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How can science accommodate the supernatural?

But clearly axiom 1 does not refer to the macro behavior of complex organisms as measured by some arbitrary consistency criteria of other organisms.

Does it? That's not at all "clear" to me. If that's really the case, then someone needs to formalize axiom 1 so that it says exactly to what it refers and does not refer, "clearly."

How does this supernatural world operate, if not by logical laws?

By the whims of a capricious supernatural being who is not confined by laws.


If the supernatural world can somehow have an affect on the natural world, then there is no explanation that would not involve the supernatural, unless some portion of the natural world is completely partitioned from the rest. All explanations would be supernatural, thus illogical, thus there would be no natural world at all.

Not at all. As an analogy, consider a pool table somewhere in Japan. We can produce logical, rule-based descriptions of the behavior of the ball on the table -- "if I hit this ball in such-and-such a way, it will move thusly, and strike the object ball as follows:" We can even assume (since this is only an analogy, after all), a degree of precision that would astonish a watchmaker -- the balls are perfectly spherical (or we know their imperfections to the Nth degree), the table is frictionless, and so forth.

Within the universe of this pool table, the behavior of the balls is perfectly "natural" in the sense defined by Stiimpy -- as long as there is no earthquake. Unfortunately, Japan is earthquake-prone, and whenever there is an earthquake, all bets (and rules) are off.

The motion of the balls during a period of geological stability is "natural." The movement of balls during an earthquake is "unnatural" or "supernatural," in this analogy.

As long as our capricious deity does not interfere with the normal rule-based workings of the universe, our natural rules work. Just because a supernatural entity can have an effect on the world doesn't mean that it must in all cases.

~~ Paul[/QUOTE]
 
No, not wrong. An inconsistent system cannot emulate a consistent one, nor can it emulate another inconsistent system, because doing so would require consistent behavior.

Wrong. Again.


To the extent that a human being is inconsistent, it cannot create a useful and meaningful model of the world.

Wrong. Again.

To the extent that a system is inconsistent, it cannot create a useful and meaningful model of anything.

Wrong. Again.

I could build a calculating device that expressed inconsistent statements about mathematics, but it couldn't emulate any systems - and I could do so only to the degree that my construction is consistent, and that is possible only to the degree that the underlying physics is consistent.

Wrong. Again.
 
Drkitten said:
By the whims of a capricious supernatural being who is not confined by laws.
How does he make his decisions, if not according to some set of laws? And how does he apply his decisions to the natural world in a way that appears lawful, if his decisions are not in themselves lawful?

Within the universe of this pool table, the behavior of the balls is perfectly "natural" in the sense defined by Stiimpy -- as long as there is no earthquake. Unfortunately, Japan is earthquake-prone, and whenever there is an earthquake, all bets (and rules) are off.

The motion of the balls during a period of geological stability is "natural." The movement of balls during an earthquake is "unnatural" or "supernatural," in this analogy.
Why are all rules off during an earthquake? The earthquake operates according to laws, too. This analogy needs an interaction with something that does not follow laws, however that might work.

As long as our capricious deity does not interfere with the normal rule-based workings of the universe, our natural rules work. Just because a supernatural entity can have an effect on the world doesn't mean that it must in all cases.
I agree that if the deity keeps his hands off completely, there is no problem. There is also no reason to think there is a deity.

I don't understand this deity who operates without laws. He sounds like a synonym for libertarian free will, which I've never had described to me in a coherent manner.

~~ Paul
 
Within the universe of this pool table, the behavior of the balls is perfectly "natural" in the sense defined by Stiimpy -- as long as there is no earthquake. Unfortunately, Japan is earthquake-prone, and whenever there is an earthquake, all bets (and rules) are off.

The motion of the balls during a period of geological stability is "natural." The movement of balls during an earthquake is "unnatural" or "supernatural," in this analogy.
And when earthquakes (or just bumping the table) create deviations from what we expect should be possible, we alter our rules to include the new phenomena.

