What is the appeal of "objective morality"

[David Mo]

To be sure, your most recent definition says nothing about method. You wrote

And so, a sentence (or an idea, or a perception) is “objective” if it reflects accurately the features that belong to the object itself.​

This happens to be the definition of truth, not of objectivity, unless the two are the same.

I have explained this in #519. “The objectivity of a proposition resides in the method to validate it”.

I don't know. Does "objectively false" mean something different than "objective but false"? What does turning it into an adverb do?

They are different ways to mean de same, I suppose.

I never said that all appeals to authority are equally strong. My point merely is that I don't use the scientific method to draw conclusions about most scientific claims. Rather, I appeal to authority, namely the authority of the media or texts, primarily. Thus, since you tie objectivity to the scientific method, I wonder whether my beliefs about science count as objective.

I trust in science because it has shown to be objective. Call this as you like. I would call it a rational opinion. But, of course, philosophy of the science is not science.

So, here is the meat of my response. I have only said that there is intrinsic value in truth, so that it is generally preferred over falsity. There may be certain extrinsic features of a false belief (such as the comfort of believing one is the creation of a loving God) that may produce benefit, were one to believe it. This extrinsic value can, I suppose, outweigh the intrinsic value of truth in rare circumstances, so that one would say, "I know this is false and therefore I cannot believe it, but I would prefer to believe it nonetheless."

Thus, Dostoevsky need not be irrational if we read him as saying that, were there no God, he would nonetheless prefer to believe that there is one, because this belief produces such advantages that it outweighs the intrinsic value of truth.

So, the primary principle is “You ought to prefer what is advantageous for you”. “You ought to prefer truth to falsehood” is secondary and it is not always accepted by a rational agent.

 

[phiwum]

I have explained this in #519. “The objectivity of a proposition resides in the method to validate it”.

Right, but that is inconsistent with what you most recently said.

Compare:

“The objectivity of a proposition resides in the method to validate it”.

"a sentence (or an idea, or a perception) is 'objective' if it reflects accurately the features that belong to the object itself. "​

The second statement, which actually looks like a proper definition, does not depend on any method. A statement's objectivity is determined by whether or not it accurately reflects the features that belong to the object itself, and this fact does not depend on any method.

Note that the scientific method sometimes settles on a false theory, at least for a while, so there simply is no necessary connection between method and truth.

If you'd like to amend the above definition to bring method into it, feel free. I don't think that's a good idea, but have at it if you wish.

I trust in science because it has shown to be objective. Call this as you like. I would call it a rational opinion. But, of course, philosophy of the science is not science.

But I'm not trusting in science when I conclude that the Higgs Boson has been discovered. I'm trusting in the reporting authority, since I am incapable of repeating the experiment.

Not that there is anything irrational about appealing to reliable authorities, including science texts, science journals, popular media and so on. But appeal to authority isn't the scientific method. It's a different method. If method is what matters to make something objective, then I have to ask whether appeal to authority is also an objective method.

So, the primary principle is “You ought to prefer what is advantageous for you”. “You ought to prefer truth to falsehood” is secondary and it is not always accepted by a rational agent.

I haven't thought about priority.

But the second statement should be that, "True beliefs are intrinsically preferable to false beliefs," and this is accepted by every rational agent. What I am allowing (though I'm not certain I'm convinced) is that sometimes, extrinsic benefits of a false belief can outweigh intrinsic benefits of truth.

To be honest, I think that if someone says, "I know P is false and therefore I cannot believe P, but I would prefer to believe P if I could," what they really mean is, "I wish P were true." But I won't stake my life on that, and if one thinks that a rational person would prefer to believe something false (even though he cannot do so), I'll accept it.

 

[David Mo]

Right, but that is inconsistent with what you most recently said.

Compare:

“The objectivity of a proposition resides in the method to validate it”.

"a sentence (or an idea, or a perception) is 'objective' if it reflects accurately the features that belong to the object itself. "​

Take the first sentence as a clarification of the second sentence.

