Proof of Immortality, VI

[John Jones]

dup

 

[John Jones]

Anyone keen to experience even more of the remarkable standard of intellectual argument found on this thread may care to mosey along to the Intelligent Design thread, where a similar argument is being put forward in support of fine tuning:

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=12054431#post12054431

Until this moment, I never realized that the fine folks of the British persuasion were inclined to recommend others to "mosey along". I thought that term was strictly out of Texas.

This thread has not been a total waste.

 

[Dave Rogers]

Until this moment, I never realized that the fine folks of the British persuasion were inclined to recommend others to "mosey along".

Oh, very much so. Sometimes we even announce an intention to mosey on down.

Dave

 

[Dave Rogers]

My formula is 2+2=5.

My claim is that this formula is correct.

I don't think you've satisfactorily demonstrated that. Try dividing both sides of the equation by seven; that'll be more convincing.

Dave

 

[Toontown]

It would have to be.

Jabba starts out by saying that his particular existence is a remarkably low-probability event. He's one of: all possible people + alive at this time. However, the set of "all possible people" is infinitely large. "Alive at this time" doesn't add anything.

So, if he were mortal or immortal, his existence remains equally unlikely.

The only argument then is that he necessarily had to exist because God chose him and placed him on earth. And that, while stupid, at least has nothing to do poor Mr. Bayes.

That's just another appeal to determinism, and as such is not a valid argument against the application of probability.

Why not? Because probability was never about randomness in the first place.

Probability has always been about making maximum use of limited information. It just happens to work well on random or pseudo-random events.

The mind of God, should He exist, is sufficiently opaque to us as to be a prime candidate for the use of probability. From our perspective, a God deciding to choose Jabba and place him on earth is no different from the roll of a trillion-sided die. We couldn't possibly have any idea of the exact reasoning behind His action, any more than we could have any idea of the exact forces acting on the trillion-sided die.

If we had such complete knowledge, we would have no need of probability. We could predict exactly what God or a trillion-sided die would turn up, with unerring accuracy.

But we don't have complete knowledge, and we do need probability. Now more than ever.

 

[Loss Leader]

That's just another appeal to determinism, and as such is not a valid argument against the application of probability.

Why not? Because probability was never about randomness in the first place.

You're right. Jabba's argument would be illogical either way. I think it would be slightly less stupid if it were an argument for determinism but it would still be deeply stupid.

 

[Jabba]

Quote caveman, part III: It's not about dependence per se but that we can identify each soul with a body. For each soul we can point to a body and say "this is the first body that this soul inhabits" - whether the soul exists prior to the body or only comes into existence simultaneously with this body doesn't change that we can identify it with this body. Unless you're claiming that there exists some sort of reservoir of souls which never "inhabit" any body?

Jabba: 1.00*.01/(virtually zero) is not "virtually one".

You are dividing .01 by "virtually zero", which is "equal" to "virtually infinity".

Humots,
- Sorry about that. Flying by the seat of my pants.
- Earlier, when using OOFLam as H, I had used
P(H|E)=(P(E|H)*P(H)/((P(E|H)*P(H)+P(E|~H)*P(~H)), and got the results expected. Above, I tried simplifying things and switched over to a more intuitive hypothesis of "Immortality" (I) and the simpler formula of
P(I|E)=P(E|I)*P(I)/P(E) -- which doesn't seem to apply...
- How about P(I|E)=(P(E|I)*P(I)/((P(E|I)*P(I)+P(E|~I)*P(~I)), and specifically, "I" is "We who currently exist are immortal"?

caveman,
- I'm hoping that you will agree that the last sentence above answers your "request" above, and sets the record straight. I think that I understand your previous objection, but resolve it by a better definition of "I."
- P(E|I)>P(E|~I) -- "E" is my current existence, so my claim is that the likelihood that I would currently exist is greater if we who _________ exist are immortal than if we are not.

