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The Trials of Amanda Knox and Raffaele Sollecito: Part 28

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Knox was not a defendant.

The ECHR erred in assuming Knox was a 'suspect under interrogation'. She made a witness statement to the effect 'it was Lumumba what done it'. There is zero reason for such a witness to be subject to the rules of arrest.

Knox was not 'subject to a criminal charge'.

You are wrong. You continue to ignore the ECHR's decision that a person/suspect does not have to be officially charged with a crime to have the rights of a defendant.



1. The existence of a “charge”

11. The concept of “charge” has to be understood within the meaning of the Convention. The Court takes a “substantive”, rather than a “formal”, conception of the “charge” contemplated by Article 6 (Deweer v. Belgium, § 44). Charge may thus be defined as “the official notification given to an individual by the competent authority of an allegation that he has committed a criminal offence”, a definition that also corresponds to the test whether “the situation of the [suspect] has been substantially affected” (ibid., §§ 42 and 46; Eckle v. Germany, § 73, and also Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], § 249; Simeonovi v. Bulgaria [GC], § 110).

Would you seriously like to propose that, once RS had 'withdrawn' his alibi for Knox and said she may have gone out and the police misinterpreted her text message to Lumumba, that Knox's situation had not been 'substantially affected'?

12. The Court held that a person arrested on suspicion of having committed a criminal offence (Heaney and McGuinness v. Ireland, § 42; Brusco v. France, §§ 47-50), a suspect questioned about his involvement in acts constituting a criminal offence (Aleksandr Zaichenko v. Russia, §§ 41-43; Yankov and Others v. Bulgaria, § 23; Schmid-Laffer v. Switzerland, §§ 30-31) and a person who has been questioned in respect of his or her suspected involvement in an offence (Stirmanov v. Russia*, § 39), irrespective of the fact that he or she was formaly treated as a witness (Kalēja v. Latvia, §§ 36-41) as well as a person who has been formally charged with a criminal offence under procedure set out in domestic law (Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC], § 66; Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark [GC], § 44) could all be regarded as being “charged with a criminal offence” and claim the protection of Article 6 of the Convention. On the other hand, a person questioned in the context of a border control, in the absence of a need to determine the existence of a reasonable suspicion that she had committed an offence, was not considered to be under a criminal charge (Beghal v. the United Kingdom*, § 121).
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_6_criminal_ENG.pdf

Again, would you seriously like to propose that Knox was not being questioned about her suspected involvement in the murder even as a witness on Nov. 5/6?
Mignini himself stated that he began to suspect Knox and Sollecito on Nov. 2 when "They were comforting each other with an affection inappropriate for the moment,” and again stated that upon returning to the cottage on Nov. 3 “She started hitting the palms of her hands on her ears as if there was the memory of a noise, a sound, a scream — Meredith’s scream. Undoubtedly, I started to suspect Amanda.” (Netflix docu)

How long are you going to pretend this definition from the ECHR and Mignini's quotes don't counter your claim?
 
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It's all moot, as Boninsegna did not hear the calunnia case for which Knox was convicted. He is merely expressing his own opinion, based on Hellman (as pleaded by Dalla Vedova) and had not actually tried the case himself.

It's amazing ECHR should use Boninsegna as the primary document. It's rather like a critic assessing the works of Shakespeare on a GCSE keynotes revision guide instead of Shakespeare himself.

I tell ya what...since you seem to understand ECHR case law and Italian law much better than the ECHR and Judge Boninsegna, why don't you offer your services (along with Slick Pete) to the Rome Ministry of Justice lawyers? I'm sure they'd appreciate your input.
 
You are wrong. You continue to ignore the ECHR's decision that a person/suspect does not have to be officially charged with a crime to have the rights of a defendant.





Would you seriously like to propose that, once RS had 'withdrawn' his alibi for Knox and said she may have gone out and the police misinterpreted her text message to Lumumba, that Knox's situation had not been 'substantially affected'?


https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_6_criminal_ENG.pdf

Again, would you seriously like to propose that Knox was not being questioned about her suspected involvement in the murder even as a witness on Nov. 5/6?
Mignini himself stated that he began to suspect Knox and Sollecito on Nov. 2 when "They were comforting each other with an affection inappropriate for the moment,” and again stated that upon returning to the cottage on Nov. 3 “She started hitting the palms of her hands on her ears as if there was the memory of a noise, a sound, a scream — Meredith’s scream. Undoubtedly, I started to suspect Amanda.” (Netflix docu)

How long are you going to pretend this definition from the ECHR and Mignini's quotes don't counter your claim?

Stacyhs, your quotation from the ECHR's Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Right to a fair trial (criminal limb) is very appropriate. I hope everyone interested in this case reads the relevant portions of that document in order to understand that the ECHR's judgment against Italy of two separate violations of Convention Article 6.1, one with Article 6.3c and the other with Article 6.3e, was a predictable outcome in Knox v. Italy because of published ECHR case-law. Thanks for reminding us of this ECHR Guide.