Note that the scientific method sometimes settles on a false theory, at least for a while, so there simply is no necessary connection between method and truth.

Yes, there are mistakes in the application of the method. There are open questions in science and debates in the borders of the scientific theories. But the mistakes, the open questions and the debates are finally solved (if possible) with a correct application of the same scientific method. Not intuition or faith.

But appeal to authority isn't the scientific method. It's a different method. If method is what matters to make something objective, then I have to ask whether appeal to authority is also an objective method.

I am not speaking of trusting in a particular statement of science, but the trust in general consensus of science. Yes, you can show some rational reasons to doubt about a particular case of consensus in science. But you ought to present strong reasons for doubt. Of course, not religious or paranormal reasons. I don’t know any authority stronger than science. I’m speaking of matters of fact.

I haven't thought about priority.

I am sorry, but this is the question. Because you said to prefer the truth because it is profitable (“advantageous”). Then, the question is What is profitable for any man? Why the truth is profitable? And you will find a diversity of opinions. Dostoevsky included. Or Nietzsche. This is the problem of moral.

Be careful with vague universal conclusions. They are very common in philosophy.

 

[phiwum]

Take the first sentence as a clarification of the second sentence.

It doesn't work. The second sentence is clear. If the statement accurately reflects properties of the object, then it is objective. Method is utterly irrelevant. Either the statement accurately reflects etc. etc., or it doesn't, regardless of the method.

Yes, there are mistakes in the application of the method. There are open questions in science and debates in the borders of the scientific theories. But the mistakes, the open questions and the debates are finally solved (if possible) with a correct application of the same scientific method. Not intuition or faith.

I'm not speaking of mistakes. Newtonian physics was not a mistake in the application of the method, but it was a false theory. It took some time to discover it was false.

This is plainly a feature of the scientific method -- the best theory of today is not guaranteed to be true, and so the fact that a belief is derived from this method is no guarantee that it is objective in the sense you recently defined.

Of course, this is not a criticism of science, but a criticism of your claim that the first statement clarifies the second. Truth and derivation from a method -- even the scientific method -- are obviously different things.

I am not speaking of trusting in a particular statement of science, but the trust in general consensus of science. Yes, you can show some rational reasons to doubt about a particular case of consensus in science. But you ought to present strong reasons for doubt. Of course, not religious or paranormal reasons. I don’t know any authority stronger than science. I’m speaking of matters of fact.

And I'm saying that very few of us derive our beliefs about scientific claims from the method itself. Instead, we appeal to authority. Now, you claim that method is essential in determining whether a statement is objective or not. Is a statement derived by appeal to authority objective?

I am sorry, but this is the question. Because you said to prefer the truth because it is profitable (“advantageous”). Then, the question is What is profitable for any man? Why the truth is profitable? And you will find a diversity of opinions. Dostoevsky included. Or Nietzsche. This is the problem of moral.

Be careful with vague universal conclusions. They are very common in philosophy.

You are simply mistaken. I never said that advantage has anything to do with the preference for truth. I said that truth is intrinsically preferable to falsehood.

Having a belief about the 10^100th digit of pi is pretty useless to me. I see no practical applications for such beliefs in my life. Nonetheless, if I do have a belief about that digit, I would prefer to have a true belief over a false, because I value truth and not falsity, not for what truth does for me (though it in fact usually has significant advantages) but because it is intrinsically better than falsity.

So, you have misread my claim. Perhaps the word "intrinsic" is too abstruse. Perhaps "inherent" would have conveyed my meaning more clearly.

 

[David Mo]

This is plainly a feature of the scientific method -- the best theory of today is not guaranteed to be true, and so the fact that a belief is derived from this method is no guarantee that it is objective in the sense you recently defined.

This doesn’t mean that the method is not warranty of objectivity. This means that absolute objectivity is an ideal. Real objectivity is approximate.
If the law of gravity is “false” (I doubt very much this is a correct way to speak of the limits of Newton’s theory), they are the news theories (relativity and quantum) that show this by means of the scientific method. It is not theology that shows that Newton's theories are false (?).