Just because a supernatural entity can have an effect on the world doesn't mean that it must in all cases.
Actually, it does. Nothing in the universe fails to affect everything else. It's just that it doesn't necessarily make much of a difference that we care about.

The existence of certain planets was deduced from our failure to model the other planets' orbits properly - there were deviations that we could only account for by postulating an outside influence. Does that make those planets supernatural?
 
I should mention that if there is this capricious deity affecting the world (however that might work), then the epistemological axioms listed above are incorrect. In the long run, we should notice this. In that sense, the axioms are falsifiable.

~~ Paul
 
I think Drkitten would agree that if the deity follows a set of laws, then it is natural, too. All we would see was the union of the set of deity laws and the set of non-deity laws, resulting in one set of laws we'd call natural, and we'd never suspect the deity at all.

The interesting part is this deity that doesn't follow a set of laws. I don't get how that works.

~~ Paul
 
I should mention that if there is this capricious deity affecting the world (however that might work), then the epistemological axioms listed above are incorrect. In the long run, we should notice this. In that sense, the axioms are falsifiable.
Not quite. The axioms are still correct - it's just that our ideas of what actually constituted "reality" would have to adjust. They refer to the properties of categories without saying precisely what's grouped into those categories. There will still be an uber-system whose description encompasses every set of interactions that can occur to us.
 
I think our new Goddidit science curricullum will make many school children happy. With one fell swoop they have eliminated the need for any science education at all.

Of course I am sure we can count on this god fellow to continue to give us many fine things like medicine, central heating and hardy food crops. I am sure if we all pray hard enough he will maintain and improve on the status quo.
 
Mel said:
Not quite. The axioms are still correct - it's just that our ideas of what actually constituted "reality" would have to adjust. They refer to the properties of categories without saying precisely what's grouped into those categories. There will still be an uber-system whose description encompasses every set of interactions that can occur to us.
I'm thinking about this capricious deity who doesn't obey laws. I don't understand what that means, but if there is such a thing interacting with the world, then the axioms are in trouble.

~~ Paul
 
I'm thinking about this capricious deity who doesn't obey laws. I don't understand what that means, but if there is such a thing interacting with the world, then the axioms are in trouble.
If you postulate that logic doesn't hold... well, there're no conclusions that can be derived from that. Only from the perspective of logic can you even reach the conclusion that logic is the only way you can reach conclusions.
 
How does he make his decisions, if not according to some set of laws? And how does he apply his decisions to the natural world in a way that appears lawful, if his decisions are not in themselves lawful?

Most of the time, he doesn't apply his decisions -- we can, if you like, postulate a "meta-law" that in the absence of such application, the world follows laws. As to how he makes his decisions -- that's up to him. "Free will," remember?

Why are all rules off during an earthquake? The earthquake operates according to laws, too.

The're not laws within the context of the "laws" of the pool table. What conditions of the pool table will produce an earthquake?

This analogy needs an interaction with something that does not follow laws, however that might work.

Yes, exactly. That's the very definition of supernatural, as given above.

I don't understand this deity who operates without laws.

You are not required to understand him. Indeed, in the sense that "understand" means "able to produce rules by which he behaves," such understanding is impossible by definition. But lack of understanding on your part produces no obligation on his. I suspect that my cat doesn't understand the "rules" by which a neutron decides whether or not to decay either -- in fact, most modern physicists don't. Most modern physicists, in fact, deny that such "rules" exist. But that doesn't mean neutrons don't decay.


He sounds like a synonym for libertarian free will,

He should, since that's one of the fundamental premises upon which much theology is based,. and explicitly one of the concepts I referred to in my opening post.

which I've never had described to me in a coherent manner.

Again, lack of understanding on your part is not a disproof of its existence.
 
I should mention that if there is this capricious deity affecting the world (however that might work), then the epistemological axioms listed above are incorrect. In the long run, we should notice this. In that sense, the axioms are falsifiable.

Only if we notice his working -- or the effects of his working. Depending upon how rarely our hypothetical deity affects the world, the effects might get lost in the noise.

