Materialists......

[DreadNiK]

Marx's philosophy was a direct descendent of Hegel's philosophy. Hegel's philosophy is a very sophisticated offshoot of these particular issues. All this stuff is related.

That doesn't answer my question...or rather it doesn't enlighten me...

 

[UndercoverElephant]

That doesn't answer my question...or rather it doesn't enlighten me...

You are obviously aware of the influence of Marx. But Marx was inspired by Hegel. This thread is called "Materialists......."

Here is a small article on the relationship between Hegel, Marx and materialism:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialectical_materialism

There could have been no Marx without a Hegel, no Hegel without Kant, no Kant without Descartes - and Descartes was (partly) trying to clear away the philosophical legacy of Plato and Aristotle.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Robin

Let's get this clear, contingent has more than one definition, here are two:
1. might not have existed
2. dependent on or conditioned by something else

They cannot be used interchangeably unless you can show that they are equivalent.

You are starting your argument with one definition then finishing it with the other. Otherwise you are assuming that the definitions are equivalent - in other words you are assuming your conclusion.

First off, there is a third way of defining contingent : "can stop existing".

So how do these three properties relate?:

1. might not have existed
2. dependent on or conditioned by something else
3. capable of stopping existing

If X is dependent upon Y (2), then if Y had not come into existence then X would not have existed either. Therefore it might not have existed (1). Therefore if (2) is true, (1) is also true.

If X is dependent upon Y, then if Y stops existing then X will stop existing (3).
Therefore if (2) is true, (3) is also true.

So the answer is that the root definition of "contingent" is (2) and that (1) and (3) both follow from (2).

And in any case, asking for examples is not a valid reasoning process. Similarly I can't give you an example of something that is causeless and must have existed. And neither can you.

If you cannot conceive of a single example of something that has both properties X and Y then it can indeed form part of a valid reasoning process that nothing can be both X and Y. It's inductive, but inductive reasoning is not invalid per se. It's just weaker than deductive reasoning. Counterfactual reasoning is also valid.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Robin,

I just found a very nice article explaining something almost identical to my own position, but in the words of the archaic Indian philosophy.

http://www.infinityfoundation.com/mandala/i_es/i_es_ashok_sequenc.htm

Classical Indian philosophy excelled in a profound meditation on the relationship between sequence, contingency and causality. Sequence was viewed as the very modality of contingency ("kadacitkatva"). Anything contingent is that which is wedged between an antecedent and a subsequent non-existence. The no-longer antecedence is the cause ("karana") of the contingent "present" which is the effect ("karya") of its antecedence and which in turn becomes the cause of the not-yet subsequence. As causality is the ontological logic of contingency, sequence is bound by causality or implicated in the dynamics of "karana-karya". In a dazzling spell of enquiry, the Nyaya philosopher Udayanacarya (10th-11th century) held that the causality of contingent sequence is the reason why a given event cannot occur always or unsequenced or in another sequence(Balslev 20). Earlier, Bhartrhari attributed the ontology of why all events do not happen at once but in a causal sequence to the two principal powers of "time" – "abhyanuja"("permission") and "pratibandha"("prevention"). In his notes on the "karikas" 4 and 5 of the celebrated "kala samuddesa" in Kanda III of the Vakyapadiya, K.A.Subramania Iyer observes:

It is due to Time that there is sequence of things in this universe. Some things appear at a particular time while other things do not appear at that time. If Time does not prevent some things from appearing at a particular time, if all things were born at the same time, there would be confusion and the whole edifice of causality would crumble (37).

Classical Indian philosophy conceptualizes sequence as inseparable from contingency and causality with the corollary that only the non-contingent ever-present ("nitya") and never-present are sequenceless and uncaused.

 

[DreadNiK]

You are obviously aware of the influence of Marx. But Marx was inspired by Hegel. This thread is called "Materialists......."

Here is a small article on the relationship between Hegel, Marx and materialism:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialectical_materialism

There could have been no Marx without a Hegel, no Hegel without Kant, no Kant without Descartes - and Descartes was (partly) trying to clear away the philosophical legacy of Plato and Aristotle.

But what I was really getting at is I'd like an example of how this specific topic might have an influence on the way someone acts.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

But what I was really getting at is I'd like an example of how this specific topic might have an influence on the way someone acts.

That's a slightly different question. Can I try rephrasing it?

Q: What is the difference between living in a world where materialism is true and living in a world where idealism is true, but the observed world ALWAYS behaves as if materialism was true?

