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What is the appeal of "objective morality"

I admit that ISIS simply has different preferences, no more right or wrong than one's choice regarding chocolate and vanilla.

Same here. But I can also hold the view that chocolate is so much better than vanilla that vanilla ice cream should be removed from shops to leave more room for chocolate and anyone who stands up for vanilla should be publicly shamed.

Just because one admits that things are preferences doesn't mean that one has to abandon the attempt to make one's own preferences superior.
 
Same here. But I can also hold the view that chocolate is so much better than vanilla that vanilla ice cream should be removed from shops to leave more room for chocolate and anyone who stands up for vanilla should be publicly shamed.

Just because one admits that things are preferences doesn't mean that one has to abandon the attempt to make one's own preferences superior.

Yes, I like my preferences more than I like the preferences of ISIS.
 
Same here. But I can also hold the view that chocolate is so much better than vanilla that vanilla ice cream should be removed from shops to leave more room for chocolate and anyone who stands up for vanilla should be publicly shamed.

Can you?

I loathe the vast majority of pop music these days. I think that it is an insult to discerning listeners. But I can't get so worked up to wish that others are unable to listen to it.

I would view it as a great advance, on the other hand, to eliminate the pathological morality of ISIS. There are limits to the means that are acceptable, of course, but I see the aim of convincing people that ISIS is the embodiment of a bad morality and should be rejected as perfectly good.

I can think of no non-moral opinions that entail such a strong opinion that they should be suppressed as far as possible. As long as I can still by chocolate, the vanilla eaters bother me not one bit. So long as the pop listeners don't assault my eardrums, I see no need to discourage pop. And so on.

None of the above is conclusive, of course, that moral norms are objective, but I do think that even if they weren't, they are different than other subjective preferences.

Just because one admits that things are preferences doesn't mean that one has to abandon the attempt to make one's own preferences superior.

I think the word "dominant" may work better for you than "superior".

As far as I'm concerned, I can't help shaking the perhaps unfounded feeling that killing and raping people for failing to adhere to your interpretation of Islam is rather more objectively wrong than choosing the wrong flavor of ice cream. But, that said, I have seen no decisive argument one way or the other.
 
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As far as I'm concerned, I can't help shaking the perhaps unfounded feeling that killing and raping people for failing to adhere to your interpretation of Islam is rather more objectively wrong than choosing the wrong flavor of ice cream. But, that said, I have seen no decisive argument one way or the other.

Why and how come it is a feeling?
 
Why and how come it is a feeling?
I can't tell you why. It may be because, as certain anti-realists say, I confuse the depth of my emotional reaction or strongly held preferences for objective fact or it may be some deeper insight, as when I say that believing truth is better than believing falsity.

As for the word "feeling", I used it as synonymous with judgment, with the caveat that I do not presently have a decisive argument in its favor.
 
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does not, is no reason to suppose (from an anti-realist perspective) that ISIS is wrong in their values -- and the same would be said about their even more heinous acts of torture, summary execution, rape and forced marriages.

The problem with any kind of terrorism is not moral. We cannot discuss on moral principles with that people, because their moral system is incompatible with ours. ISIS is a political problem and needs a political solution.
 
A moral principle must either be self-evident (which is, as you say, doubtful) or requires some argument for it's truth. Since objectivity, in the sense I mean, is not synonymous with self-evidence (the latter is included in the former), there is no contradiction in thinking that some norms are both objective and require careful consideration before a person can see that they are objective.

But an axiom that requires demonstrations is not an axiom at all.
Every deductive system is based on indemonstrable axioms and deduced theorems (with transformation rules). If a sentence in this system needs to be demonstrated is not an axiom, is a theorem.

A moral principle is the basic postulate of a moral system. If the whole system must be demonstrated you can show the external principles that demonstrate the basic moral principles. Then, you are saying that moral is not autonomous. It depends from religion, science or astrology.
But you have an unsolvable logic problem: in logic, the connectors of the conclusion must be included in the premises. You cannot conclude a universal sentence from particular sentences, for example. And you cannot conclude a sentence with “ought to” from sentences of the form “is”. But science is a system of descriptive/explicative sentences, that is to say, with the form “is/are”. Therefore, you cannot deduce moral principles from scientific laws. (Hume’s guillotine).

Note that the impediment is of different level than Fermat’s theorem. This one neither violates the logic rules nor mathematics axioms. It was only a problem of find the solution inside the mathematic system. Hume’s guillotine is unsolvable because raises a contradiction with basic rules of logic.
 
The problem with any kind of terrorism is not moral. We cannot discuss on moral principles with that people, because their moral system is incompatible with ours. ISIS is a political problem and needs a political solution.

Sorry, but your claim is simply bizarre.

Yes, perhaps the solution will be political, but it is silly to pretend that there is not a moral component to terrorism as well. The act of effectively enslaving young girls for the purpose of raping them is, obviously, an immoral act.
 
But an axiom that requires demonstrations is not an axiom at all.
Every deductive system is based on indemonstrable axioms and deduced theorems (with transformation rules). If a sentence in this system needs to be demonstrated is not an axiom, is a theorem.

