Idealists: What does 'physical' mean to you?

[AkuManiMani]

Except that the solipsist has to explain why the trees in his backyard maintain their configured existence independently of his conscious thought.

Stuff is out there. Every metaphysic has some splainin' to do.

~~ Paul

Imo, solipsism sounds a lot like a form a megalomania. Have there been any serious philosophers who held it as an actual position beyond mere hypothetical debate?

 

[Dancing David]

I think in this context, "physical" means made of matter. A photon isn't categorized as matter -- its a massless wave/particle.

I have a question of my own, tho. What would you categorize as non-physical?

Soory, AMM, photons are matter as much as bosons.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Soory, AMM, photons are matter as much as bosons.

Okay, so what isn't matter?

 

[RandFan]

I think in this context, "physical" means made of matter.

What context? A question was asked how an electron or photon can be "physical"? Quite simple. I would suggest a remedial course of physics. If I ask you how you can think lions are cats and my "context" means felines then it's a silly if not poorly asked question. Further it interjects a presupposition that is not warranted. So what if there exist things that are physical that are not composed of matter?

A photon isn't categorized as matter -- its a massless wave/particle.

Be that as it may it is still physical and that is why, to no surprise, photons are part of any physics course as are space-time and gravity. None of which are made of matter.

I have a question of my own, tho. What would you categorize as non-physical?

The word you are looking for is metaphysical. My answer to you would be anything that is imagined that does not exist.

 

[Beth]

Why do you think they shouldn't? Do they interact with the physical world?

Because they don't have mass - or, at least, they didn't back when I was in school. Has that changed? It seems as if I heard at some point that the electron might have a very small mass. I can't say for sure now.

Can we measure and detect photons and electrons with physical instruments?

Of course.

 

[RandFan]

Because they don't have mass - or, at least, they didn't back when I was in school. Has that changed? It seems as if I heard at some point that the electron might have a very small mass. I can't say for sure now.

(see post above)

Of course.

Then they are physical. The only other option would be metaphysical, or do you have a third option that I don't know about?

 

[Malerin]

Which, again, I have no problem with.

Rather than go point for point on the rest of your statements, I'll try a different tact (not to say this is you being obtuse, but rather it's an effort for me to understand your view, given what I feel are contradictions);

What, in your understanding 'causes' the chair to appear in your mind? If there is only 'mind' and nothing else, how does the chair come to become a construct in your consciousness? Likewise, what 'causes', say, a change in any observation in your mind? How might you explain, say, a ball dropping to the ground when it's pushed from a table?

Athon

Well, we're moving away from the question of "what is physical?" to "how does idealism work?". If reality is idealistic, there are a couple of possibilities as to how we perceive the chair:

1. The chair (and all things) exist as a projection of God's mind. In some way, our minds interact with God's mind so that we "see" the chair God wants us to see. Things don't disappear when we go away because God perceives all.
2. All our minds collaborate unconsciouslly to create the world we perceive. The chair is an unconscious manifestation of a group mind and we interact with it like we would a hallucination or vivid dream. Things don't disappear when we turn our backs on them because our minds are always unconsciously maintaining reality.
3. Same as (2), but there is only one mind (solipsism).

 

[Malerin]

That can't be right. The trees in your backyard exist independently of your thoughts about them. Idealism has to explain how this works.

~~ Paul

This isn't really a problem for idealism. Berkeley invoked God as the ultimate perceiver, or you can just as easily say it is an unconscious process we're all engaged in (but not aware of) that maintains reality.

 

[AkuManiMani]

What context? A question was asked how an electron or photon can be "physical"? Quite simple. I would suggest a remedial course of physics. If I ask you how you can think lions are cats and my "context" means felines then it's a silly if not poorly asked question. Further it interjects a presupposition that is not warranted. So what if there exist things that are physical that are not composed of matter?

[...]

Be that as it may it is still physical and that is why, to no surprise, photons are part of any physics course as are space-time and gravity. None of which are made of matter.

[...]

The word you are looking for is metaphysical. My answer to you would be anything that is imagined that does not exist.

Gotcha. Physical = everything that exists.

