Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

[Garrison]

The Germans out-tricked the Russians diplomatically. Stalin was only interested in his own territorial demands, and he simply didn't believe the British, or his own spies, that Hitler was determined to march on Moscow.

Utterly irrelevant to appeasement.

Somebody has recently said on TV that Britain would have lost the war if Hitler had not marched on Moscow. That was something Chamberlain was fully aware about. Somebody has also said on TV that Trump is not Chamberlain, and he should be.

Untrue on multiple grounds, Germany had no ability to invade the UK, which was receiving increasing support from the USA by mid 1941. One of Hitler's justifications form marching on Moscow in 1941 was precisely the hope that conquering the USSR would force the British to make peace and of course Chamberlain was dead before Operation Barbarossa was launched so he knew nothing about it. And if it were true then that would be on Chamberlain for allowing Germany so much time to rearm and handing them Czech tanks and gold to do it with.

 

[Dave Rogers]

Utterly irrelevant to appeasement.

To be fair, that's pretty much par for the course by now.

Dave

 

[Garrison]

That's a blatant non sequitur, as well as being almost diametrically opposed to being right. The fact that the Ardennes counter-offensive achieved surprise had nothing to do with whether Eisenhower had sufficient strategic reserves to counter it; and, in fact, his very rapid deployment of the reserves he did have immediately to hand was instrumental in preventing it from being more than a brief local reversal of fortune for the Allies until he was able to deploy sufficient forces to stop it dead in its tracks. Overall the main effect of the Ardennes counter-offensive was to deplete the Wermacht of its final reserves in the West by forcing Eisenhower to engage some of his overwhelmingly greater reserves.

Dave

A cogent rebuttal, but Henri is yet again trying to change the subject to avoid addressing his myriad claims about how Germany would win so easily in 1938.

ETA: and rendered obsolete by your next post.

 

[lobosrul5]

That's a blatant non sequitur, as well as being almost diametrically opposed to being right. The fact that the Ardennes counter-offensive achieved surprise had nothing to do with whether Eisenhower had sufficient strategic reserves to counter it; and, in fact, his very rapid deployment of the reserves he did have immediately to hand was instrumental in preventing it from being more than a brief local reversal of fortune for the Allies until he was able to deploy sufficient forces to stop it dead in its tracks. Overall the main effect of the Ardennes counter-offensive was to deplete the Wermacht of its final reserves in the West by forcing Eisenhower to engage some of his overwhelmingly greater reserves.

Dave

Yes, in fact Eisenhower's handling of the Ardennes offensive is maybe a textbook example of what to do in such a situation. If Henri is looking for a "bad guy" then look no further than one Courtney Hodges. Eisenhower took Germany's last offensive and had his army across the Rhine virtually ending the war in the west in about 2 months time. If thats your idea of doing poorly, I dunno what would be doing well exactly.

But good job Henri, you've taken us from pre-war appeasement to The Battle of the Bulge.

 

[Garrette]

I flatly disagree. Eisenhower was left with a lack of strategic reserves with his broad front strategy, as was shown by the Battle of the Bulge which caught him with his pants down. Attacks were made along the front in France by the Americans but they came to nothing because of a lack of concentration of force.

Somebody has recently said on TV that Britain would have lost the war if Hitler had not marched on Moscow. That was something Chamberlain was fully aware about. Somebody has also said on TV that Trump is not Chamberlain, and he should be.

The controversy over the broad front strategy is still discussed now. I suppose General Alan Brooke and Montgomery were most severe in their criticism of Eisenhower, but so was the American General Patton. Eisenhower's grandson still defends him but I don't know what he really knows about it:

http://armchairgeneral.com/a-lingering-controversy-eisenhowers-broad-front-strategy.htm

You demonstrate yet again that you haven't the slightest idea of what you are talking about. Eisenhower wasn't perfect, but broad front was not a mistake nor a bad thing. Patton's criticism can be dismissed fairly easily as his operational expertise did not expand into strategic sense. Montgomery requires more consideration, but he was hardly the best judge of what should and shouldn't be adopted; one need look no further than his attempts at breakout or Market Garden to realize that.

