Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

[Tolls]

Yes, if Hitler thought the Red Army was a huge capable force, that probably would've weighed on his decision to go to war for Czechoslovakia, even if in reality they weren't. Germany would essentially be fighting the same enemies as in WW1, but with no Habsburg or Ottoman empire.

Though, as was been mentioned earlier, the Soviet Union did not have a border with Czechoslovakia, so unless someone else gets involved the Soviets could only supply aircraft and whatever could be brought into the (presumably bombed) Czech airfields.

And I've always wondered, how seriously did the flag/general officers in Britain at the time take an operation Sea Lion? For example, did they know Germany's plan relied on towed river barges that were lucky to make 3 or 4 knots?

They had aerial photos of the barges, so they were pretty clued up on what the Germans had available. I expect they were more concerned than they needed to be, but that's probably preferable to being cocky.

 

[SpitfireIX]

A good example is something as mundane as motor transport. Germany couldn't produce enough trucks and lorries to equip its army even in piece. When the war actually started they never stood a chance, they could barely keep up with losses, civilian motor transport was almost completely commandeered for military use. This had a choking effect on the economy.
Horses were still important up until the end.

Once for an economics class, I had to interview someone who'd lived through the Great Depression. I asked the professor if I could interview someone who'd lived through the Depression in another country. He said I could, so I interviewed an older friend of my mother's who was born in Germany in 1921.

At one point she mentioned that she'd subscribed to buy a Volkswagen. "I paid my 999 marks, but I never got a Volkswagen," she said, shaking her head.

"They all went to Russia," I responded. (That may have been a bit insensitive of me; her father was killed driving an ammunition truck in 1943. )

"Ja, they all went into the war. I wondered why they were all grey; I though maybe it was easier to paint them the same color."

 

[SpitfireIX]

Soviet Russia was not much help and they would not come to our aid in a crisis.

If by "our" you mean "Britain's," that's likely true. The issue, however, is whether they would have come to the aid of Czechoslovakia, with whom they were allied. But even if Stalin had not sent direct military aid, the mere threat of his being able to do so would have tied down some German troops in the East.

The Luftwaffe were capable of terror bombing on London in 1938.

Yes, with unsustainable losses inflicted by Gladiators directed by the same radar that directed Spitfires and Hurricanes in 1940.

The air war was pretty close in 1940 with Spitfires and Hurricanes.

First, as has been pointed out to you, it was never that close. It might have been closer if the Germans had made better strategic choices. Second, as has also been pointed out to you, in 1940 Germany had numerous airbases on the English Channel.

I just think Hitler would have used the same strategy in 1938 to reach Northern France but it would have been a year earlier with Britain unprepared for war.

Wishful thinking. How were the Germans going to use the same strategy on the Western Front in 1938, or even spring of 1939, with only at most half as many significantly weaker panzer divisions, and a lot fewer infantry divisions, as in 1940??

The English Channel was dangerous waters for the British Navy. They wanted to stay in the North Sea.

No. You've been corrected on this point several times; why do you keep repeating it?

There is a discussion of appeasement on this forum:

http://www.johndclare.net/RoadtoWWII4_AppeasementForum.htm

This "discussion" misses the point. Chamberlain and Daladier could have given Czechoslovakia a guarantee, as they later guaranteed Poland. That would have provided a justification for a declaration of war had Hitler proceeded with an attack (assuming he wasn't deposed by the Wehrmacht).

 

[theprestige]

This "discussion" misses the point. Chamberlain and Daladier could have given Czechoslovakia a guarantee, as they later guaranteed Poland. That would have provided a justification for a declaration of war had Hitler proceeded with an attack (assuming he wasn't deposed by the Wehrmacht).

It's been a while since I read Churchill's history of the war, and my recollection may be bad. However, I do remember that this seemed to be the basis of Churchill's harshest criticism of Chamberlain.

For the most part, Churchill was generous towards Chamberlain in his book. But on this point, Churchill argued that giving the "Polish guarantee" to Czechoslovakia would have deterred Hitler from further aggression; whereas giving the guarantee to Poland had the opposite effect of encouraging Hitler and guaranteeing further aggression.

