Question to free will skeptics

[Taffer]

I usually stay out of this, but according to my definition we have free will.

My definition is that free will is the ability to choose between more than one decision, given the same set of external influences.

Our body has a set of inputs (present sense stimuli, past experiences, etc). From these we choose a behaviour. While in much tighter control from the input thant we like to imagine, we are nevertheless able to consciously influence our behaviour.

Hans

Consider a simple robot. It takes input, undergoes some computation, and then provides an output. If it was further able to modify its computation internally, but these modifications were, in turn, based on external inputs, would you say that the robot has the ability to "choose" which output it gives?

 

[Mercutio]

I usually stay out of this, but according to my definition we have free will.

My definition is that free will is the ability to choose between more than one decision, given the same set of external influences.

Our body has a set of inputs (present sense stimuli, past experiences, etc). From these we choose a behaviour. While in much tighter control from the input thant we like to imagine, we are nevertheless able to consciously influence our behaviour.

Hans

As birthday boy Tricky suggests, you have moved the debate to one on what constitutes an "external" influence. How far back into the person's history do you go? Hell, even the individual's genetics have ultimately been selected, over eons of evolution, by the environment.

"Consciously influencing" our behavior is, I would argue, also more illusion than evidence. Libet's experiment leaps to mind, of course, as just one of many that imply that our conscious experience is caused, rather than causal. Experimental psychologists have demonstrated for decades that people are quite often unaware of very real influences on their behavior, but very quick to "explain" that behavior in terms of irrelevant causes (either internal or external). The fact that something feels like a free choice should not be taken as evidence that it actually is.

Free will is a very hazy concept, given that by most definitions it cannot be either A) determined by environment or B) random; rather, it has to be determined, but by an "unmoved mover" of a self. Good luck with that.

 

[MRC_Hans]

Similar to mine. To me, Free Will (or more simply, Will) is synonomous with the ability to choose. So what's the big deal?

However, Hans' definition might open up another semantic debate about what 'external' means.

Well, have fun. If there is one thing I have learned to stay out of, it's semantic quibbles.

Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

Consider a simple robot. It takes input, undergoes some computation, and then provides an output. If it was further able to modify its computation internally, but these modifications were, in turn, based on external inputs, would you say that the robot has the ability to "choose" which output it gives?

Consider the robot calculating the possible outputs, then choosing between them, based on a random generator. (I have written game programs doing this).

No, I don't wanna discuss how the make a random generator.

Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

As birthday boy Tricky suggests, you have moved the debate to one on what constitutes an "external" influence. How far back into the person's history do you go? Hell, even the individual's genetics have ultimately been selected, over eons of evolution, by the environment.

Yes, and?

"Consciously influencing" our behavior is, I would argue, also more illusion than evidence.

So, have you never thought: Next time that happens to me, I'll ......

Libet's experiment leaps to mind,

Not to mine, I admit, but I'll look it up.

The fact that something feels like a free choice should not be taken as evidence that it actually is.

Oh, I agree. As I did note, our decisions are much less deliberate than we like to think.

Free will is a very hazy concept, given that by most definitions it cannot be either A) determined by environment or B) random; rather, it has to be determined, but by an "unmoved mover" of a self. Good luck with that.

Not trying to. I take the pragmatic position that since it obiously makes a difference if I try to make sensible choices or not, I'd better assume I have some kind of will.

Hans

 

[Soapy Sam]

I wonder why this is always expressed as a yes / no all-or-nothing question.

Am I free to choose whether to type this post now or make coffee first?
Yes.
Am I free to choose to respond in Aramaic?
Not unless I make the coffee now, as it will take me some time to learn Aramaic.

I'm free to choose what I'm free to choose, but some choices are not open to me, either because I lack the ability or the will to acquire the ability , supposing that to be possible.
Right now I'm going for the coffee. Whether this is an exercise of free will or an acquired addiction is open to argument. In Serbo- Croat, please.

ETA- Libet's work simply shows that the nervous system has a timing mechanism and that many so-called conscious decisions arise from subconscious neural activity.

So- is "free will" a property of humans, or of neurons?

 

[NeilC]

I wonder why this is always expressed as a yes / no all-or-nothing question.

Am I free to choose whether to type this post now or make coffee first?
Yes.

How do you know that. Maybe it's purely a factor of the level of coffee desire has not yet reached the level of desire to express your thoughts on this matter. One determined by your history of coffee enjoyment and time since last beverage the other by your entire educational experience and character traits including the desire to look intelligence. For instance.

 

[MRC_Hans]

*snip*

ETA- Libet's work simply shows that the nervous system has a timing mechanism and that many so-called conscious decisions arise from subconscious neural activity.

So- is "free will" a property of humans, or of neurons?

Ah, yes, now I remember reading about it. It was just the name that didn't ring a bell.

I'm sure will is not restricted to humans. Many higher animals, and the type of robot described above, have some kind of will.

I have another reason to believe this: The structural properties of the world we observe. If you will, read this post. Now, IMHO you have the choice of believing that it was somehow pre-programmed from the Big Bang, or that it resulted from some level of voluntary action.

Hans

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Free will is defined as a decision-making method that is not entirely predetermined or random.

No one has it, because the concept is incoherent as far as I can tell.

~~ Paul

 

[Tricky]

As birthday boy Tricky suggests, you have moved the debate to one on what constitutes an "external" influence. How far back into the person's history do you go? Hell, even the individual's genetics have ultimately been selected, over eons of evolution, by the environment.