And I'm saying that very few of us derive our beliefs about scientific claims from the method itself. Instead, we appeal to authority. Now, you claim that method is essential in determining whether a statement is objective or not. Is a statement derived by appeal to authority objective?

Of course, not. You are confusing two different things: the objectivity of a scientific statement and the rationality of the philosophy of science.

You are simply mistaken. I never said that advantage has anything to do with the preference for truth. I said that truth is intrinsically preferable to falsehood.

(…)

So, you have misread my claim. Perhaps the word "intrinsic" is too abstruse. Perhaps "inherent" would have conveyed my meaning more clearly.

Indeed?

Thus, Dostoevsky need not be irrational if we read him as saying that, were there no God, he would nonetheless prefer to believe that there is one, because this belief produces such advantages that it outweighs the intrinsic value of truth.

Conditional sentence. Truth is conditioned to advantages. This to say it is not a categorical imperative. The imperative is not moral but instrumental.

 

[phiwum]

This doesn’t mean that the method is not warranty of objectivity. This means that absolute objectivity is an ideal. Real objectivity is approximate.

Nice. Now we have real and absolute objectivity, and the latter is really about truth and the former is about things that are probably true because of a method. Is this what you're saying?

So, real objectivity (which is surely what we should be concerned with) doesn't entail anything about what actually is true, and whether something is real-objective depends on the time. In 1850, Newton's theory was real-objective, but at least by 1950, it was not.

Of course, as we all surely know, the data underdetermines the scientific theories (different and incompatible theories can explain the same data). Are all theories that are consistent with the data "real-objective"? Even though they may be mutually inconsistent?[1]

If the law of gravity is “false” (I doubt very much this is a correct way to speak of the limits of Newton’s theory), they are the news theories (relativity and quantum) that show this by means of the scientific method. It is not theology that shows that Newton's theories are false (?).

Newton's theory is false. It is a theory about how physical motion works without exception, and it is clear that it is merely an approximation to what we observe, with larger and larger errors as we go faster. Hence, it is simply false.

I have no idea why you keep saying things about theology. Right. Of course, if this or that theory is false, we will discover it by observation. Let's stop attacking straw men. I've never said anything about the capacity of theology to disprove scientific theories.

Of course, not. You are confusing two different things: the objectivity of a scientific statement and the rationality of the philosophy of science.

This has nothing at all to do with philosophy of science, far as I can tell. It's about the fact that none of us learn most of our scientific beliefs by experiment, but rather by authority. You've tied objectivity to the method used to derive one's belief, so we have two choices:

(1) My belief that the Higgs Boson isn't objective.
(2) Certain beliefs derived from authority are thereby objective.

Recall, you have always said that objectivity is about actual utterances (unlike my position, which ties it not to what a person says, but to propositions themselves). Of course, this connection between the agent uttering the statement and objectivity only makes sense when you talk about method -- so-called "absolute" objectivity seems to be synonymous with truth and hence has bugger all to do with method.

Indeed?



Conditional sentence. Truth is conditioned to advantages. This to say it is not a categorical imperative. The imperative is not moral but instrumental.

Look, let's pretend that we can speak of value-points. When I say that truth is intrinsically preferable to falsity, I mean that even if we ignore any advantages we get from believing one over the other, truth has more value. Let's say that the intrinsic value of believing true statement P over false statement NOT P is 5 megahedrons.

Usually, believing what is true also has extrinsic value -- believing that bread is nourishing helps us find nourishment, for instance -- and so the difference between P and NOT P climbs to 32.7 megahedrons. Or 32.8, if you've just bought lunchmeats.

Sometimes, apparently, people think that there is extrinsic value to believing what is false. In that case, the difference in value between believing P over NOT P shrinks and perhaps may even tilt the balance the other way. Dostoevsky evidently thought that the extrinsic value of believing NOT P (where P is "Christianity is false") is greater than 5 megahedrons.

Nothing here changes the fact that believing that which is true is intrinsically more valuable than believing that which is false. At best, we acknowledge that certain extrinsic considerations may, in exceedingly rare circumstances, outweigh the intrinsic value of truth.

