Do Materialism and Evolution Theory Undermine Science?

[Dancing David]

Nick seems to be using the Kantian arguement that a thing can't represent itself without the creation of metaspace.

Nick also is ignoring all the work on body mapping in the perceptions of the brain.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

For sure thoughts can include references to the thinking process. But that is a quite different proposition from saying that in the expression "my body" the actual thought "my body" is referring to its (the thought's) relationship to the neural substrate. For this to be so the thought itself would have to be referencing itself in the moment. The thought would need to be aware that it was a thought. This would place the thought a priori and is thus idealism.

I do not think anyone is saying that a thought is aware of itself. People have multiple times stated that they are talking about a process, not a thing. The process can produce a sequence of thoughts dealing with the subject of the brain and its internal behavior. The overall process is self-aware, not the individual thoughts.

A complex system, once it is identified as a system, may of course self-reference. This does not mean that each aspect of its interior processing self-references, merely that the system overall has a means of communicating about itself.

Agreed.

~~ Paul

 

[Nick227]

And what's important is the process. When we discuss thoughts, we're not talking about instantaneous states, we're talking about processes.

Well, processes that manifest as referring to states. The discussion, at this juncture, is about the expression "my body" and what the "my" refers to. I don't see that this has so much to do with actual processes understood through third party examination. "My" is not a gerund here. That is simply not, I submit, how the word is understood. You can try and reframe things to construct it as so, but that's up to you.

What you appear to be saying, if I understand you right, is that your personal understanding of what thinking is is causing you to re-evaluate your own thinking processes, or rather causing the human system to re-orientate itself. If so, why not just say that?

To think of a thought as an is rather than a does is to import idealism into a material process.

Not so. It could be used to import idealism into a material process, it does not have to do so. It does so only if one considers that thought precedes materiality.

Nick

 

[PixyMisa]

Well, processes that manifest as referring to states. The discussion, at this juncture, is about the expression "my body" and what the "my" refers to. I don't see that this has so much to do with actual processes understood through third party examination. "My" is not a gerund here. That is simply not, I submit, how the word is understood. You can try and reframe things to construct it as so, but that's up to you.

Again, your argument rests on your personal understanding of the common usage of specific words. This has less than nothing to do with what actually happens.

What you appear to be saying, if I understand you right, is that your personal understanding of what thinking is is causing you to re-evaluate your own thinking processes, or rather causing the human system to re-orientate itself. If so, why not just say that?

Because it's irrelevant.

Not so. It could be used to import idealism into a material process, it does not have to do so. It does so only if one considers that thought precedes materiality.

If you want to claim this this, then all you need to do is provide a coherent definition of thought as a material object.

 

[Nick227]

Your submission is in disagreement with all available material evidence in the fields of cognitive and computer science. Neurons are discrete. Bits are discrete. The substrate is discrete. The processes that arise on the substrates are not discrete.

Fair enough. But they do manifest as so.

Do you have anything resembling a proof of this? Even an informal logical argument?

Have you ever witnessed a thought refer to itself? As I see it, there is thinking. It cannot be about itself because the only aspect that it has is referential to other phenomena. What aspect does thinking have that could be referred to?

I don't think you are making much headway here, given that most of us are programmers who work with self-referential processes every day, by simply asserting that we are wrong.

Well, I've been pointing out a couple of things. Firstly, earlier on, that the very concept of a "self-referential system" is inevitably weak as it relies on there being present a process which attributes selfhood. Thus "the system" is entirely dependent on this function to be considered a self in the first place. (Or, in the case of "third party" attribution of self, it requires that this party has itself a process attributing self present that it may be projected onto the system being examined). Secondly, that in considering that the process of thinking constructs a model of self as an inner, causative agent, one might alter this by considering that this agent is actually the whole organism. However, in doing so, certain paradoxial propositions, such as "my body" appear. Perhaps this could be overcome by considering that nouns and prepositions are actually dative constructs, something I'm not much convinced about as yet!

Nick

 

[Nick227]

Again, your argument rests on your personal understanding of the common usage of specific words. This has less than nothing to do with what actually happens.

What actually happens at a neural level may be significant but the internal models and understandings that arise are inevitably the guts of it as the topic being discussed is the effect of creating a narrative self and how it happens.

Because it's irrelevant.

You may not consider it relevant but I think that if you are going to start rearranging the internal conceptual structure of language prior to engaging in a discussion then it seems to me to be at least reasonable to let people know. The vast majority of humans, I think you'll agree, would have a quite different understanding of the phrase "my body" than the one you have constructed. I'm not attempting to devalue it, merely putting in some context.


