Materialists......

I'm not sure what you mean.


Well yes, according to the definition of indeterminism. But I wouldn't think free will choices would look random.

They must look random. If they did not, then they would look deterministic. I am NOT talking about compatibilist free will.

For example, I'd expect a free will choice to be constrained by the set of choices that is palatable to the person making the decision.

~~ Paul

Constrained is not the same as determined.
 
Yes, but this is my position. I believe in libertarian free will. I also believe that the source of that free will is the same as the source of everything else. The same "necessary being" which I have argued for on cosmological grounds is the direct source of free will.
Well, if you want to believe that... but wouldn't it be far simpler to say that there are uncaused events and that the universe itself may well be uncaused?
 
Well, if you want to believe that... but wouldn't it be far simpler to say that there are uncaused events and that the universe itself may well be uncaused?

In terms of empirical causality i.e. temporal causality, this statement is true. I am claiming there are more fundamental causes, of an ontologically different nature. These include both the non-temporal non-empirical sustaining cause of the Universe AND the non-temporal non-empirical source of free will, both of which come from exactly the same place.
 
Pure chance (as in genuinely random quantum outcomes) is acausality. Technically, free will manifesting via quantum outcomes is also termed acausality. In both cases something is happening which is not empirical causality.

Fair enough.

To get back to this:

That's a slightly different question. Can I try rephrasing it?

Q: What is the difference between living in a world where materialism is true and living in a world where idealism is true, but the observed world ALWAYS behaves as if materialism was true?

A: Very little.

Does that help?

What would help more is:

What is that very little?

Because as you've moved further on in this thread, I see nothing but words than mean 'very little' (or really, nothing) different from effective materialism. How do they change how you act? What do you do differently to us 'materialists' because of your beliefs? Do you woo?
 
Geoff said:
They must look random. If they did not, then they would look deterministic. I am NOT talking about compatibilist free will.
If random or deterministic are the only two choices, then this argues that libertarian free will is an incoherent concept, since clearly libertarians are talking about a decision-making process other than determinism and/or randomness. Also, we have to be careful not to stumble on the fact that random events can be deterministic in the large.

Constrained is not the same as determined.
No, but constraints can restrict randomness to the point where it doesn't look random anymore.

This boils down to: No one seems to be able to define libertarian free will. What is the mechanism for making decisions that is not just determinism and/or randomness? What does it mean to have a free choice in your decision at one instant and in the next instant to have made a decision?

~~ Paul
 
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If random or deterministic are the only two choices, then this argues that libertarian free will is an incoherent concept, since clearly libertarians are talking about a decision-making process other than determinism and/or randomness. Also, we have to be careful not to stumble on the fact that random events can be deterministic in the large.


No, but constraints can restrict randomness to the point where it doesn't look random anymore.

This boils down to: No one seems to be able to define libertarian free will. What is the mechanism for making decisions that is not just determinism and/or randomness? What does it mean to have a free choice in your decision at one instant and in the next instant to have made a decision?

~~ Paul

It means you are co-creating the future. I don't understand what you don't understand......?
 
What is that very little?

Because as you've moved further on in this thread, I see nothing but words than mean 'very little' (or really, nothing) different from effective materialism. How do they change how you act? What do you do differently to us 'materialists' because of your beliefs? Do you woo?

This is a very hard question to answer. Not because there is no difference at all, but because I cannot think of an easy way to explain it which won't be instantly msunderstood. I'll try to think one....
 
In terms of empirical causality i.e. temporal causality, this statement is true. I am claiming there are more fundamental causes, of an ontologically different nature. These include both the non-temporal non-empirical sustaining cause of the Universe AND the non-temporal non-empirical source of free will, both of which come from exactly the same place.
If it is not temporal, then it can't properly be called a cause. If philosophers, nonetheless, use the word "cause" in this way then this is a specialist, philosopher's jargon useage of the word. I'm not going to attempt to use it in this way when I don't understand what the scope (or point!) of that useage is.
 
