Automatons

[lupus_in_fabula]

Thanks for the link. I think he's on a good track by looking at the neurological basis of selfhood, and I'm sure he's right that selfhood and qualia are intimately linked.

The internet is a wonderful thing, isn’t it? I think you forgot a third important factor: language. Thus selfhood, qualia and language might be intimately linked.

Personally it's clear for me that if I stick a pin in my body, no one is actually feeling anything, but that feelings are present. The notion of someone feeling is just linguistic construction.

While I sort of agree with you, I think we should be careful not to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Sure, it’s possible to say “it’s just a linguistic construction”, but there’s no doubt linguistic constructs also affects neurology, especially in regards to language acquisition early on. Despite knowing the neurological basis of selfhood, it might turn out that we would have to take language into account in order to understand the working logic of it, or how it came to be in the first place.

 

[Nick227]

The internet is a wonderful thing, isn’t it? I think you forgot a third important factor: language. Thus selfhood, qualia and language might be intimately linked.

Yes, you're absolutely correct. Language and thinking.

While I sort of agree with you, I think we should be careful not to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Sure, it’s possible to say “it’s just a linguistic construction”, but there’s no doubt linguistic constructs also affects neurology, especially in regards to language acquisition early on. Despite knowing the neurological basis of selfhood, it might turn out that we would have to take language into account in order to understand the working logic of it, or how it came to be in the first place.

I think selfhood has different aspects which is reflected in the neurology. But for sure there's no doubt that thinking and language are big factors. Creating narratives, acting upon narratives - these things constantly reinforce the mental perception "I." We can perceive "I" as biological necessity created by evolution, or as a parasitic meme infesting as many brains as it can get its hands on. There are a lot of possibilities.

For me there still remains an unanswered question in evaluating what the ramifications are for the whole materialist viewpoint if selfhood is simply the result of a few brain processes. I guess mathematical relationships are still reasonably inviolable and don't require selfhood, but I'm not clear about all of it.

Nick

 

[westprog]

Well, yes and no, I would say. I think what Ramachandran is trying to point out is that looking at genetics from the point of view from DNA molecular structure was the sufficient level of explanation for figuring out the working logic. Sure, it might eventually boil down to quantum mechanics, but what current genetic problem requires such a detailed description (we still seem to understand the logic of genetic replication regardless)? You could even say that finance markets eventually boils down to quantum mechanics, thus we cannot get an understanding of how the markets work before we take QM into account. I find that a tad unnecessary however.



Well, it seems to me that consciousness is a little bit like figuring out what ‘money’ actually is. So if you look at a dollar bill closely you’ll just find ink on a piece of paper. You can also look at money from a transaction point of view; thus money is a symbolic placeholder by witch we exchange goods and services. In the latter example, we haven’t pinpointed what money, in and of itself, really is, but we still have managed to explain the working logic of money. I would say the latter explanation is far better than the former, although not all encompassing of course. In the same vein as my example with ‘money’, I’m not convinced that quantum mechanics is necessary for explaining consciousness.

I think the example of money is an excellent one, because it show exactly why we need to look closely to figure out what something's fundamental nature is.

The reason that money disappears when we look closely - i.e. dissolves into mere paper and ink - is because money is a fictional construct. It has no physical meaning. It's a story we tell each other about the world. If we decide tomorrow that money doesn't exist, it doesn't.

The same thing applies to pictures. When we look closely at a newspaper photo of Britney getting out of a taxi, it dissolves into a lot of dots. That's because it's only a picture in the way in which we interpret it.

If, however, we get out a magnet and examine the magnetic field, we find out more the closer we look. We see fields of force, and then the interchange of virtual particles. We expect to find out more the closer we look, because we think that magnetism, unlike money or portraiture, is objectively real.

With respect to genetics, when we look closer, we don't find out more about genetics. We don't gain any further insight into genes by looking at individual electron states. But we don't lose information. Genetics doesn't disappear when we look closely. It just gets unnecessarily complicated, so we pull back to just the right distance.

If consciousness disappears when we look closely at the operation of the neurons, then we'll know that it's not a real phenomenon. Personally, I think that if it exists, it must be something fundamental, on a level with magnetism - a basic property of physics. However, that's just a guess, and one thing this field suffers from is confident pronouncements based on nothing more than a hunch.