BTW, the version of the Guide now available on the ECHR's website is shown as updated as of 30 April 2019. In the section devoted to the case-law for Article 6.3e there now appears the following text:

"511. The obligation of the competent authorities is not limited to the appointment of an interpreter but, if they are put on notice in the particular circumstances, may also extend to a degree of subsequent control over the adequacy of the interpretation. Thus, a failure of the domestic courts to examine the allegations of inadequate services of an interpreter may lead to a violation of Article 6 § 3 (e) of the Convention (Knox v. Italy*, §§ 182-187)."

The asterisk after the case title means that the case was not final on the date that the Guide was published (online). The explanation provided by the ECHR in the List of Cited Cases (at the end of the Guide) provides this interesting commentary:

"Chamber judgments that were not final within the meaning of Article 44 of the Convention when this update was finalised are marked with an asterisk (*) in the list below. Article 44 § 2 of the Convention provides: “The judgment of a Chamber shall become final (a) when the parties declare that they will not request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber; or (b) three months after the date of the judgment, if reference of the case to the Grand Chamber has not been requested; or (c) when the panel of the Grand Chamber rejects the request to refer under Article 43”. In cases where a request for referral is accepted by the Grand Chamber panel, the Chamber judgment does not become final and thus has no legal effect; it is the subsequent Grand Chamber judgment that becomes final."

A further interesting point is that no ECHR Guide on Article 3 has been published. However, from ECHR case-law, it is clear that the ECHR would find Italy in violation of Article 3 on the procedural limb, because there was no doubt it had not conducted any effective and independent investigation which could have established whether, after the authorities had received a credible allegation of a violation, there was or was not such a violation.

In addition, to not be in violation of the procedural limb, the state must conduct an investigation and follow-up judicial procedures that would be capable of assigning responsibilities and result in accountabilities to any persons who had committed or ordered such violations (if found to have occurred). Thus, the criminal trial of Amanda Knox on charges of calunnia against the police could not be considered an investigation that could satisfy the procedural limb of Article 3.

According to the ECHR's online document Practice of the Grand Chamber Panel, "A meeting of the Panel of the Grand Chamber is organised when a sufficient number of referral requests are ready for examination. On average, the Panel meets at intervals of eight or nine weeks and examines between forty-five and sixty referral requests." Since the GC Panel last met on May 6, 2019, the next Panel meeting most likely will be in July, 2019 although it could be held any time from June until perhaps September, 2019, depending on the number of requests for referral the ECHR receives. So we shall see whether the Chamber judgment in Knox v. Italy becomes final at that point, or in the alternative, there will be, in due time, a Grand Chamber judgment in the case.
 
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Again, would you seriously like to propose that Knox was not being questioned about her suspected involvement in the murder even as a witness on Nov. 5/6?
Mignini himself stated that he began to suspect Knox and Sollecito on Nov. 2 when "They were comforting each other with an affection inappropriate for the moment,” and again stated that upon returning to the cottage on Nov. 3 “She started hitting the palms of her hands on her ears as if there was the memory of a noise, a sound, a scream — Meredith’s scream. Undoubtedly, I started to suspect Amanda.” (Netflix docu)

How long are you going to pretend this definition from the ECHR and Mignini's quotes don't counter your claim?

When initially asked, Mignini said that the Netflix documentary was very fair and balanced. Strangely so did Nick Pisa, but that's another story.

It was only when Mignini realized he had hanged himself with is own words did any other suggestion be made about that documentary.

In fact, in it Mignini had doubled down on his instincts about ferreting out Knox as a suspect right from the start. He specifically said that only a woman would cover a body, as the victim's body had been covered with a duvet. Even after the Italian Supreme Court had exonerated Sollecito and Knox, Mignini was still doubling down on the appropriateness of suspecting the pair right from the git-go.

Add to all this - Napoleoni suspecting that Sollecito had been pointing the cops to the pooh in Laura's toilet a little too vigourously, as if Sollecito had wanted (too hard) for the police to notice it.

Add to this, author John Follain wrote "A Death in Italy", written mainly from the police and prosecutor's point of view - writing in that time before the 2011 acquittal when most of the world thought that the Italian courts had been right in convicting (in 2009).....

...... and more importantly, that the Italian cops had been right to suspect the pair right from the start. Follain virtually reads Knox's and Sollecito's minds in the part where he relates that in the Postal Police's observation that Filomena's room did not look like a real break-in, to which Follain adds suspiciously, "Knox and Sollecito say nothing."

The heavy inference Follain drew was that they said nothing because they knew why the room looked the way it had, and that the cops were falling for the ruse.

And then..... (hitting the reset button) they have the gall to suggest that Knox had not been a suspect at the beginning of the interrogation when Ficarra had gone out into the hall in the Questura to say to Knox, "It's time for the truth between us."