A: Very little.

Does that help?

 

[Robin]

First off, there is a third way of defining contingent : "can stop existing".

So how do these three properties relate?:

1. might not have existed
2. dependent on or conditioned by something else
3. capable of stopping existing

If X is dependent upon Y (2), then if Y had not come into existence then X would not have existed either. Therefore it might not have existed (1). Therefore if (2) is true, (1) is also true.

If X is dependent upon Y, then if Y stops existing then X will stop existing (3).
Therefore if (2) is true, (3) is also true.

So the answer is that the root definition of "contingent" is (2) and that (1) and (3) both follow from (2).

Oh please, that is the most basic logical error possible. Don't they teach logic in Philosophy courses any more? Equivalence requires a bidirectional implications.

Look, you are saying that (2) implies (1). Certainly.

But a->b does not mean that b->a. So (1) still does not imply (2).

In other words if you were arguing that something that had a cause must be capable of non-existence you would be absolutely right.

But you are arguing the converse - that something capable of non-existence must have a cause. So you are simply assuming that the converse of a statement must also be true.

If you cannot conceive of a single example of something that has both properties X and Y then it can indeed form part of a valid reasoning process that nothing can be both X and Y. It's inductive, but inductive reasoning is not invalid per se. It's just weaker than deductive reasoning. Counterfactual reasoning is also valid.

So your 100% certainty is now based on induction on an existential negative?

OK, suppose that were valid (it isn't, by the way) then apply it to the paragraph of mine that you quoted:

Similarly I can't give you an example of something that is causeless and must have existed. And neither can you.

So you must now have 100% certainty there is nothing that is both causeless and must have existed - in other words you now have 100% certainty that there is no necessary being.

 

[Robin]

Robin,

I just found a very nice article explaining something almost identical to my own position, but in the words of the archaic Indian philosophy.

http://www.infinityfoundation.com/mandala/i_es/i_es_ashok_sequenc.htm

Geoff,

Look at it this way.

An exact duplicate of the universe in 1906 is created and runs parallel with the current universe with no external intervention in either.

Will both universes be identical in 2006? Or is it possible, say, that a person might exist in one universe and not in the other? If so then that person cannot be completely accounted for by antecedent causes (since precisely the same antecedent causes did not cause him in the other universe).

In short there is some aspect of that person that came from nothing. And that person was clearly capable of not existing.

So unless the universe is entirely deterministic then something can come from nothing.

 

[DreadNiK]

Geoff,



Will both universes be identical in 2006? Or is it possible, say, that a person might exist in one universe and not in the other?

I would say yes and no respectively

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Geoff,

Look at it this way.

An exact duplicate of the universe in 1906 is created and runs parallel with the current universe with no external intervention in either.

You have just introduced the modal definition of "necessary". Something necessary would have to be the same both duplicates whatever happens. Something which is necessary is "the same in all possible worlds".

So now we have four notions of necessity? This is why I didn't want to discuss modal logic, and why I am losing the desire to continue responding to the technical debate about the exact relationships between these different senses of necessity, possibility and contingency. There are different forms of modal logic which define different relationships between them.

Will both universes be identical in 2006?

If hard determinism is true, then yes.
If it isn't, then possibly not.
Whether it is or it isn't, some things will always be the same, and these are necessay. Anything which is possible of not being the same is contingent.

Or is it possible, say, that a person might exist in one universe and not in the other?

The following use "possible worlds" definition of necessity and contingency:

Question: "Is the Prime Minister of England necessarily Tony Blair?"

Answer: "Yes, Tony Blair is necessarily Tony Blair". ("De Dicto" reading of the question)
Answer: "No, Tony Blair might have lost the last election." ("De Re" reading of the question)

Even the first answer can be challenged. What if in one possible world, the fertilised egg which became Tony Blair in this world split and T.B. was a twin? Which twin is Tony Blair? Answer: Neither. Tony Blair couldn't have been a twin. It gets worse. What it one of the embryos died before birth, and the one which survived became Tony Blair (this could have actually happened)? Did the twin go back to being T.B. when his unborn brother died?

Messy, messy.....

The above post is taking us into the area of philosophy known as "essentialism", which is exactly where it was always destined to end up once we started analysing the notion of necessary beings and contingent universes.

 

[Robin]

You have just introduced the modal definition of "necessary". Something necessary would have to be the same both duplicates whatever happens. Something which is necessary is "the same in all possible worlds".

