Belz...
Fiend God
Yeah, nobody thinks that except you. And the reason is that you've given no reason to believe that it is more likely given immortality. Whenever pressed to look at your assumptions on this, you run away.
Proof of Immortality, VI
- Thread starter jond
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Yeah, nobody thinks that except you. And the reason is that you've given no reason to believe that it is more likely given immortality. Whenever pressed to look at your assumptions on this, you run away.
caveman1917
Philosopher
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We already tried that, remember? You gave a bunch of definitions, and I showed you how your definitions fail to lead to the conclusion you wanted. At which point you, rather than accept the reasoning, just went back and changed your definitions. Sorry but there's just no reasoning with someone like that.
It's up to you to show that one is greater than the other.
caveman1917
Philosopher
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Belz...
Fiend God
The irony
How so?
ferd burfle
Graduate Poster
Pretty reasonable, taken in its entirety. I wonder which parts of your post Jabba will seize on and which parts he will ignore.
Belz...
Fiend God
Pretty reasonable, taken in its entirety. I wonder which parts of your post Jabba will seize on and which parts he will ignore.
Maybe he'll just reiterate his claim.
Jabba
Philosopher
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Caveman,
- I probably realized (or just figured) that I was either wrong about those definitions or just wasn't expressing them properly.
- I've been reviewing your comments -- looking for our conversation -- but haven't yet found it and still have over 100 of your comments to go. Could you direct me to the beginning of it?
Emily's Cat
Rarely prone to hissy-fits
Emily's Cat thinks that the likelihood of Jabba not existing is much, much greater than the likelihood of Jabba existing.
John Jones
Penultimate Amazing
You've wasted 5 of your 71 years of http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/images/smilies/cool.gif life trying to convince people that you are right when we all know better. Not one person has been persuaded to come to your rescue.
Stop! Plant a garden! Play with your grandchildren! Stay in bed! Stay off ISF!
Last edited:
John Jones
Penultimate Amazing
Probably, but who would bet against you?
Jabba
Philosopher
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- The following quotes come from part III of this thread. I assume that I don't need to provide all the numbers. They start at 2796.
Quote Jabba:
Caveman,
- I don't understand.
- OOFLam, is not that I have a body -- it's that each of us potential humans have only one, finite, life at most.
Caveman: Ah, that's what the "AM" in OOFLAM stands for. I had figured that OOFL stood for "only one finite life" but couldn't figure out what the AM stood for.
Do you agree with the following statements?
1. Every soul (ie the subjective "I"), mortal or immortal, for at least the first part of its life "inhabits" a body.
2. A soul is mortal if it dies when the body it inhabits dies.
3. A soul is immortal if it continues to live after the body it inhabits dies.
This ignores a couple of other possibilities, but I presume it captures what you want to argue.
If you agree with these statements, then we can identify each soul with the body it started out with. All potential souls can then be identified with all potential bodies, and all actual souls with all actual bodies. The probability that you, Jabba, would be in the set of actual souls is then the same irrespective of whether your soul is mortal or immortal. It is simply the probability of your body being in the set of actual bodies.
Quote Jabba:
My current existence is much more likely if that hypothesis is not true.
Caveman: Why? The probability of your existence as an immortal soul is the same as the probability of your existence as a mortal soul. By the identification of souls with bodies, it is the same as the probability of your existence as a body tout court. Ergo P(E | H) = P(E | ~H).
Caveman,
- I almost agree with your statements.
- Re #1, my (hidden?) assumption is that the self exists prior to any specific body
- In my argument, the self is not dependent upon a specific body. Take such dependence out of your formula and the likelihood of my current existence (E) is much greater given ~H than it is given H. I think that makes sense.
_
Caveman: Even so, bodies haven't always existed. So even if the soul exists before the body, there is still a "first body" that it "inhabits" and hence can be identified with. The "prior to" doesn't change the argument here.
