Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

[jond]

Waterman,
- Mostly, that premise just seems self-evident to me…
- I.e., there would be a difference between the two “selves” if I wasn’t brought back to life.
- If that would require a non-physical element, so be it.

Once again, Jabba: what specifically is the difference between the original and the copy? If the copy has all the same thoughts and memories and thinks it is the original, the only difference between the original and the copy would be that there are now two identical physical bodies. That really doesn't help your cause.

 

[Toontown]

The copy would bring YOU back to life. There would be no way (expect by observation of the copy process) to distinguish YOU before and YOU after.

MRC_Hans: No. Making an exact copy of YOU would not bring YOU back to life, irrespective of whether the copy or anyone else knows the copy is not the original. Informational states do not exert magical influences on the identities of things. An absence of knowledge about the identity of a thing does not change what or who the thing is.

In that case you would have to explain what you think exists other than the emergent property of our physical instance. You can, of course, construct a definition of YOU that requires it to be generated by the original instance, but that would not only be illogical, but it would render your argument circular.

No. Denying your unsupported claim does not require me to do anything. Your claim, your burden, if you want to support it.

I have no counter-claim to make.

I will say that, if I were to construct a definition of the currently subjectively experienced ME, I would indeed require myself to be generated by this specific physical instance. And, if you then declared my definition illogical and circular, it would again be your burden to prove or support said declaration.

But If I were to speculate publicly on some form of immortality, or some facsimile thereof, I would not require this specific physical instance of ME to ever be repeated or copied. For therein lies madness.

Nor would I ever walk onto a transporter stage, unless I was ready to die for the cause - or I was convinced that the exact same atoms would instantaneously coalesce at the new location from the energy into which they would be transformed. And even then I'd have reservations about the conversion to energy and back.

But I wouldn't have a problem with something akin to quantum tunneling, which happens instantaneously and doesn't require the particle to be converted to energy and back.

 

[Waterman]

Waterman,
- Mostly, that premise just seems self-evident to me…
- I.e., there would be a difference between the two “selves” if I wasn’t brought back to life.
- If that would require a non-physical element, so be it.

Yes I understand that YOU think that this is self evident. However it is inconsistent with the current scientific understanding of the rise of consciousness and the concept of continuity of the self. Note there are no quotes and I do not mean to imply anything that is not a result of material processes.

Lets continue the thought experiment one step further.

Lets say the aliens arrive with a clone-o-matic 2000.

They beam up Waterman and make a exact replica down to all the molecular states that would impart memories. Lets call him Xaterman. As far as Xaterman is concerned he is Waterman. H says that there is no reason that the two individuals would have any connection or particular awareness of each other.

They decide to keep the original on the ship for further study and return the clone back down to earth however Xaterman isn't aware that he is the clone and lives the only life he is aware of. Can you let me know if anyone including himself would ever be aware of the change.

H Says that the clone would proceed in no way different than the original would have done. My wife and kids would never be aware of the switch.

Your claim about having a non-physical element that provides some actual 'continuity' which would either be missing or different. In what ways would these differences manifest?

 

[Toontown]

Well, I don't search for immortality. If, against expectations and evidence, I should turn out to be immortal, I am obviously going to find out.

Only if the form immortality takes is of the Everettian "many worlds" variety, in which case you may eventually find yourself being the oldest person on the planet, apparently having survived against apparently gargantuan odds.

I've already beaten gargantuan odds, but I'll have to keep beating them for another lifetime before I'll have the proof Jabba seeks. The odds don't look good, but if the Everett interpretation is correct, odds don't matter until they become impossible.

No, I'm not proposing that, and no, I wouldn't bet on it. But nor can I rule it out.

 

[MRC_Hans]

No. Denying your unsupported claim does not require me to do anything. Your claim, your burden, if you want to support it.

The claim is that of materalism. You know, the one Jabba purports to disprove. It doesn't really matter if you believe it or not, it is the claim Jabba is up against.

I have no counter-claim to make.

Oh:

MRC_Hans: No. Making an exact copy of YOU would not bring YOU back to life, irrespective of whether the copy or anyone else knows the copy is not the original. Informational states do not exert magical influences on the identities of things. An absence of knowledge about the identity of a thing does not change what or who the thing is.

That looks like a claim to me, but have it your way.