Judging from the discussion so far, it seems that there are two monist philosophies being debated and that the root of the argument is what to call the "stuff" that constitutes everything that exists. One is arguing that "EverythingThatsReal" is merely thus-n-thus and the other is asserting that ETR is, instead, such-n-such.

Essentially, from what I've gathered, the "Idealist" argues that the only thing that is ontologically real is subject and the "Materialist" argues that the only thing that's real is the object. Neither positions is positing contradictory predictions. They are basically picking different frames of reference of the same thing (in this case ETR) and arguing that the other frame of reference is somehow false or illusory.

Seems a lil' silly, IMO.

 

[athon]

Well, we're moving away from the question of "what is physical?" to "how does idealism work?".

Well, considering the question was aimed at idealists, and it questions what 'physical' refers to, I think we're still on topic.

1. The chair (and all things) exist as a projection of God's mind. In some way, our minds interact with God's mind so that we "see" the chair God wants us to see. Things don't disappear when we go away because God perceives all.

Ok, fine. Then how is our mind not part of that process? If 'physical' refers to concepts in God's mind, and it's through this deity's perception of it that we have laws, doesn't the transfer of that information have to also subscribe to the system we've simply dubbed 'God's imagination'?

2. All our minds collaborate unconsciouslly to create the world we perceive. The chair is an unconscious manifestation of a group mind and we interact with it like we would a hallucination or vivid dream. Things don't disappear when we turn our backs on them because our minds are always unconsciously maintaining reality.

3. Same as (2), but there is only one mind (solipsism).

Again, I'll suspend disbelief for this as a concept, and address it on the assumption that this is the case. Now, wouldn't this assume again some system of laws to govern it? Whatever the minds are, they'd still require a level of interaction in order to create this 'reality'. No matter where we go, we keep requiring a set of laws for this to be embedded in.

These laws - no matter where or how they are embedded - give rise to observations. We can therefore refer to them as physical reality. Even if we are a single mind interpreting it, the mind interacts with it all. It must also subscribe to laws and rules. Otherwise it's simply special pleading.

Athon

 

[athon]

Gotcha. Physical = everything that exists.

Judging from the discussion so far, it seems that there are two monist philosophies being debated and that the root of the argument is what to call the "stuff" that constitutes everything that exists. One is arguing that "EverythingThatsReal" is merely thus-n-thus and the other is asserting that ETR is, instead, such-n-such.

Essentially, from what I've gathered, the "Idealist" argues that the only thing that is ontologically real is subject and the "Materialist" argues that the only thing that's real is the object. Neither positions is positing contradictory predictions. They are basically picking different frames of reference of the same thing (in this case ETR) and arguing that the other frame of reference is somehow false or illusory.

Seems a lil' silly, IMO.

Well, yes and no. It is silly if one simply accepts that they are two different words for exactly the same system. Except they're not - Idealists seem to then assume a second layer to reality that continues to involve itself in some way (be it God, Plato's ideals, archetypes etc.) without being part of this 'set of laws'. Hence a contradiction - they must interact with the rules of nature without actually having anything to do with them.

Hence my confusion.

Athon

 

[RandFan]

Well, yes and no. It is silly if one simply accepts that they are two different words for exactly the same system. Except they're not - Idealists seem to then assume a second layer to reality that continues to involve itself in some way (be it God, Plato's ideals, archetypes etc.) without being part of this 'set of laws'. Hence a contradiction - they must interact with the rules of nature without actually having anything to do with them.

And violates parsimony and there's no reason to think that this extra layer exists except to flatter one's self or cling to the idea of god.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Well, yes and no. It is silly if one simply accepts that they are two different words for exactly the same system. Except they're not - Idealists seem to then assume a second layer to reality that continues to involve itself in some way (be it God, Plato's ideals, archetypes etc.) without being part of this 'set of laws'. Hence a contradiction - they must interact with the rules of nature without actually having anything to do with them.

Hence my confusion.

Athon

[bolding added]

Well, if you think about it, there isn't a necessary contradiction. In a very significant way, the bolded statement is true. Gods, ideals, archetypes, etc. undeniably exists within the minds of people (in this case idealists) and within the realm of their minds they do appear to operate according to a different 'set of laws'.

edit:The real question would be whether one considers abstractions like ideas, information, and thoughts to be ontologically real. To be clear on my position, I'm of the view that such such things are infact as ontologically real as 'physical' objects.

