What is the appeal of "objective morality"

[phiwum]

My argument is as strong as those against little fairies, mountain gnomes, flying dragons and eternal vampires. If you concede, this is enough for me.

I do not. The situations are different, for reasons that I explicitly explained several posts back.

I don’t like the mention of believes. It is not a matter of believes but of rational preferences.
I don’t know what exactly a “rational man” is. But if some rational (or not) man affirms that his morality is objective, I hope he has some rational method to show this.

The belief I speak of is the belief that morality is objective. I'm not speaking of moral judgments at present.

I see. You call what is not objective “arbitrary”. I prefer to speak of” preferences” because in preferences can be some degree of rationality and community. My moral preferences can be shared by other people, that is to say my moral community, and by adherents to a rational system of debate. Only in this space (agora) a moral debate has any sense.

The last sentence is just plain false. Were morality objective, moral debates are understandable.

And, indeed, if morality is not objective, then there is no point to moral debate at all. If there is no right answer which we aim for, then a debate over different judgments makes just as much sense as trying to convince someone that he ought to prefer chocolate to vanilla. What is there to debate over "preferences"?

 

[marplots]

This thread needs more trigger warnings.

 

[I Am The Scum]

someone said a mean thing

therefore

i don't have to back up what i say

this makes sense to me

philosophy is stupid

 

[Agatha]

The subject is objective morality, not each other. I have moved several posts to AAH, and this modbox should serve as a reminder that you are all expected to follow your membership agreements. If you are talking to each other, then be civil and polite. If you are talking about each other you are probably breaching rule 11 and rule 12, and you risk cards, suspension or worse. So return to the topic and stop personalising your posts.

Replying to this modbox in thread will be off topic  Posted By: Agatha

 

[I Am The Scum]

Just to get back on track, I think I have a thought experiment showing that morality is likely not subjective. Comments welcome.

Luke and Daryl are a pair of intelligent, rational guys that are always open to having their beliefs challenged. They go out for ice cream one day, trying a new flavor they have never tasted before. Luke likes it. Daryl dislikes it. They have a conversation about the ice cream. Here's the question: Can Luke possibly convince Daryl that he did, in fact, enjoy the ice cream? In other words, is there any fact Luke can cite, argument he can make, or thought experiment he can propose that will convince Daryl that his "belief" about the ice cream was mistaken?

Definitely not. The like/dislike of the ice cream is not based on the association of the experience with some other facts/beliefs. It's purely subjective. It would be like yelling at someone for not liking the same music you like. Nothing you say will change their tastes.

To bring it back home, let's suppose that Luke and Daryl are now discussing some contentious moral issue, like the death penalty or abortion. Again, they disagree. Again, the same question: Can Luke bring forth facts, arguments, etc. to convince Daryl that he is wrong? This time, I would say yes. Luke is capable, in principle, of modifying Daryl's belief about this moral issue through the use of rational discourse. This would likewise reflect the way a lot of us have experienced changes in our own moral views: Someone convinced us that our belief was flawed.

So as long as there is this very clear divide in the manner we discuss morality and subjective views, it seems unwise to actually treat morality as though it is in the category of subjectivity.

 

[Pup]

Just to get back on track, I think I have a thought experiment showing that morality is likely not subjective. Comments welcome.

Luke and Daryl are a pair of intelligent, rational guys that are always open to having their beliefs challenged. They go out for ice cream one day, trying a new flavor they have never tasted before. Luke likes it. Daryl dislikes it. They have a conversation about the ice cream. Here's the question: Can Luke possibly convince Daryl that he did, in fact, enjoy the ice cream? In other words, is there any fact Luke can cite, argument he can make, or thought experiment he can propose that will convince Daryl that his "belief" about the ice cream was mistaken?

Definitely not. The like/dislike of the ice cream is not based on the association of the experience with some other facts/beliefs. It's purely subjective. It would be like yelling at someone for not liking the same music you like. Nothing you say will change their tastes.

To bring it back home, let's suppose that Luke and Daryl are now discussing some contentious moral issue, like the death penalty or abortion. Again, they disagree. Again, the same question: Can Luke bring forth facts, arguments, etc. to convince Daryl that he is wrong? This time, I would say yes. Luke is capable, in principle, of modifying Daryl's belief about this moral issue through the use of rational discourse. This would likewise reflect the way a lot of us have experienced changes in our own moral views: Someone convinced us that our belief was flawed.

So as long as there is this very clear divide in the manner we discuss morality and subjective views, it seems unwise to actually treat morality as though it is in the category of subjectivity.