Hans

 

[Mojo]

He didn't say "repeat". He said "demonstrate".

There is no non-physical element until you demonstrate that there is.

And even then it wouldn't change the likelihood of Jabba's existence under H.

Jabba, can you answer the question about the die, please?

 

[Toontown]

The claim is that of materalism. You know, the one Jabba purports to disprove. It doesn't really matter if you believe it or not, it is the claim Jabba is up against.

Really? I'm not familiar with that form of materialism. Is that the one in which other peoples' informational states determine MY subjective reality?

That looks like a claim to me, but have it your way.

Hans

Not really. That was just my (apparently dated) understanding of plain vanilla materialism.

You know. The old one in which other peoples' informational states do not determine MY subjective reality.

 

[MRC_Hans]

Really? I'm not familiar with that form of materialism. Is that the one in which other peoples' informational states determine MY subjective reality?



Not really. That was just my (apparently dated) understanding of plain vanilla materialism.

You know. The old one in which other peoples' informational states do not determine MY subjective reality.

Take care not to smoke near your strawmen.

 

[Jabba]

Incidentally, Jabba, there's a question, first posted a few pages back, that you still haven't answered:

Say we have a six-sided die. We throw it, and it comes up as a 3 (event E). I form the hypothesis (H) that all six sides of the die have a 3 on them. The likelihood of the observed event under this hypothesis is 1, right?

You have an alternative hypothesis (let's call it J), that the six sides are numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. The likelihood of the observed event under this hypothesis is 1/6.

Then you pick up the die, and demonstrate that the sides are indeed numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

What is the likelihood of the the observed event if H is true?

Mojo,
- Couple of problems here.
- The die could be loaded.
- But I have already proven that the sides are indeed numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6...

And even then it wouldn't change the likelihood of Jabba's existence under H.
Jabba, can you answer the question about the die, please?

Mojo,
- Sorry, I was thinking that I had answered your question -- but apparently, I had gotten distracted and didn't quite finish...
- I have already proven that H is true, so I don't know that "likelihood" is an appropriate term in this case. If it is appropriate, I assume that the likelihood is 1.00.

 

[Jabba]

Yes I understand that YOU think that this is self evident. However it is inconsistent with the current scientific understanding of the rise of consciousness and the concept of continuity of the self. Note there are no quotes and I do not mean to imply anything that is not a result of material processes.

Lets continue the thought experiment one step further.

Lets say the aliens arrive with a clone-o-matic 2000.

They beam up Waterman and make a exact replica down to all the molecular states that would impart memories. Lets call him Xaterman. As far as Xaterman is concerned he is Waterman. H says that there is no reason that the two individuals would have any connection or particular awareness of each other.

They decide to keep the original on the ship for further study and return the clone back down to earth however Xaterman isn't aware that he is the clone and lives the only life he is aware of. Can you let me know if anyone including himself would ever be aware of the change.

H Says that the clone would proceed in no way different than the original would have done. My wife and kids would never be aware of the switch.

Your claim about having a non-physical element that provides some actual 'continuity' which would either be missing or different. In what ways would these differences manifest?

Waterman, or Xaterman (whichever one you are),
- I know that most of my audience is here cause they would figure that if they ceased fighting, I’d claim that I won…
- But, I must admit that, personally, I find this stuff really interesting – which is the main reason that I haven’t quit (but also, I still think I’m right).
- My answer to your question: they wouldn't be looking out the same pair of eyes.

 

[JesseCuster]

- My answer to your question: they wouldn't be looking out the same pair of eyes.

According to H, perfect duplicates of people would not be looking out the same pair of eyes. Each self would be looking out its own pair of eyes.

So why do you keep raising this supposed objection, when it does nothing to disprove H or further your own case for immortal souls?

 

[Belz...]

- My answer to your question: they wouldn't be looking out the same pair of eyes.

Of course not. We've already explained to you, dozens of time, that the copy is not the original. It's just identical in every way. We've also explained that it wouldn't resurrect the original. You'd need to reconstruct the original, for that, but you still wouldn't have continuity of self just like you don't have it now.

Why do we need to repeat things to you hundreds of times?

 

[Jabba]

Waterman,
- Mostly, that premise just seems self-evident to me…
- I.e., there would be a difference between the two “selves” if I wasn’t brought back to life.
- If that would require a non-physical element, so be it.

