Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

[Belz...]

He's been corrected so many times on his usage of the words 'same' and 'different' and how he equivocates between different meanings of them, that it's really starting to look like he's being quite deliberate when he uses them in a way that's vague and allows for misunderstanding.

There's simply no excuse at this stage for using him using the word 'different' when he really should be using the word 'distinct' to avoid any misunderstanding.

Oh, jabba's not the confused old man he claims to be. When he wants to he can be surprisingly lucid, and sharp.

 

[Mojo]

Under H they are not connected in any way if one is a perfect copy of the other. They are two identical people, with identical consciousnesses.

- Agreed.

Which means that there is nothing missing from the copy.

 

[Mojo]

If jabba wants to remove that distinction, he'll have to admit that jabba right now isn't the same jabba from two seconds ago. He's missing something from his earlier "self", and thus is no longer alive. Jabba from two seconds ago is dead, replaced by a new instance.

Jabba can't have it both ways.

I'm sure he'll do his best to.

 

[JayUtah]

I love how he practically demands my respect in order to read and respond to my posts...

...as if being responded to is a privilege, or the only goal Jabba's critics have in mind. Jabba reproduced a handful of my posts which he claimed were unfriendly, but was unable to convince anyone that they were. Instead the posts showed that Jabba was being energetically and correctly rebutted. Jabba may or may not realize he can't gaslight everyone into believing he's been as badly mistreated here as he claims. People will draw their own conclusions, and Jabba's previous "map" to the Shroud debate conspicuously omitted a link back to the original, ostensibly because the last thing Jabba hoped to accomplish with such a "map" is allowing his readers to have a full picture of the evidence.

When I write here, I do so with the full understanding that Jabba will likely not respond. And that serves a purpose, because other people will be able to drawn their own conclusions about any future claims Jabba may decide to make about how successful he was here. Dollars to donuts, if Jabba makes a "map" for this debate, it will not contain a link back to the the ISF debate. My goal is, in part, to force Jabba either to be forthright about this debate, or to have to overtly lie in order to achieve his aim of claiming either to have bested his critics or to have lost to them only by unfair means.

 

[zooterkin]

- If I believed that they were connected in some way (that a physically perfect copy would be a totally perfect copy), I would expect them each to say, "blue and red."

And what possible mechanism would explain that? How would making a perfect copy link the copy with the original?

 

[Waterman]

Waterman,
- I'm simply claiming that if I am not brought back to life by this copy (whatever this "I" is that you agree would not be brought back to life), the copy is missing something from the original -- it's missing that ME that was not brought back to life (and, will never exist again) according to H.

Yes that is still the claim which you are supposed to demonstrate. It does presuppose that there is something non-physical that is not replicated in the copy. Your “I” and ME which you have used as code words for an entity that may or may not be a soul. So far you appear to have agreed the original and the copy are indistinguishable. Please try again without assuming that such an entity exists, which you claimed your argument does not require.

Also… other animals have awareness, can learn, have preferences, retain memories, learn names, etc. So in a similar manner what distinguishes a cat a dog or a chimp ‘perfect physical copy’ from a human ‘perfect physical copy’ or are they missing the same thing.

 

[Agatha]

Jabba, why do you think that a perfect copy of a person would have any ongoing connection with the original - why would Waterman and Xaterman both say "blue and red?

Under H, the one in the blue room would say blue, and the one in the red room would say red. Under H, the original and the perfect copy would both have identical-but-separate senses of self.

 

[Waterman]

Jabba, why do you think that a perfect copy of a person would have any ongoing connection with the original - why would Waterman and Xaterman both say "blue and red?

Under H, the one in the blue room would say blue, and the one in the red room would say red. Under H, the original and the perfect copy would both have identical-but-separate senses of self.

I am still trying to understand the 'one 'self' two sets of eyes' or 'two connected beings using the same eyes' but I don't think I am going to figure that one out or get a better explanation.

He did claim that it would work only IF they were connected but he agrees that they are not (which is consistent with current scientific theory) Also he is not claiming that if there are souls that they would be connected either. So...? I do not understand how Jabba considers the statement to provide support for his position.

 

[jond]

I am still trying to understand the 'one 'self' two sets of eyes' or 'two connected beings using the same eyes' but I don't think I am going to figure that one out or get a better explanation.

He did claim that it would work only IF they were connected but he agrees that they are not (which is consistent with current scientific theory) Also he is not claiming that if there are souls that they would be connected either. So...? I do not understand how Jabba considers the statement to provide support for his position.

I think he's desperately flailing away at anything to try to keep his position from drowning. He knows he's been thoroughly defeated but is unwilling to let it go.

 

[MRC_Hans]

Waterman,
- I'm simply claiming that if I am not brought back to life by this copy (whatever this "I" is that you agree would not be brought back to life), the copy is missing something from the original -- it's missing that ME that was not brought back to life (and, will never exist again) according to H.

Jabba: No. If you make a perfect copy of a VW and scrap the original, the original is not brought back to life. However, nobody will notice because the copy is just the same.

Under H, there is nothing else: The ME you are talking about is a property of your physical body. You loose nothing less or nothing more than the VW.

You are trying to create a false dilemma.

Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

- How about, if the copy doesn't bring me back to life, there's an obvious and significant distinction between the original and the copy...