So, in sum, you are mistaken. I never said[2] that the norm is "Always believe truth over falsity." Rather, it is about the intrinsic value of truth in general, as distinct from any extrinsic considerations.

[1] In full disclosure, I realize that I fell into a problem over this issue earlier, when I said that scientific theories are objective. They are not, per my definition, but statements of the form "Theory T is consistent with the observations thus far," are objective.

[2] Perhaps I have overstated this. Maybe early in the thread, I did say something like that. Frankly, I still think that it is likely true, Dostoevsky notwithstanding, but at this point I will accept that, for the sake of argument, some false beliefs come with substantial extrinsic advantages.

 

[David Mo]

Nice. Now we have real and absolute objectivity, and the latter is really about truth and the former is about things that are probably true because of a method. Is this what you're saying?

Truth is relative also.

So, real objectivity (which is surely what we should be concerned with) doesn't entail anything about what actually is true, and whether something is real-objective depends on the time. In 1850, Newton's theory was real-objective, but at least by 1950, it was not.

Alas, our knowledge is relative.
Real Objectivity, Absolute Truth, etc. are ideal. The thing-in-itself is unattainable.
I was speaking of the degree of objectivity we can reach (“real objectivity”).

This has nothing at all to do with philosophy of science, far as I can tell. It's about the fact that none of us learn most of our scientific beliefs by experiment, but rather by authority. You've tied objectivity to the method used to derive one's belief, so we have two choices:

(1) My belief that the Higgs Boson isn't objective.
(2) Certain beliefs derived from authority are thereby objective.

Of course (1), if you use the word in the sense of scientific objectivity. But a fewer degree of objectivity can reached if we find a suitable method.

Recall, you have always said that objectivity is about actual utterances (unlike my position, which ties it not to what a person says, but to propositions themselves).

I think I have not claimed this. Perhaps my Spainenglish…
(To be continued).

 

[David Mo]

ATENTION: SOME ADDINTIONS.

This has nothing at all to do with philosophy of science, far as I can tell. It's about the fact that none of us learn most of our scientific beliefs by experiment, but rather by authority. You've tied objectivity to the method used to derive one's belief, so we have two choices:

(1) My belief that the Higgs Boson isn't objective.
(2) Certain beliefs derived from authority are thereby objective.

Of course (1), if you use the word in the sense of scientific objectivity. But a fewer degree of objectivity can reached if we find a suitable method.

Added: To speak about the objectivity of an opinion sounds strange to me. Perhaps this means that an objective opinion is stated when subjective conditionings (religion, tradition, emotions, point or view) are pushed away but in a defective way. Deffective compared with science.

I think a rational opinion is ever relative, that is to say ithas more support in rational (argumentative) reasons than other alternative opinion. Then, my confidence in science is based on an inductive reasoning: science has showed its power of prediction and control of facts. Yes, this is not an Absolute Argument. But it is a more valid argument than other based of the simple authority or subjective arguments (Dostoevsky).
It is clear that my confidence in science is in general and some particular conditions are needed when we are speaking of a particular law, prediction or similar. The consensus is a very important condition in any case.

Recall, you have always said that objectivity is about actual utterances (unlike my position, which ties it not to what a person says, but to propositions themselves).

I think I have not claimed this. Perhaps my Spainenglish… I think propositions are the meaning of sentences that can be true or false. (In a logical sense there is a difference).
(Underlined added).(To be continued).

Look, let's pretend that we can speak of value-points. When I say that truth is intrinsically preferable to falsity, I mean that even if we ignore any advantages we get from believing one over the other, truth has more value.

This is your opinion. Many people think that we prefer truth to falsehood because it is more useful or advantageous (in many different senses). But if the advantages of falsehood can be stronger than truth and make it preferable, then the truth is a smaller value than advantages and cannot be considered intrinsic.
Have you an objective or rational argument against this opinion?

 

[phiwum]

Truth is relative also.