It's been 11 1/2 years, and that's always been the guilter-nutter story. They were suspects from the beginning and rightly so, but that at the interrogation they were simply people "informed of the facts".

Rhetorical bait and switch. And it has to be that way from their point of view.... for reasons which are obvious.
 
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"They were suspects from the beginning and rightly so, but that at the interrogation they were simply people "informed of the facts"."

I do wish they'd make up their minds.
 
And yet...and yet...Mignini says she was, the ECHR says she was, Giobbi says she was...and common sense says she was.

The ECHR states that Knox was definitively a suspect at the time of the 5:45 am statement, but it "raises the question" whether she was a suspect at the time of the 1:45 am statement.

Google translation of the relevant paragraphs of the judgment Knox v. Italy, with my help, including use of Collins Reverso:

147. The Court notes at the outset that the first question in this case is whether Article 6 § 1 of the Convention was applicable to the facts of the case. It recalls in that regard that, on 6 November 2007, the applicant was heard twice: at 1:45 am and 5:45 am.

148. It notes that the two statements were originally collected as part of the police's acquisition of summary information, during which time the applicant had not been formally investigated.

149. With regard to the statements taken at 1:45 am, the Court reiterates that the guarantees offered by Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention apply to any "accused" in the autonomous sense of the term under the Convention. There is a "criminal charge" where a person is formally charged by the competent authorities or where the actions of the authorities because of suspicions against the person have a significant impact on his situation (Simeonovi, cited above, §§ 110-111).

150. Applying this principle to the present case, the Court therefore raises the question* whether, at the time of the hearings, the domestic authorities had reasonable suspicions** that the applicant was involved in the murder of M.K.

151. It observes in that regard that the applicant had already been heard by the police on 2, 3 and 4 November 2007 and that her cell phone had been tapped. It notes that the facts of the case also show that, on the evening of 5 November 2007, the attention of the investigators focused on the applicant (see paragraphs 12-14 above). It notes that while she went to the police station spontaneously, she was asked questions in the corridor by police officers who then continued to interrogate her in a room where she had been previously subjected twice, for hours, to close interrogations.

152. In the Court's view, even assuming that these elements are not sufficient to conclude that, at 1:45 am on 6 November 2007, the applicant could be considered to be a suspect within the meaning of its case-law, it is necessary to note that, as the Government acknowledged, when she made her 5:45 am statements to the public prosecutor, the applicant had formally acquired the status of a person under investigation. The Court therefore considers that there is no doubt that, at 5:45 am at the latest, the applicant was the subject of a criminal charge within the meaning of the Convention (Ibrahim and Others, cited above, § 296).
____
* I had previously translated it as "wonders"

** I had previously translated it as "reasonable grounds to suspect"
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Thus, the ECHR judgment notes that Knox was certainly a suspect under its legal definition and under Italian procedural law, as acknowledged by the Italian government, after the 1:45 am statement - that is, for the questioning that resulted in the 5:45 am statement.

The ECHR judgment "raises the question" or "wonders" whether Knox was a suspect during the questioning leading to the 1:45 am statement, presenting some evidence to support the proposition that she was indeed a suspect. It's unfortunate that the ECHR chose not to be definitive on this issue. It may have considered that it did not need to be definitive, possibly because in its view the second statement encompassed the substance of the first.
 
The ECHR states that Knox was definitively a suspect at the time of the 5:45 am statement, but it "raises the question" whether she was a suspect at the time of the 1:45 am statement.

Google translation of the relevant paragraphs of the judgment Knox v. Italy, with my help, including use of Collins Reverso:

147. The Court notes at the outset that the first question in this case is whether Article 6 § 1 of the Convention was applicable to the facts of the case. It recalls in that regard that, on 6 November 2007, the applicant was heard twice: at 1:45 am and 5:45 am.

148. It notes that the two statements were originally collected as part of the police's acquisition of summary information, during which time the applicant had not been formally investigated.

149. With regard to the statements taken at 1:45 am, the Court reiterates that the guarantees offered by Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention apply to any "accused" in the autonomous sense of the term under the Convention. There is a "criminal charge" where a person is formally charged by the competent authorities or where the actions of the authorities because of suspicions against the person have a significant impact on his situation (Simeonovi, cited above, §§ 110-111).

150. Applying this principle to the present case, the Court therefore raises the question* whether, at the time of the hearings, the domestic authorities had reasonable suspicions** that the applicant was involved in the murder of M.K.

151. It observes in that regard that the applicant had already been heard by the police on 2, 3 and 4 November 2007 and that her cell phone had been tapped. It notes that the facts of the case also show that, on the evening of 5 November 2007, the attention of the investigators focused on the applicant (see paragraphs 12-14 above). It notes that while she went to the police station spontaneously, she was asked questions in the corridor by police officers who then continued to interrogate her in a room where she had been previously subjected twice, for hours, to close interrogations.

