Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

[John Jones]

- I thought that Dave had told me that I would not be brought back to life -- and, that would mean that the copy of me would have something left out -- whereas, the copy of the VW would not.

No you didn't think that. It was another of your attempts at a GOTCHA argument. Such transparent attempts have never worked for you, by the way.

 

[John Jones]

Pixel,
- I think that my answer is that my consciousness is an emergent property which brings with it a particular identity which would be different in the consciousness of my "perfect" copy. The VW copy has no emergent property or particular identity that differs from the original.

That's not an answer. It's an unsupported claim of the existence of a soul. Prove it. Put up or shut up.

 

[JayUtah]

What doesn't exist under H is some kind of identity that can't be duplicated.

Or in other words, defining as part of E something that H cannot reproduce means that the formulation of E is speculating about a potential cause for the observation. That's not correct for a statistical inference between two hypotheses. It amounts to a circular argument.

 

[John Jones]

Dave,
[...] My claim is that if H recognizes that identity, that identity is something that exists under H.
- I don't see how the immediately above answers that objection.

Then you should be able to demonstrate that H recognizes souls. Why don't you do it?

Oh, you weren't finished, and have more equivocating to do? Then please continue. Don't let me stop you.

 

[theprestige]

Prestige,
- So, you agree with me that the identity we're dealing with does exist under H?

Maybe. Do you agree that the identity we're dealing with under H is the effect of a material cause?

 

[MRC_Hans]

- I thought that Dave had told me that I would not be brought back to life -- and, that would mean that the copy of me would have something left out -- whereas, the copy of the VW would not.

No, the copy would not be missing anything, but obviously, it would still be a copy. So the copy would be able to continue your life without itself or anybody else noticing a difference.

But if the original died, it would stay dead.

Just like the VW: If you make a perfect copy a VW (including wear and tear and dents) and scrap the original, you would have a VW just like before, but the original would still be scrapped. But you would not notice.

So for all practical purposes, both you and the VW would be resurrected.

Hans

 

[jond]

Jim,
- I basically agree...
- I'm not sure about what the other "bunch of stuff" is, but I do agree that I can't prove ~H.
- That's misleading, cause I do still think that I can virtually prove ~H -- but then again, I must admit that I'm not quite as sure of myself as I was...

If you "basically agree" then you must know that H is far more likely than ~H. And yet you refuse to even acknowledge the posts that demonstrate this basic fact.

 

[Mojo]

- Seems to me that the identity that doesn't exist under H is the ~H interpretation of the experience. H and ~H are referring to the same experience, they just interpret it differently. Here, we're trying to determine which is interpreting correctly.

What evidence do you have that H doesn't interpret it correctly?

 

[Mojo]

Prestige,
- So, you agree with me that the identity we're dealing with does exist under H?

I was about to post:

This is what theprestige posted:

H recognizes identity as an effect. H disagrees with you about the cause of the effect.

Under H the cause of identity is a materialistic process.

You contend that the cause of identity is an immaterial soul.

Getting people to agree about the effect doesn't get you agreement about the cause. It also doesn't advance your argument about the cause.

This is what Jabba will see:

H recognizes identity blah blah blah. Blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah.

Blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah.

Blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blahblah blah blah blahblah.

Blah blah blahblah blah blah blah blahblah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blahblah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blahblah blah.

But I now see that Jabba has made that redundant.

 

[John Jones]

No, the copy would not be missing anything, but obviously, it would still be a copy. So the copy would be able to continue your life without itself or anybody else noticing a difference.

But if the original died, it would stay dead.

Just like the VW: If you make a perfect copy a VW (including wear and tear and dents) and scrap the original, you would have a VW just like before, but the original would still be scrapped. But you would not notice.

So for all practical purposes, both you and the VW would be resurrected.

Hans

Stand-by for Jabba to re-introduce his VIN argument.

 

[Mojo]

Stand-by for Jabba to re-introduce his VIN argument.

You mean Jabba's "VIN number" argument.

 

[Mojo]

- Seems to me that the identity that doesn't exist under H is the ~H interpretation of the experience. H and ~H are referring to the same experience, they just interpret it differently. Here, we're trying to determine which is interpreting correctly.

No, you're trying to claim that independently existing souls exist under H but not under ~H, so you can beg the question and stack the deck at the same time.

 

[MRC_Hans]

Pixel,
- I think that my answer is that my consciousness is an emergent property which brings with it a particular identity which would be different in the consciousness of my "perfect" copy. The VW copy has no emergent property or particular identity that differs from the original.

No. In the perfect copy, the identity would be identical.

And yes, the VW has diverse emergent properties that will also be present in the copy.

Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

- Correct.
- But does H recognize the particular experience that I'm alluding to and calling "identity"?

We don't really know (since you keep changing it) and we don't frankly give a damn. The emergent property of identity that follows from H can indeed be copied.

Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

Dave,
- A ways above, you say that the "identity" I was alluding to doesn't sound like anything that exists under H. I then asked if H recognizes the "identity" to which I was alluding. My claim is that if H recognizes that identity, that identity is something that exists under H.
- I don't see how the immediately above answers that objection.

OK, H recognizes that the emergent property of consciousness may have the illusion that it's identity is something special.

Right?

Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

Prestige,
- So, you agree with me that the identity we're dealing with does exist under H?

Jabba, I sincerely recommend that you cease and desist the practice of trying to foist an agreement on others. It creates a lot of hostility.

Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

- But H and ~H are talking about the same experience. They just interpret the experience differently. IOW, the experience does exist under H.

Yes, but under H, it is simply a process of the physical brain. That is, sort of, you know, the whole point.

Hans

 

[Belz...]

- Seems to me that the identity that doesn't exist under H is the ~H interpretation of the experience.

Yeah, so stop trying to jam it in there.

Now:
Why do you distinguish the Volk's emergent properties from yours?

 

[Belz...]

Prestige,
- So, you agree with me that the identity we're dealing with does exist under H?

What? You just said it didn't exist in the last post I quoted.

Make up your mind. Stop stalling and acting all confused. We know you can be very focused when you want to, so don't pretend.

 

[Mojo]

Incidentally, Jabba, there's a question, first posted a few pages back, that you still haven't answered:

Say we have a six-sided die. We throw it, and it comes up as a 3 (event E). I form the hypothesis (H) that all six sides of the die have a 3 on them. The likelihood of the observed event under this hypothesis is 1, right?

You have an alternative hypothesis (let's call it J), that the six sides are numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. The likelihood of the observed event under this hypothesis is 1/6.

Then you pick up the die, and demonstrate that the sides are indeed numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

What is the likelihood of the the observed event if H is true?