Materialists......

[chriswl]

Where is the physical action involved in willing an Argentinian to miss his penalty?

Well, I'm guessing that your "willing" was fairly animated, that it would have been obvious to an observer that you wanted them to miss. Even if it wasn't, there would be physical activity in the brain. If you are vocalising something internally to yourself ("miss it, miss it!") then that has to be associated with some kind of brain activity.

Of course I can't. That's not free will anyway. It's unfree will.

So will is always associated with activity, real activity or thwarted activity (pushing against something involves activity even if the thing you are pushing against doesn't move). Would you really say that your efforts to levitate were "thwarted" by some kind of obstruction? They weren't real efforts at all, just wishes.

 

[chriswl]

So for will to be free rather than unfree simply means that we have unhitched the capacity for will from the deterministic inputs being supplied by physics and genetics. Free will is freedom from the laws of physics. That doesn't mean free will can break the laws of physics

See, this is the problem. That's exactly what it must mean. You can't only "sort of" obey the laws of physics (or any laws!) without actually breaking them.

So freedom of the will is not some magical thing being imported from elsewhere just at the moment of freedom.

But it would have to be magical. It is inherently non-naturalistic. If I could explain libertarian free will by any set of laws it wouldn't be free.

 

[hammegk]

That doesn't answer my question...or rather it doesn't enlighten me...

If it can be spoken ....

This is just a nonsequiter as it has no bearing on the question of consciousness.

Very likely, as you may choose to define consciousness.

I personally take the stance of a Functional Materialist, and I believe that most all brain processes are replicable in some fashion. Also, I'm going to have to be an odd ball here and stick with compatibalism.

At least you seem to realize you have no other logical choice.

Do you have a problem with the following statements?

Atoms obey the laws of physics ...
A compatibilistic machine obeys the laws of physics ...

You can't have absolute free will, but you can't have absolute determinism either. Considering how systems work in the brain, there are psychological predispositions that will always act as a hindrance on free will. But, there are basic neurological systems that allow for a degree of free will at the very least.

Or maybe I've been reading way too much Daniel Dennett for my own good recently. Then again, I absolutely love the progress of the work being done in Cognitive Science.

Good stuff, yet of absolute irrelevance to the question of choice of monism.

 

[Belz...]

For a determinist, the decision-making and the action-taking are all part of a single, unbroken material process. For the libertarian they are not. There is a decision, which involves weighing up what is in ones self interest and what is in the interests of the greater good. Deterministic processes govern the decision. What they do not govern is the act of will itself, which follows the decision-making process.

How would you know this ? How can you tell the difference ?

There aren't many choices for free will, Geoff. Either the world is deterministic and we DON'T have any free will, or there is an element of randomness involved, which we CAN'T control and which, again, means free will is non-existent. The only way out is to posit some form of god or entity that makes it possible.

Unfortunately, I don't see how this beign could be any different from the cosmos: deterministic or partly random. Again, no free will.

 

[Belz...]

Free will is freedom from the laws of physics. That doesn't mean free will can break the laws of physics

That's a contradiction.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Well, I'm guessing that your "willing" was fairly animated....

Sure, in this case it was. But it did not have to be. I could have willed it just as strongly and simultaneously kept a poker face. The animation and the willing aren't the same thing.

Even if it wasn't, there would be physical activity in the brain.

Sure, but we are not in a position to say what the relationship is between that brain activity and the phenomenological experience of willing.

So will is always associated with activity....

No activity is necessary. Activity comes after will, not with it.

Would you really say that your efforts to levitate were "thwarted" by some kind of obstruction?

They were thwarted by the laws of physics.

They weren't real efforts at all, just wishes.

The will was just as real as my will to see the argies miss.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

See, this is the problem. That's exactly what it must mean. You can't only "sort of" obey the laws of physics (or any laws!) without actually breaking them.

Yes you can. Remember acausality and indeterminism in quantum mechanics....? There is a difference between breaking the laws of physics and breaking the laws of probability.

But it would have to be magical. It is inherently non-naturalistic. If I could explain libertarian free will by any set of laws it wouldn't be free.

OK, I accept this. Libertarian free will obviously contradicts determinism and determinism is often equated with naturalism. The point I was making that free will is not something extra. The potential is always there. In order to make the will free, something has to be taken away (disconnected) rather than something being added.

 

[Robin]

Yes you can. Remember acausality and indeterminism in quantum mechanics....?

