Automatons

[westprog]

Maybe there's a "breakthrough potential" at which data streams change their behaviour. This was evolutionarily favoured and developed, over the aeons, into what we now regard as "conscious experience."

I find it highly implausible* that consciousness could arise from simple quantities of data. Surely it must be more subtle than that.

What creates the HPC is that we mistake "experience" and "selfhood" as implicit. People can become so attached to "their experiences" they overlook mechanistic explanations for their arisal from simple data-processing.

Nick

 

[Robin]

Are you asserting that, for example, dogs have no (relevant) concept of 'self'?

In fact I would have thought that subjectivity and 'self' were the very point of a mind - allowing the organism to navigate and survive in it's environment.

 

[rocketdodger]

I have no evidence that a water molecule doesn't scream with agony when the kettle nears boiling point. However, there's no evidence for any such thing - nor for any kind of experience for inanimate objects.

Unless experience is simply identity, in which case it is trivially true.

But again, notice how you are obsessed with framing experience in terms of human experience. Why would a water molecule scream with agony? It can't feel anything, it can't do anything, etc. What makes you think it's experience would be anything like your's?

 

[six7s]

Are you asserting that, for example, dogs have no (relevant) concept of 'self'?

In fact I would have thought that subjectivity and 'self' were the very point of a mind - allowing the organism to navigate and survive in it's environment.

<further/>

Is that a yes?

Or a no?

 

[rocketdodger]

<further/>

Is that a yes?

Or a no?

lol Nick227 != Robin

 

[six7s]

lol Nick227 != Robin

Indeed

However, I suspect that
((Nick227.book.chapter.verse == Robin.book.chapter.verse) &&
(Nick227.hymnbook.page == Robin.hymnbook.page)) == true;

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

I would be perfectly happy with an explanation of consciousness that operated on a similar level to the explanation of solidity. Solidity (or liquidity or gaseousness) are states that depend entirely on the interactions between atoms. There's a direct causal link between the structure of the atoms and the large scale state of matter.

It's precisely this causal link which I'm looking for in the explanation of how consciousness arises. I realise that this will be difficult to establish. So far, we have a trail that leads from stimulus to response, but no clear indication of what makes the organism conscious.

Yes, I agree. Although, I guess we should be careful not to fall into the trap of thinking that there’s something “extra” to solidity, liquidity or gaseousness.

My hunch is that this trail we have – i.e. ‘behaviour’ – is something to stick with like a bloodhound. The more we manage to map out and distinguish circuitry, and simultaneously understand more about the specialization of different brain regions, the closer we might come to some kind of causal understanding.

It's helpful to say that consciousness is associated with certain phenomena, but we need to know exactly how they create it.

As I alluded to above, I think the problem with consciousness or subjective experience is that we often hold ontological presuppositions about ‘them’, which needn’t be true in the first place – this is partially because of language that implicitly favours dualistic thinking. We have become so entrenched in dualistic language that we find it perfectly natural to say that we ‘have’ consciousness (or subjective experience). This point of departure can already misguide us into thinking that: since we ‘have’ them, ‘they’ must therefore be something ‘tangible’ like other observer independent ‘forces’ of nature.

 

[westprog]

Unless experience is simply identity, in which case it is trivially true.

But again, notice how you are obsessed with framing experience in terms of human experience. Why would a water molecule scream with agony? It can't feel anything, it can't do anything, etc. What makes you think it's experience would be anything like your's?

I don't think that a water molecule has any kind of experience. Compare two water molecules. One sits in a bucket for a year. Another evaporates off, lives in a cloud, drops as rain, freezes in a fridge, gets scraped off, dropped in the bucket and rejoins its companion. What difference has its "experience" made? Absolutely none. Water molecules don't have "experience". They have state. Whatever state a water molecule is in carries no memory of how it got there. It simply doesn't matter to a water molecule. That's why describing what happens to a water molecule as "experience" is misleading.

 

[westprog]

Indeed

However, I suspect that
((Nick227.book.chapter.verse == Robin.book.chapter.verse) &&
(Nick227.hymnbook.page == Robin.hymnbook.page)) == true;

I'd always thought of Nick227 as a one off.

 

[westprog]

Yes, I agree. Although, I guess we should be careful not to fall into the trap of thinking that there’s something “extra” to solidity, liquidity or gaseousness.

I think that's fair enough. Most real things in the universe are the agregation of a lot of small things. Solidity is the combination of a lot of molecular relationships.

That money, for example, disappears when we look at it closely, means that it isn't, fundamentally, something "real".

My hunch is that this trail we have – i.e. ‘behaviour’ – is something to stick with like a bloodhound. The more we manage to map out and distinguish circuitry, and simultaneously understand more about the specialization of different brain regions, the closer we might come to some kind of causal understanding.

I'm quite happy to see any approaches followed. Mapping the brain and examining behaviour can only add to the sum of knowledge. I won't be surprised if things aren't finally resolved any time soon though.

As I alluded to above, I think the problem with consciousness or subjective experience is that we often hold ontological presuppositions about ‘them’, which needn’t be true in the first place – this is partially because of language that implicitly favours dualistic thinking. We have become so entrenched in dualistic language that we find it perfectly natural to say that we ‘have’ consciousness (or subjective experience). This point of departure can already misguide us into thinking that: since we ‘have’ them, ‘they’ must therefore be something ‘tangible’ like other observer independent ‘forces’ of nature.