So, you plan to salvage your notion of objectivity by claiming that truth is relative? I should be interested to learn what you mean by that, since the usual interpretation of "truth is relative" is dispiritingly close to "everything is subjective".

Alas, our knowledge is relative.
Real Objectivity, Absolute Truth, etc. are ideal. The thing-in-itself is unattainable.
I was speaking of the degree of objectivity we can reach (“real objectivity”).

You were not quite as explicit as I'd like. Do you agree with both of the following sentences?

(1) The theory of Newtonian physics was objective in 1850.
(2) The theory of Newtonian physics was not objective in 1950.

Thanks.

It just seems to me that introducing relativity into the concept of objectivity is rather to give up objectivity altogether. "Real" objectivity is evidently subjective. And, since your definition of "absolute" objectivity is synonymous with truth, and you've just said that truth is relative, it appears that "absolute" objectivity is also relative -- which is a funny use of both "objectivity" and "absolute".

 

[phiwum]

ATENTION: SOME ADDINTIONS.



Of course (1), if you use the word in the sense of scientific objectivity. But a fewer degree of objectivity can reached if we find a suitable method.

Added: To speak about the objectivity of an opinion sounds strange to me. Perhaps this means that an objective opinion is stated when subjective conditionings (religion, tradition, emotions, point or view) are pushed away but in a defective way. Deffective compared with science.

I think a rational opinion is ever relative, that is to say ithas more support in rational (argumentative) reasons than other alternative opinion. Then, my confidence in science is based on an inductive reasoning: science has showed its power of prediction and control of facts. Yes, this is not an Absolute Argument. But it is a more valid argument than other based of the simple authority or subjective arguments (Dostoevsky).
It is clear that my confidence in science is in general and some particular conditions are needed when we are speaking of a particular law, prediction or similar. The consensus is a very important condition in any case.

Pardon if I misunderstood you, but here's what you wrote in a prior post.

The sentence “The Earth turns around the Sun” was not objective four billion years ago because there was not anybody to utter it. A sentence is the product of the human brain and it is not an eternal entity similar to the platonic ideas​

Thus, it seems to me that the objectivity of a sentence depends on the fact that it is uttered. Furthermore, since you stress the method behind the utterance, it seems to me that we are committed to objectivity being a relation between sentences, speakers and their history, or something like that.

You can call commitment to a belief an opinion if you wish, but if so, it really seems that this is part of your concept of objectivity. You tell me where I'm mistaken.

Also, I should point out that you are leaning on consensus to a degree which I never have (hypothetical consensus among rational beings is rather different than real consensus among actual humans), and so it seems that you are treading closer to the scylla of intersubjectivity.

I think I have not claimed this. Perhaps my Spainenglish… I think propositions are the meaning of sentences that can be true or false. (In a logical sense there is a difference).
(Underlined added).(To be continued).





This is your opinion. Many people think that we prefer truth to falsehood because it is more useful or advantageous (in many different senses).

We believe what is true partly because of advantage. But we also intrinsically prefer it.

Suppose you had a belief about the 10^100th digit of pi. Would you be indifferent as to whether the belief were true or false?

But if the advantages of falsehood can be stronger than truth and make it preferable, then the truth is a smaller value than advantages and cannot be considered intrinsic.

The highlighted bit is a non-sequitur. Perhaps you do not understand the meaning of "intrinsic". It does not mean "outweighing all other considerations".

Have you an objective or rational argument against this opinion?

I reckon I have given it above.

We are incapable of believing that which we reckon is false.

Among those things which are uncertain, but which produce no advantage for truth or falsity, we prefer to believe that which is true.

Our respect for reason is due to its utility in distinguishing truth from falsity, not for distinguishing that which is pleasant to believe from that which is not.

Rationality consists in the capacity to reason and all rational beings value this capacity. Thus, all rational beings value truth over falsity, ceteris parabus.

 

[David Mo]

So, you plan to salvage your notion of objectivity by claiming that truth is relative? I should be interested to learn what you mean by that, since the usual interpretation of "truth is relative" is dispiritingly close to "everything is subjective".

