Question to free will skeptics

[Taffer]

No we don't, I was considering the particle as part of the decision making entity.

Either you assume that all random elements are also the same, or you ignore random elements as allowing free will. If free will is allowed by random elements, then it is no more "will" then a decaying particle has "will" as to when it decays.

 

[Taffer]

And there's the problem. By what method might they arrive at a different decision? It must be separate from randomness, because randomness is no more free will than pure determinism.

This suggests some method by which decisions are weighed that is not deterministic and not random. Yet such seems impossible or meaningless, like a square circle or a yellow song.

Exactly. He asked for an answer to both questions. I provided one. The fact that my definition of "free will" naturally does not allow for it to exist without some non-material "supernatural" element, is exactly the point. If someone wants to define "free will" in some other way so that it exists, fine.

 

[PBTree]

Is there anybody here that can satisfy both the below conditions?

a) You believe that nobody has free will
b) You can state what you mean by free will


Both conditions mind you. Another 12 pages of arguing whether or not we have eight letters and a space is pretty useless.

A stupid question from me please.

What will all of this prove? Will believers disbelieve if there is. Will non-believers believe if there isn't?

I can't see it changing anything, so why pose the question. Or have I missed something?

I think I posted this of my own free will.

 

[Robin]

Considering that I posted nearly two hours before quixotecoyote's first post, I don't think so.

Fallacious line of reasoning. You might have come by this information in another thread where I wasn't a participant. Your response did not specify that the person who could do these things was you, you merely specified that someone could and did not specify who.

I was responding to your post, Robin, and letting you know that I don't believe in free will, I can discuss the issue intelligently, and I don't want to discuss it.

I haven't found these types of discussions on this forum to be productive or something that I wish to read or take part in.

And yet, for some reason, you found it necessary to tell me so.

I find it necessary to tell you "I don't believe you".

 

[President Bush]

If anyone wants to talk about us having free will, let them both define it and provide evidence for it.

Being determined to deny free will: argument from ignorance... or worse?

You decide.

 

[Complexity]

Fallacious line of reasoning. You might have come by this information in another thread where I wasn't a participant. Your response did not specify that the person who could do these things was you, you merely specified that someone could and did not specify who.

And yet, for some reason, you found it necessary to tell me so.

I find it necessary to tell you "I don't believe you".

As you wish.

You asked a question - the Marquis and I answered it.

I guessed (correctly) that you'd be wanting to start a silly discussion and let you know that I found those things distasteful and rather childish.

Frankly, my dear, I don't give a damn.

 

[Robin]

As you wish.

You asked a question - the Marquis and I answered it.

I guessed (correctly) that you'd be wanting to start a silly discussion and let you know that I found those things distasteful and rather childish.

Frankly, my dear, I don't give a damn.

On what evidentiary basis do you suggest I wanted a silly discussion? Anythiing.

Check back. It was you and Marquis that injected silliness and childishness into the debate.

So if you find such things distasteful then why did you do it? It seems a bit self-defeating to me.

 

[Robin]

What do YOU think?

I think that we have compatibilist free will.

There are two main strains of thought on free will.

Libertarian Free Will in which our choices are neither determined, nor random. Such an idea is essentially incoherent as Hume pointed out more than two centuries ago. Interestingly Hume's argument is as valid today as it was then, even though thinking on science and determinism has undergone a major shift in the last century or so. Hume didn't just assume that the universe was purely deterministic, even though he believed it was.

As far as I am aware the last major philosopher to even take the concept of libertarian free will seriously was C.D. Broad in the early 20th century and that was only to re-debunk it.

The other strand is compatibilism where it essentially means that we can make choices that are relatively independent of influences external to our conscious thought processes. Daniel Dennett, for example, describes this type of free will, calling it "the only free will worth having".

I think I can make a good case that we do have this type of free will, but I get called all sorts of nasty names for saying so.

I also think I can make a good case that this type of free will is essentially what most people who are not philosophers think of as free will. In other words if free will is the thing we have the illusion of then we do have free will.

It seems that the majority of people who say we do have free will mean compatibilist. The majority of people who don't believe in free will mean libertarian. And they argue furiously with each other. They did in Hume's time too:

Our way of thinking in this particular is, therefore, absolutely inconsistent; but is a natural consequence of these confused ideas and undefined terms, which we so commonly make use of in our reasonings, especially on the present subject.

David Hume "A Treatise on Human Nature" Liberty and Necessity 1740

 

[Lord Emsworth]

I'll start in reverse order.