In particular, the Deist's Watchmaker God might well have "affected" the universe exactly once, by creating it, a non-rule-governed act and therefore supernatural act. He's therefore "real" by Stimpy's definition, and non-rule-governed and therefore supernatural by assumption. But I'm not sure what we will notice "in the long run" that isn't already obvious. ("The world exists?" I think I'm ahead of you there.... "Under such-and-such conditions, a universe will be created?" Man, I'd love to see how you write the grant proposal for that one....)

We can then discover rules that describe the behavior of the "natural" world, just as we can describe the balls on a pool table. Under this hypothetical ontology, we therefore have a rather Godelian supernatural being -- it's true that he exists, but we can never prove it from within the system.
 
I'm thinking about this capricious deity who doesn't obey laws. I don't understand what that means, but if there is such a thing interacting with the world, then the axioms are in trouble.

Which, I believe, is something that the supernaturalists have been saying for some time. Except that they don't use words like "if," and they claim that Stimpy's axioms are not only in trouble, but WRONG (and in some cases, the tools of Satan designed to lead us into plaid-coloured HELLFIRE).
 
Let's presume for the sake of argument that the universe is governed by an entirely consistent and immutable set of laws. From within the universe, how exactly could we determine this? No model we could build inside the universe could properly represent its initial conditions, or any conditions after, so even if we figured out what the rules were, there would always be deviations between what actually happens and what we expected.

We'll see inexplicable possible violations of causality all the time, and we'd never be able to distinguish between hypothetical breaks in the laws and experimental error.
 
Let's presume for the sake of argument that the universe is governed by an entirely consistent and immutable set of laws. From within the universe, how exactly could we determine this?

The question is usually phrased in the reverse. Because scientific practice follows methodological naturalism, the usual practice is to assume that the universe is so governed, and it need not be established -- instead, proponents of the supernatural need to refute it. To some extent, this question depends on which side you consider to be the "null hypothesis" -- and speaking for myself alone, I consider the assumption that something exists to be less null-ish than the assumption that something does not exist.

In either case, the answer is that although the two situations may be formally indistinguishable, there are other scientific principles at work that may make one explanation more causally efficatious, useful, predictive, and so forth. A capricious God who nevertheless has preferences -- there's no rule that says he WILL grant prayers, but there's a substantial probablity of him doing so -- would be as detectable as any purely aspect of nature with a complex but unknown cause. And if the apparent causal conditions lined up pretty thorougly with traditional religoius beliefs, we might be able to establish that the God hypothesis was more predictive.
 
Keep at it, guys. Kick dualism long enough and you may eventually conclude that idealism makes those pesky questions at least 'answerable in theory'. :)
 
The question is usually phrased in the reverse. Because scientific practice follows methodological naturalism, the usual practice is to assume that the universe is so governed, and it need not be established
Ah ah ah - not so fast.

Why does scientific practice follow methodological naturalism? Was it an arbitrary, random choice? Was it established by evil atheists who wanted to exclude the divine a priori from inquiry?

Of course not. We presume that any given phenomenon has causes that can be available for study because looking for such causes is the only way to find them. If we look, and don't find them, maybe they're there, or maybe we're just not looking hard enough. If they're there, and we don't look, we'll never find them.

If we're interested in developing our understanding, we need to look.
 
Ah ah ah - not so fast.

Why does scientific practice follow methodological naturalism? Was it an arbitrary, random choice? Was it established by evil atheists who wanted to exclude the divine a priori from inquiry?

Of course not. We presume that any given phenomenon has causes that can be available for study because looking for such causes is the only way to find them. If we look, and don't find them, maybe they're there, or maybe we're just not looking hard enough. If they're there, and we don't look, we'll never find them.

If we're interested in developing our understanding, we need to look.

It came about because it is the only system (albeit perhaps so far) that we've come up with actually does what it says on the tin.
 
But what methods do we use to determine whether a specific method does what it says? We start out with a method, a method that (completely coincidentally) matches science perfectly.

'Science' is what we mean when we talk about the search for truth.
 

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