Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

Retreading the same tired line. Again no one is disputing that Britain gained from the delay created by Munich, the point other posters here have been trying to get you to understand is that Germany gained far more.

It is interesting that Tooze in his book The Wages of Destruction argues that one of the reasons Germany went to war in Serpt. 1, 1939 was because it was becoming clear that Germany was encountering formidable economic, , structural and resource barriers to it's military build up and that after the benefits of Munich were exhausted, Germany's military position in relation to Britain and France would deteriorate from early 1940 on. This was because in the wake of the occupation of Prague in March 1939, France and Britain made efforts to accelerate rearmament. (To a large extent forced on reluctant governments by an irate, angry population.)

In other words things would never be has good for Germany militarily after the fall of 1939 to it would be best to strike then.

So yeah Germany benefited more from Munich and its fallout than France or Britain, certainly militarily, but with the greater resources, fiscal etc., of France and Britain that advantage would start to disappear from the start of 1940, so it would be best to strike while the iron was hot.

Tooze also argues that the idea that Hitler expected France and England not to declare war if he invaded Poland is wrong. Instead Hitler expected war with the Western powers and indeed hoped for it.
 
It is interesting that Tooze in his book The Wages of Destruction argues that one of the reasons Germany went to war in Serpt. 1, 1939 was because it was becoming clear that Germany was encountering formidable economic, , structural and resource barriers to it's military build up and that after the benefits of Munich were exhausted, Germany's military position in relation to Britain and France would deteriorate from early 1940 on. This was because in the wake of the occupation of Prague in March 1939, France and Britain made efforts to accelerate rearmament. (To a large extent forced on reluctant governments by an irate, angry population.)

In other words things would never be has good for Germany militarily after the fall of 1939 to it would be best to strike then.

So yeah Germany benefited more from Munich and its fallout than France or Britain, certainly militarily, but with the greater resources, fiscal etc., of France and Britain that advantage would start to disappear from the start of 1940, so it would be best to strike while the iron was hot.

Tooze also argues that the idea that Hitler expected France and England not to declare war if he invaded Poland is wrong. Instead Hitler expected war with the Western powers and indeed hoped for it.

I cannot recommend Wages Of Destruction enough. Tooze is that rarity among economic historians;he explains economic issues clearly and without the use of jargon that goes way over the head of the average reader. Even other Historians often find Economic Historians to be pretty hard sledding.
 
It is interesting that Tooze in his book The Wages of Destruction argues that one of the reasons Germany went to war in Serpt. 1, 1939 was because it was becoming clear that Germany was encountering formidable economic, , structural and resource barriers to it's military build up and that after the benefits of Munich were exhausted, Germany's military position in relation to Britain and France would deteriorate from early 1940 on. This was because in the wake of the occupation of Prague in March 1939, France and Britain made efforts to accelerate rearmament. (To a large extent forced on reluctant governments by an irate, angry population.)

In other words things would never be has good for Germany militarily after the fall of 1939 to it would be best to strike then.

So yeah Germany benefited more from Munich and its fallout than France or Britain, certainly militarily, but with the greater resources, fiscal etc., of France and Britain that advantage would start to disappear from the start of 1940, so it would be best to strike while the iron was hot.

Tooze also argues that the idea that Hitler expected France and England not to declare war if he invaded Poland is wrong. Instead Hitler expected war with the Western powers and indeed hoped for it.

Would also heartily recommend Wages of Destruction. :) If anyone still buys into the myth of the super-efficient Nazi's they really need to read that book. Germany lurched from one crisis to the next, usually 'fixed' by either looting some other country(of money, resources and even people) or resorting to ever more brutal and repressive measures to mobilize their own workforce.

The attack on France in 1940 wasn't the product of brilliant strategic planning. It was a desperate gamble on the only possible chance of victory before the Wehrmacht supplies ran. The notion of Germany succeeding in 1938 is plain ludicrous if you read Tooze's work. But since it isn't a one page website I doubt Henri will ever choose to do so.
 
Any sort of Alliance in 1938 between Germany and the USSR is just not on the cards. Hitler certainly didn't expect Munich to produce any results and if you look at his actions prior to the Czech crisis he was still trying to build up his anti-comintern pact, he was trying to recruit the Poles to side with him against the USSR.