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

I think the example of money is an excellent one, because it show exactly why we need to look closely to figure out what something's fundamental nature is.

I’m not so sure figuring out what something really “is” is going to be attainable. I suppose we have to settle for what something does.

With respect to genetics, when we look closer, we don't find out more about genetics. We don't gain any further insight into genes by looking at individual electron states. But we don't lose information. Genetics doesn't disappear when we look closely. It just gets unnecessarily complicated, so we pull back to just the right distance.

I agree that it’s important to know the right distance. Although, as you suggested, going further cannot hurt. But then again, it should also be recognized that going further doesn’t necessarily add to or discount our understanding of the working logic on a higher level.

If consciousness disappears when we look closely at the operation of the neurons, then we'll know that it's not a real phenomenon. Personally, I think that if it exists, it must be something fundamental, on a level with magnetism - a basic property of physics. However, that's just a guess, and one thing this field suffers from is confident pronouncements based on nothing more than a hunch.

How would you estimate the disappearance of consciousness as sufficiently observed? General anesthesia – a chemical/molecular event – seems to do that already.

I see at least one problem with your own theoretical proposal (i.e. consciousness being a fundamental property in its own right): that is, unless science can find that fundamental property, proponents of that view will hardly accept another explanation before it’s found. They can always fall back on the argument “yeah, but we don’t know all there is to the issue because you haven’t dug deep enough.” But, of course, if they’re wrong (which at least today seems rather likely), science cannot obviously find such stuff. Hence we’re back at the question pertaining sufficient explanatory levels for understanding consciousness.

 

[rocketdodger]

However, I stand by my comment that your perspective, whilst superficially appearing to correspond to materialism, is still entrenched in Cartesian assumption. For example your last sentence above. There is no "owner" of neural processes. "Owner" is just another process.

Nick

I stand by my comment that you are playing a game. For example, your last sentence above. The "owner" of a neural process is clearly the creature whose neurons are the substrate for said process. Only someone being intentionally obtuse would fail to realize this obvious definition.

 

[Radrook]

I'm struggling with the ramifications of being an atheist. If there's no soul and no afterlife, does that not make us cell-based automatons, going through the motions with the illusion that we're making decisions? What are your thoughts?

I fail to see the necessity of some invisible entity being in posession of our bodies in order for us to have free will.

 

[westprog]

I’m not so sure figuring out what something really “is” is going to be attainable. I suppose we have to settle for what something does.

Absolutely. That's part of how we know we're involved in a scientific process. We can find out everything about money. We can't find out everything about magnetism. We can just find out how it works. Or how we think it works.

I agree that it’s important to know the right distance. Although, as you suggested, going further cannot hurt. But then again, it should also be recognized that going further doesn’t necessarily add to or discount our understanding of the working logic on a higher level.

It does in the sense that it confirms we chose the right level to begin with. The fact that looking closer at the atomic structure doesn't tell us anything new about genetics leads us to think that we must be operating at about the right level.

How would you estimate the disappearance of consciousness as sufficiently observed? General anesthesia – a chemical/molecular event – seems to do that already.

I think that we can certainly do experiments on consciousness, but they always have the problem of relying on someone else to report on them. How do we know that someone isn't conscious under anaesthesia? Maybe they are conscious but can't remember it.

Examining the physical state of the brain can lead us to make inferences, but there's always uncertainty.

I see at least one problem with your own theoretical proposal (i.e. consciousness being a fundamental property in its own right): that is, unless science can find that fundamental property, proponents of that view will hardly accept another explanation before it’s found. They can always fall back on the argument “yeah, but we don’t know all there is to the issue because you haven’t dug deep enough.” But, of course, if they’re wrong (which at least today seems rather likely), science cannot obviously find such stuff. Hence we’re back at the question pertaining sufficient explanatory levels for understanding consciousness.

That's partly why it's a hard problem. There are a number of different viewpoints being confidently proclaimed. The neuroscientists seem to be less concerned with preconceptions than the philosophers, which is all to the good. If they do their research and let the chips fall where they may, then perhaps a convincing solution will be found.

 

[rocketdodger]

My point is that while consciousness appears to be a physical process, we still don't understand how it comes about. Stating as a fact that it is a physical process is not yet possible.