I forget the details of his reasoning, though, so feel free to dismiss it as a bit of waffle from a confused old man whose opinion is based on dim memories of memoirs read decades ago.

 

[Henri McPhee]

Another claim that contradicts the facts. No one wanted war in 1938 but if it had come over Czechslovakia France would have fought and at the very least the USSR would not have been allied with Nazi Germany and would almost certainly have intervened on behalf of their Czech allies.


Please make up your mind. Did the USA have the clout to intervene but wasn't interested or was it too weak to intervene? Pick one or the other.

You seem to have a high opinion of French and Soviet Russian military strength in 1938. It's no good Churchill just wringing his hands in public. He needed to deliver the goods which Chamberlain did.

My own opinion is that there would have been terror bombing of London in 1939, and the Gloster Gladiators and Bristol Blenheims would have put up a plucky little fight until they were made non- operational. Then there would have been shooty-bangs on the British mainland. The British public would not have their hearts in all this because most of them had never heard of the Sudetanland.

My reference to American military clout at the time was an Irish joke, or irony as it's known, which the armchair admirals on this forum don't seem to understand.

With regard to Soviet Russia at the time there is a reference in that Russian Outlook book in 1947 by Lieutenant -General Sir Giffard Martel:

it is estimated in 1937 that about 20 per cent of the entire officers of the Red army were either shot or removed from command in this purge. The list included many able and experienced officers such as Tukhachevsky, Uborovich and Egorov. A very large proportion of the higher commanders and staff had to be replaced in 1938 by young and inexperienced officers. The result was a very great loss in efficiency, and the army, once again, came under political control.

There is a bit about the American attitude in 1938 at this website:

http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/ghost-munich-americas-appeasement-complex

When considering the Munich accord and its legacy, we should remember that Franklin Roosevelt initially greeted the pact with equanimity—and that it infuriated Hitler. Like many informed Americans (and Europeans), Roosevelt suspected that Britain and France were unready for war at the time, and he knew that the American public had no desire to enter into another European conflict. Negotiations seemed the best course to take. “Good man,” FDR famously cabled Chamberlain after the conference, even as he privately acknowledged that the Briton was “taking very long chances.” Hitler, meanwhile, wanted war in 1938. He was angry that he had let himself be maneuvered into a diplomatic agreement that bought the democracies time.

For Chamberlain, Munich indeed represented a tactical victory of sorts. It provided England with a breathing spell to build its strength in preparation for the likely showdown with the Nazi juggernaut. As a result, Chamberlain won broad support for his efforts among his informed countrymen, who understood he had few cards to play.

When war came the following year, however, “Munich” instantly became a symbol of diplomatic naïveté. By the time Chamberlain died in November 1940, his reputation was in tatters. “Few men can have known such a tremendous reverse of fortune in so short a time,” he remarked not long before his death.

 

[Border Reiver]

You seem to have a high opinion of French and Soviet Russian military strength in 1938.

We are pointing out that unit for unit, the Wehrmacht was inferior to its potential enemies had war begun in 1938 in both size and technical kit.

For example - the British Army was completely mechanized by 1938 - it had sufficient trucks to handle its logistic needs, shift its artillery and its infantry, and maintained no cavalry outside of a ceremonial force. In addition, Britain had the industrial capacity to produce more trucks for its military and civilian economic needs throughout any conflict while the Germans could not and relied on nicking other country's kit.

It's no good Churchill just wringing his hands in public. He needed to deliver the goods which Chamberlain did.

In 1938 Winnie was in no position to "deliver the goods" as he was not in government. At the time, all he could do was deliver a warning and make speeches.

My own opinion is that there would have been terror bombing of London in 1939, and the Gloster Gladiators and Bristol Blenheims would have put up a plucky little fight until they were made non- operational.

Given that no German fighters in service in 1938 were capable of making it to Great Britain from their airfields in Germany to support the bombers, I believe the Gladiators, Blenheims and the lower number of operational Hurricanes would have done more than put up a "a plucky little fight." They very likely would have destroyed the German bomber force.

Unless you're under the impression that the French would let the Luftwaffe use their airfields to bomb an ally.