What's the difference between the two selves? Do they observe differently, think differently, perceive differently?

Dave,
- No.
- They wouldn't have the same sense of self. That's how they would be different.
- Again, I claim that words -- so far -- have failed us. And, unfortunately, I suspect that they always will...
- Whatever, if my "perfect" copy doesn't bring me back to life, it has failed to copy ME in an important way.

 

[godless dave]

Dave,
- No.
- They wouldn't have the same sense of self. That's how they would be different.

So they wouldn't be different. There would be two of them, but there would be no difference between them.

 

[Belz...]

- Again, I claim that words -- so far -- have failed us. And, unfortunately, I suspect that they always will...

That claim has been debunked. YOUR words have failed because they presuppose a soul where none exists.

 

[Jabba]

Yes I understand that YOU think that this is self evident. However it is inconsistent with the current scientific understanding of the rise of consciousness and the concept of continuity of the self. Note there are no quotes and I do not mean to imply anything that is not a result of material processes.

Lets continue the thought experiment one step further.

Lets say the aliens arrive with a clone-o-matic 2000.

They beam up Waterman and make a exact replica down to all the molecular states that would impart memories. Lets call him Xaterman. As far as Xaterman is concerned he is Waterman. H says that there is no reason that the two individuals would have any connection or particular awareness of each other.

They decide to keep the original on the ship for further study and return the clone back down to earth however Xaterman isn't aware that he is the clone and lives the only life he is aware of. Can you let me know if anyone including himself would ever be aware of the change.

H Says that the clone would proceed in no way different than the original would have done. My wife and kids would never be aware of the switch.

Your claim about having a non-physical element that provides some actual 'continuity' which would either be missing or different. In what ways would these differences manifest?

Of course not. We've already explained to you, dozens of time, that the copy is not the original. It's just identical in every way. We've also explained that it wouldn't resurrect the original. You'd need to reconstruct the original, for that, but you still wouldn't have continuity of self just like you don't have it now.

Why do we need to repeat things to you hundreds of times?

Argumemnon,
- People keep asking me the same questions -- and I keep responding with the same answer -- and then, someone asks the same question, and I give the same answer, etc.

 

[Belz...]

Argumemnon,
- People keep asking me the same questions.

So what's your excuse for not learning the answers?

 

[JayUtah]

People keep asking me the same questions.

People ask these questions to point out errors in your argument. You either proudly ignore the post altogether, evade the question, or simply repeat your argument without answering the question -- i.e., without addressing the rebuttal. This discussion has endured five years basically in unchanged form solely because you refuse to address the content of your critics' posts.

 

[JayUtah]

...they would figure that if they ceased fighting, I’d claim that I won…

Since you have a documented history of doing that, their concern is valid.

But, I must admit that, personally, I find this stuff really interesting –

No. You don't engage in the meatier discussion. You simply try the same bag of simple rhetorical tricks to make it seem like you're making progress in the debate without actually doing so. You show none of the behaviors commonly associated with curiosity and all the behaviors commonly associated with trying to win at all costs. Plus there are the statements you have made elsewhere to the effect that your purpose at ISF was to show those godless atheists a thing or two. The preponderance of evidence does not support your assertion.

...which is the main reason that I haven’t quit (but also, I still think I’m right).

The main reason you haven't quit is that you don't want to admit defeat. That's pretty obvious.

My answer to your question: they wouldn't be looking out the same pair of eyes.

That's not a necessary criteria for the self under H. Once again all you're doing is conflating cardinality with similarity and identity.

 

[JayUtah]

They wouldn't have the same sense of self. That's how they would be different.

The same equivocation you've been foisting for the past several weeks.

Again, I claim that words -- so far -- have failed us. And, unfortunately, I suspect that they always will...

As long as you keep retreating back to ambiguous and equivocal language, you will fail. Your critics have already deconstructed your mess of language and straightened out the important concepts to show how your argument amounts to begging the question. You're just begging the same question using the same language and trying to place the blame for that elsewhere.

Whatever, if my "perfect" copy doesn't bring me back to life, it has failed to copy ME in an important way.

Since you never identified what "bring back to life" would mean under H, this statement simply has no meaning. It's just your typical question begging.