You were not quite as explicit as I'd like. Do you agree with both of the following sentences?

(1) The theory of Newtonian physics was objective in 1850.
(2) The theory of Newtonian physics was not objective in 1950.

Thanks.

It just seems to me that introducing relativity into the concept of objectivity is rather to give up objectivity altogether. "Real" objectivity is evidently subjective. And, since your definition of "absolute" objectivity is synonymous with truth, and you've just said that truth is relative, it appears that "absolute" objectivity is also relative -- which is a funny use of both "objectivity" and "absolute".

Newtonian theory was and is objective/truth relatively with the facts/objects known in 1850. As long as I know the law of gravity continues too be true for (and applied to) these objects.
You’re welcome.


Absolute Objectivity is more or less synonym of Absolute Truth. Only metaphysics claims to achieve the Absolute Truth or the object in itself. Kant showed this is impossible. This is beyond the capacity of human mind. So we have to resign ourselves with what is possible and relative to the state of our present knowledge.

But there is a little nuance, a small difference between truth and objectivity. We can be objective even when we are in a mistake if we are able to push aside the subjective influences of the tradition, irrationality, desires, emotions, etc. This relative objectivity, even when someone is in a mistake, is preferable to irrational subjectivity because it will allow us to see our mistake more easily than if we are influenced by emotions, irrational beliefs or traditional authorities.
But moral theories don’t usually distinguish this nuance because no moral object exists, that is to say a perceivable good. So it comes the confusion between objectivity and truth. And the realist mirage of an eternal and absolute moral truth.

I think we have a problem with “object”. When I am speaking of “object” I am not meaning a thing-in-itself, this is to say the famous noumenon, but the thing as known (phenomenon). The difference is important. The noumenon is immutable. The phenomenon changes with the changes of theories and technics of perception. So, our knowledge of the reality is approximate.

ADDENDA: I think I made a distinction between real and absolute objectivity that was not clear. My mistake. It will be better if we differentiate between partial and absolute objectivity and relative and absolute truth.

 

[David Mo]

I reckon I have given it above.

We are incapable of believing that which we reckon is false.

Among those things which are uncertain, but which produce no advantage for truth or falsity, we prefer to believe that which is true.

Our respect for reason is due to its utility in distinguishing truth from falsity, not for distinguishing that which is pleasant to believe from that which is not.

Rationality consists in the capacity to reason and all rational beings value this capacity. Thus, all rational beings value truth over falsity, ceteris parabus.

This is not an argument. You have artificially changed "advantages" for "utility". (Advantage needn't to be "pleasure"). So you are utiliitarian. Truth is valid for utility and this is the main principle. This explains the case of a person that needs the falsehood because the truth is not useful for him.

 

[phiwum]

This is not an argument. You have artificially changed "advantages" for "utility". (Advantage needn't to be "pleasure"). So you are utiliitarian. Truth is valid for utility and this is the main principle. This explains the case of a person that needs the falsehood because the truth is not useful for him.

No, you have misread. When I wrote "utility" above, I meant it synonymously with "efficacy". It has nothing to do with hedonism.

As well, I was referring to the utility (i.e., efficacy) of rationality, not of truth, so it's a different statement entirely.

Here's what I wrote.

Our respect for reason is due to its utility [i.e., efficacy] in distinguishing truth from falsity, not for distinguishing that which is pleasant to believe from that which is not.​

I think that's pretty damned clear, aside from the fact that utility can be misunderstood (even then, in context, it's clear what utility meant and it has nothing to do with pleasure).


In any case, it matters not one whit whether a man "needs" to (knowingly) believe a falsehood, because he cannot believe what he knows to be false. To believe something is to believe it is true. Of course, we do believe some false things, but only because we mistakenly judge them to be true.

 

[David Mo]

As well, I was referring to the utility (i.e., efficacy) of rationality, not of truth, so it's a different statement entirely.

You are right. I have misunderstood your sentence.

In any case, it matters not one whit whether a man "needs" to (knowingly) believe a falsehood, because he cannot believe what he knows to be false. To believe something is to believe it is true. Of course, we do believe some false things, but only because we mistakenly judge them to be true.

