Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

[Andy_Ross]

Ironically in 1944 that German conviction that you needed a port to mount an amphibious assault helped sell Operation Fortitude. Even after the Allies were on the beaches at Normandy the Germans were still willing to believe it was a diversion and Calais was still where the real invasion would happen.

That was helped considerably by the fake intel that they Germans were getting from their spies in the 'Double Cross' system.
they fed the Germans a careful mix of real(but minor) info and outright fakes.
They also sent a warning via letters sent through the German Embassies in Spain and Portugal warning of the D-Day landings but timed to arrive after the landings had happened. Although the info was of no use the the Germans it did re-enforce the credibility of further messages.

 

[dudalb]

They were going to seize a port and bring armour, artillery and transport in through the port on ships.

The problem is seizing a port intact,as the Allies to find out later on.

 

[Andy_Ross]

The problem is seizing a port intact,as the Allies to find out later on.

At D-Day they took two of their own.

 

[jimbob]

At D-Day they took two of their own.

Yes, but the Allies had actually planned and realised that they needed something.

And also were able to use the beaches.

 

[Galaxie]

On another note, at this point I'm thinking the Germans SHOULD have snuck a division across the channel just as a practical joke. You know, just to see the British destroy half their own ports. It would have achieved more at playing silly buggers with the British economy than half the U-Boot fleet ever did. Then let those guys be taken prisoners, their job was done.

Sounds like something Churchill would've thought up, had he been a German.

 

[Andy_Ross]

Sounds like something Churchill would've thought up, had he been a German.

and it would have ended in disaster like every one of his other schemes.

 

[HansMustermann]

Interesting

What were they planning to use to move their artillery with then? Was the plan to capture and use British Civilian transport? Or were they going to stay with horses?

They weren't going to actually have any artillery until they capture a port. The idea was that the mighty Luftwaffe would act as an artillery substitute.

This kinda ties in with what I've said before, namely that interwar and early war everyone grossly overestimated how their own airplanes would totally rule the skies unopposed.

To Germany's partial credit, though, things had kinda worked out for them that way before, so they weren't ENTIRELY wrong to learn that lesson. In the Spanish civil war, really, the worst they had to deal with were Russian fighters, which weren't all that horrible for the time, but Soviet pilot training was two steps beyond crap. Then in Poland they did manage to neutralize most of the Polish airforce early on the ground. And in France it did fairly OK, albeit partially due to the fact that the majority of French fighters were hampered by a weaker engine than the original design specified. (Government cost cutting FTW) And due to the fact that the RAF mostly stayed out of it, so there was no real feel for what it can do.

So, you know, until the battle of Britain, there was no real indication that they're grossly overestimating how good their aircraft were against the RAF.

Add to that a regime and military who was quite eager to drink deep and greedily of their own Kool Aid, and you can see where that's going.

We're talking the same guys who, as was said before, were told exactly where and when they'll run out of supplies in Barbarossa, and... just went on to believe really hard that if they just kicked in the door hard enough, the whole rotten edifice would fall down before that.

Also the same guys who were cooperating with the Soviets on tanks and stuff, and yet somehow managed to be completely surprised that the Soviets had over 22,000 tanks in '41. Compared to the around 4000 that the Germans brought along.

Basically there was a lot of magical thinking even when they had no reason to think something. Add some initial successes that did give them reason to think they rule, and yeah, they kinda ran with it.

 

[dudalb]

At D-Day they took two of their own.

I almost mentioned the Mulberries,as proof that the Allies knew how hard taking a port intact would be.
Key word is "intact". The Germans were very good at wrecking a port so clearing it to be usable would be long process. When the Allies took Cherbourg, it was Six weeks before it could be reopened to shipping, and then at only a percentage of it's peacetime capability.
I presume the British would have done the same to any British port that fell into German hands. And Germany was totally unprepared for any major over the beach supply effort. They had nothing like the amphibious ships and craft that enabled the allies to do that later in the war.
The only port that fell undamaged into Allied hands was Antwerp because of a coup by the Belgian underground. But it took two months for it to be operational as a port because of Monty's bad decision to put his little Market Garden escapade ahead of clearing the Scheldt estuary .