I think the problem is that with morality, there's an implied goal. The hungry need fed. Luke wants to get them jobs while Daryl wants to give them handouts. Arguments could revolve around which method would feed them best while hurting the rest of society least, with statistics and budgets.

There are lots of similar if-then arguments one can have that don't relate to morals.: if we invest in this, then we'll have the best return. If we have a baby, we'll have a happier marriage. If I wear this suit, then I'm more likely to get the job.

As long as there's an agreed-upon goal, there's a chance of convincing the other that your way of reaching it is best. So the objective part moves back to the shared goal, which may seem so obvious it's not even stated. These people are dying of starvation. Who wouldn't want to feed them? Or other questions revolve around what creates a fair society, prevents crime, etc.

That's where I'd argue that these are things within humans, not outside them, because they've kept us alive thus far. We want to build a good community the way border collies want to herd sheep.

 

[David Mo]

I do not. The situations are different, for reasons that I explicitly explained several posts back.

Excuse me, but you have not answered my reply:
(a) Science is not contrary to the possibility of existence of green dogs, little fairies, etc.
(b) Little fairies, mountain gnomes, etc. are refuted by the lack of inductive evidence in the same way that the objective moral principles.

NOTE: Other additional reasons have been mentioned in this debate, but it is better to shelve them now.

The last sentence is just plain false. Were morality objective, moral debates are understandable.
And, indeed, if morality is not objective, then there is no point to moral debate at all. If there is no right answer which we aim for, then a debate over different judgments makes just as much sense as trying to convince someone that he ought to prefer chocolate to vanilla. What is there to debate over "preferences"?

Excuse me, again, for my English. I was speaking of a moral community that practice rational methods of debate. In a moral community, that is to say a community with the same moral principles, it is irrelevant if its members are objectivist or relativist because the debate will centre in the coherence between our key principles and our maxims. A discussion with members of other moral community is also possible if their practices of debate are rational. In that case the discussion would point to the consistency of the respective principles with some desirable or undesirable outcomes.
Of course, these are ideal situations. A moral debate is considerably more tangled in a real context.

 

[David Mo]

Grammar correction:

"Excuse me, again, for my English. I was speaking of a moral community that practice practises rational methods of debate".

 

[phiwum]

I think the problem is that with morality, there's an implied goal. The hungry need fed. Luke wants to get them jobs while Daryl wants to give them handouts. Arguments could revolve around which method would feed them best while hurting the rest of society least, with statistics and budgets.

There are lots of similar if-then arguments one can have that don't relate to morals.: if we invest in this, then we'll have the best return. If we have a baby, we'll have a happier marriage. If I wear this suit, then I'm more likely to get the job.

As long as there's an agreed-upon goal, there's a chance of convincing the other that your way of reaching it is best. So the objective part moves back to the shared goal, which may seem so obvious it's not even stated. These people are dying of starvation. Who wouldn't want to feed them? Or other questions revolve around what creates a fair society, prevents crime, etc.

That's where I'd argue that these are things within humans, not outside them, because they've kept us alive thus far. We want to build a good community the way border collies want to herd sheep.

Your response reminds me of Ayer, who says that what appear to be moral disputes are always really disputes over the facts of the situation and never disputes over the fundamental values involved.

I don't agree. I do think we can have disputes over values. But I do agree that disputes over facts leading to moral judgments are far more common than disputes over values.

 

[phiwum]

Excuse me, but you have not answered my reply:
(a) Science is not contrary to the possibility of existence of green dogs, little fairies, etc.
(b) Little fairies, mountain gnomes, etc. are refuted by the lack of inductive evidence in the same way that the objective moral principles.

NOTE: Other additional reasons have been mentioned in this debate, but it is better to shelve them now.

But I mentioned, of course, that there are many reasons to doubt the existence of fairies, aside from lack of evidence. These reasons have to do with the fact that beings in close proximity to humans would leave evidence. It's that additional fact which turns the argument from an absence of evidence fallacy to a properly inductive argument.

What can we say about moral realism? I think it's fair to say that there has been no decisive argument in its favor. I also think it's fair to say that there has been no decisive argument against it, including the one above. I don't think that it is as reasonable to try to appeal to induction in order to settle this question.

ETA: Let me be more concrete.

For a few centuries, mathematicians struggled to verify or refute Fermat's last theorem. Every failure to verify it provided some evidence that it was not verifiable, but it would have been odd to conclude that it was false, since attempts to refute the theorem were similarly unsuccessful. At best, we might conclude that we had some evidence that the theorem is undecideable, but none about its truth or falsity.