152. In the Court's view, even assuming that these elements are not sufficient to conclude that, at 1:45 am on 6 November 2007, the applicant could be considered to be a suspect within the meaning of its case-law, it is necessary to note that, as the Government acknowledged, when she made her 5:45 am statements to the public prosecutor, the applicant had formally acquired the status of a person under investigation. The Court therefore considers that there is no doubt that, at 5:45 am at the latest, the applicant was the subject of a criminal charge within the meaning of the Convention (Ibrahim and Others, cited above, § 296).
____
* I had previously translated it as "wonders"

** I had previously translated it as "reasonable grounds to suspect"
_______

Thus, the ECHR judgment notes that Knox was certainly a suspect under its legal definition and under Italian procedural law, as acknowledged by the Italian government, after the 1:45 am statement - that is, for the questioning that resulted in the 5:45 am statement.

The ECHR judgment "raises the question" or "wonders" whether Knox was a suspect during the questioning leading to the 1:45 am statement, presenting some evidence to support the proposition that she was indeed a suspect. It's unfortunate that the ECHR chose not to be definitive on this issue. It may have considered that it did not need to be definitive, possibly because in its view the second statement encompassed the substance of the first.

Of importance in its evaluation based upon its case-law, the ECHR found that there was no compelling reason for the Italian courts to have denied Knox a lawyer during either of the questionings for the 6 November statements. Therefore, Italy needed to show that overall, Knox had received a fair trial in which those statements had been used to convict her of calunnia. Italy could not demonstrate that it had conducted a fair trial, and the ECHR showed convincingly that the trial was unfair.

The translation by Google, with my help, of the "compelling reasons" section of the judgment:

153. The Court notes that, while* the domestic courts have concluded that the disputed statements could not be used against the applicant for the crimes of murder and sexual violence, as the Government has indicated, in accordance with domestic case-law (paragraph 142 above), these same statements could have been used, in the absence of a counsel, insofar as they included in themselves a criminal offense.
154. It goes on to point out that restrictions on access to a lawyer for compelling reasons are permitted during the pre-trial phase only in exceptional cases, and that they must be temporary in nature and based on an individual assessment of the particular circumstances of the case (Beuze, cited above, § 142).

155. In the present case, however, the Government refers to a jurisprudential interpretation permitting the use of spontaneous statements made by a person under investigation in the absence of a defense counsel when they constitute an offense in themselves.

156. Even if it seeks to read that argument as a "compelling reason" within the meaning of its case-law, the Court notes, however, that the jurisprudential interpretation invoked is general in nature {and therefore invalid under ECHR case-law}. The Government has not established the existence of exceptional circumstances which could have justified the restrictions on the applicant's right. It is not for the Court to seek {such circumstances} on its own (Simeonovi, cited above, § 130).

157. The Court thus finds no compelling reasons to justify the above-mentioned restrictions in this case.__________
* I had previously translated "si" as "if"; "si" also translates as "yes"; in context, "while" appears to be a better translation
_______
The translation by Google, with my help, of the "fairness of trial" section of the judgment:

Fairness of the proceedings as a whole

158. In such circumstances, the Court must assess the fairness of the proceedings by exercising a very strict test. The burden of proof thus falls on the Government, which has to demonstrate convincingly that the applicant has nonetheless benefited globally from a fair criminal trial. The Government's inability to establish compelling reasons weighs heavily in the balance and may tilt the Court in the direction of a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) (Beuze, cited above, § 165).

159. In that exercise, the Court will examine, in so far as they are relevant to the present case, the various factors arising from its case-law (Ibrahim and Others, cited above, § 274, and Simeonovi, cited above, § 120).

160. The Court first emphasizes the applicant's state of vulnerability, a young foreign girl aged 20 at the material time who was recently in Italy and did not speak Italian fluently (Kaçiu and Kotorri, cited above, §§ 119-121 and Salduz, cited above, § 54).

161. The Court observes that, only a few hours after the impugned {interrogation} hearings, the applicant had promptly retracted her statements, in particular by means of a text drafted at her initiative on 6 November 2007 at around 1 pm and handed over to the police (paragraph 20 point 3 in fine and point 4 letter e above), another text drafted on 9 November 2007 for the attention of her lawyers (paragraph 24 point 14 above), and the telephone call to her mother on November 10, 2007 during which the line was tapped. The Court notes that, however, six months later, on 14 May 2008, the applicant was charged with malicious false accusation.

162. It should also be pointed out that, as is clear from the judgment of the Florence Court of 14 January 2016, the applicant's statements of 6 November 2007 were taken in a context of strong psychological pressure (see paragraph 103 below {sic; should be "above"}).