A moral principle is the basic postulate of a moral system. If the whole system must be demonstrated you can show the external principles that demonstrate the basic moral principles. Then, you are saying that moral is not autonomous. It depends from religion, science or astrology.
But you have an unsolvable logic problem: in logic, the connectors of the conclusion must be included in the premises. You cannot conclude a universal sentence from particular sentences, for example. And you cannot conclude a sentence with “ought to” from sentences of the form “is”. But science is a system of descriptive/explicative sentences, that is to say, with the form “is/are”. Therefore, you cannot deduce moral principles from scientific laws. (Hume’s guillotine).

Note that the impediment is of different level than Fermat’s theorem. This one neither violates the logic rules nor mathematics axioms. It was only a problem of find the solution inside the mathematic system. Hume’s guillotine is unsolvable because raises a contradiction with basic rules of logic.

This is not mathematics and we're not using purely formal reasoning.

I can give an argument why rationality requires truth over falsity, though this norm plays a foundational role. What I am suggesting is the possibility that a similar argument may be found for a fundamental moral norm.
 
But you have an unsolvable logic problem: in logic, the connectors of the conclusion must be included in the premises. You cannot conclude a universal sentence from particular sentences, for example.

Goodness.

So, the rule of inference

A
B
So, A & B

is not acceptable in logic. Nor is universal introduction as we use it in the various formulations of natural deduction.

Sorry, I do understand that the is-ought issue is a problem, hence my reference to the essentially Kantian solution of showing that certain values are objective in the sense that each rational being, upon reflection, must accept such values. But your statement of the problem above is literally incoherent. The & need not appear in an argument prior to its introduction rule. The universal quantifier similarly need not appear prior to its introduction rule.
 
Sorry, but your claim is simply bizarre.

Yes, perhaps the solution will be political, but it is silly to pretend that there is not a moral component to terrorism as well. The act of effectively enslaving young girls for the purpose of raping them is, obviously, an immoral act.

It may be that the politics sets the context, which in turn drives the moral analysis. So, for instance, "murder is wrong" really means murder is wrong when it's done for the wrong reasons. Give them the right reasons and the moral principle no longer applies. Everyone can still agree that murder is wrong, but simply claim, "Yeah, well that's not murder."

I think this is generally the case when inner concepts are applied to the outer world - there's a step that translates from one frame to the other, and this operation can itself be influenced, substantially altering the outcome.
 
Sorry, but your claim is simply bizarre.

Yes, perhaps the solution will be political, but it is silly to pretend that there is not a moral component to terrorism as well. The act of effectively enslaving young girls for the purpose of raping them is, obviously, an immoral act.

Evidence please for the highlighted part and in particular the bolded part.
 
Goodness.

So, the rule of inference

A
B
So, A & B

is not acceptable in logic. Nor is universal introduction as we use it in the various formulations of natural deduction.

Sorry, I do understand that the is-ought issue is a problem, hence my reference to the essentially Kantian solution of showing that certain values are objective in the sense that each rational being, upon reflection, must accept such values. But your statement of the problem above is literally incoherent. The & need not appear in an argument prior to its introduction rule. The universal quantifier similarly need not appear prior to its introduction rule.

What if there are 2 or more versions of what rational is?
 
Evidence please for the highlighted part and in particular the bolded part.

Yes, yes, very cute.

Demand that I give evidence for that which I've admitted repeatedly that I cannot demonstrate.

There is no doubt in any rational person that, if the word "morality" applies to any actions at all, it applies to the enslavement of young girls for the purposes of rape. It is fundamentally stupid to pretend that these actions are merely political and not also a matter of morality, unless one is prepared to say that literally nothing is a matter of morality.

Allow me to turn the tables. Do you think that some things are the domain of moral judgments? If so, do you doubt that the abduction of so-called brides is somehow merely political and not a proper object of moral judgments?
 
Yes, yes, very cute.

Demand that I give evidence for that which I've admitted repeatedly that I cannot demonstrate.

There is no doubt in any rational person that, if the word "morality" applies to any actions at all, it applies to the enslavement of young girls for the purposes of rape. It is fundamentally stupid to pretend that these actions are merely political and not also a matter of morality, unless one is prepared to say that literally nothing is a matter of morality.

Allow me to turn the tables. Do you think that some things are the domain of moral judgments? If so, do you doubt that the abduction of so-called brides is somehow merely political and not a proper object of moral judgments?

Here we go again. The same as above as per highlighted and bolded, evidence for that fact that are rational persons?
 
What if there are 2 or more versions of what rational is?

Then either this approach fails, or it derives two or more "objective" forms of morality.

Do you doubt that it is a condition of rationality to prefer true beliefs over false? If not, so much the better for objective norms, though it is rather another thing to show that there are moral analogs to this non-moral norm.
 
Then either this approach fails, or it derives two or more "objective" forms of morality.

Do you doubt that it is a condition of rationality to prefer true beliefs over false? If not, so much the better for objective norms, though it is rather another thing to show that there are moral analogs to this non-moral norm.

Yes, I doubt that it is a condition of rationality to prefer true beliefs over false ones; e.g. in regards to the debate about verification versus falsification. It is very easy to delude oneself if you only look for the truth.
 

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