The same can be said for gravity. As I said, what is your point? If you want to think of gravity as "something that appears to be a physical process, but might be juju after all" then be my guest. But I really don't have anything to discuss with you in that case.

Why not throw in theology and gardening while you're at it? Claiming the entire sum of human knowledge as supporting your position is rather less impressive than a more detailed cite.

You are seriously requiring a "detailed cite" that there is no scientific evidence for dualism?

The question is "How does the feeling arise?" Saying that it arises out of being the person having the feeling is just rephrasing the question as the answer.

But that is the only answer you will ever get -- it is a mathematical fact. You know, incompleteness?

When we build a full simulation of a human brain or have imaging techniques strong enough to monitor individual neurons in a living brain, and can explain the mechanics behind every behavior a human can display, we still won't see "subjective experience." All we will see is neurons firing. All we will see is molecules interacting. Particles doing what particles do. You can't "explain" subjective experience -- it is impossible to explain your own and nobody else has it besides you. All you can explain is behavior.

 

[rocketdodger]

I forgot where I asked about how water molecules experience the world. Refresh my memory, please.

You want to know where human experience comes from. I told you that all entities experience, and humans are no different.

What I find wrong with the idea that water molecules "experience" the world is that there is absolutely no evidence for any such phenomenon.

No. According to the definition I gave, that experiencing behavior is simply the act of being the entity doing the behaving, water does indeed experience. Water molecule A, in a droplet falling from a cloud, experiences being water molecule A in a droplet falling from a cloud.

What you really find "wrong" is the idea that water molecules "experience" like you "experience" -- which is something I never claimed, and is indeed absurd (since a water molecule does not have a brain with trillions of neurons, among other things).

I cannot imagine a serious physicist giving a moment's attention to the idea that matter "experiences" the world. A water molecule is a water molecule. That's the extent of its experience.

You said "that's the extent of its experience" rather than "it has no experience at all."

Good. That is what I am trying to say.

It's a fact that consciousness has only been observed in human beings. Naturally that's philosophically uncomfortable and if one has a core belief that human beings aren't special or unique, then it's necessary to come up with some idea to prove this.

No. It has only been observed in the one doing the observing. What they have observed in others is merely behavior. Consciousness in others is merely a conclusion they have reached.

However, this is an idea which is based on nothing at all. There is simply nothing in physics, biology, chemistry, computer science, boat building or corporate finance which shows that a thermostat has some "experience" of being a thermostat. It is, as physical theories go, undetectable, unquatifiable, and doesn't explain a single observed phenomenon. It's just a way to get off a nasty philosophical hook. Building physical theories on philosphical preconceptions is a bad idea.

No, it isn't.

It is based on the empirical fact that the only difference between one's subjective experience, and the supposed subjective experience of others, is the act of being the experiencer.

I dare say the homeopathy crowd would like the idea of water molecules having "experience".

I will persist in demanding a physical theory for a physical phenomenon. How that gets translated into "proving the truth of dualism" I don't quite follow.

Thats funny, because all the materialists in the forum follow quite nicely.

You are a closet dualist. Everyone knows this based on the other threads on this issue.

We provided explanations, evidence, theories, and numerous sources and citations so you can also check for yourself. You simply choose to ignore all of it, because it doesn't support dualism.

How can you not see this? You demand an explanation for why subjective experience is subjective experience. I tell you because it is subjective experience. You refuse to accept that, becuase (according to dualism) subjective experience must be more than subjective experience. Don't you see how nonsensical this is?

 

[rocketdodger]

I'm just calling it like it is. Selfhood is a brain process. Experience is a brain process. There is nothing inviolable or mysterious here.

It seems to me that rather than accept this simple materialist fact, you drift of into some world of fantasy where water molecules experience being water molecules.

Nick

You clearly have no idea wtf I am talking about.

I am trying to explain why experience seems like more than a brain process to the brain doing the processing.

You are also clearly not a materialist, so why do you keep pretending Nick?

 

[rocketdodger]

Personally it's clear for me that if I stick a pin in my body, no one is actually feeling anything, but that feelings are present. The notion of someone feeling is just linguistic construction.

Nick

See -- you are not a materialist, you are just insane. You are annihiliating all useful words in language on the basis that they are just "linguistic construction."

I found you strange before, Nick, back when you were an idealist. Now you are completely off the deep end.