Then there would have been shooty-bangs on the British mainland. The British public would not have their hearts in all this because most of them had never heard of the Sudetanland.

If you're referring to bombs dropping on England, I'm fairly certain that this would have had the effect of ticking off the British public and not causing them to throw in the towel....

Given the demonstrated inability of bombing to do this.

 

[Tolls]

My own opinion is that there would have been terror bombing of London in 1939, and the Gloster Gladiators and Bristol Blenheims would have put up a plucky little fight until they were made non- operational.

So you don't think Britain would fall in a week in 1938? That's good. We're making progress.

Of course you haven't explained what would have made those aircraft non-operational, but even if they had been then the Hurricanes would have been there. We are talking 1939 now, after all.

Then there would have been shooty-bangs on the British mainland. The British public would not have their hearts in all this because most of them had never heard of the Sudetanland.

And it has been explained to you how any form of invasion of the British mainland was simply a no-go.

 

[Garrison]

You seem to have a high opinion of French and Soviet Russian military strength in 1938. It's no good Churchill just wringing his hands in public. He needed to deliver the goods which Chamberlain did.

Why do you keep referencing Churchill he has nothing to do with the subject under discussiom

My own opinion is that there would have been terror bombing of London in 1939, and the Gloster Gladiators and Bristol Blenheims would have put up a plucky little fight until they were made non- operational.

Why would you imagine for one second, given your complete failure to support any of your claims with any evidence, that anyone is going to give any weight to your opinion? What was going to render them non-operational? Especially as by summer 1939 it would have been Hurricanes and Spitfires the Germans would have been facing so you yet again make a nonsensical claim.

Then there would have been shooty-bangs on the British mainland.

Is your childish attempt to refer to an invasion? Because that was never possible at any time.

The British public would not have their hearts in all this because most of them had never heard of the Sudetanland.

And you think once they come under direct attack from the Germans they will just capitulate, yeah that plan worked so well for the Japanese in the pacific...

My reference to American military clout at the time was an Irish joke,

So that is you withdrawing that claim while, having an irrelevant dig at your other pet hate, the Irish?

or irony as it's known which the armchair admirals on this forum don't seem to understand.

So you made a false claim, which in the context in which you posted clearly was not ironic and try to blame everyone else for taking you seriously and denigrate the factual information on air and naval capabilities you've had explained repeatedly?

With regard to Soviet Russia at the time there is a reference in that Russian Outlook book in 1947 by Lieutenant -General Sir Giffard Martel:

You mean exactly the same thing Hans Mustermann laid out in far more detail a few posts back?

There is a bit about the American attitude in 1938 at this website:

Yes they were inclined to neutrality, lucky then that by their own estimate the Germans couldn't have won against the British and the French in 1938.

Could you please drop the childishness and address the outstanding questions that have been asked of you?

 

[HansMustermann]

"Ja, they all went into the war. I wondered why they were all grey; I though maybe it was easier to paint them the same color."

That's not even far off from the truth. Remember that Germany later resorted to a camo scheme where about two thirds of the tank was left in orange primer colour, to save on paint.

Mind you, even before that, the tanks were delivered only with the primer on them, and it was your problem to paint it any way you wish. (And can find enough paint for.)

Between that and mix-and-match bits -- e.g., some Panthers had radial fans, some had axial fans, and some had one of each -- I think it's safe to say that Germany invented tabletop wargaming

And, hey, their tanks were only slightly more expensive than the Games Workshop ones

 

[HansMustermann]

Yes, if Hitler thought the Red Army was a huge capable force, that probably would've weighed on his decision to go to war for Czechoslovakia, even if in reality they weren't.

I think it's safe to say that out of all nations, Germany took the USSR the LEAST seriously. At the risk of repeating myself, the Nazis drank deep and greedily of their own Kool Aid.

But basically you just answered that question yourself above. IF Hitler had thought the USSR is some military super-power in '38, THEN he'd have sought some deal with them about Czechoslovakia. Especially since they were allies of the very state he was trying to divide. Since X => Y is equivalent to !Y => !X, that tells you exactly how much of a superpower he thought they were.

 

[Garrison]

I think it's safe to say that out of all nations, Germany took the USSR the LEAST seriously. At the risk of repeating myself, the Nazis drank deep and greedily of their own Kool Aid.

