Automatons

[lupus_in_fabula]

For those interested, here’s a short clip (8 min.) where Ramachandran is digging into the consciousness, qualia and self problem. I think it’s an interview conducted at a Beyond Belief conference (perhaps the whole interview can be found there). Food for though?

 

[six7s]

WTF is HPC?

 

[rocketdodger]

WTF is HPC?

hard problem of consciousness

 

[six7s]

I thang u

 

[six7s]

For those interested, here’s a short clip (8 min.) where Ramachandran is digging into the consciousness, qualia and self problem. I think it’s an interview conducted at a Beyond Belief conference (perhaps the whole interview can be found there). Food for though?

Fascinating! Thanks for the link

 

[godless dave]

I just wanted to debate why we choose to go on living as rational beings who are capable of observing our existence as a physical process in a physical universe that doesn't care what we do.

Beats the alternative. Personally, I enjoy being alive. There are parts of being alive that I don't enjoy at all, but on balance I like living.

But if your brain is constructed of physical matter, then are you not an automaton going through the motions?

No. There's nothing about physical matter that precludes having emotions and thoughts and making decisions.

What would be the difference between a human brain and an artificially constructed brain? Perceiving your own thoughts and qualia is a function of the brain, probably a result of our evolved ability to empathize with others which allows us to empathize with ourselves. This self-awareness could be emulated in a complex artificial brain given the technology to build it, which begs the question of when emulation stops being emulation and starts being what we already are.

Given sufficiently advanced technology, there would be no difference. It should be possible to build a conscious, self-aware machine that felt the same emotions we do. That would carry with it certain ethical considerations which have been explored at length in science fiction.

I'm not arguing that there's a soul. I've been asking everyone how they grapple with the fact that they're soulless, physical objects.

I don't see anything to grapple with.

 

[Brian-M]

I'm not arguing that there's a soul. I've been asking everyone how they grapple with the fact that they're soulless, physical objects.

I'd like to answer that question... but first I need to know what you consider a soul to be, and how we'd be different if we had them.

Personally, I regard 'soul' as a primitive concept for mind, so in that respect yes, we do have souls.

If you regard the soul as a non-physical aspect of the mind that survives after death, I suspect the real question here is how we come to terms with our own inevitable mortality.

 

[westprog]

Ok, lets suppose you are right -- all we know is that we experience it, and we seem to observe it in others.

1) All the available evidence points to us being material.
2) The only properties of gut feelings I seem to observe in others are the behavior of those others.
3) The only difference between my gut feelings and those I seem to observe others is that mine are mine and I am sure of their existence.

What conclusions could a rational being possibly reach, given only this information (and we have only this information)?

a) Gut-feelings are some kind of physical process or aggregation thereof.
b) Humans have gut-feelings.
c) The "experience" of a gut-feeling is nothing more than being the one having the gut-feeling.

a - probably. Though that is merely an assumption. We know that gut-feelings exist, and we presume that they come from a physical process.

b - probably true. Each of us individually has such feelings, and assumes that when other human beings assert that they do too, they mean the same thing.

c - we have absolutely no evidence to support any such thing.

 

[westprog]

That is one possible view -- that experience does not exist.

The other view, held by myself and others, is that experience is very real and is simply the subjective act of being. A water molecule experiences being a water molecule. A thermostat experiences being a thermostat. An ipod, an ipod, A dog, a dog, and a human, a human.

Where does my experience come from? Nowhere -- it is simply the act of being the aggregation of molecules I label "me."

And what physical phenomena are explained by the concept that a water molecule "experiences" being a water molecule, or a thermostat experiences being a thermostat? It's an answer to a question nobody's asking. The behaviour of a thermostat or a water molecule has no need of any concept of "experience" to explain how it behaves. It's an entirely meaningless concept.

It's only human beings that assert their capacity to have experiences. It's only in the case of human beings that there is anything to explain. Creating unfounded properties for the entire physical universe is a step too far for me. What does it explain?

