You got my point after the next paragraph, right?
Agreeing that the behaviorist controls particular variables in an experimental situation is not the same as agreeing that the behaviorist is not also being controlled.
I wish you would be more specific about what constaints, reinforcers, punishers you are talking about.
Ay, there's the rub. The whole reason for studying them in an experimental context is that it it much too uncontrolled to study them adequately in vivo. I do not, though, think it improbable that the laws of behavior stop working at the lab door. (I imagine someone challenging a chemist: "sure, the chemicals react that way in your lab, but not in my body!")
Is the phenomenon sometimes called countercontrol one? Sometimes the objects of study may resist. Or is that a bad subject, given that this phenomenon seemingly undermines behaviorist theory of choice being a function of environmental variables.
I'll let Skinner explain it by some lines he wrote (in Science and Human Behavior):
Please note that Skinner is speaking there about reactivity, with emphasis on reactivity to aversive control. Aversive control (which our society uses, and which Skinner advocates
against in "Beyond Freedom and Dignity) is, in part because of a subject's reactivity to it, not nearly as effective as control through reinforcement. That is the point of Skinner's quote. He can state it rather confidently, because there is excellent evidence.
It is not utterly irrelevant to our current question, but it is only a small part of it. We react against negative control, in part because it is salient. Control through reinforcement may be much more subtle, and because it is not seen (by our society) as a threat to our freedom, it is more acceptable. (When it is excessive, it is seen as a threat--bribes, the "love bombing" of cults, etc., but in general, positive reinforcement is far less prone to countercontrol than is punishment.) In addition, much control of our behavior comes about through the establishment of stimulus control, rather than the simple manipulation of consequences.
What happens to the behaviorist theory that reinforcement is what controls behavior if the behaviorist who tries to control/reinforce his subject is likely to be repaid in kind? Who would be controlling whom given this circumstance?
Are you assuming that in any relationship, "control" is a one-way thing? It most certainly is not. Also, why are you artificially removing the behaviorist from her/his environment? There are other factors, aside from the behavior of the subject, that influence the behaviorist's actions. The fact that some come from outside the lab situation does not make them, while inside the lab, part of the behaviorist's "free will".
(minor quibble: "the behaviorist theory that reinforcement is what controls behavior"...incomplete. The environment is what controls behavior. It does so through reinforcement, punishment, stimulus control, etc.)
But that has little to do with my original question in all of this. You said:
How does the behaviorist/scientist chose to propose his specific hypothesis as an explanation of natural phenomena (behavior), designing experimental studies that test this prediction/concept for accuracy, etc, if the environmental variables controlling this process of proposing, designing, and testing are not in his control?
In another thread, you listened to Skinner's lecture on having a poem. How does a mother have a baby if the chromosomes are not under her control?
A behaviorist's experiment-running behavior is determined by her/his interaction with environment; it is both shaped by contingencies and an instance of "rule-governed" behavior (an entirely different can of worms we can get into if you would like--the cliff-notes version is that we are reinforced for following rules, which allows us to learn the gist of some complex behaviors very quickly). What it is not, is a freely chosen spontaneous creation, independent from environmental influences.
Oh, but of course: Skinner found invoking terms such as "hypotheses", "concepts", or "experimental studies" not relevant in functional analysis as the mental activity these terms imply is really just behavior and that the only non-circular way to explain behavior is to appeal to something non-behavioral like the environment.
Other authors find the terms helpful, as part of the rules one learns to follow in order to engage in such behavior.
Mercutio, is our dialogue here really better understood within Skinner's construct (forgive the "mentalistic' term) of control/countercontrol? Theoretically, (again, forgive the "mentalistic" term) that would be me, attempting to control the situation by pointing out the apparent incoherence (damn, not another "mentalistic" term) of your position, and you, countercontrolling through vague and evasive answers?
Your failure to understand could be the result of the form of my answers, certainly. It could also be due to prior learning. Without adequate controls, it is mere speculation.
Is the only way the controller can escape from the possibility of countercontrol to give up trying to control the actions of someone else?
Probably.
One does not have to *try* to control the actions of someone else in order to actually control them; nor does "not trying" guarantee escape from countercontrol. Also, control is not always something that one tries to escape from (my classes are full of people who have paid good money to have someone attempt to control and influence their behavior; therapists, personal trainers, investment consultants, etc., can all say the same).
The biggest bit of advice (based on the research, of course) for someone trying to "escape from the possibility of countercontrol" would be to A) use positive reinforcement rather than punishment to control, and B) to use natural, rather than artificial, reinforcers whenever possible. And to keep up to date on the behavioral literature.