Ah, well. I've had my fun, and others here hardly need my help in demonstrating the vacuity of your non-arguments.

I'm out.

 

[Border Reiver]

I flatly disagree. Eisenhower was left with a lack of strategic reserves with his broad front strategy, as was shown by the Battle of the Bulge which caught him with his pants down. Attacks were made along the front in France by the Americans but they came to nothing because of a lack of concentration of force.

You disagree with what? Eisenhower's broad front strategy worked - that is incontrovertible. Need evidence - whose armed forces were occupying what country at the end of hostilities?

The Battle of the Bulge/Ardennes Offensive was contained by Allied Reserves and then crushed - the initial tactical success for the Germans turned into an operational defeat with extremely negative strategic consequences.

As for these allegedly unsuccessful attacks you are referring to - when, what attacks specifically are you talking about?

Somebody has recently said on TV that Britain would have lost the war if Hitler had not marched on Moscow. That was something Chamberlain was fully aware about. Somebody has also said on TV that Trump is not Chamberlain, and he should be.

And many somebodies right here have told you and provided evidence in support of their claims, that this "somebody on the telly" is full of codswallop.

The only way that Britain could have lost WWII is if the people of the UK lost the will to fight and sued for peace. There was no way that Germany could have landed troops in the United Kingdom in quantities large enough to take an intact port fast enough to resupply any forces left in the UK.

There was no way that Germany would have been able to bomb Britain into submission - the Allies with a vastly larger and more effective strategic bombing force were unable to do that to Germany over a course of years, why do you think the Germans could have done so in less time with a less effective force?

The controversy over the broad front strategy is still discussed now. I suppose General Alan Brooke and Montgomery were most severe in their criticism of Eisenhower, but so was the American General Patton. Eisenhower's grandson still defends him but I don't know what he really knows about it:

http://armchairgeneral.com/a-lingering-controversy-eisenhowers-broad-front-strategy.htm

Brooke, Monty and Patton disagreed with Eisenhower's strategy because they all wanted to the be general leading the strategic advance into Germany and therefore the Western general that won the war. Monty and Patton in particular were a pair of glory hounds very interested in being having that particular feather in their cap. The biggest criticism of that Eisenhower's strategy from all of them is, "That isn't what I would have done." Not that it wasn't a sound strategy that played to the Allied strength of greater materiel superiority and that practically guaranteed positive results, just at a slower rate than the glorious thrust to the enemy's heart.

 

[Hans]

You disagree with what? Eisenhower's broad front strategy worked - that is incontrovertible.

Would it be correct to say that after the Falaise pocket battle a broad front strategy was required by the Allies due to:

1. a broad front retreat by the German Army?
2. The need to take the channel ports and the greatest port Antwerp?
3. Answer the French political call to Liberate La Belle France?

 

[Border Reiver]

Would it be correct to say that after the Falaise pocket battle a broad front strategy was required by the Allies due to:

1. a broad front retreat by the German Army?
2. The need to take the channel ports and the greatest port Antwerp?
3. Answer the French political call to Liberate La Belle France?

Short answer, yes.

Long answer, also yes, but with Broadway show tunes, Music Hall numbers, a singing Mountie and a surly Frenchman.

 

[Tolls]

They might. But, if Germany doesn't go to war with the Netherlands then they have all the oil they can buy right there.

Unless Britain is blockading there as well. Which happened in WW1.

The Germans out-tricked the Russians diplomatically. Stalin was only interested in his own territorial demands, and he simply didn't believe the British, or his own spies, that Hitler was determined to march on Moscow.

Which has nothing to do with the Soviet posture in 1938, in which Stalin was willing to support the Czechs.

 

[Henri McPhee]

Would it be correct to say that after the Falaise pocket battle a broad front strategy was required by the Allies due to:

1. a broad front retreat by the German Army?
2. The need to take the channel ports and the greatest port Antwerp?
3. Answer the French political call to Liberate La Belle France?