On the contrary I purposely didn't say anything about necessity at all. That is why I started the sequence with a contingent state. I was responding to your post about how sequence and causality are inextricable.

Technical definitions of necessity are for the moment unimportant so we can leave that road to Essentialism (and Mr Blair) for another time.

Your post raised the idea that there is a sequence of states in which each state is the cause of the successive state.

So in such a sequence each state would have to account completely for the successive state.

So if you have identical first terms, you must have identical sequences, or else the states do not completely account completely for the successive state.

If the sequences were not identical we would have to look for an external factor to account for the successive states.

But if the sequence is a closed system there can be no other factor.

So the only alternative is that acausality exists in the sequence.

So if it is possible that the universes will be different then it must be possible for something to begin and end but not have a cause.

 

[Robin]

I would say yes and no respectively

But would you agree if the opposite was true then the system would have to contain acausality?

 

[DreadNiK]

Not necessarily, it could be that at some level there is a degree of pure chance...I don't know but that would seem to me to be something different to acausality.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Not necessarily, it could be that at some level there is a degree of pure chance...I don't know but that would seem to me to be something different to acausality.

Pure chance (as in genuinely random quantum outcomes) is acausality. Technically, free will manifesting via quantum outcomes is also termed acausality. In both cases something is happening which is not empirical causality.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Your post raised the idea that there is a sequence of states in which each state is the cause of the successive state.

So in such a sequence each state would have to account completely for the successive state.

That's not necessrily the case. There could be hidden variables.

So if you have identical first terms, you must have identical sequences, or else the states do not completely account completely for the successive state.

This stuff is only true if hard determinism is true.

If the sequences were not identical we would have to look for an external factor to account for the successive states.

Like hidden variables.

But if the sequence is a closed system there can be no other factor.

If we are talking about our universe then QM provides the possibility for another factor.

So the only alternative is that acausality exists in the sequence.

Yes, this other factor implies some sort of acausality.

So if it is possible that the universes will be different then it must be possible for something to begin and end but not have a cause.

You sound like you are now saying "If there is acausality in the system, something can come into existence without a cause." The trouble is that the acausality doesn't actually bring anything new into existence - it just re-arranges the state of what already exists. So even if there is acausality, there still isn't anything which begins and ends but has no cause.

I followed you all the way up to the last statement.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Pure chance (as in genuinely random quantum outcomes) is acausality. Technically, free will manifesting via quantum outcomes is also termed acausality. In both cases something is happening which is not empirical causality.

I don't think that Free Willyians intend for free will to be based on randomness. We still need to find that elusive agent of choice that is neither predetermined nor random.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I don't think that Free Willyians intend for free will to be based on randomness.

The point is that it would look like randomness.

Indeterminism is indeterminism regardless of whether it is random indeterminism or free-will indeterminism.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

The point is that it would look like randomness.

I'm not sure what you mean.

Indeterminism is indeterminism regardless of whether it is random indeterminism or free-will indeterminism.

Well yes, according to the definition of indeterminism. But I wouldn't think free will choices would look random. For example, I'd expect a free will choice to be constrained by the set of choices that is palatable to the person making the decision.

~~ Paul

 

[chriswl]

You sound like you are now saying "If there is acausality in the system, something can come into existence without a cause." The trouble is that the acausality doesn't actually bring anything new into existence - it just re-arranges the state of what already exists. So even if there is acausality, there still isn't anything which begins and ends but has no cause.

New things (i.e. matter) coming into existence would be a form of acausality and you've not shown that it can't happen. In fact the standard, no-hidden-variable interpretation of quantum physics says that this does happen.

Anyway, acausality always brings something new into existence. A completely causal universe (including hidden variables, if we knew what they were) is completely predictable from day one. In fact it is completely prredictable if you know its state at any one moment. Acausality (including supposed libertarian human free will) introduces new information that wasn't present at the start.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

New things (i.e. matter) coming into existence would be a form of acausality and you've not shown that it can't happen. In fact the standard, no-hidden-variable interpretation of quantum physics says that this does happen.

Anyway, acausality always brings something new into existence. A completely causal universe (including hidden variables, if we knew what they were) is completely predictable from day one. In fact it is completely prredictable if you know its state at any one moment. Acausality (including supposed libertarian human free will) introduces new information that wasn't present at the start.

Yes, but this is my position. I believe in libertarian free will. I also believe that the source of that free will is the same as the source of everything else. The same "necessary being" which I have argued for on cosmological grounds is the direct source of free will.