 

[Malerin]

Well, considering the question was aimed at idealists, and it questions what 'physical' refers to, I think we're still on topic.

Ok

Ok, fine. Then how is our mind not part of that process? If 'physical' refers to concepts in God's mind, and it's through this deity's perception of it that we have laws, doesn't the transfer of that information have to also subscribe to the system we've simply dubbed 'God's imagination'?

Physical doesn't refer to concepts in God's mind. The Berkeley-type reality I described would not have anything "physical" in it. If God is the ultimate perceiver, then the transfer of information (from "Chair as projection of God's mind" to "Chair being perceived by us") would follow whatever rules God thinks are appropriate.

Again, I'll suspend disbelief for this as a concept, and address it on the assumption that this is the case. Now, wouldn't this assume again some system of laws to govern it? Whatever the minds are, they'd still require a level of interaction in order to create this 'reality'. No matter where we go, we keep requiring a set of laws for this to be embedded in.

Yes, there would be a system in place to keep the idealistic reality orderly and internally consistent. For example, we'd all have to agree what a "tree" looks like, and that it loses it's leaves in the Fall.

These laws - no matter where or how they are embedded - give rise to observations. We can therefore refer to them as physical reality.

Well, the laws don't give rise to observations. Minds do that. You can have a materialistic universe with no minds, with plenty of laws of nature, and you would never have any observations going on.

I also think you're making a big leap from observation to reality. Just because we observe something doesn't mean reality is physical or immaterial or theistic. The most we can say is that we are experiencing (or observing) such-and-such.

 

[Frozenwolf150]

I raised these points in the other recent topic.

Regardless of whether we live in a Matrix-like world, the conclusion that we cannot truly know anything meaningful about reality does not follow. Let's assume the world is an illusion and see where the possibilities lead.

First, suppose the world is an imperfect Matrix, just like in the movies. It begs the question, how does one identify the glitches in the system? The simple answer is that any violation of the laws of physics would be a glitch in the system. In the films, the people who realized that the world was an illusion were partly freed from its restrictions and were able to bend the normal laws. However this is all dependent on knowing what those physical laws are and understanding how they work in the first place. It is meaningless to say that Neo can defy gravity if we don't know what gravity is and how it's supposed to work. In this scenario, scientific knowledge would be extremely useful because it would allow us to distinguish between normal and abnormal behavior in our world.

Now suppose the illusion or simulation were perfect. There are no glitches to speak of. What this implies is that the Matrix world and the real world would actually have no effect on each other in any way, shape, or form. Those trapped inside the illusion could never get out, and those outside, such as the pilots of Zion, could not hack into the Matrix to get inside. In other words, the two realities would in effect be mutually exclusive. What we learn and discover within this world would be meaningless in the outside world, and vice versa. In this scenario, scientific knowledge would be even more important, because it logically follows that this is the only world such knowledge could ever apply to, Matrix illusion or not. When objects are dropped, they fall to the ground, and if they fall from a great enough height, they get smashed into pieces. Neo would end up as a red smudge on the street for ignoring the laws of physics.

The third possibility is that the world is as real as we perceive it to be. In this scenario, science remains the most reliable means we possess of coming to as close an approximation of reality as possible, and conclusions based on speculation would not tell us anything useful about the world.

Remember that Neo wasn't just asked to believe in a ridiculous proposition without evidence. He had reasons to doubt based on what he and others saw happening around him, and was shown the real world for what it was.

 

[Malerin]

Well, yes and no. It is silly if one simply accepts that they are two different words for exactly the same system. Except they're not - Idealists seem to then assume a second layer to reality that continues to involve itself in some way (be it God, Plato's ideals, archetypes etc.) without being part of this 'set of laws'. Hence a contradiction - they must interact with the rules of nature without actually having anything to do with them.

Hence my confusion.