Eisenhower made strategic mistakes in France. He never really understood the strategy in Normandy. In the end it delayed the end of the war by about six months at the cost of many lives and hardship. And like nearly all senior American military commanders at the time, except the genius MacArthur, he was a believer in the classic Civil war doctrine of frontal assault, of "Everybody attacks all the time."

 

[Henri McPhee]

Which has nothing to do with the Soviet posture in 1938, in which Stalin was willing to support the Czechs.

I just think it was all a bit more complicated than that. There is a discussion about the matter at this forum:

http://theminiaturespage.com/boards/msg.mv?id=87032

Admiral Knewt: I get the feeling Russia was actually collaborating with Germany at this point in history.

My information is that Stalin very much wanted to block Hitler's ambitions with the Red Army. His problem was that the USSR had no land border with the Czech Republic or Germany. The Russians would have had to march through Poland to intervene, and the Poles were absolutely opposed to that, threatened to fight them if they came. The Czechs were also unenthusiastic about hosting Soviet allies on their territory.

Stalin asked France and Britain to apply pressure on Poland, but no one paid much attention to him, and the Czech crisis ended with Chamberlain's Munich agreement. Supposedly it was then that Stalin concluded that the French and British would never fight Germany, and changed his own foreign policy to ally with the Nazis.

I think I got this interpretation of the history from A.J.P Taylor. If you've heard different, I'd be interested to know where and what.

 

[fagin]

Once again, the opinion of a random poster on an internet forum is not exactly historical fact.

Especially when they are a bit unsure themselves - "I think I got this interpretation of the history from A.J.P Taylor."

 

[Border Reiver]

Eisenhower made strategic mistakes in France. He never really understood the strategy in Normandy. In the end it delayed the end of the war by about six months at the cost of many lives and hardship. And like nearly all senior American military commanders at the time, except the genius MacArthur, he was a believer in the classic Civil war doctrine of frontal assault, of "Everybody attacks all the time."

Let's unpack this:

a. Eisenhower SET the strategy that was employed in Normandy. Eisenhower was the Supreme Commander. It was Eisenhower's strategy that Crerar, Montgomery, Patton and Bradley executed.

b. You are basing your speculation that the war could have been over by November 1944 on what exactly? Something you saw on the telly in 1974?

c. The Broad Front strategy employed was not an "everyone attacks all the time" plan. The plan was to move the front forward and ensuring that pockets of resistance were not left behind or bypassed to ensure that France was liberated from Nazi control and that the Allies were able to secure a large port close to the front to ensure resupply. The idea could be described as "when one area of the front advances, pressure will be brought in other areas to advance there." This ensures that a more aggressive commander does not unnecessarily expose the flanks of their advance leaving them vulnerable to attacks and being cut off. Zhukov ended up doing something similar - where is your criticism of him?

d. MacArthur was a legend in his own mind - and if he, Patton, and Montgomery were ever in the same room the collection of egos would undoubtedly reach critical mass and set off an explosion that would rival Hiroshima

That being said MacArthur's strategy of Island Hopping was influenced heavily by the theatre in which he waged war - a collection of islands that needed to be resupplied by ship - destroy the enemy navy and you can use your superior mobility to deal with the immobile enemy land forces later. You will note that this strategy could not work in Europe for the simple reason that Europe is a contiguous land mass and barring leaving much stronger follow on forces to contain pockets of resistance (by in effect making those pockets islands), you cannot eliminate enemy strategic mobility in such an area. Witness his campaign in Korea - straight forward ground slogging after the extremely well executed Inchon Landing.

Stop talking out of your hat. Stop relying on your vague recollections of "something you saw on the telly last night/last week/sometime in the undetermined past" and stop relying on anonymous posters on websites for your historical facts - go to your library and read proper history books. Be prepared to revise your preconceived ideas about what is accurate history

 

[Tolls]

I just think it was all a bit more complicated than that. There is a discussion about the matter at this forum:

http://theminiaturespage.com/boards/msg.mv?id=87032

Um, they're saying what I just said.
That the Soviets were backing the Czechs.
Had Britain and France supported the Czechs, and had it gone to war, Stalin is likely to at least have embargoed the food and resource shipments to Germany, wven if the Red Army could not actually get into the fight themselves.