On the other side one of Stalin's goals with the M-R Pact was to encourage war amongst the Western capitalist powers, while the USSR sat it out and got on with rebuilding his military. In 1938 a deal with Germany has to opposite effect, making war in the West less likely.

I never said they'd ally. I was basically saying he had no means or reason to actively oppose Germany in '38. Not just militarily, but he had no reason to embargo them, when he can get more machinetools and stuff from them while they duke it out or not with the rest of the world.

It was really only the aftermath of Munich that paved the way for the M-R Pact.

As I've said before, I'm not convinced that that is the main cause. The USSR needed desperately to secure its western border SOMEHOW in '39, so it can move whatever operational divisions it had to the Japanese border, where a major incident was unfolding.

We tend to think of the USSR as a major superpower, but in '39 it had only 1.6 million soldiers, less than a fifth of what they had in '39. And as I was saying on the previous page, most of its tank divisions lacked trucks for the infantry, lacked spare parts, lacked ammo, etc. Most motorized divisions were even less mobile than the foot divisions, because the foot divisions had horses to pull their artillery and supplies, while most motorized divisions hadn't received their trucks. Etc.

It was in no condition to even risk a war on two fronts. In fact, it was in no condition to even fight Japan alone, if it came to full scale war. Its only chance was to throw every division it could make fully operational at the incident, so the Japanese stop it right there.

So it had to sign SOME pact that guaranteed that what's left behind in the west doesn't get rolled over. Was England or France going to guarantee the USSR's independence against Germany? I don't think so. It had to sign a pact with Germany.
 
I've not looked into this myself in any great detail, but does anyone have a grasp on what Poland would likely have done in the case of a war in '38 over Czechoslovakia?

My assumption has been that they would have been mad to align with Germany due to the threat of a Soviet invasion, but is that a reasonable assumption?

Would Poland have felt confident enough to join in the invasion?
 
I've not looked into this myself in any great detail, but does anyone have a grasp on what Poland would likely have done in the case of a war in '38 over Czechoslovakia?

My assumption has been that they would have been mad to align with Germany due to the threat of a Soviet invasion, but is that a reasonable assumption?

Would Poland have felt confident enough to join in the invasion?

What for? They already had part of Silesia from previous war. And available low land avenues for attack had heavy fortifications finished anyway. (And mountain approaches were filled with light fortifications)

For those curious, we have masive electronic database of all fortifications:
http://www.opevneni.cz/
 
I've not looked into this myself in any great detail, but does anyone have a grasp on what Poland would likely have done in the case of a war in '38 over Czechoslovakia?

There was a complex political situation in Poland at that time as well. Poland was interested in territorial demands on the Czechs and Ukraine. There is quite an amusing article on the internet, which is pro-Nazi and pro - German, which says that Hitler was only peace loving and that Chamberlain should be blamed for starting the war. It makes a change from all this Churchill talk of Chamberlain appeasement:

https://www.wintersonnenwende.com/scriptorium/english/archives/articles/wrsynopsis.html

These and many more are the things one must take into account before making the fallacious accusation that Germany was the one to have started WW2. The following quotations are added here to show that not only Poland was bent on war against Germany, but also her ally Great Britain (and France). Although it is still widely believed that Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain on September 29th, 1938 (Munich) honestly tried for peace, one has to consider the possibility that his real goals were somewhat different. Only five months later, on February 22nd, 1939, he let the cat out of the bag when he said in Blackburn: "... During the past two days we have discussed the progress of our arms build-up. The figures are indeed overwhelming, perhaps even to such an extent that the people are no longer able even to comprehend them.... Ships, cannons, planes and ammunition are now pouring out of our dock yards and factories in an ever-increasing torrent..."

Max Klüver writes: "Of the considerable body of evidence that gives cause to doubt whether Chamberlain actually wanted peace, one noteworthy item is a conversation [after Hitler's address to the Reichstag on April 28th,1939, W.R.] between Chamberlain's chief advisor Wilson, and Göring's colleague Wohlthat... When Wohlthat, taking his leave, again stressed his conviction that Hitler did not want war, Wilson's answer was indicative of the fundamental British attitude that could not be a basis for negotiations between equals: 'I said that I was not surprised to hear him say that as I had thought myself that Hitler cannot have overlooked the tremendous increases which we have made in our defensive and offensive preparations, including for instance the very large increase in our Air Force.'"
 
