Differences in Sex Development (aka "intersex")

Just like my "desperate insistence" that the planet we live on is an oblate spheroid, when confronted with a flat-earther.
 
Just like my "desperate insistence" that the planet we live on is an oblate spheroid, when confronted with a flat-earther.
:rolleyes: Rather than getting peeved at what was clearly a jest, a needle, you might try addressing the substance of my comment ...
 
"The thing is" that you have yet to define "male" and "female" - and "sex" itself - with any coherence, logical consistency, or biological currency so I'm not quite sure how you can argue that "... 'chromosomal sex' is very tightly defined".

You may wish to read a fairly decent article - "Decoupled from Reality" (indeed) - by Amanda MacLean over at Weekly Worker:



A pretty solid if somewhat flawed takedown of Ainsworth's Nature article, but a more relevant quote for those unwilling to follow links ...



As she suggests, you have to FIRST define what you mean by "male" and "female" BEFORE you start talking about which "traits like chromosomes or hormone profiles" are typical of which sex.

You're probably more the pro-from-Dover on which chromosomes are more commonly found in which sex than I am - and I'll cheerfully defer to your superior knowledge in that case. But it seems it's unreasonable to infer "because chromosome set PQRS therefore male or female". Clearly, even if one set is more typical of one sex than another that does not preclude its occurrence in those who exhibit OTHER features that are more typical of the OTHER sex.

Methinks you're putting the cart before the horse. Probably a consequence of a "desperate insistence that everyone - of every sexually-reproducing species has to be of one sex or the other" ... ;)

Do you realise that article has already been posted multiple times on the other thread? I first posted it a year or two ago. There is nothing in it that supports your bizarre interpretation. You repeatedly imply that if nobody draws the inferences you do from from materials we have already read, everybody else is wrong.

"In ‘whole organism’ disciplines, sex relates to an organism’s potential reproductive role: to produce sperm (male), or to produce ova (female). Evolution has resulted in different body plans that are associated with these roles - we are all familiar with what they are in the human species. Therefore, in any discussion of human beings as individuals, or as social, economic or political groups, in contradiction to Vilain, as quoted above, there is one biological parameter that takes over every other parameter - it is the definition of sex that applies to the whole organism: its potential reproductive function."

To define what male and female mean from a biological perspective, we need to understand the two reproductive roles and associated gamete types. Males produce sperm, females produce ova. This refers to how the classes are distinguished, not to how individuals are placed within a class. We can classify individuals as belonging to one of these two classes regardless of whether or not they currently produce gametes. Unlike the 'patchwork definition of the social sciences' which claims there is no reliable way to classify males and females because no characteristic takes precedence over any other.

The purpose of categorization and classification is to create categories that have predictive and explanatory value. An example of predictive value is making inferences about further functions on the basis of present structures, for example predicting what type of puberty a child will go through. An example of explanatory value is to show how the fact that females have the potential to produce large gametes has historically resulted in various attempts to control women in order to control reproduction.

You are basically arguing to do away with categorisation and replace it with completely useless, non-explanatory definitions of nouns.
 
"The thing is" that you have yet to define "male" and "female" - and "sex" itself - with any coherence, logical consistency, or biological currency so I'm not quite sure how you can argue that "... 'chromosomal sex' is very tightly defined".

You may wish to read a fairly decent article - "Decoupled from Reality" (indeed) - by Amanda MacLean over at Weekly Worker:

A pretty solid if somewhat flawed takedown of Ainsworth's Nature article, but a more relevant quote for those unwilling to follow links ...

As she suggests, you have to FIRST define what you mean by "male" and "female" BEFORE you start talking about which "traits like chromosomes or hormone profiles" are typical of which sex.

You're probably more the pro-from-Dover on which chromosomes are more commonly found in which sex than I am - and I'll cheerfully defer to your superior knowledge in that case. But it seems it's unreasonable to infer "because chromosome set PQRS therefore male or female". Clearly, even if one set is more typical of one sex than another that does not preclude its occurrence in those who exhibit OTHER features that are more typical of the OTHER sex.