 

[Hans]

They weren't going to actually have any artillery until they capture a port. The idea was that the mighty Luftwaffe would act as an artillery substitute.

This kinda ties in with what I've said before, namely that interwar and early war everyone grossly overestimated how their own airplanes would totally rule the skies unopposed.

To Germany's partial credit, though, things had kinda worked out for them that way before, so they weren't ENTIRELY wrong to learn that lesson. In the Spanish civil war, really, the worst they had to deal with were Russian fighters, which weren't all that horrible for the time, but Soviet pilot training was two steps beyond crap. Then in Poland they did manage to neutralize most of the Polish airforce early on the ground. And in France it did fairly OK, albeit partially due to the fact that the majority of French fighters were hampered by a weaker engine than the original design specified. (Government cost cutting FTW) And due to the fact that the RAF mostly stayed out of it, so there was no real feel for what it can do.

So, you know, until the battle of Britain, there was no real indication that they're grossly overestimating how good their aircraft were against the RAF.

Add to that a regime and military who was quite eager to drink deep and greedily of their own Kool Aid, and you can see where that's going.

We're talking the same guys who, as was said before, were told exactly where and when they'll run out of supplies in Barbarossa, and... just went on to believe really hard that if they just kicked in the door hard enough, the whole rotten edifice would fall down before that.

Also the same guys who were cooperating with the Soviets on tanks and stuff, and yet somehow managed to be completely surprised that the Soviets had over 22,000 tanks in '41. Compared to the around 4000 that the Germans brought along.

Basically there was a lot of magical thinking even when they had no reason to think something. Add some initial successes that did give them reason to think they rule, and yeah, they kinda ran with it.

Yep magical.

Yes I know what you mean I ran into that type of thinking during the cold war. However, unlikely Sealion might have been it was much more likely to succeed (like zero) than an across the North Sea from Germany to East England in 1938.

That is in league with the 'The Battle of Dorking' or 'he Riddle of the Sands' type of thinking.

 

[dudalb]

Yes, but the Allies had actually planned and realised that they needed something.

And also were able to use the beaches.

The Americans had developed the art of moving large amounts of supply over the beach in the Pacific, where they had no choice because thee were no large ports on the Pacific islands they were invading. That knowledge was used on the Normandy beaches. When one of the Mulberries was taken out by a storm in late June,the Americans were able to take up the slack by greater use of amphibious craft. The LSTs might well have saved the Normandy Beachhead.

 

[Henri McPhee]

Yep magical.

Yes I know what you mean I ran into that type of thinking during the cold war. However, unlikely Sealion might have been it was much more likely to succeed (like zero) than an across the North Sea from Germany to East England in 1938.

That is in league with the 'The Battle of Dorking' or 'he Riddle of the Sands' type of thinking.

Britain was in grave peril of devastating bombing attacks in 1938, and officials thought at the time that might involve chemical warfare attacks. I agree your complacent attitude about no possibility of invasion might have applied during the First World War because of the British Navy, but the Battle of Britain was an air war, and there were practically no Spitfires or Hurricanes in 1938. Chamberlain understood this.

 

[erwinl]

Britain was in grave peril of devastating bombing attacks in 1938, and officials thought at the time that might involve chemical warfare attacks. I agree your complacent attitude about no possibility of invasion might have applied during the First World War because of the British Navy, but the Battle of Britain was an air war, and there were practically no Spitfires or Hurricanes in 1938. Chamberlain understood this.

Grave enough to let them surrender after one week?

 

[Garrison]

Britain was in grave peril of devastating bombing attacks in 1938.

Untrue. You refuse to accept any of the facts pointed out to you about the lack of capability the Luftwaffe possessed in 1938, and even though you refer to the bombing campaign of 1940 you ignore the fact that months of repeated attacks failed to knock Britain out.

and officials thought at the time that might involve chemical warfare attacks.

Which is true, but yet again they were wrong. Also had the Germans used gas the British would have happily used it on an German force that somehow managed to make it ashore.

