Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

[JayUtah]

H accepts the existence of a specific sense of self that will not be "reincarnated."

No, H has no concept of a "specific" sense of self any more than U.S. highway laws have a concept of a "specific going 60 mph." You don't get to add concepts to materialism just to make it easier for you to falsify. Particularization and specificity are just such concepts. A property is not an entity.

Everyone seems to understand what the thing or process is to which reincarnation refers.

Yes. But they also understand that it isn't in any way part of H. You tried very hard to get people to think that agreement on a different point constituted agreement on this point, but you were not successful.

H accepts that the specific sense of self to which reincarnation refers does exist --

Most emphatically no. Despite your desperate desire to remember the discussion that way, that's not what was agreed. What was agreed was that reincarnationists believe in a kind of soul that they assert creates the sense of self. What was not agreed to -- and specifically denied several times over your faux befuddlement -- was that H contained any such theory as to cause.

This was just one of many times you tried to pollute E with suppositions as to cause from ~H. E is the sense of self. Reincarnationists believe that sense of self is caused by a soul that persists after death and may be reincarnated. H believes that sense of self is a property manifested by a physical human organism that has a functioning brain, and requires nothing else.

 

[JimOfAllTrades]

Mojo,
- H accepts the existence of a specific sense of self that will not be "reincarnated." Consequently, H seems to be talking about the same thing that I think might be reincarnated.
- Everyone seems to understand what the thing or process is to which reincarnation refers. H accepts that the specific sense of self to which reincarnation refers does exist -- but according to H, this specific sense of self just can't be reincarnated...

No, that's where you get H wrong. According to H that specific sense of self doesn't exist at all. It's not missing in the copy because it was never there in the original.

The sense of self that exists in H is part of the emergent property of consciousness, nothing more. Its cause is purely material, and comes along with a functioning brain.

 

[JayUtah]

No, that's where you get H wrong. According to H that specific sense of self doesn't exist at all.

And Jabba knows this, having participated in a lively conversation with godless dave over that bit of misinterpretation and having acknowledge Dave's clarification. He seems to be conveniently forgetting that now.

E is the common observation. It must be defined the same when reckoning P(E|H) as when reckoning P(E|~H). As such it has to limit itself to what can be observed without regard or speculation to cause. H and the panoply of ~H provide the respective theory of cause. E is simply "has a sense of self." Skeptics have a sense of self. Reincarnationists have a sense of self. It is the same sense of self in that members of each camp report the same subjective sensations. Each camp hypothesizes differently about what causes those sensations. Wherever there is a difference between the formulations of the two camps, that cannot be part of E; it must be part either of H or of K (which is some specific member of ~H -- say, reincarnation). Jabba wants to take reincarnationists' speculation about what causes E and include it as part of E so that H has to explain it when reckoning P(E|H). Rightly, his critics don't let him do that.

Fortuitously forgetting having previously been set straight on this, Jabba seems to have gone back to rampant equivocation, which is his most threadbare costume. "Property" and "process" in Jabba's hands don't mean what other people think they mean. He simply considers them largely analogous to "soul."

 

[jsfisher]

Jabba,
I know there are a lot of posts being directed towards you, but would you honor me with a reply to this query:

Jabba,

Let's go back to the Jabba Replicator 5000: You step in, there is a brilliant flash of light, and then two Jabba's step out.

Which one is you?

 

[The Sparrow]

You haven't defined "ME" ...

I think you're nailing it here. Jabba's definition of me includes a unique soul.

What jabba doesn't get, is he may already be a copy. Identity is made up of a bunch of things, but, I think most importantly, memory. Who I am is largely composed of my memories. It's how I relate now to the past, and gives me the illusion of continuity. I am that kid that sat on the cross bar of my dad's bike when I was 3. I have no memory of buffalo hunting with my dad. I'd like to think I would recognize that as something false, and not me, if it appears.

Jabba, the copy of you, or you, if you already are the copy, thinks it is the real you.

How do you know you are not already a copy of the original Jabba that was made 5 years ago.

 

[godless dave]

Dave,
- I've been trying -- but, for whatever reason, nothing seems to communicate. Once again, it's the thing or process that you would say cannot be reincarnated.

I'm what way would a copy of such a thing or process be different from the thing or process it would be a copy of?
That's what isn't communicating.

 

[Mojo]

Dave,
- I've been trying -- but, for whatever reason, nothing seems to communicate. Once again, it's the thing or process that you would say cannot be reincarnated.

There is certainly an apparent failure of communication, but it isn't in the direction you imply. Everyone is fully aware that you are claiming that souls exist under H. The fact that your attempts to conceal this by calling them "selves" or "specific senses of self", or whatever, have failed is not a failure of communication. The apparent failure of communication here is your apparent inability to understand that souls do not exist under H, despite this having been explained to you very clearly multiple times by multiple posters. As such it is more of a failure of comprehension than of communication, and there's only one person who is failing to comprehend.

 

[Mojo]

Mojo,
- H accepts the existence of a specific sense of self that will not be "reincarnated." Consequently, H seems to be talking about the same thing that I think might be reincarnated.
- Everyone seems to understand what the thing or process is to which reincarnation refers. H accepts that the specific sense of self to which reincarnation refers does exist -- but according to H, this specific sense of self just can't be reincarnated...