Methinks you're putting the cart before the horse. Probably a consequence of a "desperate insistence that everyone - of every sexually-reproducing species has to be of one sex or the other" ... :wink:


:rolleyes: Rather than getting peeved at what was clearly a jest, a needle, you might try addressing the substance of my comment ...


I am not basing anything on "chromosomal sex". I am complaining that the article Eleadith quoted used the phrase "chromosomal sex" without apparently providing any idea of what was meant by this.

I'm not getting peeved by your incivility. I merely observe that you are arguing the flat-earth position and getting all uptight about people who "desperately insist" on the oblate sphere interpretation. You've had the evidence for the curvature of the horizon and so on shown to you umpteen times, but you just flip back to an insistence that Galileo supports the flat-earth interpretation and that's that.

The last quote you present above is a classic example of that, in that it entirely supports the position you are opposing in this thread. We know who is male and who is female. If we dig down into the genetics that underpin that distinction we first encounter the Y chromosome. So perhaps we say that those with a Y chromosome are male and those without are female. But then we discover some obvious males with no Y chromosome and some obvious females who have one. We therefore conclude that our hypothesis is incomplete.

We discover the SRY gene, and we modify that to decide that those with an SRY gene are male and those without are female. But then we encounter some obvious females with an SRY gene, and we realise it's not just the SRY gene itself that's required for maleness, but the entire system of hormone receptors and enzymes and so on that supports the normal function of the gene.

In the end, when we use that as the distinguishing criterion, we find that the sorting process concurs with our initial observational conclusions. That is the conclusion I have come to, and you have said not a single word that persuades me to re-evaluate this. All you have done is rabbit on about puppies and kittens and foetuses and freemartin heifers being "sexless". That is doing your position no good at all, because that is simply not how the language is used by either biologists or the general public. Except, it seems to be your position.
 
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We know who is male and who is female. If we dig down into the genetics that underpin that distinction we first encounter the Y chromosome. So perhaps we say that those with a Y chromosome are male and those without are female. But then we discover some obvious males with no Y chromosome and some obvious females who have one. We therefore conclude that our hypothesis is incomplete.

We discover the SRY gene, and we modify that to decide that those with an SRY gene are male and those without are female. But then we encounter some obvious females with an SRY gene, and we realise it's not just the SRY gene itself that's required for maleness, but the entire system of hormone receptors and enzymes and so on that supports the normal function of the gene.

In the end, when we use that as the distinguishing criterion, we find that the sorting process concurs with our initial observational conclusions.
This is an excellent summary of scientific discovery about the genetics underlying sex in humans and other mammals. Bookmarked for use in the next fringe reset.
 
I freely admit that the reasons for the normal SRY gene in the freemartin heifer not making her male and the reasons for the normal SRY gene in the CAIS woman not making her male are different. In the first case the heifer was conceived with a normal female karyotype, but during gestation her haematopoeitic system was contamimated by male cells which continue to propagate in her bone marrow. These cells have an SRY gene, but it ain't doing nothing because first, blood cells don't have any use for an SRY gene or any way of using it to divert the body into a male pathway, and second, they arrived too late. In the second case the foetus was conceived with a normal male karyotype, but the lack of androgen receptors meant that the SRY gene couldn't do its mojo in leading its development into the male pathway.

Different, but comparable. If we understand that a freemartin is female, and can't possibly be male, we can start to understand how a CAIS girl is also female. In both cases an SRY gene is present, but it can't function to lead the developing body into the male pathway.
 
Do you realise that article has already been posted multiple times on the other thread? I first posted it a year or two ago.
Bravo; great minds and all that.

But how and why in the hell do you think I should know that? Hundreds of threads, 1000s of comments in each - think I should be obliged to read them all before commenting?

There is nothing in it that supports your bizarre interpretation. You repeatedly imply that if nobody draws the inferences you do from from materials we have already read, everybody else is wrong.
How so? Show your work ...