163. As to the use of the evidence, the Court observes that the statements at issue constituted in themselves the offense which was alleged against the applicant and, therefore, the material evidence for her verdict of guilt for malicious false accusation (see, on the contrary, Gäfgen, cited above, § 178, mutatis mutandis, Kaçiu and Kotorri, cited above, § 118, and mutatis mutandis, Sergey Ivanov v. Russia, No. 14416/06, §§ 90-92, May 15, 2018).

164. The Court further notes that the circumstances in which the offending statements were obtained were not clarified in an investigation {into the credible allegations of being obtained in violation of Article 3} (see paragraph 138).

165. Lastly, it notes that it does not appear from the file, in particular the record of the applicant's interrogation at 5:45 am, that she was notified of her procedural rights (Ibrahim et al. above, § 273).

d) Conclusion

166. The Court therefore finds that the Government has failed to demonstrate that the restriction of the applicant's access to legal aid at the hearing on 6 November 2007 has not irretrievably prejudiced the fairness of the trial as a whole.
167. In the light of the foregoing, Articles 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention have been violated in this case.
 
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It's all moot, as Boninsegna did not hear the calunnia case for which Knox was convicted. He is merely expressing his own opinion, based on Hellman (as pleaded by Dalla Vedova) and had not actually tried the case himself.

It's amazing ECHR should use Boninsegna as the primary document. It's rather like a critic assessing the works of Shakespeare on a GCSE keynotes revision guide instead of Shakespeare himself.

How can PGP posters who are so staggeringly stupid they come up with ideas such Amanda and Raffaele needing to return to the cottage to stage a rape when Rudy had already raped Meredith be able to understand complex legal issues.
 
You are wrong. You continue to ignore the ECHR's decision that a person/suspect does not have to be officially charged with a crime to have the rights of a defendant.





Would you seriously like to propose that, once RS had 'withdrawn' his alibi for Knox and said she may have gone out and the police misinterpreted her text message to Lumumba, that Knox's situation had not been 'substantially affected'?


https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_6_criminal_ENG.pdf

Again, would you seriously like to propose that Knox was not being questioned about her suspected involvement in the murder even as a witness on Nov. 5/6?
Mignini himself stated that he began to suspect Knox and Sollecito on Nov. 2 when "They were comforting each other with an affection inappropriate for the moment,” and again stated that upon returning to the cottage on Nov. 3 “She started hitting the palms of her hands on her ears as if there was the memory of a noise, a sound, a scream — Meredith’s scream. Undoubtedly, I started to suspect Amanda.” (Netflix docu)

How long are you going to pretend this definition from the ECHR and Mignini's quotes don't counter your claim?

No, she wasn't. Police interviewed hundreds of witnesses. None needed lawyers.
 
And yet...and yet...Mignini says she was, the ECHR says she was, Giobbi says she was...and common sense says she was.

Be that as it may, the police cannot arrest someone unless they have probable cause. It's no good 'having a suspicion'.

Police suspected child killer Ian Huntley from the get go. However, they were not safe to arrest him and his girlfriend until they found real evidence, in the form of burnt Man U shirts in the school bin, of which he was caretaker. The whole of the UK could see the caretaker was dodgy. Doesn't mean he was of the status where police had to supply him with a lawyer every time he dug himself in deeper in his addiction for tv interviews.

In the latin countries a formal suspect has a legal status. For example, Arguido, as the McCanns were made for short period of time. It was then they were given lawyers who told the pair to say 'no comment' to all the questions.
 
Stacyhs, your quotation from the ECHR's Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Right to a fair trial (criminal limb) is very appropriate. I hope everyone interested in this case reads the relevant portions of that document in order to understand that the ECHR's judgment against Italy of two separate violations of Convention Article 6.1, one with Article 6.3c and the other with Article 6.3e, was a predictable outcome in Knox v. Italy because of published ECHR case-law. Thanks for reminding us of this ECHR Guide.

BTW, the version of the Guide now available on the ECHR's website is shown as updated as of 30 April 2019. In the section devoted to the case-law for Article 6.3e there now appears the following text:

"511. The obligation of the competent authorities is not limited to the appointment of an interpreter but, if they are put on notice in the particular circumstances, may also extend to a degree of subsequent control over the adequacy of the interpretation. Thus, a failure of the domestic courts to examine the allegations of inadequate services of an interpreter may lead to a violation of Article 6 § 3 (e) of the Convention (Knox v. Italy*, §§ 182-187)."

The asterisk after the case title means that the case was not final on the date that the Guide was published (online). The explanation provided by the ECHR in the List of Cited Cases (at the end of the Guide) provides this interesting commentary:

"Chamber judgments that were not final within the meaning of Article 44 of the Convention when this update was finalised are marked with an asterisk (*) in the list below. Article 44 § 2 of the Convention provides: “The judgment of a Chamber shall become final (a) when the parties declare that they will not request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber; or (b) three months after the date of the judgment, if reference of the case to the Grand Chamber has not been requested; or (c) when the panel of the Grand Chamber rejects the request to refer under Article 43”. In cases where a request for referral is accepted by the Grand Chamber panel, the Chamber judgment does not become final and thus has no legal effect; it is the subsequent Grand Chamber judgment that becomes final."

