The Germans were perfectly capable of bombing Prague in 1938, and it would not have been very nice for the Czechs.
And the Blitz wasn't very nice for the English, yet Britain didn't surrender.
Churchill would not have been much help to the Czechs in that situation.
First, as has been repeatedly pointed out to you, Churchill was not in government in 1938, though, had Britain gone to war with Germany then, he probably would have joined the War Cabinet, as he did in 1939.
Second, as has also been repeatedly pointed out to you, the idea isn't that Britain and France (and possibly the Soviet Union) could have necessarily saved Czechoslovakia. Rather, it's that Czechoslovakia needed to put up a fight, in order to drain German (and Czech) resources, so as to pave the way for ultimate victory over the Nazis, with most likely a far smaller cost in blood and treasure than historically.
And yet, when I previously introduced this document, your only comment was to claim, incorrectly, that the Empire and the dominions wouldn't have gone to war along with Britain in 1938. As for the quotation, as others have said, it only further weakens your case, such as it is.
I agree that the Luftwaffe had all sorts of problems, including technical problems, but its dive bombers did a lot of damage, even in Soviet Russia.
Yes, they did a lot of damage--to infantry and artillery [ETA: (and, when the pilots were properly trained, which they weren't until later in the war, ships)]. Cities and factories, not so much. And here's another quotation (p. 19) that illustrates the Luftwaffe's utter lack of readiness in 1938:
The introduction of a new generation of bombers and fighters after 1936 caused serious transition problems. High accident rates coupled with low in-commission rates continued to plague the transition program as late as the summer of 1938. At that time, Luftwaffe operational ready rates were surprisingly low. On August 1, 1938, the in-commission rate for bombers was 49 percent, for fighters 70 percent, and for the whole force 57 percent. Only after drastically reducing flying and training time could the Luftwaffe bring its in-commission rate to a respectable level by the end of September 1938, shortly before the onset of the planned invasion of Czechoslovakia. The level of aircrew training was equally deplorable. In August, the Luftwaffe possessed barely two-thirds of its authorized crew strength, and over 40 percent of the crews on duty were not fully operational. [notes omitted]
As noted in the table following the above, availability of bomber crews in August 1938 was particularly bad, with only 378 fully operational (27%) and 411 partly operational (29%), against an authorized strength of 1407. And the situation for dive bombers wasn't much better, with 80 fully operational (27%) and 123 partly operational (43%), against an authorized strength of 300.
