which it doesn't. Or the incongruous fact that even if you make an automaton from scratch you don't even know what the world 'looks like' to it lets alone whether or not it experiences qualitative states.

You're confusing consciousness as a fundamental process with consciousness as it is experience specifically by alert, healthy, psychosis-free, adult humans. That is just one specific example of consciousness, and you are attaching all sorts of baggage that simple doesn't apply to the general case.

What did Descartes tell us? I think, therefore I am. Consciousness is self-reference, all else is just factory-installed extras.

Consciousness is awareness. Self-reference is not awareness.

Me invoking specific sensory examples is just to illustrate what we don't know. The "factory-installed extras" aren't merely add-ons but different manifestations of the same phenomenon in question, namely consciousness. The fact that we cannot account for them or meaningfully attempt to reproduce them [still waiting on your explanation of how to produce a bot that experiences "redness"] clearly highlights the limits of our understanding of the subject of consciousness.

When we're able to produce an entity from scratch that can experience qualia to our specifications and we can know what its experiencing, then we can take meaningfully of understanding consciousness. Until then we're just making guesses.

You're not talking about consciousness. You're essentially ignoring consciousness and talking about all sorts of other things that simply do not matter.

Ironically enough, the reverse is true. I'm the one discussing qualitative experiences that are central to the topic of consciousness and you're invoking thermostats and toaster ovens. With a definition of consciousness as broad as the one you're using you might as well just call yourself an idealist and be done with it.

The examples I've listed illustrate that self-reference is not synonymous with consciousness yet you pull a "system error: does not compute" on me and completely miss the fact that your definition of consciousness is inadequate. Its like trying to discuss politics with a web bot. You can't seem step back from the system of thinking you've taken for granted to look at its flaws and limitations.

 

[Undesired Walrus]

Just to play Devil's advocate here, when we drift off to sleep, our perception of reality becomes radically distorted from our day to day perception of reality. If our brain allows itself to distort the world around us in this manner, for what justification do we have to have to assume to sober world is a more accurate depiction?

One answer may be that all alert, sober Humans can describe the appearance and texture of objects and events in a similar and familiar manner to each other, whilst a drowsy, stoned Human cannot. That said, for what reason do we assume this is satisfying? What is more real about the sober world than the stoned one?

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

For anyone interested... Ramachandran has a new essay that seems to fit this discussion: Self Awareness: The Last Frontier (1.1.09, Edge.org).

 

[paximperium]

For anyone interested... Ramachandran has a new essay that seems to fit this discussion: Self Awareness: The Last Frontier (1.1.09, Edge.org).

Great article. Goes to show how much we know(and don't know) about the brain and its function when not hampered by woo-mongerers and magic thinking.

 

[Dancing David]

Because denying your own consciousness is ludicrous? This seems to be the second prong of the materialstic attack on consciousness. First, we had toasters and thermostats are conscious. Now, we have nothing is conscious.

Yep, materialism is looking better and better

So, you sate that there is no evidence for the 'material' but then turn around and state that the same evidence is evidence for 'consciousness'.
I had expected better of you, I know you do stop and think so i am very suprized by your pat dismissal.

Why does the exact same evidence lead you to say one is illusion and the other real ?

Is it not truly more rational to apply the same standard to both?

 

[Dancing David]

This post of yours contains at least 5 propositions.
If you believe that all propositions are meaningless why have you bothered to make thirteen thousand posts, full of propositions, on an internet forum?
Your beliefs and your actions contradict each other.
And in terms of amusement value you are edging closer to Pixymisa and his self-aware toaster (only certain models, apparently).

I believe that there was a qualifier to the statement about propositions.

So as usual you ignore the use of the term 'a priori', that sort of figures. Since you can't come up with a coherent response to my comment, you just try to laugh it off.

Strange, I had thought better of you too. Turns out that you don't want to talk about it or look at it.

As with BAC I will take that as an admission that you don't have a counter to the statement that:

'a priori all propositions are meaningless'.

Figures, you are unable to maintain focus because you don't have a counter argument.

This is the post
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showpost.php?p=4311380&postcount=592

This is the quote which I will highlight as you perhaps are not wearing your glasses:
So, let us see, I say that a priori, all propositions are meaningless.

I know you can offer better arguments than shifting the words I used around. Unless you will now mount your mighty steed and gallop away....

 

[Dancing David]

It depends where you take the theory. Consider, if people really believe that personhood is like a computer program and nothing more what's to stop their being more Peter Singers in the world?

