Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

[Pope130]

Did the Germans even have a go at any mock landings?

Before D-Day we'd sampled the make up of the various target beaches, and chosen practice sites in the UK that matched that for mock landings.

My understanding is that Hitler viewed it as just a larger river crossing, with which the Wehrmacht had considerable experience. I've read that many German officers knew this was wrong, but were also convinced that Sea Lion would never take place anyway.

By comparison, the allied forces had, by D-Day, considerable experience in amphibious operations in the Pacific, North Africa and Italy, and also had a lot more experienced sailors.

 

[theprestige]

In the end he Mulberry on the US beaches was wrecked in a storm and even the British Mulberry provided only a smll percentage of the supplies, most came over the beaches.

I would say that D-Day worked in part because the Allies had enough resources to develop more than one way to attack the logistics problem, implement both of them, and fully develop them as circumstances permitted.

Apparently Cherbourg was captured earlier, and in better condition, than expected, making the Mulberries less critical. And of course the Americans in typical American fashion just banged on over the beach once their Mulberry was lost. That said:

The Mulberry harbour at Arromanches was more protected, and although damaged by the storm it remained intact. It came to be known as Port Winston. While the harbour at Omaha was destroyed sooner than expected, Port Winston saw heavy use for eight months, despite being designed to last only three months. In the 10 months after D-Day, it was used to land over 2.5 million men, 500,000 vehicles, and 4 million tons of supplies providing much needed reinforcements in France. In response to this longer than planned use the Phoenix breakwater was reinforced with the addition of specially strengthened caissons.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mulberry_harbour#Deployment​

 

[jimbob]

My understanding is that Hitler viewed it as just a larger river crossing, with which the Wehrmacht had considerable experience. I've read that many German officers knew this was wrong, but were also convinced that Sea Lion would never take place anyway.

By comparison, the allied forces had, by D-Day, considerable experience in amphibious operations in the Pacific, North Africa and Italy, and also had a lot more experienced sailors.

Somewhere - maybe even in this thread, it was pointed out that the Germans didn't have enough sailors - let alone enough experienced sailors.

Don't forget all the hundreds of concrete embarkation 'hards' built all along the rivers and creeks of the south coast to disperse the assault forces and avoid overcrowding and delay at the major portd. Plus, landung ships were loaded by driving tanks etc aboard not lowering from docks.
Also they towed complete prefabricated harbours across to the beaches, the 'Mulberries' to allow resupply from conventional ships.
There were even ships fitted out as floating kitchens and canteens to feed the landing craft crews and beach teams.
To cover the actual location of the landings targets long the entire French coast were targeted a massive effort.
Even after the landings started the Germans held back reserves as they had been led to believe it was a decoy for the real assault further north by Patton and his 'ghost' army. Operation 'Double Cross'.

At least some of that was due to a patriotic safe-breaker in prison in the Channel Islands, who was dropped into England and promptly reported himself to the authorities.

And, in a similar vein, are the Mulberries, though the Germans were hoping to get an intact port (good luck with that one).

Then again, neither the Mulberries nor an intact port would have done them any good with no ships to do the actual supplying.

Yup

 

[Andy_Ross]

At least some of that was due to a patriotic safe-breaker in prison in the Channel Islands, who was dropped into England and promptly reported himself to the authorities.

Do you mean Eddie Chapman? 'Agent Zig-Zag'?

It went a lot deeper than that, the entire German spy ring in Britain was controlled and sending fake information.
Because all the spies were 'turned' they could send seemingly independent reports that backed each other up.
Of course it helped that an entire radio net for Patton's 'ghost army' was set up and transmitting messages all over east Anglia for the Germans to listen in on.

I recommend 'Double Cross: The True Story of The D-Day Spies' by Ben Macintyre.

it's a pretty comprehensive look at the whole of the Doublecross system and some of the amazing and strange individuals involved concentrating on the 'well known' agents such as Bronx, Brutus, Treasure, Tricycle and Garbo.