You're doing the same thing here: looking at the failures of realism and concluding it is false, while ignoring the failures of anti-realist arguments. You may conclude that the problem appears insoluble, but not that it is decided in favor of anti-realism.

Excuse me, again, for my English. I was speaking of a moral community that practice rational methods of debate. In a moral community, that is to say a community with the same moral principles, it is irrelevant if its members are objectivist or relativist because the debate will centre in the coherence between our key principles and our maxims. A discussion with members of other moral community is also possible if their practices of debate are rational. In that case the discussion would point to the consistency of the respective principles with some desirable or undesirable outcomes.
Of course, these are ideal situations. A moral debate is considerably more tangled in a real context.

Okay, I understand your point better and still dispute the use of the word "only". A realist is certainly capable of moral debates, including of a deeper kind -- they could debate over the fundamental principles and not just their consequences.

 

[Pup]

Your response reminds me of Ayer, who says that what appear to be moral disputes are always really disputes over the facts of the situation and never disputes over the fundamental values involved.

I don't agree. I do think we can have disputes over values. But I do agree that disputes over facts leading to moral judgments are far more common than disputes over values.

I think disputes over values divorced from goals will be like chocolate vs vanilla ice cream. If a person doesn't feel that a certain moral value is true, it's difficult to convince him with logical reasons.

 

[phiwum]

I think disputes over values divorced from goals will be like chocolate vs vanilla ice cream. If a person doesn't feel that a certain moral value is true, it's difficult to convince him with logical reasons.

I don't think that I have a convincing argument that you're wrong. Thus far, we don't have an example of a moral theory that all reasonable men would assent to.

Obviously, I still think that such a situation is conceivable.

The Ayer argument, by the way, is in a short article titled "A Critique of Ethics", where he argues that ethical claims are not propositions at all, but simply express emotional reactions to the thought of various actions. When I say, "Murder is wrong," I'm saying nothing much different from, "Chocolate ice cream! Yum!"

I did a quick look online for the article, but couldn't find it. Don't feel quite like typing out a long quotation at present, sorry.

 

[marplots]

(some snipped to save space)
To bring it back home, let's suppose that Luke and Daryl are now discussing some contentious moral issue, like the death penalty or abortion. Again, they disagree. Again, the same question: Can Luke bring forth facts, arguments, etc. to convince Daryl that he is wrong? This time, I would say yes. Luke is capable, in principle, of modifying Daryl's belief about this moral issue through the use of rational discourse. This would likewise reflect the way a lot of us have experienced changes in our own moral views: Someone convinced us that our belief was flawed.

So as long as there is this very clear divide in the manner we discuss morality and subjective views, it seems unwise to actually treat morality as though it is in the category of subjectivity.

I don't think this works because you are contrasting two different types of things to get where you want to go. In the ice cream case, you accept that the subjective experience is atomistic - there's no way to decompose and attack the underlying principles. But then, for morality, you are describing something which does decompose and hence, can be altered by realigning some underlying assumptions.

It may be that the situation is as you describe, but the proper target to make the comparison would have to be the same. You'd need an atomistic moral principle, or you'd need a decomposable taste experience. Otherwise, you run the risk of claiming a subjective morality is built up of objective moral principles. (Unless that's on offer too?)

 

[Dancing David]

How do you know that a hallucination is false? As far as I know a hallucination is an actual process in a brain; i.e. a hallucination is something, which happens in reality and as a process it takes place in reality.
A person experiences something which takes places; i.e. the person doesn't hallucinate a hallucination or are you saying that something which is false, isn't real? In other words a hallucination doesn't take place in reality and it takes places in a reality, which is false. I.e. there are 2 kinds of reality, the true one and the false one.

Let me explain it more:

1. The moon is made of rock and dust.
2. 2+2+=4
3. Killing is wrong.

#1 or the moon would be there without humans.
#2 or 2+2+=4 is only true if there are one or more beings capable of computation, whether it be humans or computers. It is objective in the sense that it doesn't involve feelings, emotions or personal bias, but it is subjective in the sense that it requires brains or computers.
#3 or killing is wrong is a first person subjective claim and it refers back to the person who thinks and/or feels that killing is wrong.