But you have not explained yet why the truth is an intrinsic value.

(1) The link between truth and subjective certainty (belief) doesn’t imply that truth is preferable to falsehood. This is a fact, not a value.
(2) That some people prefer falsehood to truth is related to a value (preference).
(3) If you cannot prove that these people are irrational we have a rational reason stronger that truth: what you have called in some comments “advantages”.

You have not proved the intrinsic value of truth. I think we prefer truth to falsehood because knowing the truth in usual conditions has been an “advantage” in many senses (power, rights, personal relations…). In almost all occasions the knowledge of truth is useful. So, we have got a positive emotion towards truth. And we say that truth is valuable for us.

In any case, truth is not a moral value in itself. The moral refers to the relations with other people. But I think the process of forming moral values is almost ever similar to valuing the truth. We obtain some satisfactory answer in our personal relations and, then, we call "moral" to the advantages that are congruent with our empathic emotions.

So, there is not any moral object that can be manipulated, predicted or communicated as the natural sciences have. This is the case of empirical knowledge, but not in moral. In moral we have a common learning and basic emotions. Nothing "objective".

In some cases our empathic emotion is stronger that the learned a-moral norms. We call this “moral conscience”. In these cases a subsidiary emotion arises. We call it guilt or shame.

 

[phiwum]

You are right. I have misunderstood your sentence.



But you have not explained yet why the truth is an intrinsic value.

(1) The link between truth and subjective certainty (belief) doesn’t imply that truth is preferable to falsehood. This is a fact, not a value.
(2) That some people prefer falsehood to truth is related to a value (preference).
(3) If you cannot prove that these people are irrational we have a rational reason stronger that truth: what you have called in some comments “advantages”.

Statement (3) is irrelevant, since it merely supposes that sometimes extrinsic value outweighs intrinsic value.

Statement (2) is false, generally speaking. It is true (for reasons of extrinsic value) that some persons claim to prefer to believe particular falsehoods over the truth, but I think no rational person has ever preferred falsity over truth generally speaking, or been indifferent to whether he believes one or the other.

And, of course, as I have said, such "preference" for a belief you know is false is mere wishful thinking, since we cannot literally believe that which we recognize as false. I don't think that such wishful thinking should be taken as a deep insight into the relative value of truth and falsity.

The fact is that reason (in the theoretical realm) is aimed at attaining truth. This is its purpose and its virtue. Hence, it is literally irrational to say, "I have no preference for truth over falsity, generally speaking. I only prefer truth when there are advantages to believing truth."

Perhaps you are unpersuaded. There is not much more I can say, I suppose, and I don't care to continue in these same circles if we can avoid it.

You have not proved the intrinsic value of truth. I think we prefer truth to falsehood because knowing the truth in usual conditions has been an “advantage” in many senses (power, rights, personal relations…). In almost all occasions the knowledge of truth is useful. So, we have got a positive emotion towards truth. And we say that truth is valuable for us.

In any case, truth is not a moral value in itself. The moral refers to the relations with other people. But I think the process of forming moral values is almost ever similar to valuing the truth. We obtain some satisfactory answer in our personal relations and, then, we call "moral" to the advantages that are congruent with our empathic emotions.

Could be, but you have not, of course, proved this.

So, there is not any moral object that can be manipulated, predicted or communicated as the natural sciences have. This is the case of empirical knowledge, but not in moral. In moral we have a common learning and basic emotions. Nothing "objective".

Yes, that would follow, had you shown that there is nothing which is objectively valued. But this has merely been asserted, not shown.

We both agree that I have not shown the existence of objective moral norms. That does not give you license to proclaim that there are none.

In some cases our empathic emotion is stronger that the learned a-moral norms. We call this “moral conscience”. In these cases a subsidiary emotion arises. We call it guilt or shame.

You may be right, but you have not shown that you are correct. This is not, of course, surprising. I regard moral realism as an open question. You, instead, pretend that unless the realist has proved his position, then moral realism is false. It seems a blatant appeal to ignorance.