 

[Garrette]

Let's unpack this:

a. Eisenhower SET the strategy that was employed in Normandy. Eisenhower was the Supreme Commander. It was Eisenhower's strategy that Crerar, Montgomery, Patton and Bradley executed.

b. You are basing your speculation that the war could have been over by November 1944 on what exactly? Something you saw on the telly in 1974?

c. The Broad Front strategy employed was not an "everyone attacks all the time" plan. The plan was to move the front forward and ensuring that pockets of resistance were not left behind or bypassed to ensure that France was liberated from Nazi control and that the Allies were able to secure a large port close to the front to ensure resupply. The idea could be described as "when one area of the front advances, pressure will be brought in other areas to advance there." This ensures that a more aggressive commander does not unnecessarily expose the flanks of their advance leaving them vulnerable to attacks and being cut off. Zhukov ended up doing something similar - where is your criticism of him?

d. MacArthur was a legend in his own mind - and if he, Patton, and Montgomery were ever in the same room the collection of egos would undoubtedly reach critical mass and set off an explosion that would rival Hiroshima

That being said MacArthur's strategy of Island Hopping was influenced heavily by the theatre in which he waged war - a collection of islands that needed to be resupplied by ship - destroy the enemy navy and you can use your superior mobility to deal with the immobile enemy land forces later. You will note that this strategy could not work in Europe for the simple reason that Europe is a contiguous land mass and barring leaving much stronger follow on forces to contain pockets of resistance (by in effect making those pockets islands), you cannot eliminate enemy strategic mobility in such an area. Witness his campaign in Korea - straight forward ground slogging after the extremely well executed Inchon Landing.

Stop talking out of your hat. Stop relying on your vague recollections of "something you saw on the telly last night/last week/sometime in the undetermined past" and stop relying on anonymous posters on websites for your historical facts - go to your library and read proper history books. Be prepared to revise your preconceived ideas about what is accurate history

I know I said I'm out, and I am in regard to responding to Henri, but I have to say that I enjoy your posts. Like your others, this is spot on.

 

[SpitfireIX]

I remember the former Jewish terrorist and Israeli president, or prime minister Begin, saying like people on this forum that the Czechs and Chamberlain should have gone to war in 1938. He struck me as another Master of Disaster. That's ill thought out.

No. What are ill thought out are your claims that Germany could have invaded or bombed Britain into submission, or invaded France, in 1938 or 1939, while attacking or recovering from conquering Czechoslovakia.

Not all Jews think like that. This is a differing Israeli opinion about appeasement:

https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/In-praise-of-appeasement-332994

Yet again, Touval is not a historian. As far as I could determine, he's a "foreign-policy analyst" and former professor of business management. Like all of your other non-historians, he wants to rehabilitate appeasement because he favors the appeasement of Iran and/or North Korea.

Further, he claims that the only reason appeasement failed in 1938 was that Hitler was so unreasonable, which contradicts your assertion that Chamberlain knew war was inevitable and was only buying time for rearmament.

Finally, Touval misuses the word "appeasement" by applying it to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Kennedy's policy was the absolute antithesis of appeasement. The fact that he secretly agreed to withdraw some US missiles in Turkey (which were obsolescent and slated to be decommissioned anyway) does not change that. Appeasement would have been letting the Russians keep their missiles in Cuba in return for an agreement not to add any more.

 

[lobosrul5]

Eisenhower made strategic mistakes in France. He never really understood the strategy in Normandy. In the end it delayed the end of the war by about six months at the cost of many lives and hardship. And like nearly all senior American military commanders at the time, except the genius MacArthur, he was a believer in the classic Civil war doctrine of frontal assault, of "Everybody attacks all the time."

why am I surprised that Henri actually thinks highly of 'ole dugout Doug.

