Materialists......

Hammegk said:
Congratulations on pointing out what has been for millenium, and will be for many more if not forever, one the most intractable philosophical problems, viz. "What Is Free Will?".
Dude, d00d, Dooood! It's not an intractable problem, it's an incoherent one. And this conversation is making that clear to all participants. There is no logical definition of libertarian free will, let alone some difficult problem that arises once it's defined.

Hmm. Then you need to explain how you interpret compatibilistic free-will. To me it means that a machine uses all or a subset of available inputs and computes a result based on the coding available to it at the time and in the time available for computation.
Compatibilist free will is a cop-out used by materialists who really want some sort of free will but can't figure how real free will could possibly work. :D The fact that compatibilist free will might be deterministic does not mean that we need to apply the term to machines, unless it's just a synonym for computing. In an event, compatibilist free will also involves randomness, so it doesn't apply to computers (at least not yet).

And I have read elsewhere that quantum effects do come into play as ions move across synapses. I don't have a citation handy.
Even if they do, why does that make anyone feel good about free will?

~~ Paul
 
Then I presume you agree with:

Either that, or we're postulating a nonphysical, nonrandom, acausal, nondeterministic process for which we have absolutely no logical definition, never mind no evidence.

Not quite. The word "process" would need to be removed. But pretty close.

Are you just using the term free will as a name for the part of Being/Zero that is differentiated into my self?
~~ Paul

That is where it comes from, yes. Free will is that entity acting on the world, via the hidden variables. Imagine the Universe as a matrix-like or Wolfram-like algorithm. On each iteration of the algorithm, the next state is determined by two factors: (1) The previous state and (2) the hidden variables. Free will can then be thought of as an infinity which can insert values into the hidden variables. Empirical causality is the effect of (1).

***Try not to take the above metaphor too literally.***
 
Not quite. The word "process" would need to be removed. But pretty close.
What would we replace it with? A "whatchamaycallit"?
That is where it comes from, yes. Free will is that entity acting on the world, via the hidden variables. Imagine the Universe as a matrix-like or Wolfram-like algorithm. On each iteration of the algorithm, the next state is determined by two factors: (1) The previous state and (2) the hidden variables. Free will can then be thought of as an infinity which can insert values into the hidden variables. Empirical causality is the effect of (1).

***Try not to take the above metaphor too literally.***
Hidden variables would still have a deterministic effect. Just a hidden deterministic effect.
 
No. QM allows acausality to co-exist with the laws of physics.
No, if acausality exists then it must be part and parcel of physics, ie any acausal event has a real effect.
Undoubtedly? Based on what, exactly?
Er.... aren't you the one arguing that something cannot come from nothing?

I think it is pretty clear that this is true in the case of our universe at least, so it would seem that there is something apart from our universe (Or are you assuming that "outside" can only have a spatial meaning?).

And it seems parochial to say the least that only one universe resulted from whatever it was.

Anyway, the idea of many universes appears to have quite respectable support in the physics community.
 
Our knowledge of both quantum mechanics and neuroscience are woefully inadequate at this point in time, certainly regarding providing an answer to a question like this.
I agree with half of that statement. Our knowledge of quantum mechanics is extremely good. The theory only breaks down at in the most extreme situations we can imagine - the centre of black holes and the first few nanoseconds of the universe's existence. As a scientific theory it is extremely successful. Only philosophers have problems with it.

If, via some method I cannot imagine, science could prove a negative of this sort, then it would introduce a serious inconsistency into my belief system. I suppose it would require both a completed neuroscience and a completed physics - little short of a theory of everything.
I don't see why that would be necessary at all. If we can understand the workings of the brain, and we find that we can understand it without reference to these kind of quantum effects then there is no room for libertarian free will.

It normally requires some sort of very special set up for quantum randomness to have visible effects (human free will, you seem to agree, can definitely produce visible effects). Simply observing that there are QM processes going on (there always are) is not enough. Transistors make use of quantum effects and they are used to make computers, but the computer is a paradigmatic case of a deterministic machine. The transistors' behaviour depends on the motion of a large number of particles, any one of which is highly unpredictable, but which as a collective behave in highly predictable ways.

Just as we design our computers to be predictable in this way, we would expect evolution to design humans to act in non-random ways. What is the survival benefit of introducing quantum mechanical randomness into our decision making?
 
No, if acausality exists then it must be part and parcel of physics, ie any acausal event has a real effect.