 

[rocketdodger]

a - probably. Though that is merely an assumption. We know that gut-feelings exist, and we presume that they come from a physical process.

It is also "merely an assumption" that if one drops an apple near the surface of the Earth it will fall towards the ground -- presumably because of a physical process. What is your point?

b - probably true. Each of us individually has such feelings, and assumes that when other human beings assert that they do too, they mean the same thing.

Probably, as in throughout the entire history of mankind nobody has been able to observe a "gut feeling" in someone else except via their behavior. So yes probably.

c - we have absolutely no evidence to support any such thing.

Yes no evidence at all if you choose to ignore most of neuroscience, psychology, biology, chemistry, physics, mathematics, computer science, and all the rest.

 

[rocketdodger]

And what physical phenomena are explained by the concept that a water molecule "experiences" being a water molecule, or a thermostat experiences being a thermostat? It's an answer to a question nobody's asking.

No, it is an answer to a question you are asking. But it is clearly an answer you refuse to accept -- even though you can find nothing wrong with it, other than that it removes human experience from the pedestal you wish to place it upon.

The behaviour of a thermostat or a water molecule has no need of any concept of "experience" to explain how it behaves. It's an entirely meaningless concept.

I agree that it is meaningless. It is done for consistency -- you know, that thing that dualism completely lacks?

It's only human beings that assert their capacity to have experiences. It's only in the case of human beings that there is anything to explain. Creating unfounded properties for the entire physical universe is a step too far for me. What does it explain?

It explains why your experience of you seeing red is different from your experience of me seeing red. It explains "qualia" and "subjective experience" and all the other issues of the HPC. In particular, it explains why they are non-issues.

Of course, if one assumes dualism to begin with, then it doesn't make sense to "explain away" the issues. If one does, then dualism disappears -- why would one want to do that when they are trying to prove the truth of dualism!

 

[westprog]

It is also "merely an assumption" that if one drops an apple near the surface of the Earth it will fall towards the ground -- presumably because of a physical process. What is your point?

My point is that while consciousness appears to be a physical process, we still don't understand how it comes about. Stating as a fact that it is a physical process is not yet possible.

When we've actually found the physical process which causes consciousness, then we can make confident statements about it.

Probably, as in throughout the entire history of mankind nobody has been able to observe a "gut feeling" in someone else except via their behavior. So yes probably.



Yes no evidence at all if you choose to ignore most of neuroscience, psychology, biology, chemistry, physics, mathematics, computer science, and all the rest.

Why not throw in theology and gardening while you're at it? Claiming the entire sum of human knowledge as supporting your position is rather less impressive than a more detailed cite.

Saying

the "experience" of a gut-feeling is nothing more than being the one having the gut-feeling

is either completely without foundation, or it's platitudinous. Clearly it's necessary to be the person having the feeling in order to have the feeling. The question is "How does the feeling arise?" Saying that it arises out of being the person having the feeling is just rephrasing the question as the answer.

 

[westprog]

No, it is an answer to a question you are asking.

I forgot where I asked about how water molecules experience the world. Refresh my memory, please.

But it is clearly an answer you refuse to accept -- even though you can find nothing wrong with it, other than that it removes human experience from the pedestal you wish to place it upon.

What I find wrong with the idea that water molecules "experience" the world is that there is absolutely no evidence for any such phenomenon.

I agree that it is meaningless. It is done for consistency -- you know, that thing that dualism completely lacks?

I cannot see any merit in uttering meaningless statements in order to be consistent. If a theory requires meaningless statements to hold it together, that would lead me to think that it's a very shaky theory.

I cannot imagine a serious physicist giving a moment's attention to the idea that matter "experiences" the world. A water molecule is a water molecule. That's the extent of its experience.

It's a fact that consciousness has only been observed in human beings. Naturally that's philosophically uncomfortable and if one has a core belief that human beings aren't special or unique, then it's necessary to come up with some idea to prove this.