I agree your complacent attitude about no possibility of invasion might have applied during the First World War because of the British Navy, but the Battle of Britain was an air war, and there were practically no Spitfires or Hurricanes in 1938.

The only thing complacent is your attitude to facts and research. A)BoB required the Luftwaffe to have bases in France, which they don't have in 1938. B)The Luftwaffe was largely ineffective against shipping. C) Even if they had 'won' the BoB in 1940 Sealion would still have been impossible as Germany had no amphibious assault capability.

Chamberlain understood this.

Chamberlain understood very little. You can argue that he was convinced by a specious argument about the effectiveness of air power, but Munich was still a grievous mistake because if you choose to read anything other than a Google search you will see how truly weak Germany was in 1938.

 

[Andy_Ross]

It's like trying to knock a wall down with a cushion.

 

[Hubert Cumberdale]

Britain was in grave peril of devastating bombing attacks in 1938, and officials thought at the time that might involve chemical warfare attacks. I agree your complacent attitude about no possibility of invasion might have applied during the First World War because of the British Navy, but the Battle of Britain was an air war, and there were practically no Spitfires or Hurricanes in 1938. Chamberlain understood this.

No it wasn't. The reasons why this is not the case have been explained to you ad nauseum.

 

[HansMustermann]

and it would have ended in disaster like every one of his other schemes.

Well, yes, but think of the lulz. The LULZ, man. Do it for them

Plus, you have to admit that it's a less ridiculous scenario than Henri's. Well, marginally, but still...

 

[Dave Rogers]

Britain was in grave peril of devastating bombing attacks in 1938,[...]

...and Germany actually suffered far more devastating bombing attacks from about 1942, when Bomber Command really got its act together, through to the end of the war. Professional historians may note that "the end of the war" didn't take place until 1945, and expert mathematicians may further note that this was more than a week after 1942. If Germany didn't surrender until after the Russians had literally over-run their capital, what makes you so certain that a week of far less effective bombing would lead to a British surrender?

I agree your complacent attitude about no possibility of invasion might have applied during the First World War because of the British Navy, but the Battle of Britain was an air war, and there were practically no Spitfires or Hurricanes in 1938.

Germany had practically no Spitfires or Hurricanes throughout the entire war! How come they didn't surrender on September 10th 1939?

Dave

 

[lobosrul5]

...and Germany actually suffered far more devastating bombing attacks from about 1942, when Bomber Command really got its act together, through to the end of the war. Professional historians may note that "the end of the war" didn't take place until 1945, and expert mathematicians may further note that this was more than a week after 1942. If Germany didn't surrender until after the Russians had literally over-run their capital, what makes you so certain that a week of far less effective bombing would lead to a British surrender?

Obviously, because they weren't decadent capitalists that would surrender after the first bomb dropped, which the British were in 1938, but not in 1940 for some reason.

 

[Hans]

Britain was in grave peril of devastating bombing attacks in 1938

No they weren't. Henri repeating made up nonsense doesn't make it a fact.

We've had this discussion before and you ability to make up 'stuff' then refuse to back down. Now are you going to continue to stamp your feet and shout over a over again that you cannot be wrong on this?

lol

 

[Henri McPhee]

You people can't just complacently deny that Britain and Malta were blitzed during the war, even if America wasn't. Chamberlain thought it would have been far worse in 1938 because he didn't believe in the Churchill 'with what' and want of judgment strategy. There is an intelligent website about the situation of the Czechs in 1938:

http://www.radio.cz/en/section/special/heroes-or-cowards-czechs-in-world-war-ii

Just two decades after the end of WWI, neither Britain nor France - still recovering from the war and marked by the world economic crisis of the inter-war period - wanted another war. On September 29, 1938, representatives of the four great powers - Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany, met at Munich to come to an agreement. Neville Chamberlain, the British prime minister, became the major spokesman for the West. Recognising Hitler's claims for the ethnic Germans in Czechoslovakia as genuine, he believed that a war could be avoided if Hitler were "appeased" by promising him the Sudetenland. The Munich Agreement was signed and the Czechoslovak government was neither invited nor consulted.