I know that's your claim. Stop repeating it and start supporting it.

caveman,
- I was trying to support my position by changing the wording -- I figured that my new wording resolved your objection. Though now, I see that I left out a critical word ("currently"),and should have used "those" instead of "we" in my last sentence above.

- If I am immortal, my existence doesn't depend upon a particular body, and probably doesn't depend upon any body -- as, the continuation of my self doesn't depend upon anything we would now call "physical." And, given such consideration, my current existence is much more likely if I am indeed immortal, than if I am not immortal.

 

[Loss Leader]

- If I am immortal, my existence doesn't depend upon a particular body, and probably doesn't depend upon any body -- as, the continuation of my self doesn't depend upon anything we would now call "physical." And, given such consideration, my current existence is much more likely if I am indeed immortal, than if I am not immortal.

Jabba -

How many potential different souls could there be? You've previously said that there were an infinite number.

How is 1/inf. larger than 1/inf.*time?

They're both zero.

How does being immortal mean that you are more likely to exist than if you were mortal?

 

[Filippo Lippi]

Anyone keen to experience even more of the remarkable standard of intellectual argument found on this thread may care to mosey along to the Intelligent Design thread, where a similar argument is being put forward in support of fine tuning:

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=12054431#post12054431

Jabba ignores this. Never forget that honesty is a cornerstone of his world changing Effective Debate

 

[Dave Rogers]

I was trying to support my position by changing the wording -- I figured that my new wording resolved your objection

Let's see how changing the wording affects your claim, shall we?

- If I am immortal, my existence doesn't depend upon a particular body, and probably doesn't depend upon any body -- as, the continuation of my self doesn't depend upon anything we would now call "physical." And, given such consideration, my current existence is much more likely if I am indeed immortal, than if I am not immortal.

If you are mortal, your existence doesn't depend on a particular immaterial soul, and probably doesn't depend upon any soul -- as, the process you call "self" doesn't depend upon anything we would now call "immaterial". And, given such consideration, your current existence is much more likely if you are indeed material, than if you are immaterial.

You see, re-wording the claim can give an equally convincing argument for the opposite claim. And if I too am allowed to make up numbers and plug them into Bayes' Theorem, I can invent a set that makes immortality have an effectively zero probability if I feel like it. That's the fatal flaw in your claim that caveman1917 has repeatedly pointed out; it's based entirely on mathematical premises that are simply made up to suit the convenience of the argument, and have no basis in reality.

Dave

 

[jond]

Odd: earlier you said your soul required a body to communicate. Which means your current existence requires your current body.

 

[Belz...]

- I was trying to support my position by changing the wording

You should know by now that tricks will not work on the locals here.

- If I am immortal, my existence doesn't depend upon a particular body, and probably doesn't depend upon any body -- as, the continuation of my self doesn't depend upon anything we would now call "physical." And, given such consideration, my current existence is much more likely if I am indeed immortal, than if I am not immortal.

None of this means a damned thing if you can't establish that any of those assumptions are true. You need to show that: 1) There is a pool of potential selves, 2) The probability of you existing if you're mortal is ZERO, 3) Being immortal somehow removes this consideration.

 

[JayUtah]

I was trying to support my position by changing the wording...

This just rearranges the deck chairs on the Titanic. You're still stuck in the wrong-headed notion that your argument is fundamentally sound but needs only minor tweaking. In fact your argument is broken in several ways at the fundamental, structural level. Further, your critics are well attuned to your practice of changing wording not to clarify your argument but rather to further obscure it after they've clarified it.

If I am immortal, my existence doesn't depend upon a particular body, and probably doesn't depend upon any body --

Just say "soul," Jabba. There's no use pretending you're not simply talking about the neo-Platonic soul as formulated in western Christianity. You have admitted as such on more than one occasion. Those occasions correspond to your explanation that you desire to avoid the word "soul" so that you can try to get away with begging the question.