He also has a book dedicated to Chapman 'Agent Zigzag: The True Wartime Story of Eddie Chapman'

 

[jimbob]

Do you mean Eddie Chapman? 'Agent Zig-Zag'?

It went a lot deeper than that, the entire German spy ring in Britain was controlled and sending fake information.
Because all the spies were 'turned' they could send seemingly independent reports that backed each other up.
Of course it helped that an entire radio net for Patton's 'ghost army' was set up and transmitting messages all over east Anglia for the Germans to listen in on.

I recommend 'Double Cross: The True Story of The D-Day Spies' by Ben Macintyre.

it's a pretty comprehensive look at the whole of the Doublecross system and some of the amazing and strange individuals involved concentrating on the 'well known' agents such as Bronx, Brutus, Treasure, Tricycle and Garbo.

He also has a book dedicated to Chapman 'Agent Zigzag: The True Wartime Story of Eddie Chapman'

I suspect it was - I read about it a long time ago, I think in passing in The secret war of Charles Fraser Smith.

 

[dudalb]

My understanding is that Hitler viewed it as just a larger river crossing, with which the Wehrmacht had considerable experience. I've read that many German officers knew this was wrong, but were also convinced that Sea Lion would never take place anyway.

By comparison, the allied forces had, by D-Day, considerable experience in amphibious operations in the Pacific, North Africa and Italy, and also had a lot more experienced sailors.

They also had a lot of specilised Ampthibious equipment (from LCVP's to LST's) that Hitler did not have in 1940.
Fact was the German Amry and Navy were totally ill equipped and did have the traiing to carry out a major amphibious operation in the face of opposition.

 

[dudalb]

In the end he Mulberry on the US beaches was wrecked in a storm and even the British Mulberry provided only a smll percentage of the supplies, most came over the beaches.

This is where sending Navy, Army and Marine officers who had experience with Amphibious operations in the Pacific to help in the D Day training and Preparations paid off.

 

[Andy_Ross]

They also had a lot of specilised Ampthibious equipment (from LCVP's to LST's) that Hitler did not have in 1940.
Fact was the German Amry and Navy were totally ill equipped and did have the traiing to carry out a major amphibious operation in the face of opposition.

They equipped their barges with planks of wood for the horses to walk down.

 

[jimbob]

Nice counterpoint, Captain_Swoop and Dudalb

 

[lobosrul5]

And what about Project Pluto? A fuel pipeline from the UK across the bottom of the channel, to keep the invasion force gassed up.

Pluto wasn't actually all that successful. Only a small percentage of fuel that made it over was through pipelines.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Pluto

The initial performance of the PLUTO pipeline was disappointing. During the period from June to October 1944, it carried on average only 150 imperial barrels per day (25,000 litres per day), just 0.16% of the Allies total consumption during the same period.

And, in all pipelines only delivered 8% of fuel between D-day and VE day.

Of course the Germans didn't have anything like the shipping capability to keep their tanks, assault guns, SP arty etc fueled and supplied for a Sealion invasion. And the idea that the Luftwaffe could keep them supplied through the air is laughable (see Stalingrad).

 

[Andy_Ross]

There wasn't enough transport to keep the attack fueled in the 'race to the coast' Tanks were relying on captured supplies and what they could get from roadside garages and gas stations.

 

[erwinl]

Pluto wasn't actually all that successful. Only a small percentage of fuel that made it over was through pipelines.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Pluto

The initial performance of the PLUTO pipeline was disappointing. During the period from June to October 1944, it carried on average only 150 imperial barrels per day (25,000 litres per day), just 0.16% of the Allies total consumption during the same period.

And, in all pipelines only delivered 8% of fuel between D-day and VE day.

Of course the Germans didn't have anything like the shipping capability to keep their tanks, assault guns, SP arty etc fueled and supplied for a Sealion invasion. And the idea that the Luftwaffe could keep them supplied through the air is laughable (see Stalingrad).