Athon

Except you could turn it around and say materialists assume a second layer of reality by positing the existence of physical objects. An idealist could argue that reality is simply thoughts and minds and the interaction between them. A materialist adds another (unecessary) layer of substance and interaction: thoughts, minds, and physical objects.

The idealist could also argue that we know for certain that thought and mind exist (in the Cartesian sense), so why muddy the waters by positing the existence of physical objects, which there is no evidence for?

 

[MattusMaximus]

A dualist thinks that the universe contains matter/energy/real-stuff, which interacts by mysterious means with immaterial minds. Descartes was a dualist.

An idealist dispenses with the real stuff, and thinks that the universe consists solely of immaterial minds and mental events. Berkeley was an idealist. The obvious problem with idealism, that objects do not vanish when nobody is looking at them, was resolved in Berkeley's case by assuming the existence of an omniscient God to keep an eye on everything.

A physicalist dispenses with the immaterial minds and thinks that the universe is just made up of stuff, some of which forms minds.

(There's also "neutral monism", made up by idiotic Continental philosophers, which is just dualism plus the idea that the real-stuff and the immaterial mental-stuff are two different manifestations of one underlying reality. It's even dumber than dualism because it clings to the unsupportable idea of immaterial mental-stuff and then posits an extra layer of nonsense which there is no evidence for).

That helps a lot. Thanks for clarifying things for me, Kevin

Now I can keep up with the conversation...

 

[RandFan]

Except you could turn it around and say materialists assume a second layer of reality by positing the existence of physical objects.

Actually no. We only need accept that what we percieve is as we percieve it. Physical objects behave as they do because of their pysical nature. The mass of an object explains why it behaves as it does when it is at rest and when it is in motion. With idealism you need another layer that isn't axiomatic and can't be explained. Why does something have mass and why do the rules dictate it operate by the laws of motion? We don't know. We have to insert the unknown into our theories.

Parsimony favors materialism.

 

[MattusMaximus]

This isn't really a problem for idealism. Berkeley invoked God as the ultimate perceiver, or you can just as easily say it is an unconscious process we're all engaged in (but not aware of) that maintains reality.

But then this leads to an obvious question: from whence came God? Is God just something else that pops into existence simply because Berkeley perceives it to be so? Wouldn't this then make Berkeley, or whomever is perceiving the notion of God, the ultimate perceiver? But if that's the case, we're back to the whole tree question...

Sounds like circular logic to me.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Now suppose the illusion or simulation were perfect. There are no glitches to speak of. What this implies is that the Matrix world and the real world would actually have no effect on each other in any way, shape, or form. Those trapped inside the illusion could never get out, and those outside, such as the pilots of Zion, could not hack into the Matrix to get inside. In other words, the two realities would in effect be mutually exclusive.

I pretty much agreed w/ almost all of your post, w/ the exception of the bolded statement. In the case of this Matrix-like scenario you have two 'universes' w/ the only exception being one is natural [i.e. 'real'] and the other is "intelligently" designed by some agency to emulate the other. It stands to reason that either:

(a) the Matrix universe was built within the natural/'real' universe. In this case, no matter how flawless the simulation architecture of the matrix is, a disruption to it in the 'real' universe it exists within will have a direct effect on it's performance. One would also have to specify whether or not a conscious human being needs to be pluged-in to it or can be "uploaded" into it w/o the necessity of their organic bodies.

or

(b) the architect is advanced enough to pinch off a separate space-time in which to construct this matrix -- in which case one would fall into the extremely speculative territory of multiverses. Even assuming that The Architect could pinch off another bubble universe to constrict his matrix, it doesn't completely rule out the possibility that they could interact in some way.

In both scenarios there is still, in principle, some way for those in either universe to interact.

The third possibility is that the world is as real as we perceive it to be. In this scenario, science remains the most reliable means we possess of coming to as close an approximation of reality as possible, and conclusions based on speculation would not tell us anything useful about the world.

Remember that Neo wasn't just asked to believe in a ridiculous proposition without evidence. He had reasons to doubt based on what he and others saw happening around him, and was shown the real world for what it was.

Well, regardless of what universe you're in, science would be the most reliable method of figuring out how things work in it. Given enough time it might even advance enough to have something meaningful to day about possible 'outside' universes