Question to free will skeptics

[cyborg]

Thouh I don't believe my computer has what is defined as mind.

Well I don't believe that a pile of carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, sulphur and various other elements has what is defined as a 'personage' unless it's configured correctly.

So it is not a question of whether your computer has a mind: it is whether it can have one. Just like it's a question of whether or not that pile can be a person, not if it's one now.

Really, joking aside, if you want me to understand a distinction you are attempting to make here I think you'll need to be more specific.

It's quiote simple really: when you say, "ah you say it can only be one of two things but it could be a third thing so that's a fallacy," the basic problem is that I only need two things to represent the third. And in computational terms we only say a new thing is computationally novel if it affords something that could be computed that could not before.

The basic problem then is that simply stating, "the third thing could add more power!" may be logically sound but it has not been demonstrated and frankly only seems to lead to infinite regression - since there could always be a 'third thing' but it never seems to give anything that 'two things' couldn't give you if you allow them to be representational.

In reading the link to axiom of choice (from above) I get the impression that the "axiom of choice" is but one axiom among many.

The axiom of choice basically says, "well, pick whatever you like here." If that entails some other, more familiar axiomatic construct then essentially the axiom of choice is 'emulating' it.

I am trying to understand (what I believe is) your point concerning human behavior being reducible to an axiomatized system of knowledge. Is that an accurate way to state it?

Well either our formal systems are powerful enough to express it and hence human behaviour can be formally studied or it can not. If you accept the later you reject scientific inquiry into the human condition.

In situations involving such explicit choices, isn't the axiom of choice unnecessary?

Unnecessary yes but the point, in my mind at least, is that the axiom of choice is completely general. That's why we reason about infinities in the first place: we may not actually be able to experience them but understanding them gives us insight into the behaviour of the finite.

 

[The Man]

A couple of links on the subject of free will you might want to read.

http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/swartz/freewill1.htm

http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/physical-law/index.htm

They are quite lengthy. I haven’t finished reading it all yet so I can not say weather I subscribe to all of the authors points. They do address some of the specific issues discussed on this thread and makes some compelling points.

 

[The Man]

You already have and seem quite attached to those 8 letters.

I am in fact, very attached, to all 26 letters in the English language. I don't claim any favorites.

 

[The Man]

A definition cannot be circular, only an argument. My definition is not, in any case, circular. If free will exists, it must manifest itself by breaking deterministic cause/effect. The only way to test this is by making the same choice a second time with exactly the same deterministic variables, including random elements.

Wouldn’t that necessitate the elimination, in the subject, of the knowledge of what choice was made in the initial run?

 

[President Bush]

Well I don't believe that a pile of carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, sulphur and various other elements has what is defined as a 'personage' unless it's configured correctly.

So it is not a question of whether your computer has a mind: it is whether it can have one. Just like it's a question of whether or not that pile can be a person, not if it's one now.

I certainly won't argue that no computer will ever have a "mind". That would be an argument from ignorance.

Your line: "it's a question of whether or not that pile can be a person, not if it's one now"... is that a direct quote from Shelley's Frankenstein?

It's quiote simple really: when you say, "ah you say it can only be one of two things but it could be a third thing so that's a fallacy," the basic problem is that I only need two things to represent the third. And in computational terms we only say a new thing is computationally novel if it affords something that could be computed that could not before.

The basic problem then is that simply stating, "the third thing could add more power!" may be logically sound but it has not been demonstrated and frankly only seems to lead to infinite regression - since there could always be a 'third thing' but it never seems to give anything that 'two things' couldn't give you if you allow them to be representational.

While studying formal logic don't forget the rules of correct reasoning (in relation to inductive fallacies).

To help you out in this, here is a link to Logical Fallacies.info where these paragraphs on what constitutes informal fallacies may be found:

Inductive arguments needn’t be as rigorous as deductive arguments in order to be good arguments. Good inductive arguments lend support to their conclusions, but even if their premises are true then that doesn’t establish with 100% certainty that their conclusions are true. Even a good inductive argument with true premises might have a false conclusion; that the argument is a good one and that its premises are true only establishes that its conclusion is probably true.

All inductive arguments, even good ones, are therefore deductively invalid, and so “fallacious” in the strictest sense. The premises of an inductive argument do not, and are not intended to, entail the truth of the argument’s conclusion, and so even the best inductive argument falls short of deductive validity.

