Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

Tolls said:
Can't read that here, but considering the biggest problem the French had was their "upper management", and that was (as far as I can remember) pretty much the same in 38 as it was in 39, I'm not sure in what way they were better prepared?
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It would be page 199 when you get to it. (Gamelin said they had 1,5m of soldiers mobilized and they would advance into Germany till serious resistance encountered and then withdrawing behind Maginot line.)

Note: C&P not possible.
 
But wasn't that the plan in 39?
That was the Saar offensive.
And they scarpered back to Maginot when they encountered bits of the German defences.

I don't see the mobilisation in late September '38 being any earlier or faster than in '39. It was the same mobilisation plan.
 
Tolls said:
But wasn't that the plan in 39?
That was the Saar offensive.
And they scarpered back to Maginot when they encountered bits of the German defences.

I don't see the mobilisation in late September '38 being any earlier or faster than in '39. It was the same mobilisation plan.
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It gives completely different impression. I guess that since it would be in our defense it would go differently. (France really liked us apparently)
 
Possibly, but you still have Gamelin to contend with and the limitations of French mobilisation, which were no different in '38 than '39. So a force would not have been available for about a fortnight.
 
Tolls said:
Possibly, but you still have Gamelin to contend with and the limitations of French mobilisation, which were no different in '38 than '39. So a force would not have been available for about a fortnight.
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That's the thing, it's Gamelin who is so active in our support. Those parts where are quotes from French are so unlike what we know from 1939.
 
lobosrul5 said:
And absolutely positively needlessly wasted lives taking Peleliu. And his "defense" of the Phillipines was an amateurish shambles.
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Pelielu was a shared reponsiblity;Nimitz, in one of his few mistakes, also felt that taking Peleliu was necessary. Ironically Halsey, who had the reputation of being over aggressive ,is the one who recommended bypassing it.
 
Henri, we're still waiting for you to explain, in detail, how the Germans were going to conquer France and Britain in 1939, assuming that they were able to conquer Czechoslovakia in 1938.
 
Klimax said:
That's the thing, it's Gamelin who is so active in our support. Those parts where are quotes from French are so unlike what we know from 1939.
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Perhaps the events of Autumn 1938 simply undermined French resolve? And of course in 1938 they would have been facing defences barely worthy of the name.
 
dudalb said:
a brutal Autumn campaign,taking nearly two months, fought largely by Canadian Troops,when in early September it could have been done very quickly and at little cost.
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No.

Opening the Scheldt was never going to be quick or easy because of Walcheren Island.

Walcheren was an Atlantic Wall fortress with a large number of large calibre naval guns, anti-aircraft guns, a Fortress Regiment and support from various 7th Army divisions moving from coastal defences further south.

It couldn't be ignored as its guns covered the minefields in the Scheldt, FAAA refused to carry out an airborne assault, and the landward approach was along a very narrow 1km+ causeway. A seaborne assault needed the specialist craft that were involved in the capture of Le Havre and then needed refitting.

Walcheren might have been isolated earlier, making the final assault by the Canadians easier, but it was never going to be a quick or easy battle.

Best book on it is Moulton's Battle for Antwerp.
 
I made it to the library yesterday, and I ordered Australia and Appeasement on Interlibrary Loan. Plus I checked out Wages of Destruction, on the basis of the recommendations in this thread.

Of more immediate interest, however, I also checked out The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938-1939: The Path to Ruin, by Williamson Murray, whose Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945 I've previously quoted.

I skimmed the chapters on Munich and its aftermath while I was at the library; I'll read them and take notes when I get a chance. From what I've seen so far, Murray is very much against the "Chamberlain gained time for rearmament" argument.

The book has an entire chapter on how the war would likely have developed if Britain and France had backed Czechoslovakia; Murray's conclusion is that that war would have been won by the Allies at a significantly lower cost than the war that started in 1939.
 
Klimax said:
That's the thing, it's Gamelin who is so active in our support. Those parts where are quotes from French are so unlike what we know from 1939.
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Well, he did promise a major offensive 2 weeks after the declaration of war to the Poles...and we got the Saar.
 
Klimax said:
I wonder how enthusiastic were French about Poles and if there was anything different in France between 1938 and 1939.
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The French High Command was in a bad state in 1938 and 1939. The political situation was chaotic there as well. General Juin was a good general but he was not in control. There is a bit of information about the matter at this website:

https://ww2-weapons.com/french-armed-forces-1939/

The French military establishment had its critics, and there was a small but vociferous school of thought which condemned the reliance on static fortifications.

The French Army, based on conscription, was of variable quality; reserve divisions especially were often considered a liability, and observers, including the British General Brooke, were shaken by their insubordination and slovenly appearance.
The French Army was mobilised on 1 September 1939: about 5,000,000 reservists were to be added to the standing army of 900,000 men.
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