Prematurely translating pure theory it into actual policy is to me where things could get very ugly.

Or how about giving robots rights?

~
HypnoPsi

I hope you understand this, I can not prove that I am not a robot.

I assume that i am not a robot.

You have misplaced your argument, belief in a spirit , soul and all that led to as much destruction as no belief in a soul.

You seem to have avoided answering my statement.

How can you tell the difference between quanta and godthink or butterfly dreams?

I am amazed by all the shifting that is going on here, you are doing better than the others.

 

[Dancing David]

Which part?

The problem for me is that now that the holidays are nearly over I simply won't be around that much on here after the weekend

~
HypnoPsi

I appreciate that, I would find it interesting as the evidence for the Ganzfeld is very, very , very weak.

 

[Dancing David]

Aku Mani Mani
As someone who has had severe sleep disturbances and even some memories of my recent sedation. (Very dreamlike)

There is already the notion that exists that there are levels of consciousness, in many states one actually is 'aware' and actually meets the criteria for 'self aware', they do not however for concrete memories of the events.

That is a BIG problem when people use the word consciousness, they don't define it and just assume that it has meaning.

When I had my colonoscopy they gave me some major benzodiazepine and a narcotic. the point is that they want you 'rousable' meaning that you are capable of looking as though you are 'awake' and 'responsive' as in they can ask you questions and ask you to preform tasks.

So this si where I think the use of therm consciousness gets into trouble.

Take a person with Alzheimers or dementia, they are 'aware', they are 'self aware', yet they do not often form new memories.

So then you still end up with the laundry list defintion of consciousness or old chinese menu list.

Must have 5 out of seven criteria or one from column A and two from column B.

Either way it points out why I feel it is better to avoid the use of the term 'consciousness' and try to define which processes you are talking about.

 

[PixyMisa]

Another instance: I sometimes experience lucid dreams - that is, I am aware that I am dreaming, and have some control over the course of the dream. I can even voluntarily wake myself from this state. And yet, I'm in REM sleep.

Consicousness is self awareness. The rest is interesting, but it's not consciousness.

 

[plumjam]

I believe that there was a qualifier to the statement about propositions.

So as usual you ignore the use of the term 'a priori', that sort of figures. Since you can't come up with a coherent response to my comment, you just try to laugh it off.

Strange, I had thought better of you too. Turns out that you don't want to talk about it or look at it.

As with BAC I will take that as an admission that you don't have a counter to the statement that:

'a priori all propositions are meaningless'.

Figures, you are unable to maintain focus because you don't have a counter argument.

This is the post
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showpost.php?p=4311380&postcount=592

This is the quote which I will highlight as you perhaps are not wearing your glasses:
So, let us see, I say that a priori, all propositions are meaningless.

I know you can offer better arguments than shifting the words I used around. Unless you will now mount your mighty steed and gallop away....

Can you offer a convincing explanation as to how adding 'a priori' to the start of a proposition makes that proposition not a proposition?
Even if you could show that adding qualifiers to propositions can magic them into being non-propositions then you are in the following position.

a) you are not making a proposition, so you're literally saying nothing in regard to the relationship, if any, between meaninglessness and propositions

If, however, you cannot manage it you are back where I initially said you were
b) in the self-defeating position of making a proposition which states that all propositions are meaningless.

If it is a, then the most rational thing you can do is to shut up. If it is b then the most reasonable thing you can do is acknowledge the self-defeating nature of that position, appropriately modify your belief on the matter, and move on.

 

[plumjam]

How do you know you are conscious?

More hilarity from the Pixy.
To see how absurd you're being, simply imagine a situation in which you know you are currently not conscious.
To know that you are currently not conscious you would have to be what?
(I'll help you out) _ o _ s _ _ _ _ s
Rhymes with the first name of that guy who helped decide Jesus' fate and didn't fly planes yet.

 

[paximperium]

More hilarity from the Pixy.
To see how absurd you're being, simply imagine a situation in which you know you are currently not conscious.
To know that you are currently not conscious you would have to be what?
(I'll help you out) _ o _ s _ _ _ _ s
Rhymes with the first name of that guy who helped decide Jesus' fate and didn't fly planes yet.

Hey, another inane Plumjam dodge. Why am I not surprised?
The standard tactic of throw bullcrap around and hopefully no one will notice that he didn't answer the question at all.

So you don't have an answer to "How do you know you're conscious"?