Because all inductive arguments are technically invalid, different terminology is needed to distinguish good and bad inductive arguments than is used to distinguish good and bad deductive arguments (else every inductive argument would be given the bad label: “invalid”). The terms most often used to distinguish good and bad inductive arguments are “strong” and “weak”.

An example of a strong inductive argument would be:

(1) Every day to date the law of gravity has held.
Therefore:
(2) The law of gravity will hold tomorrow.

I hope this helps.

While we're at it, a link to Atheism: Logic & Fallacies on "what logic isn't".

It's worth mentioning a couple of things which logic is not.

Firstly, logical reasoning is not an absolute law which governs the universe. Many times in the past, people have concluded that because something is logically impossible (given the science of the day), it must be impossible, period. It was also believed at one time that Euclidean geometry was a universal law; it is, after all, logically consistent. Again, we now know that the rules of Euclidean geometry are not universal.

Secondly, logic is not a set of rules which govern human behavior. Humans may have logically conflicting goals.

The axiom of choice basically says, "well, pick whatever you like here." If that entails some other, more familiar axiomatic construct then essentially the axiom of choice is 'emulating' it.

Couple posts back you said point blank: "All axioms are axioms of choice".

You seem to be backtracking.

Well either our formal systems are powerful enough to express it and hence human behaviour can be formally studied or it can not. If you accept the later you reject scientific inquiry into the human condition.

This commits an inductive fallacy known as a fallacy of presumption, specifically the bifurcation fallacy or false dilemma.

Unnecessary yes but the point, in my mind at least, is that the axiom of choice is completely general. That's why we reason about infinities in the first place: we may not actually be able to experience them but understanding them gives us insight into the behaviour of the finite.

In that a proof requiring the axiom of choice is necessarily nonconstructive such insight into the behavior of the finite will take place only as long as we never try to specify exactly what that behavior is.

 

[cyborg]

Your line: "it's a question of whether or not that pile can be a person, not if it's one now"... is that a direct quote from Shelley's Frankenstein?

Not that I know of.

While studying formal logic don't forget the rules of correct reasoning (in relation to inductive fallacies).

I do not need a lecture in logic from you sir.

Especially not when you fail to get the point spectacularly when you post this:

Secondly, logic is not a set of rules which govern human behavior. Humans may have logically conflicting goals.

Talk about mixing levels inappropriately.

Couple posts back you said point blank: "All axioms are axioms of choice".

You seem to be backtracking.

You seem to be unable to grasp the point.

This commits an inductive fallacy known as a fallacy of presumption, specifically the bifurcation fallacy or false dilemma.

As I pointed out before, and which you spectularly failed to acknowledge, all logic is a bifuraction fallacy - namely on the presumption that 'true' and 'false' are meaningful entities.

In that a proof requiring the axiom of choice is necessarily nonconstructive such insight into the behavior of the finite will take place only as long as we never try to specify exactly what that behavior is.

I already pointed out that there is complete overlap in deterministic/non-deterministic descriptions. What about this could not be more clear? Any assumption about a fundamental mechanism is unprovable.

The assumptions made about libertarian free-will lead to infinite regress. Logically sound and useless. Logic needs to be metered by pragmatic concerns - it can describe anythnig. But please, do continue your trite trotting out of logical fallacies as you continue to miss the point spectacularly and fail to attempt any forward progress here.

 

[President Bush]

I do not need a lecture in logic from you sir.

Especially not when you fail to get the point spectacularly when you post this:

The quote is from Atheism: Logic & Fallacies. Take it up with someone there if you wish.

You seem to be unable to grasp the point.

I believe that my question is reasonable. If you are unable to answer it I suspect it might mean that you can't.

As I pointed out before, and which you spectularly failed to acknowledge, all logic is a bifuraction fallacy - namely on the presumption that 'true' and 'false' are meaningful entities.

All logic is a bifuraction fallacy? Even with "bifurcation" spelled correctly I am not sure how to interpret that sentence correctly. Anyhow, in the following...

Well either our formal systems are powerful enough to express it and hence human behaviour can be formally studied or it can not. If you accept the later you reject scientific inquiry into the human condition.

... there is another alternative you fail to consider in your premise.

I already pointed out that there is complete overlap in deterministic/non-deterministic descriptions. What about this could not be more clear? Any assumption about a fundamental mechanism is unprovable.

Perhaps we are getting somewhere.

I started posting here only in response to your stating of certainty concerning a human choice vis-à-vis general properties of choice. As if a particular choice would be limited only to what seems a determined list of possibilities.