However, this is an idea which is based on nothing at all. There is simply nothing in physics, biology, chemistry, computer science, boat building or corporate finance which shows that a thermostat has some "experience" of being a thermostat. It is, as physical theories go, undetectable, unquatifiable, and doesn't explain a single observed phenomenon. It's just a way to get off a nasty philosophical hook. Building physical theories on philosphical preconceptions is a bad idea.

I dare say the homeopathy crowd would like the idea of water molecules having "experience".

It explains why your experience of you seeing red is different from your experience of me seeing red. It explains "qualia" and "subjective experience" and all the other issues of the HPC. In particular, it explains why they are non-issues.

This must be some special meaning of the word "explain" with which I am not familiar.


Q: A phenemonon we call consciousness arises due to the operation of the human brain and body. How is this?

A: Consciousness is a phenomenon which arises due to the operation of the human brain and body. It's nothing to worry about.

Q: Eh?

A: Y'see, Jimmy [takes boy on lap] you an' me, we feel the worl' in our way. Ol' man river, he see's the worl' his way. Wind an' de trees, dey see it dere way. It's all part of the Great Circle Of Life.

Q: Gee Granpa, guess I never thought of it like that. I won't worry 'bout it no more nohow!

A: That's my boy. You run along now. [pats Q's head, spits chaw of baccy]

Of course, if one assumes dualism to begin with, then it doesn't make sense to "explain away" the issues. If one does, then dualism disappears -- why would one want to do that when they are trying to prove the truth of dualism!

I will persist in demanding a physical theory for a physical phenomenon. How that gets translated into "proving the truth of dualism" I don't quite follow.

 

[Nick227]

No. I did answer -- you just refuse to accept my answer because it doesn't leave me open to your rebuttal.

I gave you multi-level description of exactly what is going on in my brain when I "see colour," and all of those processes are behavior. Behavior, according to the accepted dictionary definition, I might add, not the redefined-to-suit-my-argument version you seem to be grasping for here.

Of course I "see colour." I have color vision and a brain to process color information.

But why are you beating around the bush, Nick? What you really want me to say is "Even though I assert qualia do not exist I have to admit that I experience qualia."

Well you would be wrong, because I don't assert qualia don't exist -- I assert that qualia are simply the name given to neural processes by the owner of those neural processes.

OK, I think I was a bit harsh in my questioning before, and a bit unfair. Also I see the perspective Lupus put in. So I apologise for seeking to lead you into an untenable position when it was not one I even believe in myself. I am not a qualia-phile.

However, I stand by my comment that your perspective, whilst superficially appearing to correspond to materialism, is still entrenched in Cartesian assumption. For example your last sentence above. There is no "owner" of neural processes. "Owner" is just another process.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

How about the entire history of cognitive science, psychology, neuroscience, computer science, ... etc?

All evidence points to human consciousness being a physical process. All evidence points to humans having experience.

Experience is a physical process. It's a linguistic construction. There is no need to set it aside from your first statement.

Nick

 

[westprog]

For those interested, here’s a short clip (8 min.) where Ramachandran is digging into the consciousness, qualia and self problem. I think it’s an interview conducted at a Beyond Belief conference (perhaps the whole interview can be found there). Food for though?

An analogy he makes needs to be looked at more closely. He says that Crick and Watson needed to look at genetics from the point of view of the DNA molecular structure in order to figure out how it worked. If they'd tried to figure it out from principles of quantum mechanics, they'd have been lost.

However, genetics does operate from the level of quantum mechanics. It's just simpler to look at it from the level of molecular structure. It is, in fact, quantum mechanics driving the whole thing, and if we wanted to, we could look at it on that basis.

Hence, even if consciousness is best examined from the POV of neuron structures rather than the operation of individual neurons - which I think is Ramachandran's proposal - it is still necessary that consciousness operates, as does every physical process, on the combination of many small scale processes.

Thus it isn't possible to simply say "Oh, consciousness is a large scale phenomenon, we don't need to look at it at the small scale." If we can't explain it at the small scale, we can't explain it.