How can the acausal part be part of physics? From the point of view of physics, "acausal" means "random". The metaphysical component of the theory turns the apparent randomness into manifestations of free will and fate.

Er.... aren't you the one arguing that something cannot come from nothing?

Not sure what this response has got to do with my question.

I think it is pretty clear that this is true in the case of our universe at least, so it would seem that there is something apart from our universe (Or are you assuming that "outside" can only have a spatial meaning?).

Are you saying the Universe had to have external cause? :confused:

And it seems parochial to say the least that only one universe resulted from whatever it was.

Anyway, the idea of many universes appears to have quite respectable support in the physics community.

Sure it does, but only because the alternative is trying to find a non-anthropic explanation for cosmological constants. It's a position of last-resort.
 
What would we replace it with? A "whatchamaycallit"?

Neti, neti.

Hidden variables would still have a deterministic effect. Just a hidden deterministic effect.

Sort of. It depends what is determining the value of the hidden variables. It could be other things in the Universe. It (supposedly) could be random. I believe it is will and fate/karma. I don't believe there is any such thing as randomness.
 
I agree with half of that statement. Our knowledge of quantum mechanics is extremely good. The theory only breaks down at in the most extreme situations we can imagine - the centre of black holes and the first few nanoseconds of the universe's existence. As a scientific theory it is extremely successful. Only philosophers have problems with it.

That's because the scientists often don't understand the philosophical problems. Most of the people I've met who are studying QM are mathematicians. They learn how to do the maths. They don't even know who invented the maths they are learning most of the time. They certainly don't get bogged down in philosophical discussions about how to interpret QM and relate it to other areas of study. They just do the maths. When you ask them questions about philosophy of maths or metaphysics or the mind-body problem or the metaphysical implications of QM they look bemused, as if they cannot understand why such a question is being directed at them. "I can tell you how the maths work", they will say, "but Bohm? Who is Bohm?" Same University, different world.

I don't see why that would be necessary at all. If we can understand the workings of the brain, and we find that we can understand it without reference to these kind of quantum effects then there is no room for libertarian free will.

This all depends on what you mean by "understand". Some people think "understanding the brain" or "explaining consciousness" involves denying its existence. That sort of understanding won't be enough. I want understanding that involves actual understanding. :)

It normally requires some sort of very special set up for quantum randomness to have visible effects (human free will, you seem to agree, can definitely produce visible effects). Simply observing that there are QM processes going on (there always are) is not enough. Transistors make use of quantum effects and they are used to make computers, but the computer is a paradigmatic case of a deterministic machine. The transistors' behaviour depends on the motion of a large number of particles, any one of which is highly unpredictable, but which as a collective behave in highly predictable ways.

Just as we design our computers to be predictable in this way, we would expect evolution to design humans to act in non-random ways. What is the survival benefit of introducing quantum mechanical randomness into our decision making?

What is the survival benefit of subjective consciousness at all? Wouldn't it have been more economical to have zombies instead?

There is no evolutionary explanation for free will. Free will is ontologically prior to evolution. It comes straight from Zero. No evolution necessary.

[edit] correction: In order to actually take advantage of free will - to put it into action instead of leaving it blindly coupled to the ego (unfree will), which most certainly did evolve (because self-interest is the driving force behind evolution), we need the capacity for rational thought. That also had to evolve, although much more recently than the ego. All creatures have the capacity to act self-interestedly. Only rational beings are capable of willfully transcending this evolved capacity to act self-interestedly, but rationality alone is not enough. We also need the self-discipline ("will-power") to make it happen. [/edit]
 
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How can the acausal part be part of physics? From the point of view of physics, "acausal" means "random".
You said previously that you understood that physics does not necessarily imply determinism.

Now you appear not to understand. You see, as I said earlier, to be using "physical" and "deterministic" interchangeably.

Physics does not, (as the immaterialists on this board dogmatically insist) attempt to impose a deterministic framework on the universe. It seeks to describe.

As soon as it became apparent that some observations could best be explained by indeterminism, then indeterminism became part of physics.
The metaphysical component of the theory turns the apparent randomness into manifestations of free will and fate.
Metaphysics has nothing to do with the case. Whatever metaphysic you care to choose, you cannot escape the brutal logic of the thing - "apparent randomness" could be one of two things: Real randomness, or determinism.

The opposite of order is not freedom. It is disorder. And with disorder you cannot have freedom or will.
Sure it does, but only because the alternative is trying to find a non-anthropic explanation for cosmological constants. It's a position of last-resort.
This kind of nonsense statement about science is the position of last resort for those seeking to find a place for the numinous.
 