Might very well be about that 8%.

But the questions that have to be asked are the following.
Could the campaign do without that 8% fuel?
If not. Could, in absence of the Pluto pipeline, that 8% added to the other transport capacity?
If yes. What, in that case, has to be left back in England in order to transport that 8% in fuel?

I can well believe that, all in all, the amount of resources spend in Pluto could and maybe should have been spend more efficiently.
I can also believe that the existence of Pluto was of vital importance for the campaign as a whole.

 

[lobosrul5]

Might very well be about that 8%.

But the questions that have to be asked are the following.
Could the campaign do without that 8% fuel?
If not. Could, in absence of the Pluto pipeline, that 8% added to the other transport capacity?
If yes. What, in that case, has to be left back in England in order to transport that 8% in fuel?

I can well believe that, all in all, the amount of resources spend in Pluto could and maybe should have been spend more efficiently.
I can also believe that the existence of Pluto was of vital importance for the campaign as a whole.

As for the battle of Normandy it only supplied .16% of fuel. It was indeed insignificant. The 8% was from many different laid pipelines, not just the original (I'm honestly not 100% sure if they all fell under Operation Pluto or not).

Yes, we could've moved the other 8% over by other means, that might have meant tying up dock space that was needed for other supplies though? Maybe, but we certainly had the shipping to spare by early 1945.

 

[lobosrul5]

There wasn't enough transport to keep the attack fueled in the 'race to the coast' Tanks were relying on captured supplies and what they could get from roadside garages and gas stations.

That was mainly a problem of getting supplies from the harbor to the front if I'm not mistaken. Patton's 3rd Army was particularly hard hit.

 

[erwinl]

As for the battle of Normandy it only supplied .16% of fuel. It was indeed insignificant. The 8% was from many different laid pipelines, not just the original (I'm honestly not 100% sure if they all fell under Operation Pluto or not).

Yes, we could've moved the other 8% over by other means, that might have meant tying up dock space that was needed for other supplies though? Maybe, but we certainly had the shipping to spare by early 1945.

Shipping capacity. No doubt. Dock space? I’m not so sure.
Every tanker full of fuel that was shipped through the pipes was one tanker that did not have to be docked in Arromanches.

 

[Andy_Ross]

That was mainly a problem of getting supplies from the harbor to the front if I'm not mistaken. Patton's 3rd Army was particularly hard hit.

I mean the German 'race to the coast' in 1940. they were far outstripping their supply lines as there wasn't enough motor transport to move the fuel forward.

 

[Andy_Ross]

Pluto was a disappointment, but it shows the depth of thinking and planning involved.

 

[Henri McPhee]

I still think Chamberlain was right when he once said Churchill suffered from a want of judgment in regard to appeasement. There is such a thing as diplomacy. There were Americans who said Churchill could have been the American president if his father had been American. It's interesting to me that Churchill suffered assassination attempts and threats before the war from the Irish and Indians, as did Chamberlain. It is not a phenomenon that started after the second world war.

 

[Klimax]

I still think Chamberlain was right when he once said Churchill suffered from a want of judgment in regard to appeasement. There is such a thing as diplomacy. There were Americans who said Churchill could have been the American president if his father had been American. It's interesting to me that Churchill suffered assassination attempts and threats before the war from the Irish and Indians, as did Chamberlain. It is not a phenomenon that started after the second world war.

Still trying to defend man who allowed Second World War? And what a mess in that derailed train of thoughts...

 

[lobosrul5]

I still think Chamberlain was right when he once said Churchill suffered from a want of judgment in regard to appeasement. There is such a thing as diplomacy. There were Americans who said Churchill could have been the American president if his father had been American. It's interesting to me that Churchill suffered assassination attempts and threats before the war from the Irish and Indians, as did Chamberlain. It is not a phenomenon that started after the second world war.

Indeed... you do realize Churchill didn't become PM until after this Hitler fella invaded Poland, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, plus illegally occupied several other countries without military invasion, right?