 

[Nick227]

That is one possible view -- that experience does not exist.

The other view, held by myself and others, is that experience is very real and is simply the subjective act of being. A water molecule experiences being a water molecule. A thermostat experiences being a thermostat. An ipod, an ipod, A dog, a dog, and a human, a human.

Where does my experience come from? Nowhere -- it is simply the act of being the aggregation of molecules I label "me."

I'm just calling it like it is. Selfhood is a brain process. Experience is a brain process. There is nothing inviolable or mysterious here.

It seems to me that rather than accept this simple materialist fact, you drift of into some world of fantasy where water molecules experience being water molecules.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

For those interested, here’s a short clip (8 min.) where Ramachandran is digging into the consciousness, qualia and self problem. I think it’s an interview conducted at a Beyond Belief conference (perhaps the whole interview can be found there). Food for though?

Thanks for the link. I think he's on a good track by looking at the neurological basis of selfhood, and I'm sure he's right that selfhood and qualia are intimately linked.

Personally it's clear for me that if I stick a pin in my body, no one is actually feeling anything, but that feelings are present. The notion of someone feeling is just linguistic construction.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

And what physical phenomena are explained by the concept that a water molecule "experiences" being a water molecule, or a thermostat experiences being a thermostat? It's an answer to a question nobody's asking. The behaviour of a thermostat or a water molecule has no need of any concept of "experience" to explain how it behaves. It's an entirely meaningless concept.

It's only human beings that assert their capacity to have experiences. It's only in the case of human beings that there is anything to explain. Creating unfounded properties for the entire physical universe is a step too far for me. What does it explain?

IMO, these kinds of viewpoints on thermostats or water molecules are what happens when you put the brakes on the reductionist evaluation of phenomena too early. You're inevitably left with all sorts of weird and seemingly untenable conclusions because you weren't prepared to investigate your original premises more deeply.

If you're investigating phenomena like "selfhood" or "experience" you're inevitably going to have to be prepared to go pretty deep also into your own preconceptions about yourself.

Nick

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

An analogy he makes needs to be looked at more closely. He says that Crick and Watson needed to look at genetics from the point of view of the DNA molecular structure in order to figure out how it worked. If they'd tried to figure it out from principles of quantum mechanics, they'd have been lost.

However, genetics does operate from the level of quantum mechanics. It's just simpler to look at it from the level of molecular structure. It is, in fact, quantum mechanics driving the whole thing, and if we wanted to, we could look at it on that basis.

Well, yes and no, I would say. I think what Ramachandran is trying to point out is that looking at genetics from the point of view from DNA molecular structure was the sufficient level of explanation for figuring out the working logic. Sure, it might eventually boil down to quantum mechanics, but what current genetic problem requires such a detailed description (we still seem to understand the logic of genetic replication regardless)? You could even say that finance markets eventually boils down to quantum mechanics, thus we cannot get an understanding of how the markets work before we take QM into account. I find that a tad unnecessary however.

Hence, even if consciousness is best examined from the POV of neuron structures rather than the operation of individual neurons - which I think is Ramachandran's proposal - it is still necessary that consciousness operates, as does every physical process, on the combination of many small scale processes.

Thus it isn't possible to simply say "Oh, consciousness is a large scale phenomenon, we don't need to look at it at the small scale." If we can't explain it at the small scale, we can't explain it.

Well, it seems to me that consciousness is a little bit like figuring out what ‘money’ actually is. So if you look at a dollar bill closely you’ll just find ink on a piece of paper. You can also look at money from a transaction point of view; thus money is a symbolic placeholder by witch we exchange goods and services. In the latter example, we haven’t pinpointed what money, in and of itself, really is, but we still have managed to explain the working logic of money. I would say the latter explanation is far better than the former, although not all encompassing of course. In the same vein as my example with ‘money’, I’m not convinced that quantum mechanics is necessary for explaining consciousness.