B) The ability to make decision that has NEITHER a chance of p = 1 or p = 0 of being made (i.e. is predetermined) NOR has a chance of 0 > p > 1 of being made (i.e. is random). Since that is impossible
A) has to be answered with: Yes, nobody has, can have free will.

 

[Robin]

Yes.

a) No-one has free will given the definition of free will below
b) Free will is the situation whereupon if one made a decision, then was presented with the same choice a second time, and all material factors that played a part in the first decision were completely identical as before, they could make a different decision.

However as I think I have pointed out before, your definition would cover the case where some random factor caused the different decision. Such a case would not qualify as "will" at all since it could not qualify as a voluntary action.

So your definition does not really describe freedom or will.

 

[Taffer]

However as I think I have pointed out before, your definition would cover the case where some random factor caused the different decision. Such a case would not qualify as "will" at all since it could not qualify as a voluntary action.

So your definition does not really describe freedom or will.

Please read the further discussion. Firstly, I state that all factors are the same (including any random factors). Secondly, randomness by its very nature cannot allow free will.

ETA: Furthermore, if one is making a decision based on an external, random, event then it is not a willful choice, is it? It is based on an external even. Free will assumes that one can decide something contrary to external and phyiscal influences. If the decision is solely based on an external element, then surely that isn't free will.

 

[Robin]

<shrug> What else could free-will be.

Compatibilist free will

We are our bodies. Between our bodies and the material world around us, all factors are accounted for in our behavior, even if we cannot name them specifically. Thus, if some free will would enable us control beyond the vagaries of genetic and environmental circumstance, it must be something beyond our bodies and the material world. As there is no evidence of anything beyond the material world, there is no evidence for free will.

Suppose somebody was severly brain impeded and had very limited faculties and movement. Then suppose some new surgical procedure cured him. He is now "free" of the limitations of his condition, but not free from the limitations of his environment.

Now suppose that supernaturalism was true and he could transcend the laws of physics.

He would now be "free" of the laws of physics but not free from whatever new environment he found himself in.

So if we are not free under the laws of physics, transcending the laws of physics would not make us any more free. Just able to do more stuff.

So your definition does not describe free will.

 

[quixotecoyote]

So your definition does not describe free will.

Of course not. I'm defining it, not describing it.

 

[Robin]

Of course not. I'm defining it, not describing it.

Very well then, your definition does not define free will - for the reasons I gave.

 

[Robin]

Please read the further discussion. Firstly, I state that all factors are the same (including any random factors). Secondly, randomness by its very nature cannot allow free will.

Yes, that is precisely what I said. But your definition did not cover this off. Your definition allowed for the possibility of randomness to be the reason for the difference.

ETA: Furthermore, if one is making a decision based on an external, random, event then it is not a willful choice, is it?

Why? As long as the process of decision making is not random why does it matter if the basis is random. The decision to fold on a bad hand is not random.

It is based on an external even. Free will assumes that one can decide something contrary to external and phyiscal influences.

Does it? This is exactly why I am asking the question, because your previous definition did not mention "external to physical influences".

You can't say that free will is impossible just because your definition of it is incoherent. You have to show why that definition is reasonable.

If the decision is solely based on an external element, then surely that isn't free will.

A decision based solely on a external element is, in any case, logically impossible so that is not an important consideration.

 

[Taffer]

Yes, that is precisely what I said. But your definition did not cover this off. Your definition allowed for the possibility of randomness to be the reason for the difference.

Excuse me? My definition was as follows:

Free will is the situation whereupon if one made a decision, then was presented with the same choice a second time, and all material factors that played a part in the first decision were completely identical as before, they could make a different decision.

Bolded is the important part. Randomness plays no part in the scenario, because all phyiscal factors are identical both times.

Why? As long as the process of decision making is not random why does it matter if the basis is random. The decision to fold on a bad hand is not random.

False dichotomy. In the situation given, where a decision is based upon the decay of a radioactive particle, this is solely based on an external, random, event. An external, random, even cannot possible allow free will, as the nature of the event is not possibly affected by any individual.

Did I have to include this in my definition? It seemed perfectly obvious to me.

Does it? This is exactly why I am asking the question, because your previous definition did not mention "external to physical influences".

Yes, it does. Please consider my definition again.

Free will is the situation whereupon if one made a decision, then was presented with the same choice a second time, and all material factors that played a part in the first decision were completely identical as before, they could make a different decision.