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There is quite an amusing article on the internet, which is pro-Nazi and pro - German, which says that Hitler was only peace loving and that Chamberlain should be blamed for starting the war. It makes a change from all this Churchill talk of Chamberlain appeasement:


What, exactly, do you feel that quoting from a pro-Nazi, Holocaust-apologist website is contributing to the discussion, other than providing an opportunity for you to attempt to change the subject after you've had your head handed to you in the debate so far?

Also, when are you planning to answer all the questions you've repeatedly ducked?
 
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There was a complex political situation in Poland at that time as well. Poland was interested in territorial demands on the Czechs and Ukraine. There is quite an amusing article on the internet, which is pro-Nazi and pro - German, which says that Hitler was only peace loving and that Chamberlain should be blamed for starting the war. It makes a change from all this Churchill talk of Chamberlain appeasement:

https://www.wintersonnenwende.com/scriptorium/english/archives/articles/wrsynopsis.html

Three things:

1) There is no such thing as an 'amusing pro-Nazi'article.

2) No one in this thread brings up Churchill except you.

3) The second paragraph of your quote contradicts your entire argument about the justification for Chamberlain's policy.
 
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There was a complex political situation in Poland at that time as well. Poland was interested in territorial demands on the Czechs and Ukraine. There is quite an amusing article on the internet, which is pro-Nazi and pro - German, which says that Hitler was only peace loving and that Chamberlain should be blamed for starting the war. It makes a change from all this Churchill talk of Chamberlain appeasement:

https://www.wintersonnenwende.com/scriptorium/english/archives/articles/wrsynopsis.html

Nazis huh - amusing - huh. Henri time for you to go away for a few days then come back and do a complete fringe reset.
 
What for? They already had part of Silesia from previous war. And available low land avenues for attack had heavy fortifications finished anyway. (And mountain approaches were filled with light fortifications)

For those curious, we have masive electronic database of all fortifications:
http://www.opevneni.cz/

Well, since both Poland and Hungary were involved in the break up in March '39, I was wondering what the odds of them getting involved in a war against Czechoslovakia in '38 was. It's something I've seen mentioned in alt history places, but rarely with anything other than a "what if Poland and Hungary got involved" and little else showing how likely that would have been.
 
There is a bit of a comedy sketch on YouTube with regard to the Irish and appeasement:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O4X_bdJox8w

Henri that is utterly irrelevant, so no change there. Please address the question. Are you admitting that your claim about American 'military clout was false? Because in context it clearly was not a joke on your part. BTW for reference Fawlty Towers is amusing, posting links to pro-Nazi sites is not.

There is a list of questions you have ducked, and claims you have yet to substantiate, perhaps you should focus on those instead of pointless YouTube links?
 
Well, since both Poland and Hungary were involved in the break up in March '39, I was wondering what the odds of them getting involved in a war against Czechoslovakia in '38 was. It's something I've seen mentioned in alt history places, but rarely with anything other than a "what if Poland and Hungary got involved" and little else showing how likely that would have been.

Thing is it's a bit of a toss up. Poland siding with Germany in 1938 would rather be the 'turkeys voting for Christmas'. It's hard to believe that they wouldn't have realized where the Germans would turn after the Sudetenland, Danzig and East Prussia were the next obvious targets.

On the other hand you only have to look at the Stalin in 1941 to see the power of denial. Overall I think the Poles would have seen Nazi Germany as the more immediate threat and acted accordingly, but I wouldn't want to have to bet on it.
 
Thing is it's a bit of a toss up. Poland siding with Germany in 1938 would rather be the 'turkeys voting for Christmas'. It's hard to believe that they wouldn't have realized where the Germans would turn after the Sudetenland, Danzig and East Prussia were the next obvious targets.

On the other hand you only have to look at the Stalin in 1941 to see the power of denial. Overall I think the Poles would have seen Nazi Germany as the more immediate threat and acted accordingly, but I wouldn't want to have to bet on it.

And we didn't. We had border fortifications on border with Poland too.
 
What the :rule10 does this have to do with appeasement??

And when are you going to answer the questions you've been asked?

You are forgetting Henri rule 1

He isn't wrong.

All he is doing now is a form of inept trolling trying to get revenge for being shown to be so wrong so often.
 

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