A further interesting point is that no ECHR Guide on Article 3 has been published. However, from ECHR case-law, it is clear that the ECHR would find Italy in violation of Article 3 on the procedural limb, because there was no doubt it had not conducted any effective and independent investigation which could have established whether, after the authorities had received a credible allegation of a violation, there was or was not such a violation.

In addition, to not be in violation of the procedural limb, the state must conduct an investigation and follow-up judicial procedures that would be capable of assigning responsibilities and result in accountabilities to any persons who had committed or ordered such violations (if found to have occurred). Thus, the criminal trial of Amanda Knox on charges of calunnia against the police could not be considered an investigation that could satisfy the procedural limb of Article 3.

According to the ECHR's online document Practice of the Grand Chamber Panel, "A meeting of the Panel of the Grand Chamber is organised when a sufficient number of referral requests are ready for examination. On average, the Panel meets at intervals of eight or nine weeks and examines between forty-five and sixty referral requests." Since the GC Panel last met on May 6, 2019, the next Panel meeting most likely will be in July, 2019 although it could be held any time from June until perhaps September, 2019, depending on the number of requests for referral the ECHR receives. So we shall see whether the Chamber judgment in Knox v. Italy becomes final at that point, or in the alternative, there will be, in due time, a Grand Chamber judgment in the case.

For crying out loud! :( The victim was English, her circle of friends were English. An English interpreter was wheeled out, employed by the police, as a matter of courtesy. She was not a lawyer and it should not be implied that the presence of a translator signifies suspicion of murder. All the English girls would have had one.
 
When initially asked, Mignini said that the Netflix documentary was very fair and balanced. Strangely so did Nick Pisa, but that's another story.

It was only when Mignini realized he had hanged himself with is own words did any other suggestion be made about that documentary.

In fact, in it Mignini had doubled down on his instincts about ferreting out Knox as a suspect right from the start. He specifically said that only a woman would cover a body, as the victim's body had been covered with a duvet. Even after the Italian Supreme Court had exonerated Sollecito and Knox, Mignini was still doubling down on the appropriateness of suspecting the pair right from the git-go.

Add to all this - Napoleoni suspecting that Sollecito had been pointing the cops to the pooh in Laura's toilet a little too vigourously, as if Sollecito had wanted (too hard) for the police to notice it.

Add to this, author John Follain wrote "A Death in Italy", written mainly from the police and prosecutor's point of view - writing in that time before the 2011 acquittal when most of the world thought that the Italian courts had been right in convicting (in 2009).....

...... and more importantly, that the Italian cops had been right to suspect the pair right from the start. Follain virtually reads Knox's and Sollecito's minds in the part where he relates that in the Postal Police's observation that Filomena's room did not look like a real break-in, to which Follain adds suspiciously, "Knox and Sollecito say nothing."

The heavy inference Follain drew was that they said nothing because they knew why the room looked the way it had, and that the cops were falling for the ruse.

And then..... (hitting the reset button) they have the gall to suggest that Knox had not been a suspect at the beginning of the interrogation when Ficarra had gone out into the hall in the Questura to say to Knox, "It's time for the truth between us."

It's been 11 1/2 years, and that's always been the guilter-nutter story. They were suspects from the beginning and rightly so, but that at the interrogation they were simply people "informed of the facts".

Rhetorical bait and switch. And it has to be that way from their point of view.... for reasons which are obvious.

Where is the face palm emoji? Mignini did not realise how biased the film was until he saw the finished product. About ten PGPs versus Mignini and one DAILY MAIL journalist.
 
The ECHR states that Knox was definitively a suspect at the time of the 5:45 am statement, but it "raises the question" whether she was a suspect at the time of the 1:45 am statement.

Google translation of the relevant paragraphs of the judgment Knox v. Italy, with my help, including use of Collins Reverso:

147. The Court notes at the outset that the first question in this case is whether Article 6 § 1 of the Convention was applicable to the facts of the case. It recalls in that regard that, on 6 November 2007, the applicant was heard twice: at 1:45 am and 5:45 am.

148. It notes that the two statements were originally collected as part of the police's acquisition of summary information, during which time the applicant had not been formally investigated.

149. With regard to the statements taken at 1:45 am, the Court reiterates that the guarantees offered by Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention apply to any "accused" in the autonomous sense of the term under the Convention. There is a "criminal charge" where a person is formally charged by the competent authorities or where the actions of the authorities because of suspicions against the person have a significant impact on his situation (Simeonovi, cited above, §§ 110-111).