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

I think that we can certainly do experiments on consciousness, but they always have the problem of relying on someone else to report on them. How do we know that someone isn't conscious under anaesthesia? Maybe they are conscious but can't remember it.

Examining the physical state of the brain can lead us to make inferences, but there's always uncertainty.

Perhaps, but if you speculate about them being conscious despite anaesthesia, and that they simply don’t remember it, then we’re going against the original point of why some people call it the hard problem of consciousness in the first place. That is to say: “but it’s the subjective experience of being aware… [fill in preferred reason for why consciousness must be so elusive].”

I think we can be fairly certain that under general anaesthesia, there’s no subjective experience. I at least have tried to remain conscious under such circumstances many times (even made it into a kind of goal), but there wasn’t the slightest of chance for me to succeed. One crude point to test consciousness is of course to see if there’s a conscious interaction between the tester and the test subject – that we can observe in many different ways.

 

[Nick227]

I stand by my comment that you are playing a game. For example, your last sentence above. The "owner" of a neural process is clearly the creature whose neurons are the substrate for said process. Only someone being intentionally obtuse would fail to realize this obvious definition.

The notion of there being an "owner" is a neural process. What is there in sensory phenomena to suggest an owner? Yours is completely a Cartesian position. I have seen this over and over again in the little gang of Jref behaviourists. You stop investigating as soon as selfhood comes up. It's just accepted as somehow a priori valid. You're in good company. Even Dan Dennett does the same. But then you are left believing water molecules are conscious and that thermostats have awareness. And it's a bugger of a job to get you into the teletransporter because you've convinced yourselves you're going to die. Selfhood is just neural process. It could be evolution. It could be a parasitic meme. Finally there's no way to make a categoric statement which.

eta: Does a computer own its CPU? If it has a programme which monitors its integrity does it now own its CPU?

Nick

 

[Nick227]

You clearly have no idea wtf I am talking about.

I am trying to explain why experience seems like more than a brain process to the brain doing the processing.

.....to the brain?! Are you sure? Doesn't that sound just a tad dualistic? You can't stop it, can you? This dualist addiction sure has you in its grip, RD.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

See -- you are not a materialist, you are just insane. You are annihiliating all useful words in language on the basis that they are just "linguistic construction."

I'm not annihilating any words. I'm pointing out that the use of language creates a big chunk of selfhood, through illusion. "I" is a linguistic construct. From the reductionist perspective there is no actual "I." It is simply that thought narratives being identified with create the illusion that it must exist, rather as coherent peripheral activity can create the sense of there being a centre.

If it sounds mad, don't worry. Plenty of other researchers have found it so too. Check out Blackmore, Dennett, Damasio for starters. Everyone agrees that it is extremely counter-intuitive.

Nick

 

[westprog]

Perhaps, but if you speculate about them being conscious despite anaesthesia, and that they simply don’t remember it, then we’re going against the original point of why some people call it the hard problem of consciousness in the first place. That is to say: “but it’s the subjective experience of being aware… [fill in preferred reason for why consciousness must be so elusive].”

I think we can be fairly certain that under general anaesthesia, there’s no subjective experience. I at least have tried to remain conscious under such circumstances many times (even made it into a kind of goal), but there wasn’t the slightest of chance for me to succeed. One crude point to test consciousness is of course to see if there’s a conscious interaction between the tester and the test subject – that we can observe in many different ways.

I think it's pretty unlikely that you're still conscious under anaesthesia. I can't rule it out entirely though, because it's perfectly possible that you are conscious, that you have no means of communicating this, and that you forget it.

This might seem absurd, but it's similar to what happens when dreaming. Are you conscious when dreaming? I presume so. Do you remember all your dreams? Probably not.

I'm not throwing out what seem like ridiculous ideas just to the hell of it. I'm just trying to show how difficult it is to say anything with certainty.

 

[westprog]

The same can be said for gravity. As I said, what is your point? If you want to think of gravity as "something that appears to be a physical process, but might be juju after all" then be my guest. But I really don't have anything to discuss with you in that case.

The difference is that gravity does have a scientific theory. In fact, it has two scientific theories, both really good ones. They give predictions and actually do explain things. If Newton had tried to explain the apple falling by just saying that it was an apple being an apple, it wouldn't have gotten us very far.