No, Jabba, souls do not exist under H.

Anyway, Jabba, can you please answer this question without trying to duck it by changing the scenario:

Incidentally, Jabba, there's a question, first posted a few pages back, that you still haven't answered:

Say we have a six-sided die. We throw it, and it comes up as a 3 (event E). I form the hypothesis (H) that all six sides of the die have a 3 on them. The likelihood of the observed event under this hypothesis is 1, right?

You have an alternative hypothesis (let's call it J), that the six sides are numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. The likelihood of the observed event under this hypothesis is 1/6.

Then you pick up the die, and demonstrate that the sides are indeed numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

What is the likelihood of the the observed event if H is true?

 

[Filippo Lippi]

nothing seems to communicate.

This is a barefaced lie

 

[JesseCuster]

- I guess I'll have to go back to "difference."
- I recognize, or imagine, a deductive difference between me and a copy of me that wouldn't bring ME back to life. That's probably the best I can do towards arguing my conclusion that the physically perfect copy would not be a totally perfect copy.

But your objection isn't that a perfect copy of you isn't a totally perfect copy of you, your objection is that a perfect copy of you IS a totally perfect copy of you.

According to you, a "totally perfect copy" of you, would have a copy of everything about you and your properties, apart from your sense of self.

According to everyone else, a "totally perfect copy" of you, would have a copy of everything about you and your properties, including your sense of self.

One of those clearly makes sense and the other doesn't.

How can you insist that something is only a totally perfect copy of something else, only if it doesn't include copies of some of its properties?

 

[Pixel42]

Dave,
- I've been trying -- but, for whatever reason, nothing seems to communicate. Once again, it's the thing or process that you would say cannot be reincarnated.

But under H there is no thing or process that cannot be reincarnated. A future copy of you which perfectly reproduced your current consciousness would be a reincarnation of you. The only difference between it and your current instance of consciousness would be its spacetime coordinates.

Please stop assuming that if we don't agree with you it's because we don't understand you. We understand you perfectly. The problem is your own understanding. Under H the only thing that uniquely identifies the instance of consciousness which you call me is its spacetime coordinates, so it makes no sense to complain that that unique identifier can't be reproduced.

ETA: Take ten identical Volkswagons. Number them 1 to 10, so each is uniquely identified. You are essentially trying to argue that number 8 cannot be a perfect copy of number 2 because its unique identifier is 8, not 2.

 

[Jabba]

Jabba,

Let's go back to the Jabba Replicator 5000: You step in, there is a brilliant flash of light, and then two Jabba's step out.

Which one is you?

js,
- The one wearing clothes.

 

[Jabba]

But under H there is no thing or process that cannot be reincarnated. A future copy of you which perfectly reproduced your current consciousness would be a reincarnation of you. The only difference between it and your current instance of consciousness would be its spacetime coordinates.

Please stop assuming that if we don't agree with you it's because we don't understand you. We understand you perfectly. The problem is your own understanding. Under H the only thing that uniquely identifies the instance of consciousness which you call me is its spacetime coordinates, so it makes no sense to complain that that unique identifier can't be reproduced.

ETA: Take ten identical Volkswagons. Number them 1 to 10, so each is uniquely identified. You are essentially trying to argue that number 8 cannot be a perfect copy of number 2 because its unique identifier is 8, not 2.

Pixel,
- We don't have to worry about bringing the VW back to life.

 

[MRC_Hans]

js,
- The one wearing clothes.

So you agree that this would be the only way to tell the difference?

Hans

 

[Jabba]

But your objection isn't that a perfect copy of you isn't a totally perfect copy of you, your objection is that a perfect copy of you IS a totally perfect copy of you.

According to you, a "totally perfect copy" of you, would have a copy of everything about you and your properties, apart from your sense of self.

According to everyone else, a "totally perfect copy" of you, would have a copy of everything about you and your properties, including your sense of self.

One of those clearly makes sense and the other doesn't.

How can you insist that something is only a totally perfect copy of something else, only if it doesn't include copies of some of its properties?

Jesse,
- In a hurry, I don't really understand your question...
- I have to repeat myself, but don't you agree that something is missing if I'm not brought back to life?

 

[Jabba]

So you agree that this would be the only way to tell the difference?

Hans

- Yes. That, or some other external identifier.

 

[jond]

Jesse,
- In a hurry, I don't really understand your question...
- I have to repeat myself, but don't you agree that something is missing if I'm not brought back to life?

If the duplicate thinks it's you, has all your thoughts and memories, how exactly would that be different from bringing you back to life? The only difference would be the physical body, of which there would be two. And, as Pixel42 points out, their spacetime coordinates.

 

[jsfisher]

Jabba,

Let's go back to the Jabba Replicator 5000: You step in, there is a brilliant flash of light, and then two Jabba's step out.

Which one is you?

js,
- The one wearing clothes.

Why evade the question rather than answer it?

Its point is very simple, and I suspect you know the answer, but choose not to face it: They are both you. Whatever it is that you sense, believe, feel, think, experience, and conclude to be "you" is present in both Jabba's.

 

[Belz...]

- All I seem able to do here is repeat myself.

And why? We all understand your claims and points. Time for you to switch to something more productive.

 

[JayUtah]

The one wearing clothes.

What a rude non-answer.