You appear to be saying that QM breaks the laws of physics. QM is part of the laws of physics.

The laws of physics does not necessarily say that everything is deterministic, certainly not anytime recently.

You appear to think of the laws of physics as those laws of physics that were known in the 19th century.

The laws of physics are simply our current understanding of the order underlying our universe. Our minds will conform to that order, or otherwise not function at all.

Undoubtedly there are other orders in other universes and even outside of universes.

But there will always be either determinism or randomness or some combination of the two.

As I always say, it is simply illogical to suggest that free will can be free of the underlying order that makes the will possible in the first place.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You appear to be saying that QM breaks the laws of physics. QM is part of the laws of physics.

No. QM allows acausality to co-exist with the laws of physics.

The laws of physics does not necessarily say that everything is deterministic, certainly not anytime recently.

Exactly.

You appear to think of the laws of physics as those laws of physics that were known in the 19th century.

No, I'm quite aware they changed.

Undoubtedly there are other orders in other universes and even outside of universes.

Undoubtedly? Based on what, exactly?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

For a determinist, the decision-making and the action-taking are all part of a single, unbroken material process. For the libertarian they are not. There is a decision, which involves weighing up what is in ones self interest and what is in the interests of the greater good. Deterministic processes govern the decision. What they do not govern is the act of will itself, which follows the decision-making process.

Who cares? Okay, so part of the process of making a decision and acting on it is deterministic. Let's ignore that part. Now explain to me what mechanism (pick any word you want) is used to decide whether I shall will my decision into action?

Segregate as much of this as you want into the determinism/randomness pile. What I want to know is how the remaining pile works. And let's be careful that the remaining pile is not empty.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Who cares? Okay, so part of the process of making a decision and acting on it is deterministic. Let's ignore that part. Now explain to me what mechanism (pick any word you want) is used to decide whether I shall will my decision into action?

Segregate as much of this as you want into the determinism/randomness pile. What I want to know is how the remaining pile works. And let's be careful that the remaining pile is not empty.

~~ Paul

OK...you are familiar enough with the position I defend for us to be able to make some progress here. What I am calling "will" is not composed of other things. It certainly isn't composed of material things. It is another manifestation of what I interchangeably call Zero/"I". When you will it is coming from the same place you might call "the subject of consciousness". But as you know from our previous discussions, this "thing" isn't a thing at all. So in a way, the remaining pile is indeed empty - it's empty because it's another manifestation of nothingness/zero/void. From your own phenomenological, first person point of view it is the thing which is observing the contents of your mind and the thing with which you will. From the perspective of "things in themselves" it's absolute nothingness.

In order to make sense of free will, it looks like you need a homonculus - except this time it is an active homonculus rather than a passive one. But it only looks like a homonculus from the subjective perspective. In the bigger picture, it becomes a manifestation of absolute nothingness, or "the world soul".

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

So in a way, the remaining pile is indeed empty - it's empty because it's another manifestation of nothingness/zero/void. From your own phenomenological, first person point of view it is the thing which is observing the contents of your mind and the thing with which you will. From the perspective of "things in themselves" it's absolute nothingness.

Marvelous, but this tells me nothing about how Zero decides what to will.

In order to make sense of free will, it looks like you need a homonculus - except this time it is an active homonculus rather than a passive one. But it only looks like a homonculus from the subjective perspective. In the bigger picture, it becomes a manifestation of absolute nothingness, or "the world soul".

This still tells me nothing.

How does the nothingness/zero/void decide what it shall will?

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Marvelous, but this tells me nothing about how Zero decides what to will.

Oh, I think I see what's going on here. The Zero doesn't decide anything at all. "Deciding" is a thoroughly cognitive act and it requires a brain. But knowing what is right and what is wrong - what one should do or should not do - is absolutely not the same as actually doing it. Just look at someone trying to quit smoking. They know exactly why they want to quit, they know its stupid, they know that they've only given it a week and if they give in now they are back to square one. They don't "decide" to smoke a cigarette. What happens, as correctly described by the layman, is that their will caves in. The laws of physics take over. You could say that they find themselves smoking that cigarette anyway, even though every rational bone in their body knows it is the wrong thing to do.

So "will" isn't about decisions. You take a decision to act, then you actually act. The smoker who succeeds in quitting has done so because he has decoupled the agent of will from the biological impulses compelling him to smoke a cigarette. The smoker who fails to quit doesn't really have free will in this respect.