In any case, we are going in circles at this point and I think it's time to end the discussion. It was a thought-provoking discussion, but for the times that we each became a bit repetitive. Take care.

 

[David Mo]

Statement (3) is irrelevant, since it merely supposes that sometimes extrinsic value outweighs intrinsic value.

I don’t suppose; it is stronger in some cases. You have recognised this in a previous comment.

Statement (2) is false, generally speaking. It is true (for reasons of extrinsic value) that some persons claim to prefer to believe particular falsehoods over the truth, but I think no rational person has ever preferred falsity over truth generally speaking, or been indifferent to whether he believes one or the other.

You are recognizing that (2) is true. Whether intrinsic or extrinsic is an irrelevant matter. Some people prefer falsehood to truth.
And you have not given any reason to consider the truth an intrinsic value (or motivation) .

And, of course, as I have said, such "preference" for a belief you know is false is mere wishful thinking, since we cannot literally believe that which we recognize as false. I don't think that such wishful thinking should be taken as a deep insight into the relative value of truth and falsity.

Wishful thinking? You have recognised before that Dostoevski and others are not irrational. Wishful thinking is another form of speak of falsehood. The problem remains unchanged.

The fact is that reason (in the theoretical realm) is aimed at attaining truth. This is its purpose and its virtue. Hence, it is literally irrational to say, "I have no preference for truth over falsity, generally speaking. I only prefer truth when there are advantages to believing truth."

If irrational or irrational this is the position of many people in particular circumstances. And no argument can persuade them, because moral principles are not rational. I consider that if someone considers that he gets more advantages from falsehood than truth and can show this advantages his behaviour is not irrational. May be immoral, but this is another question.

In any case, we are going in circles at this point and I think it's time to end the discussion. It was a thought-provoking discussion, but for the times that we each became a bit repetitive. Take care.

I agree. Very nice to have met you.

 

[David Mo]

Summary of the conclusions.

I think it is useful to do a summary of main points of disagreement in this . This is my summary:

1. You: Truth is an intrinsic value. Intrinsic: valid in itself.
I: Truth is a motivation. It is not intrinsic. (See primary motivations).

2. You: Moral values might be objective. Objective: Universally accepted in a similar way of truth.
I: Moral values are subjective. Subjective: Dependent on cultural learning, emotions and subjective wishes.

2a. You: The fact that no positive proof of the intrinsic moral value had been presented doesn’t mean that this proof can be presented in the future. (Ad ignorantiam fallacy).
I: The fact that the exam of relevant demonstrations has showed that they are false or inconclusive is evidence against the claim of moral objective principles.( Against metaphysical and pseudoscientific entities. See Hume’s guillotine also).

 

[phiwum]

I think it is useful to do a summary of main points of disagreement in this . This is my summary:

1. You: Truth is an intrinsic value. Intrinsic: valid in itself.
I: Truth is a motivation. It is not intrinsic. (See primary motivations).

2. You: Moral values might be objective. Objective: Universally accepted in a similar way of truth.
I: Moral values are subjective. Subjective: Dependent on cultural learning, emotions and subjective wishes.

2a. You: The fact that no positive proof of the intrinsic moral value had been presented doesn’t mean that this proof can be presented in the future. (Ad ignorantiam fallacy).
I: The fact that the exam of relevant demonstrations has showed that they are false or inconclusive is evidence against the claim of moral objective principles.( Against metaphysical and pseudoscientific entities. See Hume’s guillotine also).

My take would go something like this. I will speak only for myself. I think that, frankly, your "rebuttal" in 2a did enough to help my cause (it really is just an appeal to ignorance, with no special circumstances suggesting otherwise).

It is the nature of rationality to pursue truth over falsity, generally speaking. This, then, is an objective norm. That such objective norms are possible is an interesting and "deep" fact and though it is insufficient to show that there are objective moral norms, it does counter a common argument: that norms are inherently subjective.

That's more or less what I've intended to show and I think I've done a passable job, though obviously I failed to convince you.