In general terms for the category of signs, all signs which refers to a positive or negative requires computation for it to be a positive or negative. So here is another example:
Someone to someone else: "You are thinking in an incorrect manner."
Now if you trace the sign/word "incorrect" back to where it has its referent; i.e. what is about, then you will notice that it traces back to the person who made the claim and not the person, who it is about.
As fallacies go, it is rather common for someone to commit the fallacy of reification; i.e. to treat a sign, which is about something abstract, as if the sign is about something concrete. E.g. "you are wrong" - the word/sign "wrong" is not about the person, which it refers to, because you can't see wrong. "Wrong" as a sign/word requires computation, cognition and so on.

In short, the moon would still be there without humans, but what wrong is about would not be there anymore, because there are no humans.

With regards

I suggest you reread my post, I stated rather clearly that there are at least two categories of perception,:
1. Perceptions unrelated to external stimuli, where a perception occurs that doesn't match external stimuli. A person hears voices where there are no sound vibrations in the air that they correlate to.
2.Perceptions that do not contain actual external events, ie there is an object which a camera will record, that is not perceived because it is in the visual blind sport.

There is only one reality, misperceptions are a subset of it.

Perhaps you could explain how your post is related to what I wrote?

 

[David Mo]

But I mentioned, of course, that there are many reasons to doubt the existence of fairies, aside from lack of evidence. These reasons have to do with the fact that beings in close proximity to humans would leave evidence. It's that additional fact which turns the argument from an absence of evidence fallacy to a properly inductive argument.

What can we say about moral realism? I think it's fair to say that there has been no decisive argument in its favor. I also think it's fair to say that there has been no decisive argument against it, including the one above. I don't think that it is as reasonable to try to appeal to induction in order to settle this question.

ETA: Let me be more concrete.

For a few centuries, mathematicians struggled to verify or refute Fermat's last theorem. Every failure to verify it provided some evidence that it was not verifiable, but it would have been odd to conclude that it was false, since attempts to refute the theorem were similarly unsuccessful. At best, we might conclude that we had some evidence that the theorem is undecideable, but none about its truth or falsity.

You're doing the same thing here: looking at the failures of realism and concluding it is false, while ignoring the failures of anti-realist arguments. You may conclude that the problem appears insoluble, but not that it is decided in favor of anti-realism.

Fermat’s theorem is a different case from moral principles.
Moral principles are similar to axioms (you recognized this some comments ago). Then, an axiom is not accepted as the result of a deductive process as Fermat’s theorem. An axiom is accepted (a) as a conventional point of departure or (b) as auto-evident.

Moral principles are not similar to theorems.
If we adopt an objectivist/realist theory in moral we cannot admit (a) because it is a conventionalist solution. And they cannot adopt (b) because it is contra-inductive: if some moral principle had had the property of evidence in itself it would have been accepted as such in more than 25 centuries of philosophy. Something evident as the Euclidian axioms would have been presented (and universally accepted) long time ago.

More replies to objectivism can be found in the field of logic (Hume’s guillotine). But this is other story.

A realist is certainly capable of moral debates, including of a deeper kind -- they could debate over the fundamental principles and not just their consequences.

Why not? We can put aside the discussion about the justification of our principles, establish the moral principles that we accept in common and what are the implications of these moral principles.

 

[phiwum]

Fermat’s theorem is a different case from moral principles.
Moral principles are similar to axioms (you recognized this some comments ago). Then, an axiom is not accepted as the result of a deductive process as Fermat’s theorem. An axiom is accepted (a) as a conventional point of departure or (b) as auto-evident.

Moral principles are not similar to theorems.
If we adopt an objectivist/realist theory in moral we cannot admit (a) because it is a conventionalist solution. And they cannot adopt (b) because it is contra-inductive: if some moral principle had had the property of evidence in itself it would have been accepted as such in more than 25 centuries of philosophy. Something evident as the Euclidian axioms would have been presented (and universally accepted) long time ago.

More replies to objectivism can be found in the field of logic (Hume’s guillotine). But this is other story.

You're right that fundamental moral principles are akin to axioms in some sense, but also different from them. Mathematical axioms need no argument at all. Either a theory is interesting or it is not, but we needn't argue that the axioms are true (except in this or that interpretation).

A moral principle must either be self-evident (which is, as you say, doubtful) or requires some argument for it's truth. Since objectivity, in the sense I mean, is not synonymous with self-evidence (the latter is included in the former), there is no contradiction in thinking that some norms are both objective and require careful consideration before a person can see that they are objective.

Why not? We can put aside the discussion about the justification of our principles, establish the moral principles that we accept in common and what are the implications of these moral principles.