"In ‘whole organism’ disciplines, sex relates to an organism’s potential reproductive role: to produce sperm (male), or to produce ova (female). Evolution has resulted in different body plans that are associated with these roles - we are all familiar with what they are in the human species. Therefore, in any discussion of human beings as individuals, or as social, economic or political groups, in contradiction to Vilain, as quoted above, there is one biological parameter that takes over every other parameter - it is the definition of sex that applies to the whole organism: its potential reproductive function."

I qualified my original comment - "A pretty solid if somewhat flawed takedown" - for a reason. It's because I object to - have objected to in dozens of articles and comments - MacLean's use of "potential". You see ANYTHING at all about "potential" in the definitions from Lexico, Parker & Lehtonen, Google/OED, Wikipedia et al?

Rank insanity. Antiscientific claptrap.

To define what male and female mean from a biological perspective, we need to understand the two reproductive roles and associated gamete types. Males produce sperm, females produce ova. This refers to how the classes are distinguished, not to how individuals are placed within a class. We can classify individuals as belonging to one of these two classes regardless of whether or not they currently produce gametes. Unlike the 'patchwork definition of the social sciences' which claims there is no reliable way to classify males and females because no characteristic takes precedence over any other.
IF the necessary and sufficient condition to qualify as male and female are functional gonads - as is clearly the case - THEN you can't very well have your cake and eat it too by still putting the prepubescent and the otherwise infertile into those categories. Membership in them isn't some sort of "contact high" that one picks up by osmosis, by some "all going well" hail-Mary pass ....

The purpose of categorization and classification is to create categories that have predictive and explanatory value. An example of predictive value is making inferences about further functions on the basis of present structures, for example predicting what type of puberty a child will go through. An example of explanatory value is to show how the fact that females have the potential to produce large gametes has historically resulted in various attempts to control women in order to control reproduction.

You are basically arguing to do away with categorisation and replace it with completely useless, non-explanatory definitions of nouns.

Sure. Big fan of categorization, of "predictive and explanatory value". Have written probably dozens of articles and hundreds of comments championing the principle:

https://medium.com/@steersmann/the-imperative-of-categories-874154213e42
https://medium.com/@steersmann/reality-and-illusion-being-vs-identifying-as-77f9618b17c7

But there are a whole bunch of pitfalls associated with that process that most people haven't a clue about - though my understanding of all of that is still very much a "work in progress".

However, a major signpost, a beacon above the miasma created by motivated reasoning (at best), is the concept of "natural kinds":

Scientific disciplines frequently divide the particulars they study into kinds and theorize about those kinds. To say that a kind is natural is to say that it corresponds to a grouping that reflects the structure of the natural world rather than the interests and actions of human beings.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-kinds/

"produces ova" is clearly such a natural kind; billions of organisms scattered over millions of species manage to reproduce BECAUSE they exhibit the functions of "producing ova" and "producing sperm".

But past abilities and future abilities are entirely different kettles of fish. MacLean and Hilton and Company are clearly trying to mash those properties into a category of their own with the present abilities property.

Their dog's breakfast, their clearly quite "artificial kind" may well have some social utility. But it sure ain't a natural kind nor anything like science.

Time for my daily constitutional - before I have apoplexy ... ;)
 
Once I've wrapped my head around the social utility in relabeling prepubescent children from the two current (sexed) categories into a new single category of "sexless," then maybe I'll take this under advisement.
Try. Maybe consider the benefits in unhorsing the transloonies making political hay out of "assigned at birth" - what's so assigned is really only a "ticket to ride" that needs validation, not a current membership card.


Agreed. Alas, you've not yet discovered a definition which allows us to make sense of key scientific phrases such as male developmental pathway.

You're putting the cart before the horse; you use phrases that comport with the definitions, not expect the definitions to be bent out of shape to comport with misuse. Change the rules of arithmetic to match those who say "2+2=5"? :rolleyes:

And yet you're the first to propose "pre-males" and "post females." Somehow everyone else missed the clear implications for five decades.
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Clearly the flaws in the language weren't obvious until the transloonies tried to take advantage of them. Now that they have we now need to fix the "potholes".
 