Quote Jabba:
- In my argument, the self is not dependent upon a specific body. Take such dependence out of your formula and the likelihood of my current existence (E) is much greater given ~H than it is given H. I think that makes sense.
Caveman: It's not about dependence per se but that we can identify each soul with a body. For each soul we can point to a body and say "this is the first body that this soul inhabits" - whether the soul exists prior to the body or only comes into existence simultaneously with this body doesn't change that we can identify it with this body. Unless you're claiming that there exists some sort of reservoir of souls which never "inhabit" any body?
And if you're claiming that an immortal soul can be identified with multiple bodies (reincarnation or something) then you're less likely to be an immortal soul rather than a mortal one, simply because, given a number of bodies, there would be less souls associated with these when they are immortal than when they are mortal.
__
Originally Posted by jt512
So, in this problem, the prior probability that we have a body and a soul can, at least in principle, be greater than the prior probability that we have a body only. It's not a conjunction fallacy.
Caveman: I highlighted the important bit here. And yes, I agree, I withdraw my previous claim about the conjunction fallacy. I thought people used it regarding his prior probabilities, but apparently they're using it regarding his likelihoods - the conjunction fallacy never applies to likelihoods. But you're right that in this case it wouldn't even apply to the priors either, and even if it did Jabba isn't using it. I checked and he has as priors P(H) > P(~H).
There seems to be a minor difference in terminology here though. I've been using "soul" in general, ie we all have a soul (the subjective "I") but it can either be mortal or immortal. Apparently "soul" here is only used for the immortal subjective "I", but then what are we using for the mortal subjective "I" - that which, under what JayUtah calls the null hypothesis, is the emergent property of the brain?
Originally Posted by caveman1917
There seems to be a minor difference in terminology here though. I've been using "soul" in general, ie we all have a soul (the subjective "I") but it can either be mortal or immortal. Apparently "soul" here is only used for the immortal subjective "I", but then what are we using for the mortal subjective "I" - that which, under what JayUtah calls the null hypothesis, is the emergent property of the brain?
Quote jt: I don't know. I've been ignoring Jabba's tortuous (and torturous) explication of his hypotheses, and boiling them down to simpler models that we can more easily talk about mathematically. I think you and I have been thinking differently about what he means by "immortal" when he talks about immortal souls. I was thinking that these souls are immortal in the sense that they have always existed and always will; whereas, I think you wrote that they supposedly come into existence when the body does, but are immortal in the sense that once they're come into existence, they exist forever after. If Jabba means the latter then I'm even more confused by why he thinks can reason about them probabilistically. If he meant the former, then at least (I think) I can understand: he thinks his soul was always around, and thus, in a sense, exists with a probability of 1 under ~H.
Originally Posted by jt512
I don't know. I've been ignoring Jabba's tortuous (and torturous) explication of his hypotheses, and boiling them down to simpler models that we can more easily talk about mathematically.
Caveman: Yes, me too. Or at least for the past couple pages after Jabba directly asked me about it, before that I wasn't really paying much attention to his posts here. Hence why I asked him those 3 questions, to boil it down to a simple well-defined problem.
Quote jt:
I think you and I have been thinking differently about what he means by "immortal" when he talks about immortal souls. I was thinking that these souls are immortal in the sense that they have always existed and always will; whereas, I think you wrote that they supposedly come into existence when the body does, but are immortal in the sense that once they're come into existence, they exist forever after.
Caveman: It is correct that this was how I interpreted "immortal soul" but as I replied to Jabba later, my argument doesn't depend on that. One could just as well consider an immortal soul to have always existed, All that's required is that each soul inhabits a body at least once.
Quote jt:
If Jabba means the latter then I'm even more confused by why he thinks can reason about them probabilistically. If he meant the former, then at least (I think) I can understand: he thinks his soul was always around, and thus, in a sense, exists with a probability of 1 under ~H.