You are seriously requiring a "detailed cite" that there is no scientific evidence for dualism?

You are switching evidence about consciousness to be equivalent to evidence about dualism.

But that is the only answer you will ever get -- it is a mathematical fact. You know, incompleteness?

I certainly don't accept that subjective experience is beyond the reach of scientific research. That certainly doesn't seem to be a materialistic position to me.

If subjective experience is real - and I certainly believe it is - and if it is created by physical processes - which I think likely - then it should be possible to learn to understand how it comes about.

When we build a full simulation of a human brain or have imaging techniques strong enough to monitor individual neurons in a living brain, and can explain the mechanics behind every behavior a human can display, we still won't see "subjective experience." All we will see is neurons firing. All we will see is molecules interacting. Particles doing what particles do. You can't "explain" subjective experience -- it is impossible to explain your own and nobody else has it besides you. All you can explain is behavior.

I certainly don't accept this. Either subjective experience exists in the physical universe or it doesn't. If it does, then it is as subject to scientific enquiry as anything else.

It might be that it eventually turns out to be impossible to understand subjective experience. We don't yet know that. Of course it's a hard problem. That's what I've been saying. Dividing it into platitudes and the impossible is not a helpful approach.

 

[westprog]

You want to know where human experience comes from. I told you that all entities experience, and humans are no different.

You told me, but you didn't demonstrate it. Simply using "experience" as a synonym for "being" doesn't explain.

No. According to the definition I gave, that experiencing behavior is simply the act of being the entity doing the behaving, water does indeed experience. Water molecule A, in a droplet falling from a cloud, experiences being water molecule A in a droplet falling from a cloud.

What you really find "wrong" is the idea that water molecules "experience" like you "experience" -- which is something I never claimed, and is indeed absurd (since a water molecule does not have a brain with trillions of neurons, among other things).

What I find "wrong", or indeed wrong, is the use of the word "experience" when no experience takes place. A water molecule doesn't have experiences.

Knowing that a water molecule forms links to other molecules that cause ice to be lighter than cold water is to say something about the molecule. Saying that a water molecule experiences being a water molecule is either saying nothing, or it's saying something "wrong". Or wrong.

You said "that's the extent of its experience" rather than "it has no experience at all."

Good. That is what I am trying to say.

I'm not clear whether it's redundant, misleading or actually incorrect. In any case, it isn't useful.

No. It has only been observed in the one doing the observing. What they have observed in others is merely behavior. Consciousness in others is merely a conclusion they have reached.

Which is why it's a hard problem.

No, it isn't.

It is based on the empirical fact that the only difference between one's subjective experience, and the supposed subjective experience of others, is the act of being the experiencer.

Which is why it's a hard problem.

Thats funny, because all the materialists in the forum follow quite nicely.

All of them?

You are a closet dualist. Everyone knows this based on the other threads on this issue.

Oh, I get it. The materialists who don't follow the argument are closet dualists. Or insane.

We provided explanations, evidence, theories, and numerous sources and citations so you can also check for yourself. You simply choose to ignore all of it, because it doesn't support dualism.

I've not only followed the arguments in the thread, I've read a number of books on the subject. I've yet to find an explanation that is satisfactory.

How can you not see this? You demand an explanation for why subjective experience is subjective experience. I tell you because it is subjective experience. You refuse to accept that, becuase (according to dualism) subjective experience must be more than subjective experience. Don't you see how nonsensical this is?

If you accept materialism, and you accept that such a thing as subjective experience exists, then it is part of the material world, and there should be a material explanation for it.

 

[rocketdodger]

The notion of there being an "owner" is a neural process. What is there in sensory phenomena to suggest an owner?

The fact that you can't see through the eyes in my head.

You are clearly just talking nonsense now.

eta: Does a computer own its CPU?

Nick

Yes. It is the only computer using the cpu. So it owns it. Get it?

 

[rocketdodger]

I'm not annihilating any words. I'm pointing out that the use of language creates a big chunk of selfhood, through illusion. "I" is a linguistic construct. From the reductionist perspective there is no actual "I."

From the reductionsist perspective nothing exists other than elementary particles and the axioms of mathematics. What is your point?

Everyone agrees that it is extremely counter-intuitive.

What is your point? Nobody here is arguing reductionism other than you.