Dude, d00d, Dooood! It's not an intractable problem, it's an incoherent one. And this conversation is making that clear to all participants. There is no logical definition of libertarian free will, let alone some difficult problem that arises once it's defined.
It's intractable. Materialists dispose of it by declaring it cannot exist; idealists by choosing to declare the question 'difficult'.

Compatibilist free will is a cop-out used by materialists who really want some sort of free will but can't figure how real free will could possibly work. :D The fact that compatibilist free will might be deterministic does not mean that we need to apply the term to machines, unless it's just a synonym for computing. In an event, compatibilist free will also involves randomness,
It does? Er, yes, materialists must have faith it is so.

so it doesn't apply to computers (at least not yet).
In the sense they are not sufficient complex by orders of magnitude for randomness to need to be solved on the fly.

We can agree on the sometimes randomness of human behavior but disagree that might be some indication of free-will (no matter how it's defined).

Even if they do, why does that make anyone feel good about free will?
We agree, it shouldn't.
 
That's because the scientists often don't understand the philosophical problems. Most of the people I've met who are studying QM are mathematicians. They learn how to do the maths. They don't even know who invented the maths they are learning most of the time. They certainly don't get bogged down in philosophical discussions about how to interpret QM and relate it to other areas of study. They just do the maths. When you ask them questions about philosophy of maths or metaphysics or the mind-body problem or the metaphysical implications of QM they look bemused, as if they cannot understand why such a question is being directed at them. "I can tell you how the maths work", they will say, "but Bohm? Who is Bohm?" Same University, different world.
On the contrary, experience has shown us that mathematicians and scientists are usually better philosophers than the ones turned out by the philosophy department.

The philosophical debate between the likes of Penrose, Dennett, Searle etc is a lot more interesting and enlightening than any of the "real" philosophical debates, just as Russell and Goedel contributed more to philosophy than mere philosophers ever did.

I met few mathematicians or scientists that were not across state of modern philosophy.
 
Physics does not, (as the immaterialists on this board dogmatically insist) attempt to impose a deterministic framework on the universe.
Which immaterialists ever suggested physics does? Reality might, and physicists might, but physics doesn't.

Metaphysics has nothing to do with the case. Whatever metaphysic you care to choose, you cannot escape the brutal logic of the thing - "apparent randomness" could be one of two things: Real randomness, or determinism.
If the question can be appropriately mathematized, that's correct.

I can think of many questions, relevant to reality whatever it is, that cannot be effectively dealt with by mathematizing them.
 
On the contrary, experience has shown us that mathematicians and scientists are usually better philosophers than the ones turned out by the philosophy department.

The good ones are. The brilliant ones...yes, they often tend to be reasonable philosophers. Penrose, Bohm, Einstein, Schrodinger, Eddington, Heisenberg, Jeans, Planck, Pauli....

The trouble is, all of the above people held positions like mine, not yours.
 
You said previously that you understood that physics does not necessarily imply determinism.

Now you appear not to understand. You see[m], as I said earlier, to be using "physical" and "deterministic" interchangeably.

They aren't quite interchangeable but they are closely related. It spins on the difference between material and physical. "Materialism" really responds to an older view - the newtonian one and maybe also the relativistic one. In this case, materialistic and deterministic are interchangeable. That sort of materialism implies determinism. Only QM changes the picture. But if you introduce QM and call QM "a purely physical theory" then you are introducing the inherent acausality of QM into your notion of physical and physicalism. At this point, free will is not incompatible with the laws of physics, because the laws of physics have expanded enough to encompass acausality. That help?


Physics does not, (as the immaterialists on this board dogmatically insist) attempt to impose a deterministic framework on the universe. It seeks to describe.

As soon as it became apparent that some observations could best be explained by indeterminism, then indeterminism became part of physics.

That's still being argued about.

Metaphysics has nothing to do with the case. Whatever metaphysic you care to choose, you cannot escape the brutal logic of the thing - "apparent randomness" could be one of two things: Real randomness, or determinism.

....or acausal free will or fate/karma.......

The opposite of order is not freedom. It is disorder. And with disorder you cannot have freedom or will.

Sure, without some degree of determinism, free will couldn't operate. There is an anology available with a car. Free will is like your hands on the driving wheel. But without the rigid deterministic mechanisms inside the body of the car, your attempts to impose your free will on the movement of the car would fail. You need the car to behave deterministically in order to be able to drive the car. Now just think of the your body as an extension of the car and the thing doing the driving to be your "I".