I am not basing anything on "chromosomal sex". I am complaining that the article Eleadith quoted used the phrase "chromosomal sex" without apparently providing any idea of what was meant by this.
Your comment about "chromosomal sex" was only in response to a comment by "d4m10n". I should maybe have tracked back to see exactly what you meant by it - mea culpa, shoot me at dawn - but that really doesn't change my point or argument that "chromosomal sex" is largely barking up the wrong tree. Largely MacLean's point if I'm not mistaken.

I'm not getting peeved by your incivility. I merely observe that you are arguing the flat-earth position and getting all uptight about people who "desperately insist" on the oblate sphere interpretation. You've had the evidence for the curvature of the horizon and so on shown to you umpteen times, but you just flip back to an insistence that Galileo supports the flat-earth interpretation and that's that.
Not the same kettle of fish at all. Galileo and company were arguing about facts; what I'm arguing about is the stipulative definitions of biology which have far more logical coherence, philosophical justification, and biological utility than the schlock peddled by Hilton and company.

The last quote you present above is a classic example of that, in that it entirely supports the position you are opposing in this thread.
Nope. As I argued in a later comment to Elaedith, I rather objected to MacLean's "potential reproductive function". She made some very good points and cogent observations but then snatched defeat from the jaws of victory with that "potential" argument.

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showpost.php?p=13882923&postcount=747

We know who is male and who is female. If we dig down into the genetics that underpin that distinction we first encounter the Y chromosome. So perhaps we say that those with a Y chromosome are male and those without are female. But then we discover some obvious males with no Y chromosome and some obvious females who have one. We therefore conclude that our hypothesis is incomplete.
No, you don't. You have a definition that you take as gospel truth and refuse to consider that it doesn't play out all that well when applied to many of the other 7-odd millions of sexually-reproducing species on the planet.

We discover the SRY gene, and we modify that to decide that those with an SRY gene are male and those without are female. But then we encounter some obvious females with an SRY gene, and we realise it's not just the SRY gene itself that's required for maleness, but the entire system of hormone receptors and enzymes and so on that supports the normal function of the gene.

In the end, when we use that as the distinguishing criterion, we find that the sorting process concurs with our initial observational conclusions. That is the conclusion I have come to, and you have said not a single word that persuades me to re-evaluate this. All you have done is rabbit on about puppies and kittens and foetuses and freemartin heifers being "sexless". That is doing your position no good at all, because that is simply not how the language is used by either biologists or the general public. Except, it seems to be your position.
You - and Hilton and Company - remind me of the Ptolemaic "astronomers" - epicycles within epicycles to patch up new data that didn't fit with those already created.

You and d4m10n squabbling about various intersex are male or female being cases in point of later versions of the same problem. Methinks changing your points of view to call them sexless would likely provide the same degree of simplification as did the Copernican system ...
 
Lexico's definition of an oak tree: 'A large tree which bears acorns and typically has lobed deciduous leaves.'

When it's out of season for bearing acorns, is it still an oak tree? If somebody picks all the acorns, does it stop being an oak tree? If it has a genetic condition that stops acorns developing, is it still an oak tree?

Online definitions of nouns are not prescriptions for scientific uses of categories.
 
Lexico's definition of an oak tree: 'A large tree which bears acorns and typically has lobed deciduous leaves.'

When it's out of season for bearing acorns, is it still an oak tree? If somebody picks all the acorns, does it stop being an oak tree? If it has a genetic condition that stops acorns developing, is it still an oak tree?

Online definitions of nouns are not prescriptions for scientific uses of categories.

Oh very very good. This should stop steersman in his tracks. Sadly it won’t.
 
There must be hundreds if not thousands of similar definitions even in Steersman's preferred dictionary. Someone earlier referenced the definition of "human being" and pointed out that people with learning difficulties or brain damage are therefore not human.

The point that a dictionary is entirely in the business of describing existing usage, and not of imposing a usage that isn't what is normally meant by that word in normal speech seems to have gone right over Steersman's head. About a dozen times by now.

