Do Materialism and Evolution Theory Undermine Science?

[Nick227]

My is the common referent to the unique physiacl body that is part of an individual process called consciousness.

the issue of posseion in semantics is part of the confision, but Nick will make mountains out of the arcahic meanings in words.

I am articulating the issue, but it is actually endemic. It's all around us in human culture. It arises because of the nature of thinking, not of language or semantics. Because thinking narratives both construct and reinforce our idea of selfhood, not actual biological selfhood, so the organism starts to seek to fulfil not its needs, but the needs of this constructed narrative self.

Like you say, life can be easy, fun, and fulfilling when lived in the moment with openness. But with a narrative self on board, constructed progressively over decades of human interractions, you can pretty much bet its going to start to drag.

Nick

 

[rocketdodger]

I'd disagree.

A program can refer to the hardware it is running on as its hardware; the hardware is not the program.

Same with my brain.

Yes of course. It depends on how one is looking at it.

I was looking at it as the program being a state of the hardware. That is a less useful viewpoint in many applications, but in this one -- namely, arguing with Nick -- I think it is more appropriate because it stops him cold in his attempts to corner us into admitting dualism.

 

[rocketdodger]

Can you rewrite them with this gerund?

The substrate of this process got up this morning and this process awoke.

This process prefers the stimuli generated by the substrate of this process when it consumes muesli for breakfast.

This process interprets auditory stimuli from the substrate of this process as a robin singing.

This process calculates that there is a high probability it is considered by humans as "an easy-going sort of person."

This process has a valid reference of the event of meeting you last week.

This process desires to be an engine driver when the substrate of this process "grows up" and this process matures.

 

[rocketdodger]

I perceive a fairly major problem with this apparent viewpoint of yours.

Thinking does not refer to itself, rather it refers to the neural substrate from which it arises. It is an expression of the state of the neural substrate at that time.

Thus, the thought "my body" does not refer to that actual thought, but rather it reflects the state of the neural substrate from which it emerges. To believe it reflects the thought itself would not be consistent with materialism. In fact it would be idealism.

Thus the perspective you are advancing is clearly idealistic. Considering the phrase "my body" to be a gerund is to assume that the thought itself is self-aware, that it is describing its own relationship to the substrate. That's not materialism.

Nice try, though.

Nick

Spot on, except for the facts that

1) Incompleteness -- no duh. Are you really lecturing materialists on incompleteness?

2) A thought can partially reference itself if one views thoughts as latent I.E. a sequence of states rather than a single state. And it is easy to do for a fully self-aware being -- it simply thinks about itself thinking about itself at that moment.

3) Viewing thoughts as non-latent is absurd, because you would need to assert that every different state of the brain at every single infinitessimal time slice is a different thought.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

However, simply because language invariably implies duality does not mean that all dualistic statements that a writer makes are arising because of language. In the specific case of Dennett's "cartesian materialists," the waters are muddied because the writer is frequently not aware that they are following a dualistic model.

I agree that not all statements that sound dualistic do so merely because of language. Sometimes the speaker is a dualist. However, as I did say, not all dualistic-sounding statements imply that the speaker is a dualist. As soon as I use the word mind, it sounds dualistic. Yet I am not a dualist.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Thus the perspective you are advancing is clearly idealistic. Considering the phrase "my body" to be a gerund is to assume that the thought itself is self-aware, that it is describing its own relationship to the substrate. That's not materialism.

The phrase "my body" is not a gerund, it is an adjective followed by a noun. I believe people are saying that the internal behavior we call "mental" is a continuous physical process, not a thing. This sounds like a rejection of idealism, in which the mental is taken as a fundamental ontological existent.

May I suggest that if you try to define materialism and idealism in sufficient detail to explain the world as we see it, you will find that the definitions differ only in terminology. There is no way to distinguish what actually is.

~~ Paul

 

[Nick227]

Spot on, except for the facts that

1) Incompleteness -- no duh. Are you really lecturing materialists on incompleteness?

2) A thought can partially reference itself if one views thoughts as latent I.E. a sequence of states rather than a single state. And it is easy to do for a fully self-aware being -- it simply thinks about itself thinking about itself at that moment.

"It" simply thinks?

There are thoughts. To me those thoughts are an expression of the neural substrate and represent its state at that time. A thought is not self-aware.

Pixy's position is nonsensical to me. It is idealistic in that it is ascribing self-awareness to a thought.

3) Viewing thoughts as non-latent is absurd, because you would need to assert that every different state of the brain at every single infinitessimal time slice is a different thought.