If you want to claim this this, then all you need to do is provide a coherent definition of thought as a material object.[/QUOTE]

Well, thinking can still be a material process that infers the existence of fixed states.

Nick

 

[rocketdodger]

Fair enough. But they do manifest as so.

Do you have evidence to support this statement? For example, can you describe what a "discrete thought" is like, and name a few instances of them?

Have you ever witnessed a thought refer to itself?

Absolutely. The thought "I am thinking about this thought."

As I see it, there is thinking. It cannot be about itself because the only aspect that it has is referential to other phenomena. What aspect does thinking have that could be referred to?

If thinking could not be referred to, then how would we be able to have a discussion about it?

However, in doing so, certain paradoxial propositions, such as "my body" appear.

It is only paradoxial to you. It is tautological to materialists.

 

[rocketdodger]

What actually happens at a neural level may be significant but the internal models and understandings that arise are inevitably the guts of it as the topic being discussed is the effect of creating a narrative self and how it happens.

No. This is why you just don't get it -- you really are an idealist to begin with.

What actually happens at a neural level is of paramount importance.

You may not consider it relevant but I think that if you are going to start rearranging the internal conceptual structure of language prior to engaging in a discussion then it seems to me to be at least reasonable to let people know. The vast majority of humans, I think you'll agree, would have a quite different understanding of the phrase "my body" than the one you have constructed. I'm not attempting to devalue it, merely putting in some context.

Wait -- I thought we were talking about materialists. Now we are talking about "the vast majority of humans?"

Your argument was that materialists who use personal pronouns are subconsciously dualists. We have shown that to be false because yes, we really know what we are talking about.

Now you want to move the goalposts and argue "the vast majority of humans are subconsciously dualists, even if materialists are not." Well... ok, but what does that have to do with the OP? The vast majority of humans are also clueless when it comes to science and objectivity in general. So where are you going with this now?

 

[Nick227]

Do you have evidence to support this statement? For example, can you describe what a "discrete thought" is like, and name a few instances of them?

This entire thread is composed of informational packets.

Absolutely. The thought "I am thinking about this thought."

If you are thinking, then you are not the thought. If you are thinking about this thought, then you are not the thought.

If thinking could not be referred to, then how would we be able to have a discussion about it?

The point is that a thought cannot refer to itself. That thinking is recognised as a phenomena is not in dispute.

It is only paradoxial to you. It is tautological to materialists.

Well, Dennett considers it a reflection of the benign user illusion, Blackmore that of a pernicious memeplex. I'm no expert but from what I've read I'd say you're pretty much on your own with considering it just tautological.

I don't think many who've been involved in this area actually doubt that thinking tends to cause the organism to conceptualise self as an inner, causative agent - the seeming possessor of various attributes and capabilities - and that this is not how things actually are. This disparity between notional self and actual self (however it might be constructed) is, I submit, well accepted. The cognitive neuroscientist, Steven Pinker, for example, writes specifically about how even grammar reflects this notion, citing various non-reflexive verbal constructions that proclude the speaker from reassigning subject and object in situations where this reflexion would disinfer self as an inner agent of causation. Blackmore considers the narrative self as purely memetic. Dennett asks if the statement we've been looking at can really be considered just a "bizarre and pointless tautology." I don't think there's so much dispute out there.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

No. This is why you just don't get it -- you really are an idealist to begin with.

What actually happens at a neural level is of paramount importance.

But the effect is to create an illusory self. In considering how this comes about so one can examine not just neurons. One can consider language. One can consider culture. One can consider evolution.

That thinking arises from neuronal activity is not in dispute. But thinking tends to create this illusory narrative self, and it is not so likely that the reason for this will be found neuronally.

Your argument was that materialists who use personal pronouns are subconsciously dualists. We have shown that to be false because yes, we really know what we are talking about.

That was not my argument, though I appreciate that such a position would be a great deal easier to dispute and that it could thus be attractive to you.

Now you want to move the goalposts and argue "the vast majority of humans are subconsciously dualists, even if materialists are not."

Not my position either. You're making a rather suspect use of quote marks here, RD. I haven't written that and it would be nice if you could maintain basic standards of honesty in communication.

Nick

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

I'm no expert but from what I've read I'd say you're pretty much on your own with considering it just tautological.