Caveman: From where I'm sitting that doesn't matter, at best his likelihoods are equal and hence non-discriminatory, at worst they are stacked against immortality (if immortal souls can be identified with multiple bodies each). But like you said, we are all probably using slightly different models for this question.
__________________________________________________________
Caveman & jt,
- First, I’ve tried to avoid using the word “soul” in that it usually implies immortality, and I figured that using it would be like begging the question. Consequently, I’ve used “self” which doesn’t, and I’ve tried to argue that it is (immortal).
- Otherwise, I’m saying that P(I|E)=P(E|I)*P(I)/P(E), or 1.00*.01/(virtually zero), or (virtually one). I'm replacing "~H" with the more intuitive "I."
- My math came through the behavioral sciences, consequently wasn’t that strenuous in the first place and is currently largely forgotten – so, I really do appreciate the expertise you guys have brought to the debate and have used to actually support some of my argument…
- But so far, I still disagree that any of my assumptions result in P(E|I) = P(E|~I). All I’m saying is that I’m much more likely to exist, and to exist right now, if I’m immortal than if I’m not.
- Then, to be immortal just means either that we have always existed (in some form of awareness) or will always exist once created (however that happens), and my honest opinion is that the prior probability of our immortality is at least .01.
- I suspect that science is really just still in its infancy -- and as I keep suggesting, that our current attempt to understand reality is analogous to chickens trying to understand calculus. For instance, do we really understand what “now” is -- or, how nothing could produce or become something, or simply has always been something? Etc.
- If cause and effect is absolute, there is no such thing as free will or ultimate meaning. Could these assumed characteristics of life be like emergent properties -- leaving cause and effect in the dust?
- Then, there’s the uncertainty and anthropic principles, and quantums zero and entanglement, etc.
- My best guess so far is either that each of us is a piece of an infinitely divisible bucket of consciousness (and more than one of us used to be Napoleon), or “now” just isn’t what we think it is -- or, a combination of the two – or, something else… Whatever, I think that scientifically speaking, my current existence is an absolute miracle.
- I suspect that reality is (at least, somewhat) “magical” — and what seems ridiculous from a naturalistic/materialistic/scientific point of view is actually what reality is all about...
Quote Jabba:
Caveman,
- I don't understand.
- OOFLam, is not that I have a body -- it's that each of us potential humans have only one, finite, life at most.
Caveman: Ah, that's what the "AM" in OOFLAM stands for. I had figured that OOFL stood for "only one finite life" but couldn't figure out what the AM stood for.
Do you agree with the following statements?
1. Every soul (ie the subjective "I"), mortal or immortal, for at least the first part of its life "inhabits" a body.
2. A soul is mortal if it dies when the body it inhabits dies.
3. A soul is immortal if it continues to live after the body it inhabits dies.
This ignores a couple of other possibilities, but I presume it captures what you want to argue.
If you agree with these statements, then we can identify each soul with the body it started out with. All potential souls can then be identified with all potential bodies, and all actual souls with all actual bodies. The probability that you, Jabba, would be in the set of actual souls is then the same irrespective of whether your soul is mortal or immortal. It is simply the probability of your body being in the set of actual bodies.
Quote Jabba:
My current existence is much more likely if that hypothesis is not true.
Caveman: Why? The probability of your existence as an immortal soul is the same as the probability of your existence as a mortal soul. By the identification of souls with bodies, it is the same as the probability of your existence as a body tout court. Ergo P(E | H) = P(E | ~H).
Caveman,
- I almost agree with your statements.
- Re #1, my (hidden?) assumption is that the self exists prior to any specific body
- In my argument, the self is not dependent upon a specific body. Take such dependence out of your formula and the likelihood of my current existence (E) is much greater given ~H than it is given H. I think that makes sense.
_
Caveman: Even so, bodies haven't always existed. So even if the soul exists before the body, there is still a "first body" that it "inhabits" and hence can be identified with. The "prior to" doesn't change the argument here.