Can you explain this bit more? It sounds interesting but I do not understand it.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

The phrase "my body" is not a gerund, it is an adjective followed by a noun. I believe people are saying that the internal behavior we call "mental" is a continuous physical process, not a thing. This sounds like a rejection of idealism, in which the mental is taken as a fundamental ontological existent.

As I see it personally, Pixy is ascribing selfhood to the thought itself. If thinking is the process emerging from the neural substrate then he is saying that the thought "my body" reflects the relationship between that thought and the substrate. From a third person perspective this is true but to claim that the thought is expressing its relationship to the substrate is pure idealism and frankly a pretty extreme position for even the most wild-eyed of idealists to take.

I don't think it has anything to do with considering selfhood a continuous mental process. Selfhood may be considered a continuous mental process precisely because thoughts are not self aware. In thinking so the assumption arises that there must be a thinker, which is then reinforced by the forming neural architecture that develops around this artificial "I" position.

A year or so in discussions he came out with his position on selfhood that "the thoughts become aware of themselves." It seems things are getting crazier still.

Nick

 

[AWPrime]

a process cannot refer to itself.

Prove it.

Give us something more then bad assumptions and semantics jokes. Also you might want to invest in a dictionary, you seem to forget the meaning of words such as idealism. With you it seems to be a catchphrase.

 

[rocketdodger]

A thought is not self-aware.

Can you give a mathematical argument as to why a process cannot reference itself?

Yes, we all know nothing can completely reference itself. But why not even partially?

Can you explain this bit more? It sounds interesting but I do not understand it.

It means if you want to insist that two different states of a process' substrate necessarily imply two different processes then you must be prepared to admit an infinite number of processes, even over an arbitrarily small period of time, since reality admits an infinite number of states over an arbitrarily small period of time.

The only alternative is to accept that a process might remain functionally the same even if the state of its substrate has changed. Which is the view I take.

 

[PixyMisa]

I perceive a fairly major problem with this apparent viewpoint of yours.

Thinking does not refer to itself, rather it refers to the neural substrate from which it arises. It is an expression of the state of the neural substrate at that time.

No it's not. It's the process.

Consider just for a moment: I snap freeze you in an instant of time. Is the frozen you expressing any thoughts? No, it isn't.

Thus, the thought "my body" does not refer to that actual thought, but rather it reflects the state of the neural substrate from which it emerges.

Nope.

To believe it reflects the thought itself would not be consistent with materialism. In fact it would be idealism.

I don't see how you can possibly continue to make this absurd claim.

It's a material process. Doing material stuff to other material stuff.

See the word "material" there? It means what it says.

Thus the perspective you are advancing is clearly idealistic.

Only to you, Nick.

Considering the phrase "my body" to be a gerund is to assume that the thought itself is self-aware

No. The process is, however, self-referential.

that it is describing its own relationship to the substrate.

Yes.

That's not materialism.

Of course it is. Every part of what I described is purely material. You are projecting idealism onto it, because you are incapable of thinking any other way.

Nice try, though.

 

[PixyMisa]

As I see it, in order to do that the process would have to recognise itself as a process. You are constructing the process as referring to itself, as a process, when actually a process cannot refer to itself.

If you actually believe this, then it might explain your mental roadblock.

Of course a process can refer to itself. I'm a computer programmer. I design processes that do this every single day. I couldn't do my job without it.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

As I see it personally, Pixy is ascribing selfhood to the thought itself. If thinking is the process emerging from the neural substrate then he is saying that the thought "my body" reflects the relationship between that thought and the substrate. From a third person perspective this is true but to claim that the thought is expressing its relationship to the substrate is pure idealism and frankly a pretty extreme position for even the most wild-eyed of idealists to take.

I agree that a thought per se does not contain any physical reference to itself. I don't think Pixy is saying that it does. What we are saying is that a sequence of thoughts can include self-referential thoughts just as it can include references to an apple or a chair. The references encapsulated in the thoughts can include references to the thinking process just as they can include any other references. It is no different from saying that a person can punch himself in the face just as he can punch someone else.

~~ Paul

 

[Nick227]

I agree that a thought per se does not contain any physical reference to itself. I don't think Pixy is saying that it does. What we are saying is that a sequence of thoughts can include self-referential thoughts just as it can include references to an apple or a chair. The references encapsulated in the thoughts can include references to the thinking process just as they can include any other references. It is no different from saying that a person can punch himself in the face just as he can punch someone else.

