You people can't just complacently deny that Britain and Malta were blitzed during the war, even if America wasn't.
You people can't just complacently deny that Britain and Malta were blitzed during the war, even if America wasn't. Chamberlain thought it would have been far worse in 1938 because he didn't believe in the Churchill 'with what' and want of judgment strategy. There is an intelligent website about the situation of the Czechs in 1938:
Just two decades after the end of WWI, neither Britain nor France - still recovering from the war and marked by the world economic crisis of the inter-war period - wanted another war. On September 29, 1938, representatives of the four great powers - Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany, met at Munich to come to an agreement. Neville Chamberlain, the British prime minister, became the major spokesman for the West. Recognising Hitler's claims for the ethnic Germans in Czechoslovakia as genuine, he believed that a war could be avoided if Hitler were "appeased" by promising him the Sudetenland. The Munich Agreement was signed and the Czechoslovak government was neither invited nor consulted.
http://www.radio.cz/en/section/special/heroes-or-cowards-czechs-in-world-war-ii
Who has denied the blitz or bombing of Malta?
It has been discussed but it wasn't in 1938.
You people can't just complacently deny that Britain and Malta were blitzed during the war.
and even though you refer to the bombing campaign of 1940 you ignore the fact that months of repeated attacks failed to knock Britain out.
Chamberlain thought it would have been far worse in 1938 because he didn't believe in the Churchill 'with what' and want of judgment strategy. There is an intelligent website about the situation of the Czechs in 1938:
You people can't just complacently deny that Britain and Malta were blitzed during the war, even if America wasn't. C
Henri you are babbling now. Trying desperately to come up with something that might make sense.
Yep they were blitzed and guess what they didn't surrender in a week....
Do you even keep track of what your argument actually is? lol
There was rearmament when Chamberlain became Prime Minister, and I think when Lord Swinton became the Minister for Air.
The British Navy could have been attacked by Stuka dive bombers if the RAF had been made non operational.
That would have made some sort of invasion easier, even if the Germans had to be supplied by air.
The British Navy were reluctant to operate in the Channel then because of the dangers involved, and they expected the army to protect their Navy bases.
The Germans had the means to launch a devastating and virtually unopposed bombing attack on Britain in 1938. That's why gas masks were introduced
The British Navy were reluctant to operate in the Channel then because of the dangers involved, and they expected the army to protect their Navy bases.
I don't think he knows anymore.
Both Japan and Germany suffered so much bombing that, by the end, the allies were struggling to find new targets worthy of the attention from the bomber fleets. There was hardly anything left.
Yet. Neither country surrendered because of bombing only.
It took a whole lot more for either of them to throw in the towel. And the same would have been necessary with the UK in 1938.
Oh and I had forgotten this until I was rereading 'Wages of Destruction' but in 1938 the Luftwaffe had done a study that concluded a strategic air war against the UK was out of the question without airbases on the channel coast. So Henri appears to have a higher estimate of Luftwaffe capabilities than the Luftwaffe did.
Oh and I had forgotten this until I was rereading 'Wages of Destruction' but in 1938 the Luftwaffe had done a study that concluded a strategic air war against the UK was out of the question without airbases on the channel coast. So Henri appears to have a higher estimate of Luftwaffe capabilities than the Luftwaffe did.
I think it's an excellent account of the Nazi war economy.Are the 'Wages of destruction' good?
I'm tempted to buy it, to have something to read during the summer holiday.
Yet notwithstanding Chamberlain's personal predilection for negotiation, what is beyond question is that he perceived himself to be a prisoner of forces largely beyond his control. As he noted stoically in January 1938, "In the absence of any powerful ally, and until our armaments are completed, we must adjust our foreign policy to our circumstances, and even bear with patience and good humour actions which we should like to treat in a very different fashion."