Proof of Immortality, VI

Status
Not open for further replies.
- But, the point is that I would not be brought back to life -- the old self was me, the new self would not be me. That is a difference -- a critical difference.

Jabba,
The first-person pronouns as you are using them have no meaning. The point is that Jabba would be brought [back] to life. The old self was Jabba. The new self would be Jabba. There is no difference.
 
Jabba, are you thinking of each self as having some kind of identity property that indicates which one it is?

If so, why?
 
- But, the point is that I would not be brought back to life -- the old self was me, the new self would not be me. That is a difference -- a critical difference.

WHAT IS THE CRITICAL DIFFERENCE!? EXPLAIN IT!
 
- But, the point is that I would not be brought back to life -- the old self was me, the new self would not be me. That is a difference -- a critical difference.


it would be another distinct second you. It would think its the real Jabba, just like the original did.

You cannot and will not accept this, because you believe the 'you' is a one of a kind unique soul that keeps getting recycled into different bodies. you have no evidence, proof, or even argument supporting why you think this.
 
- But, the point is that I would not be brought back to life -- the old self was me, the new self would not be me. That is a difference -- a critical difference.

I Jesus hope you wouldn't come back. Ooflam* is enough and then some.

* And what in hell is "at most" supposed to mean? "At least" means pretty much the same thing in this context. Or am I just talking to the wall?
 
Last edited:
What do you mean by back to life, Jabba. In this scenario, have you died? Was the copying process done before or after death? If you have not died, how does "bringing you back to life" apply?...

(1071)... According to the materialist model, if someone reproduced my DNA after my death, the new life would*look*like me, but it wouldn't actually*be*me. I would not be brought back to life.
- The materialist model accepts that*that*"self" did exist, but would not return. Another self would take its place.
 
(1071)... According to the materialist model, if someone reproduced my DNA after my death, the new life would*look*like me, but it wouldn't actually*be*me. I would not be brought back to life.
- The materialist model accepts that*that*"self" did exist, but would not return. Another self would take its place.


Here's post 1071, which for some reason Jabba quoted in such a way that it wasn't linked:

jond,
- Yes it does. According to the materialist model, if someone reproduced my DNA after my death, the new life would look like me, but it wouldn't actually be me. I would not be brought back to life.
- The materialist model accepts that that "self" did exist, but would not return. Another self would take its place. Those two selves are not the same -- they are separate entities.


It is, of course, one of Jabba's posts, so is merely his claim of what "the materialist model accepts" rather than a reliable statement of materialism.

No, Jabba, such entities are not part of the materialist model.
 
(1071)... According to the materialist model, if someone reproduced my DNA after my death, the new life would*look*like me, but it wouldn't actually*be*me. I would not be brought back to life.
- The materialist model accepts that*that*"self" did exist, but would not return. Another self would take its place.

And?

Are you ever going to move on from that?
 
(1071)... According to the materialist model, if someone reproduced my DNA after my death, the new life would*look*like me, but it wouldn't actually*be*me. I would not be brought back to life.
- The materialist model accepts that*that*"self" did exist, but would not return. Another self would take its place.
Yes, but reproducing DNA is not what we were discussing when we were discussing copying. You are equivocating two different things - reproducing the body and brain, and reproducing DNA. Reproducing your DNA alone would result in a self that may not even look much like you - think of Dolly the sheep who had different markings from the sheep from which she was cloned.

Reproducing your DNA is not sufficient. We were talking about reproducing your brain and body, identical right down to neural connections in the brain. If this were possible, then the process of consciousness in the copy would result in a second, identical you. It would be another self in the sense that it is an identical-and separate self, but it would not be different in the sense of having any identifiable differences from the original. In every sense, it would be the original self, the original "you" - it's just that now there are two of you. Identical in every respect, but separate. Nobody, including the two "yous" would be able to identify which was the original and which the copy.

Please could you address my question about whether OOFLam is the materialist model (ie H) or whether it is something from ~H?
 
Last edited:
(1071)... According to the materialist model, if someone reproduced my DNA after my death, the new life would*look*like me, but it wouldn't actually*be*me. I would not be brought back to life.
- The materialist model accepts that*that*"self" did exist, but would not return. Another self would take its place.

No. This is false. It is an incorrect statement. It is non-factual. It is erroneous. It is non-indicative of reality. It is incorrect. It is not true.
 
(1071)... According to the materialist model, if someone reproduced my DNA after my death, the new life would*look*like me, but it wouldn't actually*be*me. I would not be brought back to life.
- The materialist model accepts that*that*"self" did exist, but would not return. Another self would take its place.

Is this the "self" that rationalists refer to as a process of the living organism?
 
(1071)... According to the materialist model, if someone reproduced my DNA after my death, the new life would*look*like me, but it wouldn't actually*be*me. I would not be brought back to life.
- The materialist model accepts that*that*"self" did exist, but would not return. Another self would take its place.

It does not accept that the self existed as some separate entity.
The new self would be identical, but not the same instance.

This doesn't get you anywhere, Jabba. It does not get you out of the sharp-shooter fallacy, it does not allow you to sneak in a separate self entity.

Hans

ETA; I am here ignoring the fact that a DNA copy would not be enough, since I assume Jabba means the, putative, complete copy process.
 
Last edited:
...
ETA; I am here ignoring the fact that a DNA copy would not be enough, since I assume Jabba means the, putative, complete copy process.

Isn't it hilarious that we are reduced to arguing a hypothetical as yet impossible scenario, and somehow this relates to Proof of immortality.
 
Status
Not open for further replies.

Back
Top Bottom