I hold the view that if consciousness is something "real", then it can be detected, quantified and analysed. Exactly what the result of such study might be it's impossible to say.

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

I hold the view that if consciousness is something "real", then it can be detected, quantified and analysed. Exactly what the result of such study might be it's impossible to say.

Well, if you hold on to those criteria, please don’t hold your breath at the same time.

 

[westprog]

Well, if you hold on to those criteria, please don’t hold your breath at the same time.

I really don't expect to see it myself. There might be somebody alive today who will.

It's been estimated that it will take a collider the size of a galaxy to verify string theory. Good things take time.

 

[Nick227]

This is a question that occurred to me, also

My point is that, in all liklihood, experience is created by the brain from less dualistic simple processing. If you contrast the human with a computer, you can see it. A computer processes, we do not normally consider that it experiences its processing. So, how could you make a computer experience? You would give it functions which create selfhood. You would give it narratives. You would give it a function to identify with narratives. Now, a lot of questions arise as to how one might actually do this, but this is a basic model.

Are you asserting that, for example, dogs have no (relevant) concept of 'self'?

Well, what I said was that "I" came from narratives. "I" is just one aspect of selfhood. Selfhood also encompasses, notably, body map and mirroring. I don't know whether dogs think, but they certain have the brain organs and behaviour to pretty much say categorically they have selfhood. One day in the future we may be able to find out what dogs think, if they do, and also to model what a dog "experiences."

Nick

 

[Nick227]

I find it highly implausible* that consciousness could arise from simple quantities of data. Surely it must be more subtle than that.

A lot of scientists, from the Chalmers HPC school, I think take a similar position - It must be more complex than that! I'm not much convinced. I think consciousness is data. We are data.

Nick

 

[Gagglegnash]

Hi

A lot of scientists, from the Chalmers HPC school, I think take a similar position - It must be more complex than that! I'm not much convinced. I think consciousness is data. We are data.

Nick

I don't think so.

I think that we are what we do with the data we have.

The subset of choices that we allow ourselves out of the set of all possible choices in a specific context defines our character. The specific choice me make out of that subset defines our personality. Our choices' effects on others defines us as to which part of human society we belong.

One final, conclusive proof: Data never stubs their toe on the way to the bathroom.

Q.E.D.

 

[westprog]

A lot of scientists, from the Chalmers HPC school, I think take a similar position - It must be more complex than that! I'm not much convinced. I think consciousness is data. We are data.

Nick

The trouble is, so is everything else. The universe is made up of vast amounts of data going back and forth.

What makes data data? How does one differentiate between the data flowing around a rock, and the data generated by a thermostat (an example from an earlier thread, (and probably a later one))? It is purpose. Purpose only comes from human beings (or possibly living beings). How can data generate consciousness when there's so much of it?

 

[Nick227]

Hi




I don't think so.

I think that we are what we do with the data we have.

The subset of choices that we allow ourselves out of the set of all possible choices in a specific context defines our character. The specific choice me make out of that subset defines our personality. Our choices' effects on others defines us as to which part of human society we belong.

One final, conclusive proof: Data never stubs their toe on the way to the bathroom.

Q.E.D.

Have a go at re-writing that post without so much reference to implicit selfhood.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

The trouble is, so is everything else. The universe is made up of vast amounts of data going back and forth.

What makes data data? How does one differentiate between the data flowing around a rock, and the data generated by a thermostat (an example from an earlier thread, (and probably a later one))? It is purpose. Purpose only comes from human beings (or possibly living beings). How can data generate consciousness when there's so much of it?

I certainly agree that there are a lot of blanks to be filled in!

About your last question - how about rewriting it "How could data generate the effect of consciousness?" For me personally this is the more pertinent question. Are there aspects of consciousness that cannot be replicated in a data processing device? Which of these aspects, if there are any, could truly be said to present an insurmountable problem? Which could be resolved by using "wetware?" Personally I maintain that the only real hard problems are to be found in the mind of the researcher, mostly around the difficulty of objectively considering selfhood. If one can overcome one's own predilection for assuming selfhood to be innate or a priori present, I think a big hurdle has been overcome.

Nick

 

[westprog]

I certainly agree that there are a lot of blanks to be filled in!

About your last question - how about rewriting it "How could data generate the effect of consciousness?" For me personally this is the more pertinent question. Are there aspects of consciousness that cannot be replicated in a data processing device?

We don't know.

Which of these aspects, if there are any, could truly be said to present an insurmountable problem? Which could be resolved by using "wetware?" Personally I maintain that the only real hard problems are to be found in the mind of the researcher, mostly around the difficulty of objectively considering selfhood and subjectivity. If one can overcome one's own predilection for assuming selfhood to be innate or a priori present, I think a big hurdle has been overcome.

Nick

 

[rocketdodger]

I don't think that a water molecule has any kind of experience. Compare two water molecules. One sits in a bucket for a year. Another evaporates off, lives in a cloud, drops as rain, freezes in a fridge, gets scraped off, dropped in the bucket and rejoins its companion. What difference has its "experience" made? Absolutely none. Water molecules don't have "experience". They have state. Whatever state a water molecule is in carries no memory of how it got there. It simply doesn't matter to a water molecule. That's why describing what happens to a water molecule as "experience" is misleading.

But again, you are making this assumption that experience == human experience.

I am not making that assumption.