 

[chriswl]

Just look at someone trying to quit smoking. They know exactly why they want to quit, they know its stupid, they know that they've only given it a week and if they give in now they are back to square one. They don't "decide" to smoke a cigarette. What happens, as correctly described by the layman, is that their will caves in. The laws of physics take over. You could say that they find themselves smoking that cigarette anyway, even though every rational bone in their body knows it is the wrong thing to do.

"Every rational bone in their body", what a revealing metaphor. You can't get much more tangibly physical than bones. Of course we would literally say neurons rather than bones but it's the same thing.

Giving up or not giving up smoking is a physical act that must have a physical cause. Unless there just so happen to be quantum processes in the brain which correspond exactly with the brain processes underlying conscious choices. What do you think the chances are of that being true? As far as we know, no biological mechanisms exploit quantum mechanical effects in this way.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

"Every rational bone in their body", what a revealing metaphor. You can't get much more tangibly physical than bones. Of course we would literally say neurons rather than bones but it's the same thing.

Giving up or not giving up smoking is a physical act that must have a physical cause.

With the greatest respect, that statement is critically dependent on one or two critical assumptions, and you already know what they are. If you are going to assume materialism/determinism is true then there is absolutely no point in having a debate about the "mechanism" behind free will, because if materialism/determinism is true then there is no such thing as free will, by definition.

Unless there just so happen to be quantum processes in the brain which correspond exactly with the brain processes underlying conscious choices.

Making choices and actually engaging your will to act on those choices are not the same thing. Think about the process of being forced to make a difficult decision, and then act on it. You think for a while, then you come to a decision, then you act.

What do you think the chances are of that being true? As far as we know, no biological mechanisms exploit quantum mechanical effects in this way.

I do not know the answer to the question of exactly how quantum mechanics relates to brain function. Neither does anybody else. Roger Penrose appears to be the only person seriously trying to find out.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

So "will" isn't about decisions. You take a decision to act, then you actually act. The smoker who succeeds in quitting has done so because he has decoupled the agent of will from the biological impulses compelling him to smoke a cigarette. The smoker who fails to quit doesn't really have free will in this respect.

I'm sorry, Geoff, but this is a whirlpool of chit-chat that doesn't answer the question. We now have that the decision has nothing to do with free will and that the action has nothing to do with free will. Somewhere in between is this will thing. Does the will connect the decision to the act? If so, how does the connection work? If not, then it sounds like there is nothing for the will to do, in which case we can write it off.

It's another example of the old "ideal thing connected to the physical thing," but no one can explain the interface.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I'm sorry, Geoff, but this is a whirlpool of chit-chat that doesn't answer the question. We now have that the decision has nothing to do with free will and that the action has nothing to do with free will.

Both of them have something to do with free will, but neither of them are free will.

Somewhere in between is this will thing.

Absolutely correct, you're getting there.

Does the will connect the decision to the act?

"Connect"? I guess you are still trying to think about this in terms of materialism, Paul. We are talking about a situation where determinism isn't true. "Will" is an ontologically primary thing. It's not describable in terms of matter or determinism, by definition.

If so, how does the connection work? If not, then it sounds like there is nothing for the will to do, in which case we can write it off.

You won't ever be able to understand this if you try to interpret it materialistically. At the moment you are trying to fit free will into your own framework of understanding, and that framework is deterministic/materialistic. You then end up not being able to do so, which isn't surprising because it is quite impossible to fit free will into a deterministic view of reality, and say we can write it off. If you want to understand this, then you have to temporarily suspend your belief in materialism and think about a system where will is primary. There are no mechanical connections. From the point of view of the materialist, all there are are hidden variables. The "connection" is supplied by those hidden variables, but they exist on the level of quantum mechanics, not classical physics with its "mechanisms".