I think "Dennett's straw man" was probably the thing that people criticized him the most for. It even got a wiki-mention:

The now standard response to Dennett’s project is that he has picked a fight with a straw man. Cartesian materialism, it is alleged, is an impossibly naive account of phenomenal consciousness held by no one currently working in cognitive science or the philosophy of mind. Consequently, whatever the effectiveness of Dennett’s demolition job, it is fundamentally misdirected (see, e.g., Block, 1993, 1995; Shoemaker, 1993; and Tye, 1993).

Moreover, Dennet seems to have moved on from his "multiple drafts" metaphor toward that of "fame in the brain". He also seems to be interested in the Global Workspace Theory of Consciousness (promoted by Baars). Blackmore acknowledges that there is indeed a sort of consensus among many scientists that GW in some form or another might be a fruitful approach. It seems that Blackmore, who criticizes it, seems to be in the minority here.

 

[Nick227]

Absolutely. The thought "I am thinking about this thought."

If you are thinking, then you are not the thought. If you are thinking about this thought, then you are not the thought.

To add...personally, if I was trying to prove my own point wrong, I would probably cite something more along the lines of "This thought is not very long," because bringing selfhood into it just complicates things, if you ask me. However, I would more consider this merely an attempt to create a thought that appears to self-reference, through fulfilling certain criteria, rather than actual self-reference. The point is arguable.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

I think "Dennett's straw man" was probably the thing that people criticized him the most for. It even got a wiki-mention:

Moreover, Dennet seems to have moved on from his "multiple drafts" metaphor toward that of "fame in the brain". He also seems to be interested in the Global Workspace Theory of Consciousness (promoted by Baars). Blackmore acknowledges that there is indeed a sort of consensus among many scientists that GW in some form or another might be a fruitful approach. It seems that Blackmore, who criticizes it, seems to be in the minority here.

If I recall, Blackmore's criticism was that Barrs doesn't really address the issue of subjective states. I think she quotes Barrs' own crits of his model, but I don't have her book to hand. I would like to read more of Barrs' work and of higher-order process models in general, but at this point it doesn't seem to me that they really deal with selfhood properly. I could be wrong.

However, it's not clear for me that any of this really relates to the specific point here. Does Barrs' model really assert that a narrative self, as typically concieved of though thinking, actually does exist?

Nick

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

A minor nitpick, the name is actually Baars (2x a).

Does Barrs' model really assert that a narrative self, as typically concieved of though thinking, actually does exist?

I don't think so, but I guess it would always depend on what you mean by "actually". I mean, the narrative self is by definition already a kind of closed deal (it assumes its very abstract conclusion), and thus not a very satisfying approach. It doesn't really tell us anything empirically, thus we must venture into neuronal space. The view on selfhood could look very different from there, hence why he proposes particular brain regions as potentially important for different aspects of selfhood.

 

[rocketdodger]

This entire thread is composed of informational packets.

The fact that humans communicate in what may be considered discrete messages does not imply that the thoughts leading to those communications are also discrete.

As I said, give me an example of a discrete thought. Hint: For a thought to be discrete, it would have to lead to no other thoughts.

If you are thinking, then you are not the thought. If you are thinking about this thought, then you are not the thought.

The thought is the entire statement. And the statement references itself. You are just wrong, Nick.

The point is that a thought cannot refer to itself.

Why not? Are you ever going to give a logically sound argument for this claim of yours?

 

[rocketdodger]

That thinking arises from neuronal activity is not in dispute. But thinking tends to create this illusory narrative self, and it is not so likely that the reason for this will be found neuronally.

The "why" probably won't be found neuronally. The "how" must be.

You seem to be interested in the "why." Fine. But that has nothing to do with whether materialists know what they are talking about when it comes to "self." That has everything to do with the "how."

And that is precisely what you have been ignoring or discounting the entire time you have been a member of this forum. The "how."

That was not my argument, though I appreciate that such a position would be a great deal easier to dispute and that it could thus be attractive to you.

Then why do you always respond to our explanations by asking us to formulate statements in the third person objective?

Not my position either. You're making a rather suspect use of quote marks here, RD. I haven't written that and it would be nice if you could maintain basic standards of honesty in communication.

Then why have you started using excuses like this when presented with logically sound refutations of your claims:

The vast majority of humans, I think you'll agree, would have a quite different understanding of the phrase "my body" than the one you have constructed.

You're making a rather suspect use of quote marks here, RD. I haven't written that and it would be nice if you could maintain basic standards of honesty in communication.

Because we have the quote function on this forum, the use of standard quotation marks is extended to include more than simply a direct quote.