150. Applying this principle to the present case, the Court therefore raises the question* whether, at the time of the hearings, the domestic authorities had reasonable suspicions** that the applicant was involved in the murder of M.K.

151. It observes in that regard that the applicant had already been heard by the police on 2, 3 and 4 November 2007 and that her cell phone had been tapped. It notes that the facts of the case also show that, on the evening of 5 November 2007, the attention of the investigators focused on the applicant (see paragraphs 12-14 above). It notes that while she went to the police station spontaneously, she was asked questions in the corridor by police officers who then continued to interrogate her in a room where she had been previously subjected twice, for hours, to close interrogations.

152. In the Court's view, even assuming that these elements are not sufficient to conclude that, at 1:45 am on 6 November 2007, the applicant could be considered to be a suspect within the meaning of its case-law, it is necessary to note that, as the Government acknowledged, when she made her 5:45 am statements to the public prosecutor, the applicant had formally acquired the status of a person under investigation. The Court therefore considers that there is no doubt that, at 5:45 am at the latest, the applicant was the subject of a criminal charge within the meaning of the Convention (Ibrahim and Others, cited above, § 296).
____
* I had previously translated it as "wonders"

** I had previously translated it as "reasonable grounds to suspect"
_______

Thus, the ECHR judgment notes that Knox was certainly a suspect under its legal definition and under Italian procedural law, as acknowledged by the Italian government, after the 1:45 am statement - that is, for the questioning that resulted in the 5:45 am statement.

The ECHR judgment "raises the question" or "wonders" whether Knox was a suspect during the questioning leading to the 1:45 am statement, presenting some evidence to support the proposition that she was indeed a suspect. It's unfortunate that the ECHR chose not to be definitive on this issue. It may have considered that it did not need to be definitive, possibly because in its view the second statement encompassed the substance of the first.

Only because it cut and pasted from Boninsegna, who wasn't even the judge in the case complained of.
 
Of importance in its evaluation based upon its case-law, the ECHR found that there was no compelling reason for the Italian courts to have denied Knox a lawyer during either of the questionings for the 6 November statements. Therefore, Italy needed to show that overall, Knox had received a fair trial in which those statements had been used to convict her of calunnia. Italy could not demonstrate that it had conducted a fair trial, and the ECHR showed convincingly that the trial was unfair.

The translation by Google, with my help, of the "compelling reasons" section of the judgment:

153. The Court notes that, while* the domestic courts have concluded that the disputed statements could not be used against the applicant for the crimes of murder and sexual violence, as the Government has indicated, in accordance with domestic case-law (paragraph 142 above), these same statements could have been used, in the absence of a counsel, insofar as they included in themselves a criminal offense.
154. It goes on to point out that restrictions on access to a lawyer for compelling reasons are permitted during the pre-trial phase only in exceptional cases, and that they must be temporary in nature and based on an individual assessment of the particular circumstances of the case (Beuze, cited above, § 142).

155. In the present case, however, the Government refers to a jurisprudential interpretation permitting the use of spontaneous statements made by a person under investigation in the absence of a defense counsel when they constitute an offense in themselves.

156. Even if it seeks to read that argument as a "compelling reason" within the meaning of its case-law, the Court notes, however, that the jurisprudential interpretation invoked is general in nature {and therefore invalid under ECHR case-law}. The Government has not established the existence of exceptional circumstances which could have justified the restrictions on the applicant's right. It is not for the Court to seek {such circumstances} on its own (Simeonovi, cited above, § 130).

157. The Court thus finds no compelling reasons to justify the above-mentioned restrictions in this case.__________
* I had previously translated "si" as "if"; "si" also translates as "yes"; in context, "while" appears to be a better translation
_______
The translation by Google, with my help, of the "fairness of trial" section of the judgment:

Fairness of the proceedings as a whole

158. In such circumstances, the Court must assess the fairness of the proceedings by exercising a very strict test. The burden of proof thus falls on the Government, which has to demonstrate convincingly that the applicant has nonetheless benefited globally from a fair criminal trial. The Government's inability to establish compelling reasons weighs heavily in the balance and may tilt the Court in the direction of a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) (Beuze, cited above, § 165).

159. In that exercise, the Court will examine, in so far as they are relevant to the present case, the various factors arising from its case-law (Ibrahim and Others, cited above, § 274, and Simeonovi, cited above, § 120).

160. The Court first emphasizes the applicant's state of vulnerability, a young foreign girl aged 20 at the material time who was recently in Italy and did not speak Italian fluently (Kaçiu and Kotorri, cited above, §§ 119-121 and Salduz, cited above, § 54).

161. The Court observes that, only a few hours after the impugned {interrogation} hearings, the applicant had promptly retracted her statements, in particular by means of a text drafted at her initiative on 6 November 2007 at around 1 pm and handed over to the police (paragraph 20 point 3 in fine and point 4 letter e above), another text drafted on 9 November 2007 for the attention of her lawyers (paragraph 24 point 14 above), and the telephone call to her mother on November 10, 2007 during which the line was tapped. The Court notes that, however, six months later, on 14 May 2008, the applicant was charged with malicious false accusation.