Quote Jabba:
- In my argument, the self is not dependent upon a specific body. Take such dependence out of your formula and the likelihood of my current existence (E) is much greater given ~H than it is given H. I think that makes sense.
Caveman: It's not about dependence per se but that we can identify each soul with a body. For each soul we can point to a body and say "this is the first body that this soul inhabits" - whether the soul exists prior to the body or only comes into existence simultaneously with this body doesn't change that we can identify it with this body. Unless you're claiming that there exists some sort of reservoir of souls which never "inhabit" any body?
And if you're claiming that an immortal soul can be identified with multiple bodies (reincarnation or something) then you're less likely to be an immortal soul rather than a mortal one, simply because, given a number of bodies, there would be less souls associated with these when they are immortal than when they are mortal.
__
Originally Posted by jt512
So, in this problem, the prior probability that we have a body and a soul can, at least in principle, be greater than the prior probability that we have a body only. It's not a conjunction fallacy.
Caveman: I highlighted the important bit here. And yes, I agree, I withdraw my previous claim about the conjunction fallacy. I thought people used it regarding his prior probabilities, but apparently they're using it regarding his likelihoods - the conjunction fallacy never applies to likelihoods. But you're right that in this case it wouldn't even apply to the priors either, and even if it did Jabba isn't using it. I checked and he has as priors P(H) > P(~H).
There seems to be a minor difference in terminology here though. I've been using "soul" in general, ie we all have a soul (the subjective "I") but it can either be mortal or immortal. Apparently "soul" here is only used for the immortal subjective "I", but then what are we using for the mortal subjective "I" - that which, under what JayUtah calls the null hypothesis, is the emergent property of the brain?
Originally Posted by caveman1917
There seems to be a minor difference in terminology here though. I've been using "soul" in general, ie we all have a soul (the subjective "I") but it can either be mortal or immortal. Apparently "soul" here is only used for the immortal subjective "I", but then what are we using for the mortal subjective "I" - that which, under what JayUtah calls the null hypothesis, is the emergent property of the brain?
Quote jt: I don't know. I've been ignoring Jabba's tortuous (and torturous) explication of his hypotheses, and boiling them down to simpler models that we can more easily talk about mathematically. I think you and I have been thinking differently about what he means by "immortal" when he talks about immortal souls. I was thinking that these souls are immortal in the sense that they have always existed and always will; whereas, I think you wrote that they supposedly come into existence when the body does, but are immortal in the sense that once they're come into existence, they exist forever after. If Jabba means the latter then I'm even more confused by why he thinks can reason about them probabilistically. If he meant the former, then at least (I think) I can understand: he thinks his soul was always around, and thus, in a sense, exists with a probability of 1 under ~H.
Originally Posted by jt512
I don't know. I've been ignoring Jabba's tortuous (and torturous) explication of his hypotheses, and boiling them down to simpler models that we can more easily talk about mathematically.
Caveman: Yes, me too. Or at least for the past couple pages after Jabba directly asked me about it, before that I wasn't really paying much attention to his posts here. Hence why I asked him those 3 questions, to boil it down to a simple well-defined problem.
Quote jt:
I think you and I have been thinking differently about what he means by "immortal" when he talks about immortal souls. I was thinking that these souls are immortal in the sense that they have always existed and always will; whereas, I think you wrote that they supposedly come into existence when the body does, but are immortal in the sense that once they're come into existence, they exist forever after.
Caveman: It is correct that this was how I interpreted "immortal soul" but as I replied to Jabba later, my argument doesn't depend on that. One could just as well consider an immortal soul to have always existed, All that's required is that each soul inhabits a body at least once.
Quote jt:
If Jabba means the latter then I'm even more confused by why he thinks can reason about them probabilistically. If he meant the former, then at least (I think) I can understand: he thinks his soul was always around, and thus, in a sense, exists with a probability of 1 under ~H.
Caveman: From where I'm sitting that doesn't matter, at best his likelihoods are equal and hence non-discriminatory, at worst they are stacked against immortality (if immortal souls can be identified with multiple bodies each). But like you said, we are all probably using slightly different models for this question.