This kind of nonsense statement about science is the position of last resort for those seeking to find a place for the numinous.


It wasn't nonsense. Multiverse theory is proposed because otherwise you have to explain why the cosmological constants look fine-tuned for life. If there are lots and lots of Universes, it ceases to be a problem. It's a metaphysical answer. Not an empirical one.
 
Geoff said:
Not quite. The word "process" would need to be removed. But pretty close.
Okay, that helps emphasize one of my complaints, anyway:

Either that, or we're postulating a nonphysical, nonrandom, acausal, nondeterministic thingamabob for which we have absolutely no logical definition, never mind no evidence.

Notice how vehemently I disagree with Robin's choice of the word whatchamaycallit. This is like philosophy invented by Dave Wall.

That is where it comes from, yes. Free will is that entity acting on the world, via the hidden variables. Imagine the Universe as a matrix-like or Wolfram-like algorithm. On each iteration of the algorithm, the next state is determined by two factors: (1) The previous state and (2) the hidden variables. Free will can then be thought of as an infinity which can insert values into the hidden variables. Empirical causality is the effect of (1).
And how does this infinity determine which values to insert into the hidden variables? And what sort of effect do the hidden variables have?

~~ Paul
 
Geoff said:
What is the survival benefit of subjective consciousness at all? Wouldn't it have been more economical to have zombies instead?
There may be great survival benefit to the feeling that I willed my own actions.

~~ Paul
 
Hammegk said:
It's intractable. Materialists dispose of it by declaring it cannot exist; idealists by choosing to declare the question 'difficult'.
It's undefined. But, by all means, prove me wrong. Define it.

We can agree on the sometimes randomness of human behavior but disagree that might be some indication of free-will (no matter how it's defined).
It's not randomness of behavior, but randomness of brain function. Part of the illusion of free will might be a random element to physical brain function.

~~ Paul
 
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That's because the scientists often don't understand the philosophical problems.
It could be that the problems aren't real. The physicists are using the theory as it was intended, as a scientific theory, and the philosophers are confusing themselves by asking invalid questions about it.

This all depends on what you mean by "understand". Some people think "understanding the brain" or "explaining consciousness" involves denying its existence. That sort of understanding won't be enough. I want understanding that involves actual understanding. :)
I just mean understand the workings of the brain in an empirical sense. If free will is something that is forever trapped inside an unknowable consciousness, unobservable to science, then it's not really free will at all. Free will can make its presence known by (at least sometimes) being acted upon. We can empirically tell whether or not a subject has libertarian free will. It will sometimes introduce an element of unpredictability into their behaviour which we can observe.

What is the survival benefit of subjective consciousness at all? Wouldn't it have been more economical to have zombies instead?
If zombies were possible, yes. But if consciousness necessarily accompanies the right kind of complex agent-like behaviour then we don't need to explain it separately. We can't say the same for libertarian free will because this actually implies changes in behaviour, and thus requires an evolutionary explanation.

[edit] correction: In order to actually take advantage of free will - to put it into action instead of leaving it blindly coupled to the ego (unfree will), which most certainly did evolve (because self-interest is the driving force behind evolution), we need the capacity for rational thought. That also had to evolve, although much more recently than the ego. All creatures have the capacity to act self-interestedly. Only rational beings are capable of wilfully transcending this evolved capacity to act self-interestedly, but rationality alone is not enough. We also need the self-discipline ("will-power") to make it happen. [/edit]
As Dawkins put it, in the infamous last sentence of the Selfish Gene "We, alone on earth, can rebel against the tyranny of our selfish replicators." But, as many people have pointed out, he never explained how that was possible, why evolution would work against itself in this way, how it could favour creatures that were unoptimised for their own survival in this way over more "selfish" creatures.

Besides, it seems to me that rationality, in itself, does not make us altruistic. If our biologically programmed instincts are selfish then we will act rationally in pursuit of them. Being rational doesn't provide us with new goals.
 
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It's undefined. But, by all means, prove me wrong. Define it.
Sorry. No can do; could that be a function of intractability, do you suppose?

It's not randomness of behavior, but random of brain function. Part of the illusion of free will might be a random element to physical brain function.
That's certainly one of the best articles of faiths a ~idealist can ever have. But it doesn't do much for me, personally.

Hey, I know! We could discuss what information is transmitted by gravitons!! ;) :p :D
 

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