162. It should also be pointed out that, as is clear from the judgment of the Florence Court of 14 January 2016, the applicant's statements of 6 November 2007 were taken in a context of strong psychological pressure (see paragraph 103 below {sic; should be "above"}).

163. As to the use of the evidence, the Court observes that the statements at issue constituted in themselves the offense which was alleged against the applicant and, therefore, the material evidence for her verdict of guilt for malicious false accusation (see, on the contrary, Gäfgen, cited above, § 178, mutatis mutandis, Kaçiu and Kotorri, cited above, § 118, and mutatis mutandis, Sergey Ivanov v. Russia, No. 14416/06, §§ 90-92, May 15, 2018).

164. The Court further notes that the circumstances in which the offending statements were obtained were not clarified in an investigation {into the credible allegations of being obtained in violation of Article 3} (see paragraph 138).

165. Lastly, it notes that it does not appear from the file, in particular the record of the applicant's interrogation at 5:45 am, that she was notified of her procedural rights (Ibrahim et al. above, § 273).

d) Conclusion

166. The Court therefore finds that the Government has failed to demonstrate that the restriction of the applicant's access to legal aid at the hearing on 6 November 2007 has not irretrievably prejudiced the fairness of the trial as a whole.
167. In the light of the foregoing, Articles 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention have been violated in this case.


Haha! 'Strong psychological pressure'. Straight outta Hellmann.

Yes, the guilty generally do feel stressed. It's the basis of lie detector machines. Border security is trained to spot the guy sweating and shaking.

Can't hide your involuntary physiological responses.

Even Ian Huntley showed signs of 'great pressure'. Poor diddums. Should have appealed on those grounds.

Nasty police.
 
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No, she wasn't.


Doubling down on your false claim I see. Quelle surprise. Your claim flies in the face of what the ECHR concluded according to their own (provided) policy of what constitutes being a defendant/suspect.

Have you also forgotten that the Italian Supreme Court itself in 2008 (Gemelli) concluded Knox was a suspect in custody and not just witness from the time she made the 1:45 statement?

On the basis/tail of these principles, the declarations rendering by Amanda Marie Knox at the hour of 01:45 of November 6, 2007, at the outcome of which the deposition was suspended and the girl was placed at the disposition of the judicial Authority [translator's note: exactly as indicated in the deposition document itself] proceeding, arising evidences against her, they are useable only contra alios, while the “spontaneous declarations” of the hour of 5:54 (5:45) are not useable neither against her nor against other subjects accused of acting together in the same crime, because they were rendered without the defensive guarantees on the part of a person who had already formally assumed the vestige/dress/contour of a defendant.

Police interviewed hundreds of witnesses. None needed lawyers.

You mean like Filomena, whose lawyer was at the cottage even before Mignini arrived? Regardless, those 'hundreds of witnesses' were never under suspicion for the murder and most were never questioned in the police station in an interrogation room, either. And none was accused by the police of lying when they didn't tell them what they wanted to hear. Just accept that your 'she was only a witness" excuse is just that: an excuse. And one that no court agrees with.
 
Knox was not a suspect as of the time she dropped her bollock.

And yet...and yet...Mignini says she was, the ECHR says she was, Giobbi says she was...and common sense says she was.

Be that as it may, the police cannot arrest someone unless they have probable cause. It's no good 'having a suspicion'.

What the hell does your reply have to do with the actual topic? We weren't discussing whether the police had probable cause to arrest Knox. We were discussing whether Knox was a witness or a suspect during the interrogation. Nice try at diversion.

Police suspected child killer Ian Huntley from the get go. However, they were not safe to arrest him and his girlfriend until they found real evidence, in the form of burnt Man U shirts in the school bin, of which he was caretaker. The whole of the UK could see the caretaker was dodgy. Doesn't mean he was of the status where police had to supply him with a lawyer every time he dug himself in deeper in his addiction for tv interviews.

In the latin countries a formal suspect has a legal status. For example, Arguido, as the McCanns were made for short period of time. It was then they were given lawyers who told the pair to say 'no comment' to all the questions.

Again, the above has zero to do with the subject of the conversation. Try to stay on topic.
 
Where is the face palm emoji? Mignini did not realise how biased the film was until he saw the finished product. About ten PGPs versus Mignini and one DAILY MAIL journalist.

Where is the "head/brick wall" emoji? No one forced Mignini to say what he did. He wasn't being interrogated by "ten PGPs". He was invited to participate in the docu and he freely accepted. He was sitting on a stool looking relaxed and speaking calmly and easily. What he said refutes your claim that Knox was not a suspect from day one...something he has said elsewhere, too.
 
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