__________________________________________________________
Caveman & jt,
- First, I’ve tried to avoid using the word “soul” in that it usually implies immortality, and I figured that using it would be like begging the question. Consequently, I’ve used “self” which doesn’t, and I’ve tried to argue that it is (immortal).
- Otherwise, I’m saying that P(I|E)=P(E|I)*P(I)/P(E), or 1.00*.01/(virtually zero), or (virtually one). I'm replacing "~H" with the more intuitive "I."
- My math came through the behavioral sciences, consequently wasn’t that strenuous in the first place and is currently largely forgotten – so, I really do appreciate the expertise you guys have brought to the debate and have used to actually support some of my argument…
- But so far, I still disagree that any of my assumptions result in P(E|I) = P(E|~I). All I’m saying is that I’m much more likely to exist, and to exist right now, if I’m immortal than if I’m not.
- Then, to be immortal just means either that we have always existed (in some form of awareness) or will always exist once created (however that happens), and my honest opinion is that the prior probability of our immortality is at least .01.
- I suspect that science is really just still in its infancy -- and as I keep suggesting, that our current attempt to understand reality is analogous to chickens trying to understand calculus. For instance, do we really understand what “now” is -- or, how nothing could produce or become something, or simply has always been something? Etc.
- If cause and effect is absolute, there is no such thing as free will or ultimate meaning. Could these assumed characteristics of life be like emergent properties -- leaving cause and effect in the dust?
- Then, there’s the uncertainty and anthropic principles, and quantums zero and entanglement, etc.
- My best guess so far is either that each of us is a piece of an infinitely divisible bucket of consciousness (and more than one of us used to be Napoleon), or “now” just isn’t what we think it is -- or, a combination of the two – or, something else… Whatever, I think that scientifically speaking, my current existence is an absolute miracle.
- I suspect that reality is (at least, somewhat) “magical” — and what seems ridiculous from a naturalistic/materialistic/scientific point of view is actually what reality is all about...
The Sparrow
Graduate Poster
This looks suspiciously like one of your 'maps' like you did in the shroud thread. I believe the moderators were quite explicit about not doing that here.
If your one-sentence idea contains a double dash, a parenthetical aside, a word in meaningless quotation marks and three words with slashes between them, plus it starts with a dash and ends with an ellipse, you should stop typing and walk away from the computer. Good ideas don’t have those features.
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caveman1917
Philosopher
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- Feb 26, 2015
- Messages
- 8,143
I'm going to stop you right there. You need to focus on your task at hand, which is showing that you are more likely to exist if you are immortal than if you are mortal. Succeed in doing that and we'll debate the rest, fail in doing that and I'll expect you to acknowledge that your proof doesn't work.
JayUtah
Penultimate Amazing
How else is he going to keep replaying the debate to make it seem like he won? Oh, right.
Humots
Critical Thinker
- Joined
- May 29, 2012
- Messages
- 425
Jabba: 1.00*.01/(virtually zero) is not "virtually one".
You are dividing .01 by "virtually zero", which is "equal" to "virtually infinity".
theprestige
Penultimate Amazing
Oh, honey...
Dave Rogers
Bandaged ice that stampedes inexpensively through
Actually, Jabba, before you do that, could you please learn to use the quote function? It's really easy when you get the hang of it. At the moment you're prefacing quoted remarks by other people with their names, then replying to them and prefacing the quote with the same name, so it's almost impossible to figure out who you think said what.
Dave
Dave Rogers
Bandaged ice that stampedes inexpensively through
You're not the first person to point this out, nor the first to have it ignored. One might think that Jabba would notice that a probability greater than one indicated at best a mathematical, and at worst (as in this case) a basic conceptual error in his work. However, despite his belief that he has a strong probabilistic argument, all that can really be concluded is that he is hopelessly ignorant of the nature of probability.
Dave
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