That's why I say the easiest thing is to not go back at all. As soon as it is part of you (e.g. recorded by your brain/body) it is no longer external. Sure, what was recorded was caused, or at least preceded by external factors, but that was then and this is now. It is your brain/body and it chooses based on... and I regretfully have to throw out a technical term here... a whole bunch of stuff.

Although it is useful to find out what caused your brain/body to be what it is and make the decisions it makes, it doesn't change my observation that whatever decisions it makes are internal. "You" chose. Otherwise, the term "internal" has no meaning.

 

[Darat]

But you've not really resolved anything by that definition, because now you've got to define what is meant by "you" don't you?

Traditionally I'd say (since Descartes' dualism anyway) people seem to consider that "you" is some coherent "thing", rather than just being a handy label for the cylindrical bag of chemicals with a hole down the middle we seem to be.

 

[Tricky]

Am I free to choose whether to type this post now or make coffee first?
Yes.
Am I free to choose to respond in Aramaic?
Not unless I make the coffee now, as it will take me some time to learn Aramaic.

Which is why my definition of Free Will is "The ability to choose between available, perceived alternatives."

Responding in Aramaic is not available. Other options may not be percieved, for example, a newbie might not realize that you can use different fonts.

I wonder why this is always expressed as a yes / no all-or-nothing question.

I agree again. My definition allows for infinite variations in the amount of free will. The smarter you are, the more options become percieved. The more skills you have, the more options become available.

 

[Tricky]

But you've not really resolved anything by that definition, because now you've got to define what is meant by "you" don't you?

Traditionally I'd say (since Descartes dualism anyway) people seem to consider that "you" is some coherent "thing", rather than just being a handy label for the complete cylindrical bag of chemicals with a hole down the middle we seem to be.

You could go down that rail if you wanted, but you can avoid it by simply agreeing that the "you" exists and that your brain process are part of the "you".

 

[Jekyll]

Similarly, if the decision is made by atomic decay, then we must assume that the particle decays at exactly the same time in both situations.

No we don't, I was considering the particle as part of the decision making entity.

 

[Beerina]

Is there anybody here that can satisfy both the below conditions?

a) You believe that nobody has free will
b) You can state what you mean by free will

I challenge a religious person to make an intelligible statement as to what classical, spiritual free will is. If you don't arrive at your decisions by a deterministic weighing of options, or a deterministic-with-random-influences method, then what?

 

[Beerina]

Yes.

a) No-one has free will given the definition of free will below
b) Free will is the situation whereupon if one made a decision, then was presented with the same choice a second time, and all material factors that played a part in the first decision were completely identical as before, they could make a different decision.

And there's the problem. By what method might they arrive at a different decision? It must be separate from randomness, because randomness is no more free will than pure determinism.

This suggests some method by which decisions are weighed that is not deterministic and not random. Yet such seems impossible or meaningless, like a square circle or a yellow song.

 

[Beerina]

Similar to mine. To me, Free Will (or more simply, Will) is synonomous with the ability to choose. So what's the big deal?

However, Hans' definition might open up another semantic debate about what 'external' means.

It's similar to mine as well. You make a decision based on inputs and stored memories and emotional tendencies. Given the exact same structure, the result would always be the exact same output, or decision, on your part (which may differ only insofar as a random quantum event happened to percolate up into the relatively macroscopic realm of molecules and ions bouncing around in your brain. But, as discussed, that's not free will, either.)

Philosophically, the problem arises when one suggests that, because it's really deterministic, that Joe the killer couldn't have chosen to do otherwise, and it is therefore wrong to punish him. This is a flawed philosophy. Knowledge of possible punishment is one such input prior to making decisions, and knowledge of no punishment "because you couldn't have chosen otherwise" would most certainly change the choice in many cases...and for the worse.

Hence punishment is perfectly legitimate even in a 100% deterministic world.

 

[Gurdur]

a. By any meaningful definition, free will is a supernatural concept and thus woo.

Not true. It is in fact quite possible to form the definition and possible explanation within quite rigorous scientific constraints.

OTOH, this is one of those propaganda areas where almost all the participants on all sides are pursuing ideological agendas, and are not actually simply interested in it all, so why the hell should I care?

 

[quixotecoyote]

Not true. It is in fact quite possible to form the definition and possible explanation within quite rigorous scientific constraints.

OTOH, this is one of those propaganda areas where almost all the participants on all sides are pursuing ideological agendas, and are not actually simply interested in it all, so why the hell should I care?

Well, put your money where your mouth is, so to speak.

So far we've had mine and Taffer's definitions, which have been challenged by alternative definitions which appear to be reducible to 'choice'.

I say any definition of free will which is synonymous with choice is superfluous, because you could just use the term 'choice' and avoid the philosophical baggage.

In a philosophical sense, the debate on free will was predicated on humans resisting the will of an omniscient and omnipotent creator. Despite the creator having a plan for the universe and the ability to set the starting conditions with the knowledge of how it will all pan out, somehow humans with 'free will' are able to disrupt that.

Removing the creator from the question and replacing it with a physical beginning of the universe doesn't change the question that much. It simply becomes: Given the causal chain and the possible accompanying quantum randomness reaching back to the beginning of time, are our choices predicated on past events (and uncontrolled randomness) which determine what we will choose? Free will would be saying no, that there is something else that allows us to transcend our context.

Defining free will as choice is looking at the question far too narrowly. Of course there is choice, that is obvious. Choice is will. But is your choice free?

 

[Taffer]

Consider the robot calculating the possible outputs, then choosing between them, based on a random generator. (I have written game programs doing this).

No, I don't wanna discuss how the make a random generator.

Hans

Randomness cannot be the basis of will, because the "chooser" has no control over its output. If randomness allows for free will, then the term "free will" looses all meaning.