This means that the only thing which is different is the hypothetical "internal, non-material, self". If all external factors are identical, any decision based upon external factors will obviously be the same both times.

You can't say that free will is impossible just because your definition of it is incoherent. You have to show why that definition is reasonable.

Nonsense. You asked for my opinion on whether free will exists, and the definition I use to reach that opinion. I provided both. Just because you disagree with my definition does not make my argument incorrect.

A decision based solely on a external element is, in any case, logically impossible so that is not an important consideration.

Also nonsense. We are talking about hypotheticals. Consider the case of a robot which presses button one if a radioactive particle decays, and presses button two if the partical does not decay, at a given time period. The robot could not have free will, per my definition, because the decision is solely based upon an external, random, even, over which that robot has no control.

 

[Robin]

Excuse me? My definition was as follows:

Free will is the situation whereupon if one made a decision, then was presented with the same choice a second time, and all material factors that played a part in the first decision were completely identical as before, they could make a different decision.

Bolded is the important part. Randomness plays no part in the scenario, because all phyiscal factors are identical both times.

Are you saying that a physical thing could never exhibit random behaviour.

False dichotomy. In the situation given, where a decision is based upon the decay of a radioactive particle, this is solely based on an external, random, event. An external, random, even cannot possible allow free will, as the nature of the event is not possibly affected by any individual.

Did I have to include this in my definition? It seemed perfectly obvious to me.

Anything based solely on an external even is not a decision at all. Your definition of free will has to at least incorporate the concept of "will", ie voluntary actions. Something based solely on external events is not, by definition, voluntary.

Yes, it does. Please consider my definition again.

Free will is the situation whereupon if one made a decision, then was presented with the same choice a second time, and all material factors that played a part in the first decision were completely identical as before, they could make a different decision.

This means that the only thing which is different is the hypothetical "internal, non-material, self". If all external factors are identical, any decision based upon external factors will obviously be the same both times.

Sorry, I can't accept a definition that assumes a hypothetical "internal, non-material self" What does that even mean?

And in any case your definition includes the assumption that no physical thing is capable of random behaviour. That might be true, but it might not.

Nonsense. You asked for my opinion on whether free will exists, and the definition I use to reach that opinion. I provided both. Just because you disagree with my definition does not make my argument incorrect.

What I pointed out is that your conclusion did not follow from your definition. You were assuming that physical things could not exhibit random behaviour. So you could have been describing something that was neither free nor will.

Also nonsense. We are talking about hypotheticals.

Are we?

Consider the case of a robot which presses button one if a radioactive particle decays, and presses button two if the partical does not decay, at a given time period. The robot could not have free will, per my definition, because the decision is solely based upon an external, random, even, over which that robot has no control.

As I pointed out before, that does not even describe "will", never mind "free". So why is it relevant?

 

[Robin]

I challenge a religious person to make an intelligible statement as to what classical, spiritual free will is. If you don't arrive at your decisions by a deterministic weighing of options, or a deterministic-with-random-influences method, then what?

I agree.

 

[sinclairmcevoy]

My will is not free. It cost about 70 bucks or so. So therefore I have no free will...

 

[Taffer]

Are you saying that a physical thing could never exhibit random behaviour.

No. My definition says no such thing. Only that the outcome of these random events are also the same both times.

Anything based solely on an external even is not a decision at all. Your definition of free will has to at least incorporate the concept of "will", ie voluntary actions. Something based solely on external events is not, by definition, voluntary.

Of course, isn't that obvious? I did not include that in my definition because I thought it painfully obvious.

Sorry, I can't accept a definition that assumes a hypothetical "internal, non-material self" What does that even mean?

My definition assumes no such thing. I put that forward as the only possible mechanism by which free will arises using my defintion.

And in any case your definition includes the assumption that no physical thing is capable of random behaviour. That might be true, but it might not.

It includes no such thing.

What I pointed out is that your conclusion did not follow from your definition. You were assuming that physical things could not exhibit random behaviour. So you could have been describing something that was neither free nor will.

Wrong. Firstly, my definition makes no claim as to the existance of random elements; it only claims that all elements are the same both times. Secondly, my definition quite obviously does not consider things based soley upon external factors as free will.

Are we?

Yes, unless philosophy has become science.

As I pointed out before, that does not even describe "will", never mind "free". So why is it relevant?

*sigh*

It is relevant because it is in reference to someone who asked "what if the decision is based upon a random element". Is it really that hard to follow?