The warnings were, in the words of Tenet, unprecedented. His opinion is worth more than yours, or mine. He was around at the time of the Millenium bomb threats, which I believe was the highest level of post war terror alert in the US. Hence we conclude that they were indeed, unprecedented in post war US history.
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/pdf/fullreport_errata.pdf
http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/...11_timeline&startpos=200&before_9/11=warnings
Tenet is one man. Clarke is one man. Do you honestly believe that if the majority of the intelligence community believed the same as these men, that they would keep silent about it? Sorry, no. The majority of the IC views Tenet as a golddigger saying what he says in order to sell his book.
I speak with intelligence professionals daily. I have put the question to them regarding the so-called "unprecedented" warnings, and they have all said that they felt the warnings were not, in fact, unprecedented; unusual certainly, and fairly vivid and obvious
in retrospect, but not unprecedented. I also find it interesting that the very report you cite does not mention "unprecedented warnings". It says there was a "significant increase in information indicating bin Laden and Al Qa'ida intended to strike against
U.S. interests in the very near future" (bolding mine; note that U.S. interests is a blanket term in the IC referring to any U.S. businesses, embassies, etc both here and abroad) and that "Beginning in 1998 and continuing into the summer of 2001, the Intelligence Community received a
modest, but relatively steady, stream of intelligence reporting that indicated the possibility of terrorist attacks within the United States. Nonetheless, testimony and interviews confirm that
it was the general view of the Intelligence Community, in the spring and summer of 2001, that the threatened Bin Ladin attacks would most likely occur against U.S. interests overseas, despite indications of plans and intentions to attack in the domestic United States." (again, bolding mine; hardly seems like the IC considered the warnings "unprecedented" doesn't it?). And then there's this:
Finding: Although relevant information that is significant in retrospect regarding the attacks was available to the Intelligence Community prior to September 11, 2001, the Community too often failed to focus on that information and consider and appreciate its collective significance in terms of a probable terrorist attack. Neither did the Intelligence
Community demonstrate sufficient initiative in coming to grips with the new transnational threats. Some significant pieces of information in the vast stream of data being collected were overlooked, some were not recognized as potentially significant at the time and therefore not disseminated, and some required additional action on the part of foreign governments before a direct connection to the hijackers could have been established. For all those reasons, the Intelligence Community failed to fully capitalize on available, and potentially important, information.
(emphasis mine).
Many things are significant in retrospect that were not at the time. That's human nature, to look at an incident in the fullness of time and realize its significance AFTER the fact. Add to that the IC being hampered by the other factors in play, and you realize the issue.
Moving a little further on in the document, we come across this little gem:
Finding: Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community’s understanding of al-Qa’ida was hampered by insufficient analytic focus and quality, particularly in terms of strategic analysis. Analysis and analysts were not always used effectively because of the perception in some quarters of the Intelligence Community that they were less important to agency counterterrorism missions than were operations personnel. The quality of
counterterrorism analysis was inconsistent, and many analysts were inexperienced, unqualified, under-trained, and without access to critical information. As a result, there was a dearth of creative, aggressive analysis targeting Bin Ladin and a persistent inability to comprehend the collective significance of individual pieces of intelligence. These analytic deficiencies seriously undercut the ability of U.S. policymakers to understand the full nature of the threat, and to make fully informed decisions.
Looks like the warnings might not have been so obvious for the administration, doesn't it? And if they didn't see how obvious the warnings were, how, pray tell, were they to make the best decision possible?
In all honesty, mjd, I find your condescension and know-it-all attitude to be extremely rude and certainly unwarranted. I may not have as much experience as Tenet or Clarke, but I certainly have more experience than you do when it comes to the business of intelligence, AND I have the advantage of having access to individuals who know more than both of them AND myself. I believe I will be joining stateofgrace in no longer responding to your threads, as you have demonstrated time and again you do not care how articulately and knowledgably people respond to you so long as they feed your need for attention. It's sad, and it's wrong, and I will have no further part in it. Feel free to claim your hollow victory if it pleases you, but just remember, you're going to end up dying friendless and alone because you drove everyone away with your condescending BS. Hope that makes you happy.
