Because you say so? The environmental variables they are constrained by are not being systematically varied, but that does not mean they are not there. Being ignorant of a factor is not the same as being uninfluenced by it. (This is not merely a statement of faith; we can easily demonstrate that behavior may be constrained by variables the behaver is unaware of.)
You got my point after the next paragraph, right?
Ok. Yes. Agreed.
How does this make the behaviorist any less controlled? Even the role of "being in charge of [the] experiment" comes with its own constraints, structures, reinforcers & punishers...different in arrangement than those in other areas of her/his life, but there is nothing magical about being an experimenter that makes one immune from environmental influence.
The lab/real world difference is a bit like the difference between systematic breeding and natural selection. The former is organized systematically, but both are the same process at work.
I wish you would be more specific about what constaints, reinforcers, punishers you are talking about.
Is the phenomenon sometimes called countercontrol one? Sometimes the objects of study may resist. Or is that a bad subject, given that this phenomenon seemingly undermines behaviorist theory of choice being a function of environmental variables.
I'll let Skinner explain it by some lines he wrote (in
Science and Human Behavior):
". . . control is frequently aversive to the controllee. Techniques based upon the use of force, particularly punishment, or the threat of punishment, are aversive, by definition, and techniques which appeal to other processes are also objectionable when, as is usually the case, the ultimate advantage to the controller is opposed to the interest of the controllee."
"One effect upon the controllee is to induce him to engage in countercontrol. He may show an emotional reaction of anger or frustration including . . . behavior which injures or is otherwise aversive to the controller."
"Because of the aversive consequences of being controlled, the individual who undertakes to control other people is likely to be countercontrolled by all of them."
"The opposition to control is likely to be directed toward the most objectionable forms -- the use of force and conspicuous instances of exploitation, undue influence, or gross misrepresentation -- but it may extend to any control which is 'deliberately' exerted because of the consequences to the controller."
"The countercontrol exercised by the group and by certain agencies may explain our hesitancy in discussing the subject of personal control frankly and in dealing with the facts in an objective way. But it does not excuse such an attitude or practice. This is only a special case of the general principle that the issue of personal freedom must not be allowed to interfere with the scientific analysis of human behavior. As we have seen, science implies prediction and, insofar as the relevant variables can be controlled, it implies control. We cannot expect to profit from applying the methods of science to human behavior if for some extraneous reason we refuse to admit that our subject matter can be controlled."
What happens to the behaviorist theory that reinforcement is what controls behavior if the behaviorist who tries to control/reinforce his subject is likely to be repaid in kind? Who would be controlling whom given this circumstance?
But that has little to do with my original question in all of this. You said:
There is quite an extensive literature on "choice" in behavioral journals, all assuming that choice is not a function of free will, but a function of environmental variables.
How does the behaviorist/scientist chose to propose his specific hypothesis as an explanation of natural phenomena (behavior), designing experimental studies that test this prediction/concept for accuracy, etc, if the environmental variables controlling this process of proposing, designing, and testing are not in his control?
Oh, but of course: Skinner found invoking terms such as "hypotheses", "concepts", or "experimental studies" not relevant in functional analysis as the mental activity these terms imply is really just behavior and that the only non-circular way to explain behavior is to appeal to something non-behavioral like the environment.
Mercutio, is our dialogue here really better understood within Skinner's construct (forgive the "mentalistic' term) of control/countercontrol? Theoretically, (again, forgive the "mentalistic" term) that would be me, attempting to control the situation by pointing out the apparent incoherence (damn, not another "mentalistic" term) of your position, and you, countercontrolling through vague and evasive answers?
Is the only way the controller can escape from the possibility of countercontrol to give up trying to control the actions of someone else?
Probably.
