Fair point. However, as we've been discussing in other threads, how then is idealism any different in principle to monist materialism (as opposed to something like Descarte's dualistic materialism)? I guess I'm trying to nut out how you can define 'material' as distinct from mind at all, if they all operate under the same set of laws and principles.
I'm not following. Are you asking how is a chair (for example) distinct from a mind if they bother follow the same laws of nature? I don't see the contradiction in defining "physical" as existing independent of mind, even if minds (if they arise from brains) are bound by the same laws of nature.
I have no problem with not wanting to get bogged down in semantics, however defining precisely what one means by a term can help clarify miscommunications. If by 'physical' you means something different to what I mean, we can't ever agree on definition alone.
I don't know how else I can define it. The way I defined it makes a clear distinction between a physical thing and an idealistic thing- the former can exist independent of mind, the latter can't.
If you've never given any thought to it, on the other hand, and left it vague intentionally, it means you yourself can create those same conflicts within your arguments. I'm curious to know if it's own definitions which conflict, or whether you simply don't have a clear understanding of it yourself.
Well, that's the definition I go by. It's pretty standard to classify physical things as things that are made of matter and are not mind-dependent.
Again, no problem there. However, if one starts with that definition already begging the question in such a way, then there is no way to logically establish it.
I don't see the question begging.
I could just as well create my own definition for anything and wash my hands of any discussion. If 'physical' only ever refers to that which is external to perception, then you've simply ruled perception out as a physical process by definition, not by logic.
No, perception (in a physical sense (sight for example)) is light bouncing off an object and striking a light-sensitive area (e.g., retina), producing electrical impulses, etc. Even without a brain to see the object, you would still have the object and the light bouncing off of it. There just wouldn't be anything to perceive it.
I disagree. I'd say in an idealistic reality, the laws which created your perception of that book cease to continue to do so when you are no longer perceiving it. To state boldly that the book disappears, you're making assumptions that are unsupported by your own observations. You cannot state the book no longer exists, as it conflicts with your very own definition of the book existing at all. See how definitions are now important?
I don't see the contradiction. In an idealistic reality, the book only exists because it is either being perceived or being thought of. That is a necessary condition for its existence. I think you might be confusing necessary condition with sufficient condition. Anyway, if you take away the necessary condition (i.e., the mind thinking of or perceiving the book), then the book cannot exist.
In a materialistic/physicalistic reality, this necessary condition doesn't exist (things exist on their own), and that is at the heart of the difference between idealism and materialism.
In such a case, idealism is no different to materialism. In both cases, that statement is true. In your version, you've created a contradiction in meanings.
I don't understand. In an idealist reality, the book disappears without a perceiver or thinker. In a materialist reality it doesn't disappear.
While dualism contains idealist principles, they don't have to be the same. I realise now what I was writing could be read that way, and I apologise for that confusion. I do, however, find it even more illogical than idealism itself.
Dualism can mean different things. Some take it to mean a mixture of materialism/immaterialism (rocks and angels). It can also mean that a theory has two components (e.g., idealism is dualistic because there is mind and what the mind is perceiving or thinking of).
To clarify, idealism on its own (IMO) seems identical in observation to materialism.
"In observation" is the key phrase. Fundamentally, they are very different models of reality.
Materialism relies on laws predicting how information will be perceived. That's the best that can be done. Beyond that, every speculation is the same as the last. As others have already said, if you want to believe in exactly the same laws that I do, with the added complication of it all being fabricated within a single mind, then go for it. It's not exactly going to be parsimonous, but meh...
Well, now you're getting into epistemology. We might not be able to tell what kind of reality we're in, but our inability to know isn't a reflection on reality itself.
Yet if 'physical' is distinguishable from 'mind', this presumes that the mind does not operate under physical laws.
How do you figure? If physicalism is true, then minds are just byproducts of brains, which are bound by physical laws.