No, false dilemma. In that case, you must show that there is something that is not defined by your physical existence. (Evidence. Your belief does not count).

Hans

 

[JayUtah]

You are trying to create a false dilemma.

Actually I'd say he's trying to create an anti-dilemma. A dilemma, in logic, properly notes that if B follows from A and D follows from C, and we assert either A or C (but we don't know which), we can assert B or D -- i.e., B-or-D cannot be false. As tautological as this seems, it forms the basis for much scientific empiricism. A well-planned experiment sets up a valid dilemma. We hope to observe (B-or-E) -- i.e., an outcome -- and if we have controlled, say, for A and can know it's false, then the outcome is validly attributed to variance in C.

A dilemma becomes false (and fallacious) when there exists an E such that D follows also from E. If we observe (B-or-D) and have controlled for A but not for E, we cannot properly attribute variance in D to C.

What Jabba's trying to do, it seems, is defeat the dilemma and say that both B and D follow from A and that there is essentially no C distinct from A. To put this in the terms of his argument, he's saying that the organism and self under materialism must, somehow, suffer from the same limitations as a system in which there is a soul. In his theory, if the self is a marriage of organism and soul, then duplicating just the organism leaves either a soulless organism or some sort of bifurcated connection between the solitary soul and two organisms. Both are problematic in his model. Jabba wants a similar problem to occur in materialism. It simply doesn't. There is a legitimate dilemma between materialism and Jabba's theory.

 

[Mojo]

Incidentally, Jabba, there's a question, first posted a few pages back, that you still haven't answered:

Say we have a six-sided die. We throw it, and it comes up as a 3 (event E). I form the hypothesis (H) that all six sides of the die have a 3 on them. The likelihood of the observed event under this hypothesis is 1, right?

You have an alternative hypothesis (let's call it J), that the six sides are numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. The likelihood of the observed event under this hypothesis is 1/6.

Then you pick up the die, and demonstrate that the sides are indeed numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

What is the likelihood of the the observed event if H is true?

Mojo,
- Couple of problems here.
- The die could be loaded.
- But I have already proven that the sides are indeed numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6...

And even then it wouldn't change the likelihood of Jabba's existence under H.

Jabba, can you answer the question about the die, please?

Mojo,
- Sorry, I was thinking that I had answered your question -- but apparently, I had gotten distracted and didn't quite finish...
- I have already proven that H is true, so I don't know that "likelihood" is an appropriate term in this case. If it is appropriate, I assume that the likelihood is 1.00.

Actually, in the hypothetical situation that the question was about you had demonstrated that H was false. H was the hypothesis that each side of the die had a three on it, and you had demonstrated that they were, in fact, numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

Do you agree that the likelihood of the observed event (throwing a 3) under H is 1.00 for this scenario?

Jabba, you still haven't answered the question I actually asked: you changed the scenario from one in which you had demonstrated that H was false to one in which you had proved that H was true.

Do you agree that in the scenario I proposed under H the likelihood of a three being thrown is 1.00?

 

[Belz...]

Speaking of unanswered questions, jabba, why do you think that a person's property of "self" is fundamentally different from a Volkswagen's property of "speed"?

 

[Dancing David]

- How about, if the copy doesn't bring me back to life, there's an obvious and significant distinction between the original and the copy...

How about you build the copy machine , copy yourself and ask Jabba>2

 

[jsfisher]

Jabba,

Let's go back to the Jabba Replicator 5000: You step in, there is a brilliant flash of light, and then two Jabba's step out.

Which one is you?

 

[ferd burfle]

- But, H recognizes what I'm experiencing and agrees that this particular experience would not return. IOW, H recognizes a difference between the original and the copy.

When I first began following your threads, Jabba, I had only a vague and mostly wrong idea of what equivocation is. But thanks to JayUtah's explanation and the hundreds of examples you've posted, I can now spot one a mile away.

No matter how big your thesaurus is, this line of argument is never going to succeed. You're boring us. Try something new please.

 

[Jabba]

Jabba, 1)why do you think that a perfect copy of a person would have any ongoing connection with the original - why would Waterman and Xaterman both say "blue and red?

2)Under H, the one in the blue room would say blue, and the one in the red room would say red. Under H, the original and the perfect copy would both have identical-but-separate senses of self.

Agatha,

#1
- All I seem able to do here is repeat myself.
- I either recognize, or imagine, a direct line of deductive reasoning in the claim that if the copy doesn't bring ME back to life, it's missing something... IMO, there is a particular sense of self that is missing.
- It seems to be a different kind of difference than you guys are including.

#2
- I think I agree.

 

[Jabba]

No, false dilemma. In that case, you must show that there is something that is not defined by your physical existence. (Evidence. Your belief does not count).

Hans

Hans,
- The ME that is not brought back to life is not defined by my physical existence.
--- Jabba

 

[Jabba]

- How about, if the copy doesn't bring me back to life, there's an obvious and significant distinction between the original and the copy...

There's a distinction between the original and the copy no matter what, because that's what it means to make a copy of something.

- I guess I'll have to go back to "difference."
- I recognize, or imagine, a deductive difference between me and a copy of me that wouldn't bring ME back to life. That's probably the best I can do towards arguing my conclusion that the physically perfect copy would not be a totally perfect copy.