Yes, I agree that the anti-realist can discuss which principles they have come to accept (without any discussion of whether these are good principles or bad) and they could also discuss consequences of those principles.

It is a shallower debate than the realist has. Of course, the depth of the debate really is of no importance at all, compared to the central question: is realism true?

 

[phiwum]

Why not? We can put aside the discussion about the justification of our principles, establish the moral principles that we accept in common and what are the implications of these moral principles.

"Hey! Stop poking that boy's eye out with your sharpened stick! Here in East Haversham, we value life and freedom from pain, and your action is inconsistent with this value!"

"East Haversham? No, dear sir, you've wandered into West Haversham, where we value the deep satisfaction of causing needless pain in others."

"West Haversham? Oh, my mistake, sir! Carry on!"

Obviously, I've exaggerated the degree of difference we would find in two successful societies -- especially neighbors -- for humor's sake, but one could see that this is more or less the end of debate between two distinct cultures. The fact that more or less the entire world values historic sites, but ISIS does not, is no reason to suppose (from an anti-realist perspective) that ISIS is wrong in their values -- and the same would be said about their even more heinous acts of torture, summary execution, rape and forced marriages.

To be sure, this does not amount to an argument that anti-realism is false. Such an argument would be an appeal to consequences. It is reasonable, nonetheless, to keep the consequences of anti-realism in mind, since they are rather different when we speak of cross-cultural differences as opposed to the prevailing moral preferences of a homogeneous society.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

"Hey! Stop poking that boy's eye out with your sharpened stick! Here in East Haversham, we value life and freedom from pain, and your action is inconsistent with this value!"

"East Haversham? No, dear sir, you've wandered into West Haversham, where we value the deep satisfaction of causing needless pain in others."

"West Haversham? Oh, my mistake, sir! Carry on!"

Obviously, I've exaggerated the degree of difference we would find in two successful societies -- especially neighbors -- for humor's sake, but one could see that this is more or less the end of debate between two distinct cultures. The fact that more or less the entire world values historic sites, but ISIS does not, is no reason to suppose (from an anti-realist perspective) that ISIS is wrong in their values -- and the same would be said about their even more heinous acts of torture, summary execution, rape and forced marriages.

To be sure, this does not amount to an argument that anti-realism is false. Such an argument would be an appeal to consequences. It is reasonable, nonetheless, to keep the consequences of anti-realism in mind, since they are rather different when we speak of cross-cultural differences as opposed to the prevailing moral preferences of a homogeneous society.

Let us say that you claim either that ISIS is wrong in their values or that ISIS is right in their values. In both cases I would like evidence for the actual claim.
So phiwum, please come out of the closet and admit that you hold one of the positions and then please give evidence for it. Or come out of the closet and admit that you are an anti-realist.

With regards

 

[phiwum]

Let us say that you claim either that ISIS is wrong in their values or that ISIS is right in their values. In both cases I would like evidence for the actual claim.
So phiwum, please come out of the closet and admit that you hold one of the positions and then please give evidence for it. Or come out of the closet and admit that you are an anti-realist.

With regards

But neither of those is true.

I have a strong tendency to believe that the moral norms of ISIS are deeply, seriously and objectively wrong. This tendency is equally consistent with either realism or anti-realism. I could, after all, be wrong about the objectivity of my opinion. The fact that I have this opinion points only to my realist tendencies, not to the correctness of realism.

I do not believe that realists have managed to prove their position. I also do not believe that anti-realists have proved their position. I don't think that these two facts entail that I am an anti-realist.

I consider the debate unsettled and readily admit that my leanings may well be butt-wrong.

Perhaps I should add: either you admit that ISIS simply has different preferences, no more right or wrong than one's choice regarding chocolate and vanilla, or admit that you are a closet realist.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

But neither of those is true.

I have a strong tendency to believe that the moral norms of ISIS are deeply, seriously and objectively wrong. This tendency is equally consistent with either realism or anti-realism. I could, after all, be wrong about the objectivity of my opinion. The fact that I have this opinion points only to my realist tendencies, not to the correctness of realism.

I do not believe that realists have managed to prove their position. I also do not believe that anti-realists have proved their position. I don't think that these two facts entail that I am an anti-realist.

I consider the debate unsettled and readily admit that my leanings may well be butt-wrong.

Perhaps I should add: either you admit that ISIS simply has different preferences, no more right or wrong than one's choice regarding chocolate and vanilla, or admit that you are a closet realist.

I admit that ISIS simply has different preferences, no more right or wrong than one's choice regarding chocolate and vanilla.