It's another example of the old "ideal thing connected to the physical thing," but no one can explain the interface.
~~ Paul

That's because they are trying to explain something in terms of substance dualism. Substance dualism doesn't work, because it requires an inexplicable interface. It's an old problem, but it simply does not occur in other metaphysical positions. There is no interface problem in idealism or neutral monism. Instead, there are different levels of description and abstraction. There is no "connection" as such because the two things you are trying to connect are in ontologically different categories. Another way of saying it: there is a connection, but it can only be specified on a deeper level of description of reality. Substance dualism makes the mistake of thinking mind-stuff is another sort of stuff, on the same level as material-stuff but somehow different to it. When you ask me to specify a connection, you are doing so because you are also trying to introduce new components into the system at the same level as the substance dualist's "mind-stuff" - except in this case it is "will-stuff". There is no mind-stuff, no will-stuff and no "connection" of the sort you are asking about.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

You won't ever be able to understand this if you try to interpret it materialistically. At the moment you are trying to fit free will into your own framework of understanding, and that framework is deterministic/materialistic. You then end up not being able to do so, which isn't surprising because it is quite impossible to fit free will into a deterministic view of reality, and say we can write it off. If you want to understand this, then you have to temporarily suspend your belief in materialism and think about a system where will is primary. There are no mechanical connections. From the point of view of the materialist, all there are are hidden variables. The "connection" is supplied by those hidden variables, but they exist on the level of quantum mechanics, not classical physics with its "mechanisms".

First of all, quantum mechanics is a physical theory. You're talking about some kind of Zero Quantum Mechanics, to which you should give another name.

Second, I am not trying to fit free will into any particular metaphysic. For the tenth time, I am simply trying to get an explanation of the mechanism of free will, whether it is a mechanism, system, process, gizmo, contraption, logical sequence, or Rube Goldberg device. It doesn't make any difference whether will is primary or secondary, it has to operate by a logical process and it still has to relate to decision and action. What are the steps from decision to will to action? How is it decided how strongly one will apply his will to a decision?

What you are saying is that there are decisions and there are actions, and then there is a hidden variable that provides the connections, but you cannot describe the operation of the hidden variable at all. Hidden variables are introduced to explain something otherwise unexplained. In this case, though, the hidden variable is introduced because "Oh my gosh, we wouldn't want the whole thing to be deterministic and/or random!" What is unexplained that needs free will?

I stand by my claim that no one has ever defined free will coherently.

~~ Paul

 

[chriswl]

You won't ever be able to understand this if you try to interpret it materialistically. At the moment you are trying to fit free will into your own framework of understanding, and that framework is deterministic/materialistic. You then end up not being able to do so, which isn't surprising because it is quite impossible to fit free will into a deterministic view of reality, and say we can write it off.

This is simply an admission that you are wrong. There must be a valid materialist description of what is going on, and just yelling materialist! and closing your ears won't change this.

Ontological materialism is the belief that the materialist description is the only valid one. We are not arguing that point (not here, at any rate). We are simply arguing that the materialist description is at least one valid way of looking at the world and it is a view of the world that exhibits causal closure - physical effects have physical causes. Let me be clear, I am not suggesting that your philosophy must be reducible to a scientific description, merely that it must not contradict the scientific description. Otherwise it is wrong, in exactly the same way the flat earth theory or the Genesis creation myth is wrong.

Not being a materialist doesn't give you license to believe things that are contradicted by physical evidence. Empirical evidence is a constraint on what we can believe about the world.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

This is simply an admission that you are wrong. There must be a valid materialist description of what is going on, and just yelling materialist! and closing your ears won't change this.

Chris, I'm not sure why you don't understand this. I was being asked for a mechanism underlying libertarian free will. Libertarian free will, by definition, involved a denial that determinism is true. So there cannot possibly be a "valid materialistic [read: deterministic] description" of what is going on. It is not an admission I am wrong, nor is it armwaving. It is an analytically/deductively true statement. Libertarianism and determinism are logically incompatible. Period.

Ontological materialism is the belief that the materialist description is the only valid one. We are not arguing that point (not here, at any rate). We are simply arguing that the materialist description is at least one valid way of looking at the world and it is a view of the world that exhibits causal closure - physical effects have physical causes. Let me be clear, I am not suggesting that your philosophy must be reducible to a scientific description, merely that it must not contradict the scientific description.

Then you are claiming that libertarian free will must be non-existent simply on the grounds that nothing could possibly exist which defies scientific description. You are defining it to be impossible. I can't argue with that, so I am not even going to try.

Not being a materialist doesn't give you license to believe things that are contradicted by physical evidence. Empirical evidence is a constraint on what we can believe about the world.

Exactly. I am not contradicting physical evidence by proposing non-deterministic metaphysical theories. It just doesn't follow, for the very simple reason that the laws of physics allow for indeterminism, thanks to QM. Empirical evidence is indeed a constraint about what we can believe and it is a contraint to which I comply 100%. Nothing I believe contradicts empirical evidence.