That's not necessrily the case. There could be hidden variables.
If all the variables were not contained in the prior state then it would not be a sequence of states linked by causality such as the cite in your post described.
This stuff is only true if hard determinism is true.
If everything can be described as a sequence of states linked by causality (temporal sequence or otherwise) then hard determinism is true.
If we are talking about our universe then QM provides the possibility for another factor.
I seem to remember that one of the greatest objections to QM was that it suggested that something could come from nothing.
You sound like you are now saying "If there is acausality in the system, something can come into existence without a cause." The trouble is that the acausality doesn't actually bring anything new into existence - it just re-arranges the state of what already exists. So even if there is acausality, there still isn't anything which begins and ends but has no cause.
But re-arrangements don't just happen. If there is acausality, whatever the source, there is an acausal event.

The acausal event (or its source) must be said to exist since it has a physical effect - so there must be something that begins and ends and has (by definition) no cause.
I followed you all the way up to the last statement.
Well that is more agreement than we usually get.
 
They must look random. If they did not, then they would look deterministic. I am NOT talking about compatibilist free will.
In another thread I suggested a definition of "physical" as "some non abstract thing that could either be (at least theoretically) described by a mathematical model or it is arbitrary.

You complained that I had just defined "physical" as "everything". So it seems you do agree that determined and random are the only two choices.

So if free will "looks" random, is it? If it is not, then it is determined.

I should also point out that if our choices look random to us then we do not conclude we have free will - we conclude the opposite.
 
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Geoff said:
It means you are co-creating the future.
Co-creating it with whom?

I don't understand what you don't understand.
I don't understand what libertarian free will proposes as the mechanism of decision making. It can't just be determinism and randomness, or it would be compatibilist free will, not libertarian. There is some other way by which I make libertarian decisions.

Interesting Ian wouldn't let me call the other way a mechanism, because he said that mechanisms are deterministic. When I pressed him, he said that free will lets me make decisions based on my desires, or wants, or some such word. That tells me nothing.

From Wikipedia:
The major objection to libertarianism is that it remains a mystery why an agent makes the choice she does - any explanation of the choice (beyond a probabilistic one) would seem to make it determined. However, according to David Hume, if a choice is not determined then it is simply a random event, which is problematic since such a choice would lack purpose.

I daresay that libertarian free will has been bandied about with abandon. There is no desire to define it. To define it is to rob it of its sweet libertarian nature.

~~ Paul
 
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Is the path a single photon takes from A to B deterministic, or random?
Can one say whether there is 'a path', is 'a photon', and whether there are two (or more) different points of existence (A; B; etc.)?
You know you cannot. Therefore, you should not be pondering the ultimate existence of concepts such as determinism & chaos on the back of such Alice-in-Wonderland realities.

Again, the magnetism towards the unfounded 'reality of the world' pollutes our search for truth.
Not the first time, hey.
 
Is the path a single photon takes from A to B deterministic, or random?

This is just a nonsequiter as it has no bearing on the question of consciousness.

I personally take the stance of a Functional Materialist, and I believe that most all brain processes are replicable in some fashion. Also, I'm going to have to be an odd ball here and stick with compatibalism.

You can't have absolute free will, but you can't have absolute determinism either. Considering how systems work in the brain, there are psychological predispositions that will always act as a hindrance on free will. But, there are basic neurological systems that allow for a degree of free will at the very least.

Or maybe I've been reading way too much Daniel Dennett for my own good recently. Then again, I absolutely love the progress of the work being done in Cognitive Science.
 
Can one say whether there is 'a path', is 'a photon', and whether there are two (or more) different points of existence (A; B; etc.)?
You know you cannot. Therefore, you should not be pondering the ultimate existence of concepts such as determinism & chaos on the back of such Alice-in-Wonderland realities.

Again, the magnetism towards the unfounded 'reality of the world' pollutes our search for truth.
Not the first time, hey.


Lifegazer, lay off the bong man. :420:

It's not helping with your position.
 
Co-creating it with whom?

Everything else which has free will.

I don't understand what libertarian free will proposes as the mechanism of decision making. It can't just be determinism and randomness, or it would be compatibilist free will, not libertarian. There is some other way by which I make libertarian decisions.

It is not the decision which makes a difference. It is the action itself.

Interesting Ian wouldn't let me call the other way a mechanism, because he said that mechanisms are deterministic.