Philosophically, I simply disagree with this. Perhaps I've misunderstood you as I thought your statement(s) of certainty involved something provable. I apologize were they meant axiomatically.

Nevertheless...

Logic needs to be metered by pragmatic concerns - it can describe anythnig.

What I protest is the equating of the descriptions with reality itself. As if reality must conform to the descriptions of it.

But please, do continue your trite trotting out of logical fallacies as you continue to miss the point spectacularly and fail to attempt any forward progress here.

I'll quote the posts to which (I assume) you refer.

And just what problems do you have with the notion of computational theory that you feel cannot cover the behaviours possible for a human? Just what fundamental notion of "choice" do you feel is excluded such that you demand that a particular TV series is produced before you can accept that from knowledge of how TV works alone that it is possible?

"I will not believe another series of Big Brother can possibly exist on TV before you show it to me!"

Fallacy of question-begging analogy.

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?p=3072235#post3072235


The similarity between between computational theory and human behavior depends for its strength on an assumption which begs the question (that computational theory is like human behavior).

You don't need to explain how a specific choice was made in order to reason about all choices.

Do you think it is valid to reason about all possible choices and then apply that reasoning to human choice - which MUST be some specific instance of the general properties of choice?

The fallacy of mediocrity.

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?p=3075313#post3075313


Already addressed above. I'll just quote the definition from this link:

... the fallacy is the assumption that any given member of a set must be limited to the attributes that are held in common with all other members of the set.

As posted before, this is an informal fallacy. I acknowledge that you are defining the situation more axiomatically.

This effort towards a formalisation of a description of human behavior... do you anticipate increasing returns in certainty?

Well either our formal systems are powerful enough to express it and hence human behaviour can be formally studied or it can not. If you accept the later you reject scientific inquiry into the human condition.

This commits an inductive fallacy known as a fallacy of presumption, specifically the bifurcation fallacy or false dilemma.

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?p=3095165#post3095165

The bifurcation fallacy is committed when a false dilemma is presented, i.e. when someone is asked to choose between two options when there is at least one other option available. Of course, arguments that restrict the options to more than two but less than there really are are similarly fallacious.

I believe that this informal fallacy is committed as there is, at least, one other possibility which might occur: these particular formal systems may not be powerful enough to express it. Which doesn't necessarily mean that human behavior can't be formally studied.

Furthermore, to admit this possibility does not mean one rejects scientific inquiry into the human condition.

I do not need a lecture in logic from you sir

You may address me simply as "Mr President".

 

[cyborg]

The quote is from Atheism: Logic & Fallacies. Take it up with someone there if you wish.

Uh no. If you want to use it to support something I'll address it as you use it.

Appeal to Authourity much? Come on boy! You're supposed to be hot on these fallacies remember?

But apparently the synthetic/analytic distinction is lost on you completely - and apparently you can tell when a logical statement is one and not the other.

Bully for you.

Even with "bifurcation" spelled correctly I am not sure how to interpret that sentence correctly.

Of course not. That's the problem.

... there is another alternative you fail to consider in your premise.

Nope.

As posted before, this is an informal fallacy.

Define 'informal' for me.

I acknowledge that you are defining the situation more axiomatically.

Tell me: how can I be less or more axiomatic? I did not realise it was a sliding scale. How might I measure this? Thanks.

This effort towards a formalisation of a description of human behavior... do you anticipate increasing returns in certainty?

What is certainty?

This commits an inductive fallacy known as a fallacy of presumption, specifically the bifurcation fallacy or false dilemma.

All logic is a false dilemma.

these particular formal systems may not be powerful enough to express it.

The particular formal system powerful enough to express that may not be powerful enough to express it.

The particular formal system powerful enough to express the particular formal system powerful enough to express that may not be powerful enough to express it.

The particular formal system powerful enough to express the particular formal system powerful enough to express the particular formal system powerful enough to express that may not be powerful enough to express it.

The particular formal system powerful enough to express the particular formal system powerful enough to express the particular formal system powerful enough to express the particular formal system powerful enough to express that may not be powerful enough to express it.


The particular formal system powerful enough to express the particular formal system powerful enough to express the particular formal system powerful enough to express the particular formal system powerful enough to express the particular formal system powerful enough to express that may not be powerful enough to express it.

I feel as though the point should be made but I suspect your the type of person for whom I would actually have to sit here beyond the end of the universe to get the point.