If you don't agree with my speculations, then you are free to refute them -- tell us what your actual argument is!

What usually happens around here is people don't know what they are arguing and they get defensive when they see someone try to figure it out for them. Is that the case with you, Nick?

 

[PixyMisa]

What actually happens at a neural level may be significant but the internal models and understandings that arise are inevitably the guts of it as the topic being discussed is the effect of creating a narrative self and how it happens.

Even if I grant that, your argument is still entirely beside the point.

You may not consider it relevant but I think that if you are going to start rearranging the internal conceptual structure of language prior to engaging in a discussion then it seems to me to be at least reasonable to let people know.

I'm not "rearranging the internal conceptual structure".

I'm defining my terms.

An exercise that would do you a world of good.

The vast majority of humans, I think you'll agree, would have a quite different understanding of the phrase "my body" than the one you have constructed.

I don't agree at all. And it's still irrelevant.

I'm not attempting to devalue it, merely putting in some context.

In a way that is simultaneously irrelevant, unsupported, and incorrect.

Well, thinking can still be a material process that infers the existence of fixed states.

How? (And you mean implies. Well, I assume you mean implies. Infers is also grammatically correct in this instance, but that would make your statement rather circular.)

 

[PixyMisa]

This entire thread is composed of informational packets.

True.

But are they thoughts? In a colloquial or metaphorical sense, perhaps, but once again that is just irrelevant.

Are they thoughts as thoughts are thought? No. They are expressions of thoughts.

If you are thinking, then you are not the thought. If you are thinking about this thought, then you are not the thought.

None of which is apposite.

The point is that a thought cannot refer to itself.

Wrong! Since it is trivially provable that an expression of a thought can refer to itself, it is necessary also that a thought can refer to itself.

That thinking is recognised as a phenomena is not in dispute.

Small mercies...

I don't think many who've been involved in this area actually doubt that thinking tends to cause the organism to conceptualise self as an inner, causative agent - the seeming possessor of various attributes and capabilities - and that this is not how things actually are. This disparity between notional self and actual self (however it might be constructed) is, I submit, well accepted. The cognitive neuroscientist, Steven Pinker, for example, writes specifically about how even grammar reflects this notion, citing various non-reflexive verbal constructions that proclude the speaker from reassigning subject and object in situations where this reflexion would disinfer self as an inner agent of causation. Blackmore considers the narrative self as purely memetic. Dennett asks if the statement we've been looking at can really be considered just a "bizarre and pointless tautology." I don't think there's so much dispute out there.

Yeah, well, what you are talking about here is, once again, language.

And the appropriate response to any argument about the nature of reality based on the nature of language is a punch in the snoot. If language disagrees with reality, language is wrong. So what? Language is often wrong.

This is why scientists define their terms.

And this also is why your argument is entirely specious.

 

[Nick227]

The fact that humans communicate in what may be considered discrete messages does not imply that the thoughts leading to those communications are also discrete.

Does it not? I would have thought that it would have implied it. Might not be true, but I think it would at least imply it.

As I said, give me an example of a discrete thought. Hint: For a thought to be discrete, it would have to lead to no other thoughts.

Perhaps there is a state change brought about by the thought that creates more thoughts.

I mean, I'm happy to admit that I don't know much about the neurobiology of thinking. Do you? I'm interested.

The thought is the entire statement. And the statement references itself. You are just wrong, Nick.

Well, obviously we have to define just what we term a thought. As I'm arguing from a more experiential, "how it seems" aspect and you from more biological perspective it seems clear we're not going to meet here.

How much is now known about the nature of thinking? Maybe this would help.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

Because we have the quote function on this forum, the use of standard quotation marks is extended to include more than simply a direct quote.

If you don't agree with my speculations, then you are free to refute them -- tell us what your actual argument is!

What usually happens around here is people don't know what they are arguing and they get defensive when they see someone try to figure it out for them. Is that the case with you, Nick?

Well, this is what you wrote...

Now you want to move the goalposts and argue "the vast majority of humans are subconsciously dualists, even if materialists are not."

You put quote marks around a statement which to my mind clearly attributed it to me. Yet I did not write this nor anything particularly like it, as far as I'm aware.

I mean, we're none of us perfect in communication, certainly not me, and emotions get a bit high in these kinds of discussions. But for me this is definitely crossing a line. It's intellectual dishonesty. I'm not trying to make a massive deal out of it, but I do find your behaviour here crossing a line.

Nick