But basically you just answered that question yourself above. IF Hitler had thought the USSR is some military super-power in '38, THEN he'd have sought some deal with them about Czechoslovakia. Especially since they were allies of the very state he was trying to divide. Since X => Y is equivalent to !Y => !X, that tells you exactly how much of a superpower he thought they were.

Yeah in 1938 the major impact of the USSR is likely to be economic and diplomatic rather than military. The economic impact is obvious in that the USSR won't be supplying Germany with food and raw materials, which in combination with a British blockade is going to make a bad situation much worse. Diplomatically the Eastern European nations that do share a border with the USSR are a lot less like to be drawn into the German sphere of influence without the M-R. If Romania decides not to ship oil from Ploesti to Germany then bad becomes catastrophic from Germany. In 1940 even with Oil from the USSR and Romania Germany was considering 'demotorizing' elements of the army to conserve fuel stocks.

 

[Andy_Ross]

That's not even far off from the truth. Remember that Germany later resorted to a camo scheme where about two thirds of the tank was left in orange primer colour, to save on paint.

Mind you, even before that, the tanks were delivered only with the primer on them, and it was your problem to paint it any way you wish. (And can find enough paint for.)

Between that and mix-and-match bits -- e.g., some Panthers had radial fans, some had axial fans, and some had one of each -- I think it's safe to say that Germany invented tabletop wargaming

And, hey, their tanks were only slightly more expensive than the Games Workshop ones

At the start of the war tanks were delivered in Dunkelgrau (dark gray) but units were supplied with Dunkelbraun (dark brown) and added their own camo patterns. In a lot of contemporary B/W photographs the two tones appear almost identical and are hard to make out.
From July 1940, to save paint, it was ordered that armor should only be painted Dunkelgrau.

In North Africa a base color of Gelbbraun (yellow-brown), with one-third of the vehicle covered by Graugrün (gray-green), with feathered edges.

From February 1943, all vehicles were ordered to be painted in a base coat of Dunkelgelb (dark yellow). On top of this base coat, stripes or patches of Rotbraun (red-brown) and Olivgrün (olive green) were to be applied. Units were issued these colours as a paste to be diluted and to apply as they thought fit. This also resulted in a wide variety of patterns, from complex sprayed patterns, to some that look like they were smeared on with a broom and rag.

To standardise patterns in mid 1944 vehicles were painted at the factory. The pattern used a base of Dunkelgelb, with Rotbraun and Olivgrün over. Dots of contrasting colour were applied on each area. This pattern was called Hinterhalt-Tarnung (ambush camouflage) and was supposed to look like light through foliage.

In late 1944, vehicles started leaving the factories in red oxide primer, with minimal camo applied. Then a scheme of Dunkelgelb, Rotbraun and Olivgrün began being applied over the primer base.

Finaly towards the end there was a Dunkelgrün base coat, with a hard-edge pattern of Dunkelgelb and Rotbraun applied but after the end of 2944 it was pretty much 'make do' with whatever supplies were available.

 

[Dabop]

Well at least I am learning quite a few things from some (well most) posters, so in that this thread is a good thing...

Finaly towards the end there was a Dunkelgrün base coat, with a hard-edge pattern of Dunkelgelb and Rotbraun applied but after the end of 2944 it was pretty much 'make do' with whatever supplies were available.

I must say the Germans certainly did built to last....
Apparently he wasnt kidding when he said he wanted the Third Reich to last a thousand years!

 

[HansMustermann]

LOL.

 

[HansMustermann]

Yeah in 1938 the major impact of the USSR is likely to be economic and diplomatic rather than military. The economic impact is obvious in that the USSR won't be supplying Germany with food and raw materials, which in combination with a British blockade is going to make a bad situation much worse. Diplomatically the Eastern European nations that do share a border with the USSR are a lot less like to be drawn into the German sphere of influence without the M-R. If Romania decides not to ship oil from Ploesti to Germany then bad becomes catastrophic from Germany. In 1940 even with Oil from the USSR and Romania Germany was considering 'demotorizing' elements of the army to conserve fuel stocks.