 

[lobosrul5]

That being said MacArthur's strategy of Island Hopping was influenced heavily by the theatre in which he waged war - a collection of islands that needed to be resupplied by ship - destroy the enemy navy and you can use your superior mobility to deal with the immobile enemy land forces later. You will note that this strategy could not work in Europe for the simple reason that Europe is a contiguous land mass and barring leaving much stronger follow on forces to contain pockets of resistance (by in effect making those pockets islands), you cannot eliminate enemy strategic mobility in such an area. Witness his campaign in Korea - straight forward ground slogging after the extremely well executed Inchon Landing.

And absolutely positively needlessly wasted lives taking Peleliu. And his "defense" of the Phillipines was an amateurish shambles.

 

[SpitfireIX]

I can understand the arguments for declaring war in 1938 and that weak little Germany might have had a hard time defending itself then.

Apart from the appeal to ridicule fallacy, I'll be charitable and assume you hadn't read my post in the other thread when you wrote this. Hitler's own generals in command on the Western Front told him that they couldn't even hold off the French for three weeks. Were they wrong?

The problem is you need to have a wide and practical experience about all this . . .

As Garrison said, you have repeatedly demonstrated that you lack such experience.

. . . and that includes the state of the economy . . .

As has been repeatedly explained to you, and you have repeatedly ignored, Germany's economy was weak in 1938; the fact that Hitler was able to loot Czechoslovakia practically^* without firing a shot was instrumental in propping it up.

. . . and public opinion . . .

Which was heavily in favor of taking military measures, if necessary, to stop one country from attacking another, as erwinl pointed out, and I correctly predicted you would ignore.

. . . and even if the military felt they were capable of going to war in 1938.

The IGS never said they weren't capable of going to war. As I said, they stated, incorrectly, that a delay of 6-12 months would be advantageous. Although they were correct that the air-defense system would be stronger after that time, they also admitted that the Heer would be considerably strengthened by the looting of Czechoslovakia. And, as has been mentioned, there is some evidence that they were only telling Chamberlain what he wanted to hear.

To my mind being at war then would have involved attacking Germany, and neither the Czechs or French or British were in any military state to attack Germany then.

How was France not in "any military state to attack Germany" in 1938? As I've mentioned, the German generals commanding on the Western Front stated that they couldn't even hold out for three weeks.

Further, were France, Britain, and Poland "in any military state to attack Germany" in 1939?

Soviet Russia didn't want to.

Your opinion, with no real evidence provided, as usual. But the real question is whether they could have attacked Germany. That aside, even their not providing raw materials to Germany would have been helpful to the Allies.

Chamberlain, or Churchill, would also have been blamed now for starting the war.

No. And, as has been explained to you repeatedly, Churchill has nothing to do with the matter, as he was a backbencher in 1938. You're just throwing him in as an excuse for another anonymous attack by proxy.

There is a bit about Churchill's strategic genius and political genius at this website:

https://www.quora.com/Was-Winston-Churchill-considered-a-good-military-strategist

I decline to be drawn into an irrelevant debate by proxy about Churchill's military strategy.
______________
^*I've added the qualifier, as I've learned that there were actually a relatively small number of shots fired.

 

[Henri McPhee]

I have discovered the name of that Czech senior military intelligence officer who with twelve of his colleagues it was arranged for them to move to London before the war. I read his book from the public library once but couldn't remember his name. It was Frantisek Moravec. There is a bit of waffle about him on the internet. He seems to have provided British intelligence and Chamberlain with important information:

https://spyinggame.me/2015/01/27/master-of-spies/

He recounts stories of his work with agents, especially A-54, and the acquisition of advance warnings of Hitler’s plans for the invasions of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Western Europe in 1940 and the USSR in 1941; there are sections on his role and planning for the assassination of Heydrich (whose killing was of no value to the Allied cause, according to Robert Bruce Lockhart) and prewar liaison with the French and Soviet intelligence services. For those interested in counterintelligence, there are good portions on the Czech destruction of a Hungarian espionage network and on German penetrations in Czechoslovakia, while his description of President Benes’ s dealings with the Soviets during the war opens some interesting avenues for analysis and research. The recruitment of the Hungarian colonel who continued to work for the Allies as Hungary’s chief of intelligence until his death in 1942 is only one example of Moravec’s talents in intelligence and counterintelligence.