~~ Paul

For sure thoughts can include references to the thinking process. But that is a quite different proposition from saying that in the expression "my body" the actual thought "my body" is referring to its (the thought's) relationship to the neural substrate. For this to be so the thought itself would have to be referencing itself in the moment. The thought would need to be aware that it was a thought. This would place the thought a priori and is thus idealism.

A complex system, once it is identified as a system, may of course self-reference. This does not mean that each aspect of its interior processing self-references, merely that the system overall has a means of communicating about itself.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

No it's not. It's the process.

Consider just for a moment: I snap freeze you in an instant of time. Is the frozen you expressing any thoughts? No, it isn't.

And...?

It's a material process. Doing material stuff to other material stuff.

Thinking is considered a material process in that thinking derives from the neuronal architecture. Thinking is an expression of that neuronal state. When the neuronal state expresses "I" or "my" it says it with thoughts, but the thoughts do not say "I" or "my" about themselves.

No. The process is, however, self-referential.

A system which includes thought may be considered self-referential but this does not mean that thoughts themselves may be considered self-referential.

To consider that thoughts can be self-referential you need to be an idealist.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

Can you give a mathematical argument as to why a process cannot reference itself?

Yes, we all know nothing can completely reference itself. But why not even partially?

It depends what you call a system and what you call a process. The process we're discussing is thinking. Whilst it may have complex origins, I submit that thinking itself is but the passage of thoughts, discrete units of information. The thought cannot reference itself. A thought can be recognised by the system as a thought and other thoughts might arise referring to it, but the thought does not recognise itself and cannot refer to itself. Thus, to the materialist, the neural substrate is always the source of thought. An idealist might consider that the thought "I" is self-referential but to a materialist I submit that this is not so.

It means if you want to insist that two different states of a process' substrate necessarily imply two different processes then you must be prepared to admit an infinite number of processes, even over an arbitrarily small period of time, since reality admits an infinite number of states over an arbitrarily small period of time.

The only alternative is to accept that a process might remain functionally the same even if the state of its substrate has changed. Which is the view I take.

Yes. I mean you also could drag it all back to process and consider that neuronal architecture itself is merely process of which thinking is simply a sub-process. But I take the same view as yourself.

Nick

 

[PixyMisa]

And...?

And what's important is the process. When we discuss thoughts, we're not talking about instantaneous states, we're talking about processes.

Thinking is considered a material process in that thinking derives from the neuronal architecture.

Yes.

Thinking is an expression of that neuronal state.

NO!

It's the process.

When the neuronal state expresses "I" or "my" it says it with thoughts, but the thoughts do not say "I" or "my" about themselves.

Yes they do.

To think of a thought as an is rather than a does is to import idealism into a material process. That's entirely your doing.

A system which includes thought may be considered self-referential but this does not mean that thoughts themselves may be considered self-referential.

Wrong in every respect.

To consider that thoughts can be self-referential you need to be an idealist.

Not in the slightest.

If your persist in clinging to idealist notions of what thoughts are, you will remain unable to understand what thoughts actually are. I cannot help you with that.

You're falling into the same trap as Berkeley and Plantinga and every other idealist who thought they had found a problem with materialism: You have blindly imported your idealist notions into a materialist discussion. Of course that's going to result in inconsistencies - but those inconsistencies are of your creation and have nothing to do with materialism.

 

[rocketdodger]

Whilst it may have complex origins, I submit that thinking itself is but the passage of thoughts, discrete units of information.

Your submission is in disagreement with all available material evidence in the fields of cognitive and computer science. Neurons are discrete. Bits are discrete. The substrate is discrete. The processes that arise on the substrates are not discrete.

The thought cannot reference itself. A thought can be recognised by the system as a thought and other thoughts might arise referring to it, but the thought does not recognise itself and cannot refer to itself.

Do you have anything resembling a proof of this? Even an informal logical argument?

I don't think you are making much headway here, given that most of us are programmers who work with self-referential processes every day, by simply asserting that we are wrong.

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

Perhaps neural substrate is not necessarily best described in singular (as in referring to a single category)? It is convenient, but empirically it seems to be ad hoc nonetheless.

 

[Dancing David]

Neural processes are absolutely ad hoc, they are not programs run on a hard machine. They are programs that are the machine, the substrate reacts to itself and that is how the 'program' arises. The neural pathways are determined by enzyme gradients during development, providing the rough architechture but the 'software' comes about through the reaction of the neurons themselves to the whole process.

Now in other animals that display a higher level of steotypic behavior there is mor ehard wiring of certain behavioral events. And certainly some pathways will develop more in response to visual stimuli than others. yet the 'software' is inherently created in the reaction of the substrate to the stimulus and the rest of the system.