...as, the continuation of my self doesn't depend upon anything we would now call "physical."

The continuation of your existence after death requires something non-physical. You can't prove the existence of anything that would fit the bill. You think you have "proven" immortality by having done nothing more than wishful thinking.

And, given such consideration, my current existence is much more likely if I am indeed immortal, than if I am not immortal.

Clearly not. In the materialist hypothesis, your current existence depends only on your body. We can prove you have a body, so there remains no unsatisfied consequent. In your model your current existence depends on something you cannot prove exists -- your soul. Mathematics aside, how can a model with unsatisfied consequents be more likely to be correct than a model in which all the consequents have provably extant antecedents?

Further, your model requires a separate act: incarnation. While you try to distance yourself above from the need to incarnate, that incarnation is, in fact, the central event in your probabilistic model. Many times you have tried to explain it as "winning the lottery" or in similar terms. The alleged unlikelihood of that event is the operative core of your argument. Leaving aside the nevertheless important concern of the space from which you're observing this allegedly unlikely event, the problem remains that predicating your argument upon the alleged unlikelihood of an event you cannot show is necessary -- or even happens -- is immediately fatal to your argument. Occam's Razor justly prunes it.

 

[caveman1917]

If I am immortal, my existence doesn't depend upon a particular body, and probably doesn't depend upon any body

Are you claiming not to have a body?

as, the continuation of my self doesn't depend upon anything we would now call "physical."

Even if we accept that as true for the sake of argument, that doesn't stop you from having a body right now. But since you seem to be confusing P(I exist) with P(my endless continuing existence), let's use "I have been born" instead of "I exist". Show that you were more likely to have been born if you are immortal than if you are mortal.

 

[Toontown]

You're right. Jabba's argument would be illogical either way. I think it would be slightly less stupid if it were an argument for determinism but it would still be deeply stupid.

Agreed. Jabba's Bayesian approach is stymied by his insistence on an eternal "self".

 

[Filippo Lippi]

Jabba's been back since his last post. Just like DOC used to do, the point of this thread is to be near the top of R+P

 

[Mojo]

Are you claiming not to have a body?

I think he might be claiming that his existence would be an observable event if he didn't have a body.

 

[Filippo Lippi]

Jabba's souls don't have any characteristics, how can they ever be observed?

 

[Mojo]

Jabba's souls don't have any characteristics, how can they ever be observed?

Well, exactly. And if they have no characteristics, how many potential souls are there?

 

[Jabba]

Quote caveman, part III: It's not about dependence per se but that we can identify each soul with a body. For each soul we can point to a body and say "this is the first body that this soul inhabits" - whether the soul exists prior to the body or only comes into existence simultaneously with this body doesn't change that we can identify it with this body. Unless you're claiming that there exists some sort of reservoir of souls which never "inhabit" any body?
caveman,
- I was trying to support my position by changing the wording -- I figured that my new wording resolved your objection. Though now, I see that I left out a critical word ("currently"),and should have used "those" instead of "we" in my last sentence above.

- If I am immortal, my existence doesn't depend upon a particular body, and probably doesn't depend upon any body -- as, the continuation of my self doesn't depend upon anything we would now call "physical." And, given such consideration, my current existence is much more likely if I am indeed immortal, than if I am not immortal.

Are you claiming not to have a body?

Even if we accept that as true for the sake of argument, that doesn't stop you from having a body right now. But since you seem to be confusing P(I exist) with P(my endless continuing existence), let's use "I have been born" instead of "I exist". Show that you were more likely to have been born if you are immortal than if you are mortal.

caveman,

- Once again, I wasn't careful enough about my wording...
- One of the ways for the self to be "immortal" is for it to exist even when a body carrying the self does not. In that case, there would need to be at least two states of existence for us selves. My claim so far is that the prior probability that our selves are immortal -- in that sense -- is at least .01 (which we can argue about later). Does that resolve this objection?