Realistically, it all depends on how much Germany wants to gamble that the USSR is feeling even more isolated by the rest of the world than threatened by Germany.

Which it was. Germany was cooperating with them on tank design (the soviets made it half-way through the war with older and crappier Zeiss optics on their tanks) and other areas, plus were the best supplier of industrial equipment, while the rest of the western world was still butthurt at the whole Bolshevik thing. And for good reason, don't get me wrong. And Japan was itching to have a rerun of ye olde war too.

And it had been even more of a cooperation before Hitler decided to drop the bomb that they DO have tanks and an airforce. There was a constant stream of remarkably well paying "tourists" that were going straight to the tank training grounds and training airstrips in the USSR. And they had a common design bureau right in the middle of frikken Moskow.

Plus, Stalin seems to have somewhat been ok with the whole "NS is socialism, just not the bolshevik kind" idea. Strange as it seems, given that he wasn't particularly fond of any other socialists. Though I suppose the "not the bolshevik" kind might have actually made it less threatening for his ruler of the "communism in one country" theme. Be that as it may, I'm not saying he went bottoms-up with the Kool Aid, but it seemed to have smoothed relations a bit.

So basically the bet was that if you had to choose between:
A) your only friend, even if he's a bit of a violent psycho and not a very good friend, and
B) the guys who hate you,
you'd probably choose A.

And I think that looking at how '38 unfolded, Hitler correctly believed that it would be A.

 

[Klimax]

...Finaly towards the end there was a Dunkelgrün base coat, with a hard-edge pattern of Dunkelgelb and Rotbraun applied but after the end of 2944 it was pretty much 'make do' with whatever supplies were available.

I didn't know you are posting from Wolfstein timeline...

 

[Border Reiver]

And, hey, their tanks were only slightly more expensive than the Games Workshop ones

And one seems to have inspired the other (Baneblade/Ratte/Maus).

 

[Henri McPhee]

There is an interesting opinion about appeasement on the internet which makes sense to me:

https://jasondarensburg.wordpress.c...easement-with-hitler-from-a-1939-perspective/

A more compelling argument for appeasement would be that by pacifying Hitler in the short term, Chamberlain was playing for time to delay the war until the country had a chance to rearm. If the country had gone to war in 1938 instead of in 1940, it would most likely have been defeated.

When Germany began rearming in 1934, many politicians in Britain felt that Germany had a right to do so in order to protect its national interests. Some argued that a stronger Germany would prevent the spread of Communism in Western Europe.
In May of 1937, Neville Chamberlain became Prime minister of Britain. With the possibility of another terrible war looming on the horizon, he set in place a measured, reasonable policy of appeasement toward Germany. Chamberlain may have had a nasty streak of political vindictiveness, but he was certainly not a dictator. He didn’t have the power to start a war whenever he pleased.

He would not go to war without the full support of the people, and until 1939 most people wanted peace; almost at any price.

Peace was in Britain’s best interests. The country’s economy was in a shambles and it was clearly not ready militarily. A cautious policy of appeasement was a perfectly reasonable response to Hitler’s blatant acts of aggression.

 

[Garrison]

There is an interesting opinion about appeasement on the internet which makes sense to me:

https://jasondarensburg.wordpress.c...easement-with-hitler-from-a-1939-perspective/

Retreading the same tired line. Again no one is disputing that Britain gained from the delay created by Munich, the point other posters here have been trying to get you to understand is that Germany gained far more.

 

[Garrison]

Realistically, it all depends on how much Germany wants to gamble that the USSR is feeling even more isolated by the rest of the world than threatened by Germany.

Any sort of Alliance in 1938 between Germany and the USSR is just not on the cards. Hitler certainly didn't expect Munich to produce any results and if you look at his actions prior to the Czech crisis he was still trying to build up his anti-comintern pact, he was trying to recruit the Poles to side with him against the USSR.

On the other side one of Stalin's goals with the M-R Pact was to encourage war amongst the Western capitalist powers, while the USSR sat it out and got on with rebuilding his military. In 1938 a deal with Germany has to opposite effect, making war in the West less likely.

It was really only the aftermath of Munich that paved the way for the M-R Pact.