He's right.

When I pressed him, he said that free will lets me make decisions based on my desires, or wants, or some such word. That tells me nothing.

From Wikipedia:


I daresay that libertarian free will has been bandied about with abandon. There is no desire to define it. To define it is to rob it of its sweet libertarian nature.

~~ Paul

I still don't understand what the problem is. Do you understand the difference between making decisions and acting in the world?

For a determinist, the decision-making and the action-taking are all part of a single, unbroken material process. For the libertarian they are not. There is a decision, which involves weighing up what is in ones self interest and what is in the interests of the greater good. Deterministic processes govern the decision. What they do not govern is the act of will itself, which follows the decision-making process.

Maybe this will help: You can will something, even if doesn't happen. You can will to fly. Try it right now. Will your body to rise up in the air.

OK? Even though it didn't work, do you know what will is now?
 
Maybe this will help: You can will something, even if doesn't happen. You can will to fly. Try it right now. Will your body to rise up in the air.
No, I can't do that. If I think carefully about what it means to will something then it is clear that there is no way for me to "will" my body to levitate. I am merely wishing it, imagining it. You can't separate will from action in this way.

If you will something but it doesn't happen then there is clearly something that is stopping it from happening. If I will my arm to rise and it doesn't, there is something stopping it from rising (some physical obstruction that prevents my arm from moving or some damage to the nerves that carry the signals from my brain to my arm). My will is a physical action, even if it doesn't get beyond signals in the brain.

Can you truly will your arm to move and yet keep it still at the same time? Try it.
 
No, I can't do that. If I think carefully about what it means to will something then it is clear that there is no way for me to "will" my body to levitate. I am merely wishing it, imagining it. You can't separate will from action in this way.

Why not? Believe me, I was willing those Argentinians to miss their penalties last night. Miss it, miss it, miss it, miss it. No action involved, only will.

If you will something but it doesn't happen then there is clearly something that is stopping it from happening.

Yes.

If I will my arm to rise and it doesn't, there is something stopping it from rising (some physical obstruction that prevents my arm from moving or some damage to the nerves that carry the signals from my brain to my arm). My will is a physical action, even if it doesn't get beyond signals in the brain.

Where is the physical action involved in willing an Argentinian to miss his penalty?

Can you truly will your arm to move and yet keep it still at the same time? Try it.

Of course I can't. That's not free will anyway. It's unfree will. :)
 
Maybe we are closer to a description of free will. Will is not action. Will comes before action. When you will your arm to rise, it just happens. This is will, but it's not free will. What makes something free will rather than unfree will is that it involves a conscious decision to act altruistically. The laws of physics, combined with out evolutionary history, compell us to act in a certain way. That way is nearly always self-interested, via some route or other. Typical evolutionary accounts of altruism all involve some sort of benefit to the individuals genes. Even if it is just "it makes me feel good", there is some sort of self-interested motive supposed to be at work. But what if you are acting out of self-discipline and moral conviction for its own right, with no possible self-interested motive? Humans are capable of doing this, but maintaining such an approach take an almost superhuman amount of self-displine and generosity of spirit. It is in fact the impossible example supposedly set by Jesus Christ - universal love including for your enemies - dedication to the greater good at all times. To behave in this manner requires the ability to will something that the laws of physics and our evolutionary heritage did not prepare us for. So for will to be free rather than unfree simply means that we have unhitched the capacity for will from the deterministic inputs being supplied by physics and genetics. Free will is freedom from the laws of physics. That doesn't mean free will can break the laws of physics but it does mean that ones will is free to act on its own instead of being driven by something else. So freedom of the will is not some magical thing being imported from elsewhere just at the moment of freedom. Instead, it involves conciously preventing ones self-interested ego from hijacking the capacity to will. It is for exactly this reason that nearly all religions, eastern and western, place a huge emphasis on self-discipline and control of egotistical and self-interested motives. The greater your capacity to act in a truly altruistic manner, the more free will you have. For a determinist, there's no such thing as truly altruistic behaviour. There's just TLOP.

"Atoms obey TLOP.
You are made of atoms.
YOU OBEY TLOP."

(Franko)

;)
 

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