If you find a definition of a word that you think is a very bad match from how it is actually used by native speakers of the language, there are two possibilities. Either the dictionary compiler is an idiot who has made a very bad mistake, or you have misunderstood the definition. (The latter is always going to be the more likely.) What you have not found is the true, ur-definition of the word that proves that all the native speakers are using it wrongly.

If you find the same thing repeatedly, for words as diverse as human being, car, spider, oak tree and so on, it could be a really big clue you have got the wrong end of the stick somewhere.
 
I'm wondering what Steersman does in real life if he can't talk about the 'woman next door' (using those words) on the grounds that she's post-menopausal. 'The elderly female human next door'? Or is 'female' also ruled out? If he's arguing in good faith (which I rather doubt) it must be hard for him to communicate with others.
 
I'm wondering what Steersman does in real life if he can't talk about the 'woman next door' (using those words) on the grounds that she's post-menopausal. 'The elderly female human next door'? Or is 'female' also ruled out? If he's arguing in good faith (which I rather doubt) it must be hard for him to communicate with others.


Ruling out "female" was the starting point. So it would have to be "the elderly formerly female human next door." Or "the elderly sexless human next door, um, the one of them who's not bald."
 
I'm wondering what Steersman does in real life if he can't talk about the 'woman next door' (using those words) on the grounds that she's post-menopausal. 'The elderly female human next door'? Or is 'female' also ruled out? If he's arguing in good faith (which I rather doubt) it must be hard for him to communicate with others.

I imagine in real life he equivocates.
 
Funnily enough I did two years of postdoctoral research on categorisation, albeit from a cognitive science and not a philosophical perspective. That was 20 years ago and I didn't continue with that area so my memory is a bit hazy, but I know that monothetic intensional definitions really didn't feature. We have something called the defining attribute approach which corresponds to a monothetic intensional definition. The first thing taught about that is how useless it is for explaining how people use categories in real contexts, and the example given is the one Steersman keeps using: bachelor = unmarried adult male. According to that definition, an 18-year old unmarried male student and a priest who has taken a vow of celibacy are bachelors, but nobody would use that term for them. Intensional definitions can be useful for something like a machine learning algorithm, but also resonsible for the failure of output to resemble human cognition in AI applications. Granted, that is referring to 'everyday' categorisation and not scientific classification. But monothetic definitions are not always possible, and polythetic definitions can be formalised to make intensional definitions and are used that way in many areas (like some diagnostic categories, and in fungal taxonomy for example). In previous posts he seemed to equate polythetic definitions to 'family resemblances'. Family resemblance refers to what in cognitive science is called the prototype approach, which is usually considered the best description of how people do 'everyday' categorisation. The prototype approach is polythetic in that multiple attributes can be considered intuitively in comparing an exemplar to the prototype, but a formal polythetic approach can specify specific numbers or combinations of attributes from a larger set as necessary and sufficient for category membership.

I'm taking a guess as this is way out of my area, but possibly polythetic definitions are used for fungi because they change so much during the life cycle that it might not be possible to have one set of attributes always present for classification? Having several alternative sets of attributes that can be used for classification is quite valid as long as they can be shown to result in correct classification. This could be demonstrated, for example, if there is one feature that is always sufficient for classification when present, the feature is not present at all times during the life cycle, but that other specific combinations of characteristics can be shown to accurately predict this feature.
 
I'm wondering what Steersman does in real life if he can't talk about the 'woman next door' (using those words) on the grounds that she's post-menopausal. 'The elderly female human next door'? Or is 'female' also ruled out? If he's arguing in good faith (which I rather doubt) it must be hard for him to communicate with others.

Surely a woman on the contraceptive pill is not female? Therefore even with those of reproductive age, I don't see how you could ever tell.
 
How can anyone know themselves? A woman who isn't having sex for whatever reason may imagine she's female because she has a period every month and everything seems to be in working order, but unknown to her she isn't ovulating viable ova.
 

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